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 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The recognition of Turkey’s candidacy for European Union (EU) membership at Helsinki 
European Council Summit in December 1999 marked a profound shift in EU-Turkey 
relations, which has been difficult and turbulent for decades. Turkey started undergoing a 
drastic transformation after the Helsinki Summit and was successful in clinching a date from 
the EU in October 2004 to launch accession talks. In between these two dates the two 
consecutive governments issued a series of new legislations in order to comply with EU 
conditionality, particularly with political criteria also known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ and 
finally started membership negotiations in October 2005.  
 
This study aims to investigate and analyse the impact of the EU on policy-making processes 
in Turkey between 1999 and 2005 by focusing on a specific policy area: broadcasting. At the 
simplest level, it is motivated by an academic interest in the complexity of Turkey’s ever-
lasting association with Europe and seeks to explore the dynamics of the post-Helsinki 
candidacy process by employing various theoretical tools offered by research on 
Europeanisation. Thus, although it questions the whole rationale of the pre-accession 
process in Turkey, it looks into the domestic arena of broadcasting policy-making to explore 
how ‘EU accession conditionality’ is translated into domestic policy responses.  
 
It concludes that Turkey’s response to EU conditionality was not unified across different 
issues of broadcasting policy. Its response to ‘democratic conditionality’ was directly 
influenced by prevailing ideas about ‘the credibility of the EU’ as well as calculations of the 
‘costs of compliance’, and its response to ‘acquis conditionality’ resulted in a regulatory chaos. 
Overall, this research reveals that where broadcasting policy-making is concerned, changes 
as a result of the EU’s impact on Turkey were limited. Rather than transformation, the 
outcome of this process was a minimal degree of adaptation. 
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Chapter 1: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 The Background and the Subject of the Research 
 
 
Turkey’s association with the European Union (EU)1 dates back to 1959, when Turkey applied 
for ‘associate membership’ to the then European Economic Community (EEC). After forty-
five years of a very complex and often very controversial engagement, Turkey is now an 
official ‘candidate’ country to the EU and is in the process of accession talks. Its candidacy 
status was first recognised at the European Council Helsinki Summit in December 1999 and 
at the end of five years of a long political reform process, during which numerous new laws 
were adopted and the existing ones were amended in the country, EU leaders made a 
historical decision in December 2004 and announced the launch of accession talks. Turkey 
started membership talks with the EU in October 2005. This study looks into this six year 
long period – from the recognition of Turkey’s candidacy to the start of accession talks – by 
focusing on a particular policy area: broadcasting. 
 
The ‘widening’ and the ‘deepening’ of Europe as a consequence of the ongoing 
institutionalisation processes of the EU continues to attract a wide range of academic interest. 
These processes, which are thoroughly discussed in this study, primarily manifest themselves 
in the context of EU enlargement. From a historical point of view, the EU is one of the most 
fascinating transnational projects in Europe emerged in the aftermath of the Second World 
War and the dynamic character of European integration makes the EU a very intriguing object 
of research. In this respect, this study is firstly motivated by an academic interest in 
understanding how the EU matters for its members and the candidate states. The burgeoning 
literature on ‘Europeanisation’, which this study also situates itself in, very persuasively argues 
that EU influence on a domestic context is dynamic and multifaceted. This complexity comes 
from the fact that the EU has both supra-national and intergovernmental aspects and its 
influences vary across policy areas as well as the domestic context it targets. Therefore, the 
                                                 
1 The EU in this study is used as a blanket term which covers the European Community (EC) and its member 
states as well as the key institutions of the EC: the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament, the 
European Court of Justice.  
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question of how the EU matters might sound very straightforward, but any research that is 
built on this question has to relate two diverse levels of politics and policy-making to one 
another. Then again, where Turkey is concerned, the significance of this question is 
indisputable. Turkey’s membership prospect has moved many stones from their places both in 
Turkey and the EU. Although the future scenario on whether Turkey will join the Union one 
day is still very unclear, the interaction between Turkey and the EU, without doubt, will have 
greater implications for both parties than one might anticipate today. Therefore, considering 
the importance of the start of the membership talks, there could not be any better time to ask 
broader questions on the nature of the relationship between the EU and Turkey.  
 
Although it seems unrelated at first, another academic endeavour that motivated this study 
was to look into broadcasting as a policy issue from a different perspective. ‘Globalisation’ has 
gained a wide currency in media policy scholarship since the 1980s and has been identified as 
an overarching imperative to explain/analyse the shifts in approaches to broadcasting policy in 
different parts of the world. My scepticism towards the ways in which various phenomena – 
be it related to the movement of the capital or the changing role of the state – are analysed 
from a single perspective made me return to the studies on policy-making itself rather than 
taking globalisation for granted, both as a phenomenon and a theory. However, this does not 
mean to suggest that globalisation is an irrelevant concept where the scope of this study is 
concerned. On the contrary, globalisation is recognised as an important factor to consider in 
understanding the institutionalisation practices of the EU as well as the responses of its 
member and candidate states to these practices. Yet, globalisation is not regarded as an 
independent variable in this study. On the other hand, ‘Europeanisation as a phenomenon’ is 
also worthy of empirical investigation and ‘Europeanisation as a theory’ helps to formulate 
better questions rather than finding better answers. The subject matter of this research 
requires a through understanding of both phenomena, but its theoretical tools are 
accumulated from research on Europeanisation.  
 
Turkey’s EU membership prospect, which became a political project by the end of 1999, 
offered a great cause to relate the above mentioned academic interests in one study. 
Broadcasting has been one the first policy areas that was subject to EU influence in Turkey in 
the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit in 1999. This influence had two components. As widely 
known, the EU links membership to the fulfilment of two types of ‘conditionality’ by the 
candidate countries. The first type of EU conditionality is broadly called ‘democratic 
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conditionality’ and refers to the criteria established in 1993 at the European Council 
Copenhagen Summit. According to democratic conditionality, candidate states are required to 
accomplish “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities” (EC, 1993) to join the EU. The second type of 
conditionality is identified as “acquis conditionality” by Schimmelfenning and Sedelminer 
(2004: 663) and refers to the whole body of EU core legislation known as the acquis 
communitaire with which candidate states are required to comply in their domestic policy 
frameworks. It was due to the democratic conditionality that broadcasting in Turkey was 
subject to the EU influence shortly after being granted candidacy status in December 1999. 
From the very beginning, the ‘Kurdish question’ in Turkey, especially in the south-east, has 
been a great concern for the EU. The European Commission, as early as 1998, cautioned 
Turkey to produce a solution to the problem and suggested that ensuring effective legislation 
that would allow all Turkish citizens to enjoy ‘cultural rights’ irrespective of their ethnic origin 
would be an important step. This meant that Turkey had to change its policy on the language 
of broadcasts to allow broadcasts in languages other than Turkish, particularly in Kurdish. On 
the other hand, where the ‘acquis conditionality’ is concerned, the European Commission 
started to pin down the ‘misfits’ in broadcasting regulation in Turkey from 2000 onwards, 
following the publication of its first fully-fledged Progress Report on Turkey. Major 
discrepancies between the EU and Turkey were identified in the areas of: i) definitions; ii) 
jurisdiction; iii) freedom of reception; iv) alignment with the Television Without Frontiers 
Directive; v) independence of the regulatory authority; vi) limits on foreign capital, and finally 
vii) the independence of the public broadcaster.  
 
This is therefore a policy-oriented study that focuses on the ways in which various policies as 
well as non-policies on broadcasting policy emerged in Turkey in the context of Turkey-EU 
relations, from 1999 to the end of 2005. It seeks to explore how the above mentioned 
conditions of accession asserted by the EU were translated into the processes of policy-
making as well as implementation. By situating the analysis around the questions on 
Europeanisation, this study aims to offer analytical insights into the ‘time’ (the making of the 
decisions), ‘timing’ (the order of decisions), and tempo (the speed) of the process (Radaelli, 
2003: 48). In this respect, although it questions both the processes of European integration 
and approaches to Europeanisation in Turkey, it does not offer any novel analysis on issues 
such as why the EU wants to pursue its enlargement to include Turkey or why Turkey has 
persisted in its desire to join the EU for decades. These are regarded as ontological inquiries 
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on the ‘nature’ of the EU both in relation to the institutions involved in the process as well as 
the countries associated with it either as member or candidate states. Therefore, some widely-
acclaimed scholarly perspectives on the ‘why’ questions of Turkey-EU relations are presented 
here simply for contextualising the key historical shifts that preceded the conclusion of the 
1999 Helsinki Summit. The originality of this study lies in its approach in analysing the 
question of what happened after the decision was taken in 1999, with particular reference to 
policy-making in broadcasting.  
 
1.2 The Problematic and the Key Research Questions 
 
The main objective of this research is to analyse the complex interaction between Turkey and 
the EU on the issues of broadcasting policy. It foremost seeks to explore what ‘interaction’ 
might entail in regard to two different levels of politics and policy-making: European and 
domestic. Once this abstract notion of ‘interaction’ is put into an analytical context, the scope 
and the limits of it can then be empirically analysed. The reason why ‘Europeanisation’ 
emerges as the main problematic within the analytical framework of this research is because, 
in very general terms, Europeanisation is regarded as the main zone of interaction between the 
EU and Turkey. This zone surfaces as a process, which is not only about the ‘transfer’ of 
rules/norms but also about their ‘reception’ in the context of EU conditionality. This is why 
Europeanisation is seen “as a problem, not as a solution” in this research (Radaelli, 2004: 2).  
 
What is put under a lens in this research in relation to Europeanisation is in fact the notion of 
‘change’. As Börzel and Risse (2003: 60) suggest, “the issue is no longer whether Europe 
matters but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, at what pace, and at what point 
of time”. Yet, as Mörth (2003: 160) puts it, “a perspective that focuses on a close interaction 
between the EU level and the domestic level means that the source of change cannot be easily 
determined”. For instance, in the case of the interaction between candidate states and the EU, 
the ‘conditionality factor’ that frames the level of interaction makes us think that change is an 
inevitable consequence of the EU impact due to the asymmetrical relation between the EU 
and the candidate. However, as the literature on Europeanisation suggests and also as the 
analysis presented in this study confirms, there is nothing inevitable about Europeanisation. 
Change itself is also a dynamic analytical category. Therefore, change is not just an outcome of 
the EU impact; it is also where the EU impact begins at a different level. This is why there is a 
particular emphasis in this study to consider the EU impact as ‘differentiated’. The analysis 
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presented here validates that ‘change’ as the outcome of the EU impact is also differentiated in 
the Turkish context.  
 
Then again, any attempt to unfold the correlation between the EU impact and the domestic 
change is an analytical challenge. Where Turkey is concerned, the complexity of its interaction 
with the EU cannot be adequately captured if the ‘EU impact’ is reduced to a unidirectional 
process. It is true that due to the hierarchical and asymmetrical nature of EU conditionality, 
we might assume Europeanisation as a top-down process. However, the actual EU impact is 
context, time and issue based. Therefore, as Goetz (2002: 4) convincingly argues, 
“Europeanization is circular rather than unidirectional, and cyclical rather than one-off”. This 
inevitably requires us to develop a bottom-up reach design, which “starts from actors, 
problems, resources, style, and discourses at the domestic level” to look into “if, when, and 
how the EU provides a change in any of the main components of the system of interaction” 
in the domestic level (Radaelli, 2004: 4) Therefore, the main research questions of this study 
are designed to unpack the multifaceted dynamics of the relation between the EU and Turkey 
by leaning the focus towards the domestic. These questions are as follows:  
 
• How does Europeanisation affect the interests and ideas, actors and institutions 
within Turkey, who/which are involved in broadcasting policy formulation? 
What are the dynamics of the policy process in Turkey, in which broadcasting 
policy has been regarded both as a national concern and also as part of the pre- 
accession strategies to the EU? 
• How is EU conditionality translated and accommodated in different policy issues 
on broadcasting in Turkey? Are there any ‘sheltered’ policy areas in broadcasting 
that remain unaffected by the EU impact?  
• How do the dynamics between different actor constellations within the nation-
specific cultural, economic and political contexts of broadcasting in Turkey 
impinge on the time, timing and the tempo of the policy response to 
Europeanisation?  
• In cases where change is evident, can it be precisely identified as an outcome of 
the EU impact? Are there any other factors that might have influenced the 
outcome? 
• In cases where change is evident, is this change limited to a policy change? Can 
any change be identified in the cognitive, discursive and identity formation aspects 
of policy-making? 
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1.3 Approaches to Policy and Policy-making: Implications on Methodology 
 
Considering that this is a policy-oriented study, it has to identify where its approach to policy 
and policy-making derives from. Some of the key conceptual debates in policy studies were 
instrumental in discovering some specific areas of inquiry that might be relevant in the context 
of this research. 
 
This study acknowledges one of the key assumptions in policy analysis is that policy is very 
difficult to locate and there is always the danger of “becoming embroiled in definitional 
debates” (Ham and Hill, 1993: 4). Therefore, rather than trying to define what policy is, it 
starts off by embracing one of the central approaches to policy in the field and does not use 
the concept synonymously with ‘decision’. As Ham and Hill (1993: 11) rightly points out, 
“policy may sometimes be identifiable in terms of a decision, but very often it involves either 
groups of decisions or what may be seen as little more than an orientation”. Approaching 
policy from this perspective corresponds to Colebatch’s (2002: 23) call to recognise the two 
interrelated dimensions to policy: vertical and horizontal. In its vertical dimension, policy is 
seen as a “rule” and the emphasis is on “instrumental action, rational choice and the force of 
legitimate authority” (ibid.). On the other hand, in horizontal dimension policy is seen as “the 
restructuring of action” which “recognizes that policy work take place across organisational 
boundaries as well as within them, and consists in the structure of understandings and 
commitments among participants in different organisations as well as the hierarchical 
transmissions of authorized decisions within any one organization” (ibid.).  
 
This horizontal dimension of policy is particularly important as it allows us to challenge the 
mainstream ‘sequential’ understanding of policy-making. As John (1998: 25) precisely puts it, 
“[i]n no way does the policy process correspond to the linear model except in the minimal 
sense that a formal policy has to be proposed, legislated on and implemented”. On the 
contrary, “[p]olicy will often continue to evolve within what is conventionally described as the 
implementation phase rather than the policy-making phase of the policy process” (Ham and 
Hill, 1993: 12). Therefore, once we recognise the complexities built into the policy-making 
process, it then becomes easier to reflect upon two important issues in policy-making: 
‘nondecision-making’ or ‘inaction’ (Heclo, 1972) and ‘implementation’ (Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1972). 
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Nondecision-making is integral to the policy processes since “much political activity is 
concerned with maintaining the status quo and resisting challenges to the existing allocation of 
values” (Ham and Hill, 1993: 12). However, nondecision-making is also a very broad category 
and we should be able to identify the difference between the deliberate choices of policy-
makers not to generate any policy on certain issues and issues that do not even succeed to 
penetrate into the policy agenda. Specifically on the latter, Bachrach and Barratz (1970) argue 
that: 
 
[N]ondecision-making is a means why which demands for change in the existing 
allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before 
they are even voiced; or kept covered: or killed before they gain access to the 
relevant decision-making arena; or failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in 
the decision-implementing process (Bachrach and Barratz, 1970: 44). 
 
Nondecision-making in the sense described above is very difficult to investigate and requires a 
different research design that incorporates a multitheoretic framework to understand the 
dynamics of human agency operating in and interacting with the structures in and out of the 
machinery of the state and the socio-economic matrix that it is situated in. From this 
perspective nondecision-making is a process. On the other hand, where the scope of this 
study is concerned, nondecision-making is considered as an ‘action’ within the policy-process. 
To put it differently, non-action itself is regarded as a policy. This is particularly important in 
the Turkish context, since where approaches to broadcasting policy are considered, non-policy 
emerges as a deliberate policy in Turkey (Kejanlioglu, 2004). This is why we need to look into 
the question of implementation from a different perspective.  
 
From a rationalist perspective, implementation is regarded as the accomplishment of “the 
desired objective” as intended by policy-makers (Colebatch, 2002: 52). However, as John 
(1998: 29) points out, what makes the classic view on implementation problematic is the 
assumption that policy emerges in a sequential top-down order, whereas in real life “[i]t is not 
often possible to specify a clear relationship between policy intentions and outcomes” and 
“decision-makers continually reconsider policy problems and their solutions over long time 
periods”. Therefore, as Ham and Hill (1993: 102) suggest, “[t]he examination of the 
implementation process must be concerned with the nature of policy, the inter- and intra-
organisational context within which it is implemented and the external world on which it is 
expected to impact”. In this view, the emphasis is on interaction among different policy actors 
involved in the process. This corresponds to Colebatch’s (2002: 53) account on how 
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implementation is seen in the horizontal dimension of policy: “an exercise in collective 
negotiation”.  
 
The top-down bias has been challenged by ‘incrementalism’ which “views policy-making as a 
continuous, exploratory process; lacking overriding goals and clear-cut ends, policy-makers 
tend to operate within the existing pattern or framework, adjusting their position in the light 
of feedback in the form of information about the impact of earlier decisions” (Heywood, 
2000: 32). This incrementalist challenge has been important as it shifted the focus from the 
government’s actions to the participation of lower levels of government, bureaucrats and 
interest groups. However, as John (1998: 30) notes, developing a separate research agenda for 
analysing implementation did not turn out to be fruitful as the view on the need to consider 
the policy-process as a whole – from policy formulation to implementation – became 
prevalent in policy analysis. This is the view that is also supported in this study. 
 
1.4 Towards a Theoretical Framework: An Orchestration of Approaches to the Policy 
Process 
 
Although looking into the policy process in its entirety is crucial, finding a theoretical 
approach that can be applied to the analysis of all possible areas of inquiry under one 
framework is very difficult. Where the scope of this research is concerned, there is an 
additional complexity since Turkey is chosen as the political context and broadcasting as the 
policy area as the objects of analysis. The theoretical debates mentioned here are all derived 
from a need to understand how politics operate in West European as well as North American 
contexts. The shared experiences of the development of industrial, capitalist and liberal 
democracies in these political contexts resulted in the emergence of similar political problems 
and similar ways of looking at these problems. This does not mean that these theoretical 
perspectives are not applicable to Turkey. On the contrary, there is a particular need to look 
into politics and policy-making in Turkey through these perspectives. However, where Turkey 
is concerned, it is necessary to explain the political context more in-depth and in its own 
historicity. This requires embracing a multiplicity of approaches rather than rigidly adopting a 
single way of explanation. Additionally, as noted, it is not only the country but also the 
selected policy area requires a comprehensive analytical perspective since issues on 
broadcasting cut across different policy areas. Therefore, the preferred approach to theory in 
this study corresponds to how historical institutionalists in political science and constructivists 
  
9 
9 
in international relations approach to theory. According to these schools of thought, “theory 
is about simplifying a complex external reality, but not as a means of modelling it” and this is 
why theory is seen as “a guide to empirical exploration” (Hay, 2002: 46). To put it differently, 
the complexity of the world of events taken into consideration lead the analysis in this study 
since political systems are regarded as open and context specific. This is why the research 
behind this study is not designed to test some selected assumptions on the dynamics of the 
relationship between Turkey and the EU.  
 
Following Scharf’s (2000: 763) distinction between ‘problem oriented’ and ‘interaction 
oriented’ policy research, this study fits in with the latter where the focus is on “the 
interactions between policy makers and of the conditions that favour or impede their ability to 
adopt and implement” certain policies. Therefore, what the term ‘conditions’ imply can only 
be revealed if the ‘institutions’ that affirm those conditions are identified. This is why ‘new 
institutionalism’2 appeared to be one of the main approaches that guided this study. In their 
seminal work on what new institutionalism entails in studying political life, March and Olsen 
(1984: 742) suggest that “[i]nstitutions seem to be neither neutral reflections of exogenous 
environmental forces nor neutral arenas for the performances of individuals driven by 
exogenous preferences and expectations”. Over the years, March and Olsen further developed 
their approach to new institutionalism and in a more recent article they argue that 
“[i]nstitutions are not simply equilibrium contracts among self-seeking, calculating individual 
actors or arenas for contending social forces. They are collections of structures, rules and 
standard operating procedures that have a partly autonomous role in political life” (March and 
Olsen, 2005: 4).  
 
It is true that there is a controversy around the all-encompassing definition of institutions as 
used in new institutionalist approach. John (1998: 64), for instance, criticises the approach on 
                                                 
2 New institutionalism is a response to the ongoing impact of ‘behaviouralism’ in political science since 1970s and 
is also a reaction to the institutional analyses of policy-making that regarded policy-making as a closed system 
(George and Bache, 2001: 20). As Rosamond (2000: 113-14) puts it, “[t]he revival of institutionalism in political 
science, represents an attempt to counter both the behaviouralist emphasis upon political outcomes as the 
product of aggregated societal behaviour and a crude emphasis on political outputs as derivatives of the 
straightforward interplay of actors’ interests”. In a similar vein with the institutionalist perspective, new 
institutionalists emphasised the importance of formal institutions – parliaments, executives, judiciary – in 
determining the policy outcome, but they have also integrated the analyses of informal institutions – policy 
networks, interest groups – in terms of their involvement in the process. However, institutionalist literature 
should not be considered as a single body of research and as Rosamond (2000: 114) argues, “different 
institutionalisms operate with quite different views about the nature of reality and the relationship between 
structure and agency”. These different institutionalisms are: i) rationalist choice; ii) historical; and iii) sociological 
institutionalism. For a variety of perspectives on institutionalist thinking, new institutionalism(s) and the EU, see: 
Pierson (1996), Bulmer (1998), Schneider and Aspinwall (2001), Lowndes (2002), March and Olsen (2005). 
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the basis that it includes “too many aspects of political life under one category”. In a similar 
vein, Lowndes (1996: 182) also recognises ‘institution’ as “a slippery term because it is used to 
refer to social phenomena at different levels”. She proposes some elements that can serve 
what she calls as “a baseline definition”. These elements are: i) “institution is a middle-level (or 
‘meso’) concept which implies that instititutions “are part of the broad social fabric, but also 
the medium through which day-to-day decisions and actions are taken”; ii) “institutions have 
formal and informal aspects” meaning that “they involve formal rules and laws, but also 
informal norms and customs”; ii) “institutions have a legitimacy and show stability over time” 
(ibid., 183). In this view, despite its flaws in its methodological stance, new institutionalism 
proved to be useful in describing why certain things are the way they are in Turkey in the 
context of this study. As it is further analysed, where the formal policy-processes are 
concerned, established parliamentary procedures provided opportunities as well as constraints 
for the policy actors in formulating specific policies on issues of broadcasting. On the other 
hand, the cognitive aspects of institutions that manifest themselves in the forms of ideas, 
norms and interests are also considered as significant in this study since these are all relevant 
in explaining issues such as the role of the army in Turkish politics; the conflict between 
different political parties on how EU conditionality should be handled in the case of 
broadcasting, and how bureaucratic politics operate in Turkey in the context of broadcasting 
policy-making. Then again, as the next chapter highlights, new institutionalism is also 
increasingly becoming a prevalent approach to study the EU impact on domestic politics. 
These studies challenge the critique of new institutionalism for not being effective to explain 
change by looking into mechanisms of change from different variations of new institutionalist 
perspective.  
 
In relation to new institutionalism, approaches to bureaucratic politics were also constructive 
in developing the analysis in this study. As Ham and Hill (1993: 48) suggest, “[t]he debate 
about the nature of the state is a debate about the nature of bureaucracy”. Therefore, any 
research on politics inevitably has to give an account on the role of bureaucracy within that 
political context. In this study, bureaucrats are not seen as actors providing continuity and 
stability to the policy process. In contrast, bureaucracy is regarded as rigid, slow and not 
capable of being able to provide sufficient expertise to policy-makers on issues in their areas. 
In the context of broadcasting policy, this is particularly evident in how the regulatory bodies 
operate. The implementation problem in broadcasting policy in Turkey is partly due to the 
limitations of resources to carry out these policies, but it has also a great deal to do with how 
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administrative bodies that are responsible of implementing these policies perceive themselves 
in their own settings and how they act upon these perceptions.  
 
Then again, all these issues on institutions and bureaucratic politics are related to how we 
coneptualise ‘power’ and the relationship between structure and agency. There is no doubt 
that power is central to political analysis, but what is most difficult is to differentiate “the 
analysis of power from its critique” (Hay, 2002: 185). Considering that this is a policy-oriented 
research, its approach to power is inevitably influenced by the “faces of power” debate in 
political analysis (Heywood, 200: 35). According to this debate, pluralists locate power in the 
‘decision-making process’ and see power as relational and authoritarian, whereas neo-elitists 
include the ‘agenda-setting’ process where informal processes are also significant in 
understanding how policy issues are filtered during the process into the location of power. 
And finally, a Gramscian perspective developed by Lukes (1974) stretches the location of 
power to ‘preference-shaping’ to reveal the difference between the real and perceived 
interests. In this respect, the ‘faces of power’ debate was important in identifying the dynamics 
of power within the context of the policy processes analysed in this research. 
 
And finally, there is the issue of structure and agency. Together with the debate on how to 
identify power in political analysis, the question of how to approach the relationship between 
structure and agency in a political context is very complex. As Hay (2002: 90) puts it, “the 
question of structure and agency is not a ‘problem’ to which there is, or can be, a definitive 
solution”. Yet, as McAnulla (2002: 272) rightly argues, “it is an issue on which we cannot 
avoid adopting a position”. There are mainly two positions to adopt in this debate. We may 
either follow Giddens’ ‘theory of structuration’ and argue that structure and agency are closely 
intermingled or we may dispute this position and regard structure and agency as related but 
separate entities. It is the latter position that is favoured in this study: the ‘strategic-relational’ 
approach developed by Jessop (1990) and Hay (1996). According to this approach, “[t]he key 
relationship […] is not that between structure and agency, but rather the more immediate 
interaction of strategic actors and the strategic context in which they find themselves” (Hay, 
2002: 128). Approaching to structure and agency question from this perspective is also in line 
with the new-intuitionalist emphasis in this research. 
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1.5 Data Collection and Research Design: The Limits and Limitations 
 
Questions about research design in political research somewhat reflect the position of 
mainstream comparative politics, which Hopkin (2002: 266) identifies as “positivist at heart”. 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that conducting a policy-oriented research is a very 
complex process and it hardly corresponds to any of the two ‘ideal’ models of research design: 
linear and wheel (Burnham et al., 2004: 45). The ‘real’ world of politics and policy-making is 
very chaotic and this inevitably limits the quality and the reliability of the data gathered from 
that world to use in the design of a particular research.  
 
The research behind this study relied heavily on documentary sources: parliamentary hearings, 
parliamentary committee reports, parliamentary enquiries, official communications of the 
President, think-tank reports, research reports, party programmes, government programmes, 
state development plans, public announcements, law proposals (drafted by MPs), draft laws 
(prepared by governments), progress reports, EU Directives, European Council conclusions, 
accession partnerships, enlargement strategy papers, judicial rulings, legislations, directives, 
constitutions, annual reports, memoirs, institutional publications, business association reports, 
and finally newspapers.  
 
Despite the range and diversity of the documentary sources used behind this research, there 
might still be a concern over the quality of these sources. Where the traditional classification 
between ‘primary’, ‘secondary’ and ‘tertiary’ sources is concerned (see Burnham et al., 2004: 
165), majority of the sources listed above fall into the category of ‘secondary’ sources. 
Although this mainstream classification has been challenged by political scientists who 
emphasise the importance of official policy documents in policy analysis, a caveat remains. 
This time the distinction is made between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ primary resources, and according to 
this new classification, “the greater the difficulty of manipulating or concealing evidence of 
what really occurred at the time, the more reliable (‘harder’) the source” gets (Moravcsik, 1998: 
82). Therefore, sources such as legal documents, reports, parliamentary records, journalistic 
commentaries are regarded as ‘soft’ sources that are open to ‘distortion’ and ‘speculation’, 
whereas “internal government reports, contemporary records of confidential deliberations 
among key decision-makers, verbatim diary entries, corroborated memoirs by participants who 
appear to lack an ulterior motive for misrepresentation, and lengthy interviews with numerous 
policy makers” are classified as ‘hard’ sources and they are considered as more reliable (ibid.).  
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However, the distinction made between first, secondary and tertiary sources or between soft 
and hard primary sources is problematic. Firstly, as Kejanlioglu (2004: 38) convincingly argues, 
at the analysis stage, since both types of sources are reconstructed through interpretation, 
“there is no need for the fetishisation of documents”. Secondly, where Turkey is concerned, 
reaching ‘hard’ primary sources is easier said than done. The supremacy of ‘oral’ culture over 
the written one is still apparent in Turkey; it is extremely difficult to find written accounts of 
the witnesses or the participants on the events and processes under discussion. Therefore, the 
sources used in this research are not classified on a hierarchical basis; however, the accuracy of 
the data gathered from these sources is checked repeatedly. This was especially important 
where the utilisation of the data gathered from the press coverage of the processes is 
concerned since newspapers used in this study also represent a particular point of view or an 
interest bound to the media group they belong to. The differences between these views and 
interests and how they manifested themselves in the coverage of the same events and issues 
were particularly emphasised throughout the analysis.  
 
A limited number of ‘elite interviews’ were also conducted at an early stage of this research. 
Unfortunately, my experience in elite interviewing confirmed that “it is a technique whose 
exercise benefits from the accumulation of experience” (Burnham et al., 2004: 219). The data I 
gathered from nine interviews that I conducted with officers, regulators and senior broadcast 
executives helped me explore and refine some key areas of inquiry, but as the research 
progressed, new areas emerged that made me reorganise my research concerns. The data I 
gathered from these interviews were significant in supporting the accuracy of certain events or 
the validity of some assumptions on those events, but none provided incisive revelations to 
delve into. Nevertheless, the whole experience was extremely valuable. 
 
There are two main limitations of this research that need clarification at the beginning. The 
first limitation is in fact observed in most of the policy-oriented research: being descriptive. I 
deliberately described the interactions between different policy and non-policy actors in a 
chronological order in certain parts of this study to explain how the process of policy-making 
evolved. My intention was to analyse these processes through the exposure of escalating 
conflicts that result in the emergence of a chaotic political world. But the second limitation is a 
matter of technicality. Considering that the tools and the language of policy-making differ in 
every country, I tried to explain the sources of policy-making procedures either in the text or 
in the footnotes where I deemed necessary. Additionally, I used the official English 
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translations of some of the key legal documents (e.g., the Broadcasting Law, the Constitution, 
and the National Programme), but I translated the excerpts that I used from newspapers, 
commission reports, parliamentary hearings, etc. I tried to preserve the ‘rhetorical tone’ in 
these excerpts, despite the danger of making them sound odd in English. 
 
1.6 The Organisation of the Thesis 
 
The chapters in this study are organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the key theoretical positions in Europeanisation research. Firstly, it 
compares the concept with other rival concepts such as internationalisation and globalisation. 
It then unpacks the concept by looking into the governance and institutionalisation aspects 
and discusses the ways in which change as an outcome of the EU impact is explained in the 
literature. It finally considers the ‘conditionality factor’ that is used to explain the dynamics of 
Europeanisation in the EU candidate countries. 
 
Chapter 3 is a contextual chapter describing the key historical shifts in Turkey-EU relations. 
This chapter explains these shifts in Turkey’s almost half a century long association with 
Europe by revealing how legacies of the past still influence Turkey’s approach to the EU. The 
details on the political context of the period from 1999 to 2005 are explained in this chapter. 
General accounts on how political parties, business circles, the army and the civil society 
organisations consider the EU impact and Europeanisation processes are also presented here.  
 
Chapter 4 is the first analysis chapter, which looks into the impact of EU acquis conditionality 
on broadcasting policy-making in Turkey. The Broadcasting Law enacted in 1994 was not 
amended until 2001 despite its major discrepancies. The chapter offers a brief historical 
overview of the emergence of broadcast media market in Turkey by identifying key historical 
moments and the market’s chacteristics. After this overview, the policy-process behind the 
amendments to the Broadcasting Law No. 3984 which was first adopted in May 2001 and later 
vetoed by the President is examined. Parliament readopted the same amendments Law 
unchanged a year later. The chapter demonstrates how the government tried to attach an EU 
tie to its policy agenda although the motive behind the amendments was not to comply with 
the EU. This package came to parliament as a result of the pressures of the big media groups 
in Turkey and the controversy around the package centred on issues such as the lifting of the 
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restrictions on ownership limits and the proposed new composition for the governing body of 
the regulator. The second and the final policy-process analysed in this chapter is on the 
attempts to open the broadcast media market to foreign investment, which was not initiated 
but promoted by the AKP government from late 2004 onwards. This was also a deregulatory 
policy change that the government wanted to pursue under an EU conditionality cover. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion on Europeanisation in the context of the policy-
processes.  
 
Chapter 5 considers the impact of democratic conditionality on broadcasting policy-making in 
Turkey by examining the policy-process behind the change in the language policy for 
broadcasting. This was actually the only policy change that was made as a direct response to 
the EU pressures. By asserting its influence through the enforcement of democratic 
conditionality, specifically the Copenhagen criterion on “respect for and protection of 
minorities”, the EU required Turkey to lift all the restrictions on the enjoyment of cultural 
rights in Turkey and allow broadcasts in languages other than Turkish, particularly in Kurdish. 
This chapter looks at the policy process behind this change in the language policy for 
broadcasting in Turkey, which was a very long process full of controversies and bickering 
among political and non-political actors. Among different actor constellations, it was the army 
that asserted greater influence on the policy process and the implementation of the policy 
afterwards.  
 
Chapter 6 looks into the conditions of public service broadcasting in Turkey. The analytical 
framework of this chapter is to some extent different than the other two analysis chapters 
since majority of the public service broadcasting related policy issues emerged during the time 
span covered in this research were not associated with Turkey’s relations with the EU. Apart 
from the public broadcaster TRT’s involvement in broadcasts in languages other than Turkish, 
there was not any direct association between policies generated to regulate the TRT and the 
EU agenda. However, where the core of these policy issues is considered, the links between 
the debates in Europe and Turkey can be clearly identified on a different level. Issues such as 
the financing of public service broadcasting, questions on accountability and efficency are also 
relevant in the Turkish context and they need to be further analysed. All of these issues are 
examined in this chapter.  
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Chapter 7 presents the conclusions of this study and offers a final discussion on how and why 
the EU’s impact differed across policy areas in broadcasting in Turkey. 
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Chapter 2: 
 
UNDERSTANDING EUROPEANISATION   
 
 
2.1 Setting the Context: ‘Europe Matters’  
 
The increasing impact of the European Union (EU) institutions and policy processes on 
national policy agendas in Europe and the ways in which this challenge is being contested at 
the national level has been of increasing interest in policy studies in recent years. As 
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeiner (2002: 501) argue, “‘Europe’ has increasingly come to be 
defined in terms of the EU; the ‘Europeanisation’ or the ‘Europeanness’ of individual 
countries has come to be measured by the intensity of institutional relations with the 
Community and by the adaptation of its organizational norms and rules”. Undoubtedly, the 
eastward enlargement process of the EU, which resulted in the inclusion of ten more 
countries to the Community by mid-2004, has played a major role in triggering academic 
interest in analysing the underpinnings of European integration and enlargement processes 
both at the Community and national levels. There are continuing attempts by the disciplines 
of international relations and political science to develop further analytical insights on Europe 
so that its reality can be adequately captured. These considerations have resulted in the 
emergence of a voluminous research focusing on the phenomenon of ‘Europeanisation’ to 
identify various aspects of the policy processes within the European polity. In simple terms, 
the main consensus among scholars researching Europe is that ‘Europe matters’ (see Knill and 
Lehmkuhl, 1999; Radaelli, 2000; Cowles et al., 2001). The real challenge is to discover how it 
matters.  
 
Sjursen (2004: 3) suggests that one way of understanding the order emerging in Europe is to 
look at how “different ideas about what the EU ought to be about” are projected on “the 
processes of determining what should be done with regard to concrete policy-issues and 
areas” within the EU. In this respect, broadcasting is a unique policy area to look at since 
different realities on the EU emerge depending on which aspect of broadcasting policy we 
focus on and how we position the EU vis-à-vis the domestic context that it interacts with. As 
various commentators suggest, broadcasting has always been a controversial area of policy in 
the EU and the dynamics of broadcasting policy in Europe today implies an ‘in-betweeness’ in 
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which broadcasting is still a highly regulated field at the national level but is also gradually 
becoming a sub-field of the diverse communications policy of the EU (see Collins, 1994; 
Hitchens, 1997; Levy, 1999). As Humphreys (2006: 305) argues, the EU constantly coerces the 
member states to adopt a mutual regulatory framework both in the areas of telecoms and 
broadcasting to strengthen the European Single Market vis-à-vis the pressures of globalisation. 
Then again, in most European countries regulators are still facing crucial dilemmas as 
‘industry’ oriented regulatory approaches generate new challenges. Issues such as media 
pluralism and diversity and the future of public service broadcasting are among the most 
important. However, facing similar challenges does not mean that member states have the 
same responses to EU’s involvement in their domestic politics. Although member states 
increasingly pool more of their policy competences to the EU to resolve the drawbacks of 
global pressures on their media markets, broadcasting remains a much politicised policy area 
in the national domain. The zone of interaction between the EU and its member states is 
where various economic, social and political interests conflict or compete with each other 
rather than act in harmony. This is why the EU impact on the domestic regulatory framework 
for cultural, political and economic aspects of broadcasting remains a contested debate.  
 
On the other hand, the rules of the game in this interaction are very different in the context of 
EU enlargement. As the experiences of the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(hereafter CEEs) revealed, it was mainly the ‘conditionality factor’ that moulded the direction 
and the scope of EU influence on broadcasting in these countries. Therefore, in very general 
terms, if EU influence on broadcasting in member states is about developing joint responses 
to commonly shared problems through regulatory harmonisation, this is not the case in the 
context of enlargement. Member states are influenced by the EU, but they also influence it as 
they are actively engaged in institution-building processes by providing input. However, for 
candidate states that aspire for membership, EU influence on broadcasting is predetermined 
by the asymmetric relation with the EU.  
 
In this respect, this chapter seeks to unpack the literature on Europeanisation focusing on a 
very straight-forward question: ‘How does Europe matter in the national contexts?’. The first 
part focuses on rival concepts such as ‘internationalisation’ and ‘globalisation’ to discuss why 
research on Europeanisation serves as a better theoretical ground in developing policy 
research on Europe. In the following part, different theoretical approaches offering various 
ways of analysing Europeanisation are discussed by looking into the EU impact on member 
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states. Finally, in the last part, the experiences of accession countries and the applicant states 
are considered in relation to what Europeanisation implies in the context of EU enlargement.  
 
2.2 Research on Europe: Puzzling with the Concepts 
 
The ways in which the EU and its member states operate challenge traditional ways of seeing 
‘international’ and ‘domestic’ politics as different spheres requiring different theoretical 
approaches of analysis as the lines between these two categories are less clear cut. In very 
simple terms, in contemporary Europe, the policy issues which were formerly regarded as 
national and domestic are increasingly being considered at the European level and this results 
in the ‘Europeanisation’ of individual national agendas. However, this is not solely a top-down 
process; member states themselves are active in every level of institutionalisation within 
European polity. This emerging polity and related Europeanisation processes influence policy-
making dynamics not only in the member states but also in the applicant states in various 
ways. 
 
Analysing the EU impact on a particular national context is indeed a very difficult task since 
even simple policy routines within the EU requires sophisticated theorising. As suggested 
earlier, the complexity of the EU mainly comes from the fact that it has both ‘supra-national’ 
and ‘intergovernmental’ aspects which are managed in different ways in various policy debates. 
This is one of the main reasons why there is an increasing tendency to conceptualise the EU 
as an ‘arena’ rather than an ‘actor’ in recent policy studies (see Goetz, 2002). As Laffan (1998: 
241) argues, “we need to abandon the notion that the EU is something, and consider it as 
always becoming […] The Union is crafted onto existing forms of political order but in turn 
contributes to the transformation of such forms” (emphasis in original). This also results in 
the diversification of the theoretical approaches of these studies focusing on the dynamics of 
the European polity. 
 
Research on Europeanisation reveals that different countries experience the ‘European 
impact’ in different ways. The ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions regarding the differences between 
various countries shaping the framework for empirical research are far more complicated, but 
very intriguing as well. Did Hungary experience Europeanisation in the same way as Poland 
did? Did the adaptational pressures lead to similar levels of policy convergence among the 
accession countries? Why do countries respond to European policy obligations at a different 
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pace? In which ways will Turkey’s pre-accession process be different? What these questions 
imply are much more focused on the dynamics of change rather than the incentives for 
change. In this respect, although research on Europeanisation greatly benefits from the 
existing theoretical frameworks offered by the mainstream political science literature in terms 
of its intersections with the studies on comparative politics, international relations and 
integration theories, it also indicates a new theoretical orientation within research on Europe. 
This shift can only be fully understood by highlighting how certain key concepts are 
challenged by new theoretical perspectives. As in the case of research on Europe, 
Europeanisation is increasingly becoming the key analytical concept to explain various political 
phenomena, which have been previously identified as ‘internationalisation’ or ‘globalisation’. 
Therefore, although these categories are by no means mutually exclusive, their analytical 
significances within their own research agendas need to be clearly specified.  
 
2.2.1 Internationalisation and Europeanisation   
 
‘Internationalisation’ as one of the central themes used within international relations theory 
does not directly relate to the policy processes in the EU. It is rather a concept that has been 
widely used to denote fundamental changes in intra-state affairs during the twentieth century. 
As Navari (2000: 1-2) argues, “the increasing density of diplomatic encounters”, 
“institutionalisation” of international organisations and “changes in the concept of 
sovereignty” were key appearances of internationalisation especially in the second half of the 
century.3 Obviously, these appearances cannot just be seen as ‘European’ in character, but 
they rather have to be considered within the context of international politics. However, 
paradoxically, European integration is regarded as the most sophisticated form of 
internationalisation taking place since the second half of the last century. As Laffan (1998: 
236) argues, “the process of institution building, law making, policy integration and market 
creation in the EU has produced a European model of internationalization with distinctive 
characteristics”.  
                                                 
3 Of course, the historical context that led to internationalisation of not only states but also the societies cannot 
be captured just in a few lines. Where the causal dynamics behind internationalisation have been concerned, what 
comes to mind first is simply the impact of the two world wars on the nations, especially the consequences of the 
Second World War. However, as Navari (2000: 13) notes, “various causal theories drew on different ‘causal 
orders’ – biological and technological, social and political – and that explanations for each trend mixed elements 
from different causal arenas”. Therefore, what is argued here in this section of the study is just a brief account on 
the general implications of the concept. For more information on various critical perspectives on 
internationalisation, see: Havila et al. (2002), Milward (2003), Goldmann et al. (2000), Goldmann (1994), 
Biancardi (2003), Iriye (2001), Iriye (2004), Long and Schmidt (2005).  
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In its broad sense, internationalisation implies a characteristic shift regarding the 
intensification of the relations between different societies. As Laffan (1998: 235) notes, “the 
international system is characterised by increasing interconnectness and interdependence 
which is driven by capital flows, technology, investment patterns, growing linkages between 
societies and more rapid dissemination of ideas”. Internationalisation from this perspective is 
a process in which not only relations across borders intensify by various means, but also the 
problems they face within become much more familiar to one another. Goldmann (2001: 10-
17) classifies internationalisation according to three dimensions; internationalisation of problems 
refers to a political agenda of a country that is increasingly defined by conditions or events 
outside its borders and is forced upon it by factors and actors beyond its control. 
Internationalisation of societies or societal internationalisation comprises the intensification of all kinds 
of human relations across nation-state borders. Finally, internationalisation of decisions is used to 
refer to two changes in the way political decisions are made: an increase in the degree of 
‘internationality’ of decision-making, and the proliferation of international decision-making to 
new policy areas. According to Goldmann, the increasing practices of “consultation with 
others before national decisions are made, negotiated agreements, decision-making by 
intergovernmental organization and supra-national decision-making” in contemporary world 
politics reinforce the arguments on internationalisation of policy-making (ibid., 16).  
 
As the basic characteristic of European integration is increasingly identified as “integration via 
policy-making” (Richardson, 2001: xvi), the inquiry into the dynamics of internationalisation 
of decisions within EU polity becomes a profound research interest. This way of 
conceptualising European integration requires distinguishing between three levels: “the 
internationalisation of problems on political agendas, of societies for which politics is made, and of 
the making of political decisions” (Goldmann, 2001: 9; emphasis in original). For instance, the issue 
of ‘illegal immigration’ is clearly an international problem – even beyond the borders of 
Europe – but the increase in the percentage of immigrants in the total population of various 
European countries imply the societal dimensions of immigration phenomena above all other 
issues as in the case of debates on ‘multiculturalism’ or ‘diasporas’. Finally, harmonisation of 
immigration policies of various countries mainly refers to a change in the level of policy-
making.  
 
On the other hand, how to study the EU in general and European integration in particular has 
always been a contentious debate within international relations scholarship. ‘Neo-
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functionalism’ as theorised by Ernest Haas (1958), and later developed by Leon Lindberg 
(1963) and Philippe Schmitter (1966) was the main paradigm of integration theory until late 
1960s.4 Neo-functionalism was significant as a ‘pluralist theory’ in contrast with the earlier 
realistic accounts of international politics. It challenged the understanding of state as ‘a single 
unified actor’ and emphasised the importance of non-state actors and interest groups in 
international politics5 (George and Bache, 2001). Neo-functionalism formed a theoretical basis 
for the analysis of the ‘process’ of European integration in which ‘supranational’ actors 
alongside with ‘national political elites’ were given a central role as the driving forces (Cram, 
1996). However, the integration process slowed down in the early 1960s as the European 
Community witnessed two crises that a key member state, France, was responsible for (see 
Rosamond, 2000: 75). Finally, the 1973 oil crisis deeply affected the whole debate on 
integration in Europe.  
 
                                                 
4 Before neo-functionalism there have been other approaches that were influential in understanding European 
integration, but were not fully developed as theory. Among these, the first approach was ‘federalism’, which was 
mainly a political project rather than a theory, developed by the early founders of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). The second approach was ‘funtionalism’ and developed by David Mitrany (1933), who 
argued that ‘function’ should determine the ‘form’ and a territorial closure. For more on these approaches, see: 
Burgess (2003), and Rosamond (2000).  
5 From late 1950s to early 1960s ‘spillover’ was the key concept of neo-funtionalist thinking. It was first 
formulated by Ernst Haas and further developed by Leon Lindberg to explain the underpinning logic of regional 
integration. Lindberg (1963) defined spillover as “a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, 
creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a 
further condition and a need for more action, and so forth” (as quoted in George and Bache, 2001: 10). Spillover 
thesis was first used, particularly by Haas, to suggest that economic integration in one sector will automatically 
generate integration in other sectors which will consequently increase the competence of supranational regulation 
(Rosamond, 2000: 60). There were two types of spillover identified in early neo-functionlist thinking: ‘functional’ 
and ‘political’; ‘cultivated’ spillover was also included in the literature of later studies (George and Bache, 2001). 
Functional spillover, which was also sometimes referred as technical spillover, occurs when co-operation in one 
policy area or sector creates pressure for co-operation in other area as happened in the case of the single 
European market (Jensen, 2003). Political spillover added the dimension of ‘political pressure(s)’ to highlight how 
different actors of different sectors or policy arenas engage/collaborate/advocate for further integration once 
they start benefiting from its consequences as happens in “package dealing” in treaty revisions (Jensen, 2003: 85). 
Finally, cultivated spillover is used to explain how supranational actors, especially the European Commission, set 
an agenda to motivate member states for further integration. In short, as Rosamond (2000: 63) puts it “the 
spillover hypothesis seemed to suggest that integration was a linear, progressive phenomenon; that once started, 
dynamics would be set in place to continue the momentum”. However, shortly after the formulation of the 
spillover reasoning and neo-functionalist theory in general, the momentum of integration in Europe slowed 
down and various crises emerged. Even Haas himself, by mid 1970s, recognised the failure of the spillover 
hypothesis in capturing the reality of European integration and its ignorance in considering the continuing 
importance of the nation states (Jensen, 2003: 89). However, neo-functionalist thinking and spillover hypothesis 
regained popularity by late 1980s and early 1990s with the advent of enlargement and the establishment of the 
single European Act and the creation of the ‘European Union’. Having said that, this time, neo-functional 
thinking was not regarded as a ‘grand theory’ but it was rather used as a reference point to develop further 
theoretical insights to explain the processes of political and economic integration (Jensen, 2003: 90). In this 
respect, the “transaction-based theory of integration” as developed by Stone Sweet and Sandholltz (1998) is a 
milestone as it revises neo-functionalist thinking by contesting the supranationalism vs intergovernmentalism 
debate.  
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Within the context of this backlash, Stanley Hoffman (1964) developed an 
‘intergovernmentalist’ critique of neo-functionalism and his theorising was rather a revival of 
the realist thinking in international relations theory as the key emphasis was on the importance 
of the states (especially the governments) in international politics (Cram, 1996; George and 
Bache, 2001). Although Hoffman recognised the importance of non-governmental actors in 
the process of integration, he argued that integration is primarily an intergovernmental process 
where decisions on ‘high politics’ (security, defence, foreign policy) are considered (George 
and Bache, 2001).6 
 
As the integration process accelerated again throughout the 1990s, the scholarly debate on 
theorising integration developed extensively around supranational vs intergovernmentalist 
approaches as both conceptualisations provided valuable insights. However, integration theory 
is later challenged by scholars of comparative politics and policy analysis who prioritised the 
questions of ‘how’ rather than the questions of ‘why’ in their research agendas. The main 
focus of research on internationalisation in general and on European integration in particular 
has been criticised for focusing extensively on ‘high-politics’ and of ignoring the multifaceted 
dynamics of the EU as a system of governance which interact with the domestic policy 
settings of the member states. As the argument goes, domestic political context has been 
mainly used to explain internationalisation of integration although it should have been the 
object of analysis in the context of European integration. Hix and Goetz (2000: 1-2) account 
for three reasons for the exclusion of research on national politics within research on 
European integration: i) the impact of the division of scholarship within the discipline of 
political science: the political domestic institutions and processes were mainly the research 
interests shared by scholars of comparative politics, whereas international regimes and 
European integration were the subjects of international relations; ii) there has been a 
widespread scepticism among the scholars of comparative politics as they regarded research 
                                                 
6 However, Putnam’s (1988) theorising of “two-level games” which describes various “domestic power-seeking” 
and “international bargaining” interests of the national executives as “taking place simultaneously” has influenced 
further development of intergovermentalist thinking (as cited in Rosamond, 2000: 136). ‘Liberal 
intergovernmental’ analysis of European integration by Moravcsik (1993, 1998) which was drawing on the ‘two-
level game’ approach is important as it regards the emergence of the “rational state behaviour” not as a closed 
process but rather as an outcome of “state-society interaction” (as cited in Rosamond, 2000: 136). Moravscik 
(1994) argued that the European Union institutions have been strategically used by the national governments to 
further exploit domestic opportunities (as cited in Cram, 2001: 64). On the other hand, ‘supranational 
governance’ approach can be seen as a reaction to Moravscik’s consideration of giving a prior status to national 
governments vis-á-vis supranational institutions and on his assertion on the possibility of analysing the EU as a 
“single regime” (George and Bache, 2001: 26). It was Sandholtz and Sweet (1997, 1998) who first voiced this 
challenge first by emphasising the emergence of ‘transnational society’ and the importance of ‘supranational 
politics’.  
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on European integration as a political project that does not provide generalisable knowledge; 
iii) the impact of European integration on domestic policy contexts was not regarded as 
significant enough to observe empirically. However, Rosamond (2000) is sceptic about the 
usefulness of generating knowledge on integration and the EU by encapsulating the analysis in 
one of the pillars of scholarship. As he argues, the dichotomy on ‘international relations’ vs 
‘comparative politics’ “rests on a narrow and largely anachronistic view of international 
relations scholarship in general and international theory in particular” (ibid., 157).7  
 
As Rosamond (2000: 161) suggests, in the core of this scholarly battle lays the question of 
what should be studied in the context of the EU. Not surprisingly, although new research 
agendas may develop, different disciplines provide theoretical insights that were built on their 
conventional methodological stances in their contributions to new inquiries. Early research on 
European integration developed in international relations literature, to a greater extent, is an 
ontological inquiry into the changing nature of the formation of nation-state with a particular 
focus on the reasons and consequences of this change.  
 
If this whole scholarly debate is well-understood, the emergence of Europeanisation as a new 
research agenda can then be fully contextualised. Research on Europeanisation has developed 
within the context of the shift in literature on Europe from ontological inquiry to post-
ontological one (Caporaso, 1996). Put differently, there is an increasing necessity to better 
understand what integration processes imply in relation to particular national contexts and 
their policy-making processes. Research on Europeanisation is shaped predominantly around 
the questions of ‘how’ in relation to the processes and outcomes within the EU. Therefore, 
although conceptualisations of Europeanisation are in a “dialectical relationship with 
European integration” (Howell, 2004: n/p); as Radaelli (2003: 33) puts it, “the post-
ontological focus of Europeanisation brings us to other, more specific, questions, such as the 
role of domestic institutions in the process of adaptation to Europe”. In this respect, 
Europeanisation is regarded as a middle-range theory developing its research agenda on the 
limitations of grand theories of policy studies (Howell, 2004). As Radaelli (2004: 3) argues, 
research on Europeanisation deals with major issues covered in the areas of international 
                                                 
7 Rosamond (2000: 15-16) outlines four different approaches in the literature on the EU and European 
integration and argues that all of them can be developed from various theoretical perspectives. Studies differ on 
the basis of whether they regard the EU as: i) an international organisation; ii) a unique appearance of 
‘regionalism’ in the global political economy; iii) a complex policy system; and iv) a sui generis phenomenon that 
cannot be generalised or used on a comparative basis. Rosamond situates the debate on the dichotomy within the 
scholarship of political science as emerging between the third and fourth approaches.  
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relations, theoretical policy analysis and comparative politics, but its primary theoretical 
incentive is “bringing domestic politics back into our understanding of European integration, 
without assuming that the balance of power between the state and the European institutions is 
being tilted into one direction or another”.  
 
This theoretical positioning is particularly important as it sets a definitional distance between 
Europeanisation and other concepts, mainly ‘convergence’, ‘harmonisation’ and ‘political 
integration’. Radaelli (2000: 6; 2003: 33) argues that convergence as well as divergence can only 
be the consequences of Europeanisation and the change in various domestic contexts may not 
be in ‘harmony’ with one another as research on Europeanisation recognises ‘diversification’ 
as well. Therefore, research on Europeanisation offers new and more dynamic understandings 
on issues of ‘national adaptation to Europe’, ‘policy convergence/divergence’ and finally on 
the relation between the ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ within European integration processes 
(Radaelli, 2003). 
 
2.2.2 Globalisation and Europeanisation   
 
Globalisation as an analytical concept has always been one of the most difficult ones to 
contextualise in a precise framework. There is almost no discipline or a field of research that 
does not have a say on globalisation one way or the other, varying from economics to cultural 
studies. However, the debate on globalisation is so fragmented that as Held and McGrew 
(2003: 2) put it, “multiple conversations coexist (although few real dialogues), which do not 
readily afford a coherent or definitive characterization”. In a similar vein, Scholte (2000) 
argues that: 
 
Yet despite this feverish output of words, we arguably still have far to go in 
consolidating concepts, methods and evidence with which to identify and measure 
globalisation […] ideas of globalisation have readily become so diverse, so broad, 
so changeable – in a word, so elusive – that one can pronounce virtually anything 
on the subject (Scholte, 2000: xiii). 
 
In very simple terms, globalisation refers to “widening, deepening, and speeding up of 
worldwide interconnectedness” (McGrew, 2004: 20). Within the globalisation literature this 
phenomenon of interconnectedness is generally discussed under three broad categories: 
economy, culture and politics. Obviously, these categories are not mutually exclusive, they are 
complementary. Additionally, there are also differences within the ways in which each 
category is taken into consideration. Held and McGrew (2003: 2), for instance, distinguish 
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between the ‘globalists’, “who consider the contemporary globalization is real and significant 
historical development”8 and the ‘sceptics’, “who conceive it as a primarily ideological or 
social construction which has marginal explanatory value”.9 These positions are important for 
identifying what fits in where in the disorderly scholarly production on globalisation.  
 
One of the initial approaches to globalisation relates the phenomena to latest phase of 
capitalism in which transnational corporate activities have made national economies 
increasingly interdependent and integrated with one another (Goldmann, 2001: 18). In this 
approach, globalisation is primarily identified as an economic phenomenon and particular 
emphasis is given to the impact of new technologies of transport, communications and data 
processing and on the organisation of the global economy around ‘post-industrial’, 
‘knowledge-based’ and ‘service-based’ economies (Scholte, 2000: 20).10 However, for 
globalists, a more multidimensional conception, which crosscuts economic, technological, 
cultural and political processes, is needed to capture the complexity of the phenomenon of 
globalisation (Held and McGrew, 2003: 6). 
 
Not surprisingly, in relation to the processes stated above, the debate on ‘cultural 
globalisation’ is the most contentious one. Here, globalisation is used in the sense that not 
only particular cultural products, life styles and consumption patterns become similar across 
the world but also the organisational structures within the societies are somewhat ‘equalized’ 
(Goldmann, 2001: 18). For sceptics, the claim about equalisation or homogenisation mainly 
has negative connotations in which Westernisation in general and Americanisation in 
particular have been regarded as the pivotal dominators in the process, with the praising of 
consumerism, spreading of mass media products and the domination of the English language 
(Scholte, 2000: 23). However, understanding globalisation as a one-way flow prevents 
capturing what differences in experience tell us and as Waters (2001: 186) puts it accurately, “a 
                                                 
8 The concept of ‘globalist’ as used in this context is quite similar to the ways in which it is used in international 
relations theory. As the globalist international relation scholars argue “the external behaviour of the states” can 
only be understood from a historical perspective, by situating the state in the global “big picture” and by 
particularly focusing on “mechanism of domination” and “the development and maintenance of dependency 
relations” (Vioti and Kauppi, 1999: 9).  
9 Elsewhere, McGrew (2004: 20) prefers using the term ‘hyperglobalists’ to globalists and includes a third 
perspective, transformationalist, to differentiate scholars who recognise globalisation as a shift occurring in the 
organistion of states and societies but do not overstate its normative implications. 
10 However, where their understandings of the association between ‘capitalism’ and globalisation is considered, 
some approaches declare the decline if not the death of capitalism by suggesting that this new global economic 
order should be regarded as a new mode of production, whereas some others have not endorsed these claims and 
emphasised the importance of the recognition of the continuation of capitalism within the globalisation processes 
no matter whether there are shifts or not.  
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globalized culture is chaotic rather than orderly – it is integrated and connected so that the 
meanings of its components are ‘relavitized’ to one another but it is not unified or centralised 
or harmonious”. Some scholars such as Appadurai (1990: 296)  argue that globalisation is not 
the homogenisation of cultures but rather is the diversification of cultures in which “the new 
global cultural economy has to be understood as a complex, overlapping, disjunctive order, 
which cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing centre-periphery models”.11  
 
Clearly, these debates are carried out in a very wide-range of scope and they cannot be fully 
captured within short theoretical extracts as outlined here. Moreover, the debate on politics 
and globalisation adds new aspects to the ways in which various dimensions of ‘global 
economy’ and ‘global culture’ are understood. Within the debate on ‘global politics’ what is 
problematised is again the thorny linkage between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’. Put differently, in 
order to attribute a ‘global’ character to politics, an assertion should be made regarding the 
change/transformation that is taking place in the ways in which we know what politics and 
policy-making is all about. This assertion inevitably directs the research agenda to question the 
role of the state. Obviously, these are not novel problematics in social sciences. Yet, what is 
important within the context of this research is to understand how different concepts – 
internationalisation, globalisation and Europeanisation – depart or overlap when they are used 
to explain the same phenomenon.  
 
Central to globalist thinking rests the argument that globalisation is changing the ways in 
which social and political life is organised and this in return results in “the transformation of 
dominant patterns of socio-economic organization, of the territorial principle, and of power” 
(Held and McGrew, 2003: 7). As the argument goes, the ‘sovereign’ state is undermined and 
weakened as it cannot control the economic and cultural interconnectedness, transnational 
corporations become more powerful and governments are obliged to pool their policy 
                                                 
11 In his theorising, Appadurai (1990: 20-3) makes a distinction between what is regarded as the globalisation of 
culture as homogenisation and the usage of ‘instruments of homogenisation’, such as advertising, fashion and 
language. Robertson (1992), in a similar vein, by relating the debate on globalisation to the more sophisticated 
issues stemming from the debates on modernity/post-modernity as well as modernisation/post-modernisation 
also argues that the world becoming more ‘united’ does not necessarily mean that it is more ‘integrated’. The 
question on ‘what are the aspects of modernity that cause globalisation?’ has been a key issue of debate. This 
debate manifests itself also in Giddens’s theorising as he considers globalisation as one of the most visible 
consequences of modernisation. According to Giddens, the development of global network of communication 
and global systems of production and exchange resulted in a “reordering” of the social life, which he refers as 
“time-space distanciation” (1990: 14). However, Giddens’s emphasis on the emergence of global communication 
networks and systems of production has been just one of the explanations. As Scholte (2000: 24) highlights, in 
some other interpretations there were other aspects emphasised, such as the modern capitalist economy, the rise 
of modern rationalist knowledge or the modern bureaucratic state as the causes of globalisation. 
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competences to supranational levels of global policymaking. However, sceptics, although they 
recognise the ‘challenge’, continue to regard the state as the central location of power.12 The 
questions on how to contextualise ‘global politics’ in general and what to understand from the 
shifts in the sovereignty of states in particular mainly derive from different articulations of the 
‘spatial scale’ of globalisation. Within international relations theory, internationalisation or 
even regionalisation is still widely used to distinguish the phenomena from its spatial 
dimension so that states can still be regarded as clearly detached units (McGrew, 2004: 24). 
However, as Scholte (2000: 46) asks: “Yet can all talk of globality be dismissed as fad and 
hype? Are ideas of globalization always reducible to internationalization, liberalization, 
universalization or westernization?” (emphasis in original). As he puts it: 
 
Whereas international relations are interterritorial relations, global relations are 
supraterritorial relations. International relations are cross-border exchanges over 
distance, while global relations are transborder exchanges without distance. Thus 
global economics is different from international economics, global politics is 
different from international politics, and so on. Internationality is embedded in 
territorial space; globality transcends that geography (Scholte, 2000: 49; emphasis 
in original).  
 
Then, of course, in relation to the scope of this research, the key question is: ‘what does the 
whole debate on Europeanisation offer that is different than what has been stated?’ Clearly, 
different understandings of Europeanisation, inevitably, crosscut with the underlying themes 
of the debate on globalisation. Even without knowing anything about Europeanisation, one 
can recognise the underlying territorial dimension embedded in the concept. For instance, the 
conceptualisation of the link between globalisation and Europeanisation as offered by Wallace 
(2000a: 370) is very interesting in a sense that it derives from a historical account of the 
importance of “the management of borders” in Europe. Wallace regards Europeanisation as 
“the development and sustaining of systematic European arrangements to manage cross-
border connections such that a European dimension becomes an embedded feature which 
frames politics and policy within the European states” (ibid.). As she suggests, although 
Europeanisation is not an even process across the continent, it is a particular way of 
                                                 
12 The main problem of the globalist arguments on the ‘weakening of sovereignty of the state’, in fact, stem from 
the non-contextualised and vague usage of the concept of ‘sovereignty’. Krasner (1999: 35) distinguishes at least 
four different types of sovereignty: i) interdependence sovereignty (“the ability of a government to actually control the 
activities within and across its borders”); ii) domestic sovereignty (“organization of authority within a given polity”); 
iii) Westphalian sovereignty (“the exclusion of external authority”); iv) international legal sovereignty (“the recognition of 
one state by the other”). As he rightly points out, “[r]egardless of how sovereignty is understood, it is difficult to 
make a case that contemporary developments, notably globalisation, are transforming the nature of the system. 
There has never been a mythical past in which states were secure in the exercise of either their control or their 
authority […] Globalization has raised some new and unique problems of sovereignty as control, but states have 
confronted comparable challenges in the past.” (ibid.)  
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responding to globalisation and countries that are subjected to various effects of globalisation 
are, in fact, the active agents formulating this response. Therefore, the commonalities between 
European countries in their encounters with globalisation processes resulted in the emergence 
of a particular management and institutionalisation of various resources as in the case of the 
EU.13  
 
However, considering globalisation and Europeanisation as entirely overlapping processes will 
also be analytically misleading. As Rosamond (2000: 183) rightly points out, reducing 
Europeanisation to a coping strategy against the side-effects of globalisation gives the 
misconception that globalisation is an exogenous process that occurs outside Europe or the 
EU and consequently affects the inside. Graziano (2002: 3) suggests that the notions of 
“controlling” and “responding to” globalisation were attached to the articulations of 
Europeanisation within the public policy perspective during the 1990s but “there does not 
seem to be much evidence of a voluntary and acknowledged acceleration of European 
integration as a response to globalisation”.14  
 
Wallace’s framing of Europeanisation as a response to globalisation is actually not a 
simplification of the linkage between the two. Wallace’s main concern can be seen as a 
motivation to further question what makes the EU a distinct/specified form of regional 
integration within the global context when compared to the other instances around the world 
(Wallace, 2000a: 369). Elsewhere, she expresses the same concern by reversing the concepts 
when she notes that “we need to ask if globalization takes a particular form in western 
Europe” (Wallace, 2000b: 48). Her understanding of the complexity relating the two 
phenomena becomes very evident when she suggests: 
                                                 
13 Wallace’s arguments are very rich in metaphors. She considers the concepts of the ‘domestic’, ‘European’ and 
‘global’ as “magnetic fields”, in which “the strongest may vary between the issue areas and between countries, as 
well as over time” (2000: 371). She also uses a second metaphor, which she calls the “Heineken test” by 
referencing a British advertisement for the beer brand in which Heineken is described as “the beer that reaches 
the parts of the body that other beers do not reach”. With this very simple and humorous analogy she argues that 
both of the processes – globalisation and Europeanisation – trigger an adaptive behaviour once they encounter 
with the domestic (ibid., 372). The ways in which this notion of ‘adaptive behaviour’ is theorised within 
Europeanisation research, will be analysed further in-depth in the following sections. 
14 Graziano (2002: 5) links the concepts of globalisation and Europeanisation within a comparative basis, in 
which his dimensions of comparison are derived from a secondary literature. He particularly focuses on various 
differing aspects of policy-making and policy-processes in relation to Europeanisation and globalisation to clarify 
the distinctiveness of each concept in analytical terms. As far as his approach is concerned, globalisation and 
Europeanisation can be compared in three dimensions in terms of: i) market orientation (market making vs 
market correcting); ii) governance (intergovernmental vs multilevel); iii) decision-making (closed vs open). In 
these dual classifications, the former characteristics are assigned to globalisation, whereas the latter ones belong 
to Europeanisation. However, although Graziano’s comparative plot may be used as a starting point, it is not 
adequate to explain why certain policy areas in the EU do not fit in what has been suggested.  
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Here there is something of a chicken and egg debate. Is the EU a reaction to 
globalization, or is it an agent of globalization? Perhaps the important pressures are 
global, and the europeanization of certain policy activities is in essence a response 
to globalization. On the other hand, perhaps the existence of the EU has produced 
a different form of globalization in western Europe from that in other parts of the 
world (ibid., 49).  
 
 
Therefore, as Rosenburg (2003: 93) precisely puts it, the problem with globalisation theory is 
that it “presents itself initially as the explanandum – globalisation as the developing outcome of 
some historical process – is progressively tansformed into the explanans: it is now globalisation 
which explains the changing character of the modern world” (emphasis in original). Therefore, 
in Rosenburg’s terms, what is needed is to distinguish the theory of globalisation from 
globalisation theory.  
 
This caution is also valid for Europeanisation. However, research on Europeanisation has a 
lot to contribute to this debate in its own terms. The critical emphasis on the importance of 
conceptualising Europeanisation as not something that explains, but something to be 
explained has been evident in Europeanisation research since the beginning. Despite the 
differences between various understandings of the concept, the assertions of different studies 
within Europeanisation research are not disconnected. Different understandings of 
Europeanisation actually cover different aspects of the same research interest. 
 
2.3 Unpacking Europeanisation: The Implications of the Concept 
 
There is clear evidence of increasing usage of the concept of Europeanisation in the literature 
on Europe (see Featherstone, 2003: 5). When the contextual meanings of the concept are 
considered, Featherstone (2003: 6-12) illustrates that although Europeanisation is heavily used 
as “adaptation of policies and policy processes” in the literature, it has also been used as a 
“historic phenomenon”, “transnational cultural diffisuion” and as “institutional adaptation”. 
As Radaelli (2000, 2003) notes, although the wide usage of the term reveals the liveliness of 
the debate in the academic milieu, there is the danger of stretching the concept to elusive 
conceptual frameworks in which it lacks a precise meaning, and there are also the risks of 
concept misformation and degreeism.15  
                                                 
15 Building on various works of Sartori (1970, 1984 and 1991) on developing a conceptual analysis, Radaelli 
(2000) emphasises the importance of the difference between ‘intension’ and ‘extension’ in research on 
Europeanisation. According to this categorisation, ‘intension’ represents endogenous properties of the concept, 
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Featherstone (2003: 3) describes Europeanisation in regard to both its maximalist and 
minimalist significance and argues that – like globalisation – it can be a very good starting 
point in understanding the current changes in European politics and societies only if it gains a 
precise meaning. In a maximalist sense, he identifies Europeanisation as a process of structural 
change affecting not only various actors and institutions but also ideas and interests, and 
suggests, “this structural change that it entails must fundamentally be of a phenomenon 
exhibiting similar attributes to those that predominate in, or are closely identified with, 
Europe” (ibid.). On the other hand, in a minimalist sense, Europeanisation is directly related 
to policy-making at the European level and is about the implications of EU policies in the 
national context. Héritier (2001: 1) who considers this implication as transformation suggests 
that “the transformation not only involves policy aspects strictu sensu, such as the general 
problem-solving approach and policy instruments used, but also the administrative structures 
and patterns of interest mediation in which the implementation of these policies is 
embedded.” In this sense, the scope of Europeanisation is not limited to member states 
actively taking part in the processes but it also includes the accession countries and the 
applicant states.  
 
Rather than considering Europeanisation as a “new theory” or an “ad-hoc approach”, Radaelli 
(2004: 2-3) suggests that it “should be seen as a problem, not as a solution” and should be 
conceptualised as “a set of post-ontological puzzles”, a way of “orchestrating existing 
concepts” in political science that enables a shift of focus in relation to theories of integration, 
theories of governance and classic themes in comparative politics, and its potential can be 
better realised if it is regarded as “something to be explained rather than something that 
explains”. He goes on to argue that although it is early to say whether studies on 
Europeanisation will be able to foster a progressive research agenda or not, they are important 
in terms of the insights they brought on three topics: i) they offered a way of understanding 
the domestic impact of international politics; ii) on the relationship between agency and 
change; iii) they contributed to the formulation of research frameworks by linking approaches 
of international governance to the models of domestic politics.16 
                                                                                                                                                    
whilst ‘extension’ refers to the empirical cases that the concept is applicable. Radaelli argues that in the early 
stages of research, as in the case of research on Europeanisation, the importance given to extension rather than 
intension is explicable as the more the concept can be observed empirically the more the research agenda is 
justified. However, as he argues, the danger of ‘degreeism’ that arises “when differences in kind are replaced by 
differences of degrees” will also be the case for research on Europeanisation, if the question of “what is not 
Europeanized?” cannot be answered (Radaelli, 2000: 4).  
16 Clearly, encountering the problem of linking the empirical evidence to the abstraction of theorising is not a 
recent case in political studies. As early as 1960, the pioneering scholar in international relations theory, Stanley 
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Although scholars of Europeanisation view the diversity in approaches to the concept as 
useful in building adequate conceptual frameworks in early stages of an emerging research 
agenda, some others argue that diversification may also result in intellectual segregation in the 
field. For instance, Olsen (2002) regards the research on Europeanisation as a “disorderly 
field” and argues that more academic effort should be invested in understanding the dynamics 
of the contemporary European polity rather than dealing with what Europeanisation “really 
is”. As he notes: 
 
[T]he empirical complexity and conceptual confusion should lead not to despair, 
but to renewed efforts of modelling the dynamics of European change. An 
immediate challenge is to develop partial, middle-range theoretical approaches that 
emphasise domains of application or scope conditions and that are empirically 
testable. A long term challenge is to provide a better understanding of how 
different processes of change interact and make institutions co-evolve through 
mutual adaptation (Olsen, 2002: 923). 
 
The reason why there is still a kind of an on-going reflection on various definitions of 
Europeanisation can be related to the problematic nature of the concepts that it deals with. It 
does not only refer to various institution building practices taking place in the European level, 
but it also suggests the ways in which these practices are tackled in the national level and fed 
back into the process of ‘high politics’ in the European level. Radaelli (2004: 6) distinguishes 
three main conceptual frameworks used in research on Europeanisation each focusing on a 
different aspect of the process. As he suggests, Europeanisation can be seen as “governance”, 
“institutionalisation” and “discourse”. What these approaches say about Europeanisation are 
not in contradiction with one another and they are useful in developing viable links between 
the empirical data and the theoretical arguments. Otherwise, there is the possible danger of 
over estimation: the empirical evidence of change and impact and the possible direction of the 
two (whether it is top-down or bottom-up) may totally be misinterpreted if the ‘cause and 
effect’ links are not well-formulated within the research design on Europeanisation.  
 
2.3.1 Europeanisation as Governance 
 
The European integration literature has long dealt with issues of governance by centralising its 
focus on the changing characteristic of the ‘Westphalian state’ and its normative implications. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Hoffmann was making a distinction between “theory as a set of answers” and “theory as a set of questions” in 
research on international relations. According to this distinction, the emphasis is on uncovering the phenomena 
itself in the former, whilst the emphasis on the latter shifts to formulating the most appropriate methodological 
tools and frameworks for studying the same phenomena (Hoffman, 1960). Radaelli’s arguments on how to 
approach Europeanisation as a methodological issue is very similar with this strand of theorising.  
  
33 
33 
Until the early 1990s, the question whether the emerging European polity weakens or 
strengthens the ‘sovereignty’ of the individual states shaped the research agenda on European 
integration. The implications of transferring national policy competences to EU level can also 
be traced back in the early conceptualisations of Europeanisation. For example, Lawton 
(1999) used the concepts of ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘Europeification’ in different ways and 
argued that Europeanisation entails the transfer of sovereignty to the EU level, whereas 
Europeification is power sharing between national governments and the EU (as cited in 
Radelli, 2003: 29). The over-emphasis on the state and related state-centric perspectives of 
understanding the EU has then been challenged by scholars of comparative politics and public 
policy analysis, who shifted their attention from understanding the integration process and its 
impact on the notions of state to the EU itself, which they have regarded as a dynamic and 
complex system of governance. The conceptual frameworks of various understandings of 
Europeanisation as governance were developed from this perspective.  
 
The underlying emphasis in various understandings of Europeanisation as governance is on 
the process by which member states reach common understandings of governance as a result 
of the dynamics between the actors (see Majone, 1996; Scharpf, 1999; Giuliani, 2003; Bache, 
2003; Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999). In this view, questions on whether Europeanisation 
should be seen as a new way of governance or an amalgamation of existing systems, and the 
quality of Europeanisation as a governance set the research agenda of scholars focusing on the 
governance aspects of Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2004: 6).  
 
In his detailed account, Olsen (2002: 923-4) seeks to develop an understanding of changes as a 
result of Europeanisation by directing questions of ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ and refers to 
Europeanisation as a governance and defines it, “as changes in external territorial boundaries” 
and as “the development of institutions of governance at the European level”. Within his 
conceptualisation, the former change indicates a system of governance by which Europe 
becomes a “single political space” and the latter change implies a “collective action capacity” 
which results in the establishment of legal and normative bounds between the members. From 
a similar perspective, Schimmelfenning and Sedelminer (2004: 661-2) make a distinction 
between the “internal” and “external” dimensions of governance in the EU according to 
which the former indicates “the creation of rules as well as their implementation in national 
political systems”, whereas the latter “is exclusively about the transfer of given EU rules and 
their adaptation” (as in the case of accession countries).  
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Research on Europeanisation as governance is important because it challenges seeing the EU 
as a sui generis phenomenon. For scholars of comparative politics and policy analysis, the 
importance of understanding day-to-day policy processes and institutional arrangements of the 
EU was overshadowed by the emphasis on ‘history-making decisions’ of the European 
integration process (Hix, 1994; Peterson, 1995). Research on the governance aspects of the 
EU offered valuable insights on how interaction takes place among ‘formal’ policy actors and 
‘informal’ societal actors within the European polity by shifting the emphasis from the 
intergovernmental vs supranational dichotomy. As one of the early advocates of this type of 
research on the EU, Hix (1994, 1999) applied the conceptual tools of ‘new institutionalism’ to 
study the EU. For the scholars of comparative politics, issues related to the “authoritive 
allocation and distribution of resources” and “the representation and intermediation of 
interests in a political system” within the EU were actually being tackled in similar ways as 
occurring in national politics and therefore could be studied with the tools of comparative 
political science (Rosamond, 2000: 107). The study of the EU has expanded to include the 
analysis of how ‘policy networks’17 and ‘epistemic communities’18 operate within European 
polity, which were earlier developed as concepts of public policy analysis.  
 
Obviously, for the scholars of comparative politics and policy analysis, the EU offers a vast 
amount of empirical incidents to develop further insights into politics in the European scale. 
The only problem here is, if the governance in the EU can fully be pictured with our 
                                                 
17 ‘Policy networks’ is one of the most debated but also contested concepts in policy studies. Börzel (1997: 1) 
suggests a very basic definition of a policy network: “a set of relatively stable relationships which are non-
hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a 
policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interest and acknowledging that co-operation is the 
best way to achieve common goals”. However as Peterson (2004: 127) suggests, “there exists no theory of policy 
networks that would lead us to predictive claims about European integration or EU policy-making”. Börzel 
(1997: 1) also confirms this observation and categorises the literature on policy networks in terms of: i) the 
methods used (quantitative versus qualitative network analysis); ii) the conceptual base preferred (policy networks 
as a typology of interest intermediation vs policy networks as a specific form of governance). Börzel suggests that 
the latter distinction is more relevant as the two methodological approaches stated in the former one are not 
exclusive but complementary. Therefore, as highlighted by Börzel, the interest intermediation school “interprets 
policy networks as a generic term for different forms of relationships between interest groups and the State” 
whereas the governance school “conceives policy networks as a specific form of governance, as a mechanism to 
mobilise political resources in situations where these resources are widely dispersed between public and private 
actors” (ibid., 2). There are also significant variations in the literature between the two schools. Regarding the 
ways in which policy networks concept has been applied to the study of European governance, Börzel notes that 
research differs “according to whether they treat European governance as dependent or independent variable and 
to whether they apply policy networks as analytical tool or theoretical approach” (ibid., 8).  
18 The concept of ‘epistemic communities’ was developed by Peter Haas who defined it as “a network of 
professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritive claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area” (Haas, 1992: 3). Haas argues that epistemic communities 
influence decision-making by asserting knowledge or “interpretation” on complex policy issues especially when 
there is an “uncertainty” and policy-makers are in need of ‘expertise’ to define their interests. See also footnote 
23. 
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understanding on how national politics work, then what is left significant about the EU? What 
is ‘new’ about the governance in the EU, if we claim it to be more than a ‘blend’ of existing 
governance patterns? More precisely, what is Europeanised in European politics? 
Respectively, Rosamond (2000: 110) neatly draws the lines of the debate:  
 
Yet, in spite of the efforts to use the EU to answer broader questions about politics, 
it remains stubbornly distinctive. Any full-scale attempt to plunge the study of the 
EU into the waters of comparative politics and policy analysis leaves itself open to 
the observation that the EU is not necessarily a precise analogue for the processes of 
politics within nation-states. Indeed the EU may be read as a hybrid form: neither 
political system nor international organization, but something in between (emphasis 
in original).  
 
This ‘hybrid’ form or the ‘new’ governance architecture has been mainly shaped by two 
benchmarking events in the EU; the member states’ agreement on the Single European Act in 
1985 and the respective accomplishment of the Single Market Programme by the end of 1992. 
As Young and Wallace (2000: 86) argue, “the single market has been elevated so much that for 
many it is taken to constitute the critical turning-point between stagnation and dynamism, 
between the ‘old’ politics of European integration and the ‘new’ politics of European 
regulation”.  
 
It was within this context that Marks et al. (1996) applied the concept of ‘multi-level 
governance’ for describing the ‘new’ governance architecture in the EU. The multi-level 
governance perspective, as Rosamond (2000: 110) notes, “amounts to the claim that EU has 
become a polity where authority is dispersed between levels of governance and amongst 
actors, and where there are significant sectoral variations in governance patterns”. Multi-level 
governance theorists depict the EU as a political system in which decision-making capacities 
are shared by numerous actors who are positioned in different levels of governance – i.e., 
supranational, national, regional and local (George and Bache, 2001: 25). In this respect, the 
governance in the EU is argued to be dispersed along ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ segments of 
the polity. The concept of multi-level governance, therefore, mainly emphasises the “increased 
interdependence of governments operating at different territorial levels […] between 
governments and non governmental actors at various territorial levels” (Bache and Flinders, 
2005: 3).  
 
Once the multi-level structure of the European polity is identified, then the modes of policy 
formulation and interaction among actors in the policy process become central concerns. 
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Bulmer and Radaelli (2004: 4-7) distinguish three modes of governance in the EU that differ 
according to the ‘type’ of policy. Accordingly, the governance in the EU appears as: i) 
negotiation (if the interests of the member states are alike, then reaching on an agreement 
happens quickly);19 ii) hierarchy (the EU either introduces ‘positive integration’ by correcting the 
results of the market or it generates ‘negative integration’ by abolishing the rules);20 iii) facilitated 
coordination (the EU functions as a forum for policy transfer, learning and socialization).  
 
Table 1. Governance, Policy and the Mechanisms of Governace by Bulmer and Radaelli (2004: 8) 
Mode of Governance Type of Policy Analytical Core Main Mechanism 
Negotiation Any of those below Formation of EU policy  Vertical (uploading) 
Hierarchy Positive integration Market-correcting rules; 
EU policy templates 
 Vertical (downloading) 
Hierarchy Negative integration Market-making rules; 
absence of policy templates 
Horizontal 
Facilitated coordination Coordination Soft law, OMC, policy 
exchange 
Horizontal 
 
2.3.2 Europeanisation as Institutionalisation 
 
Research on governance aspects of Europeanisation has vastly contributed to the field by 
revealing the dynamics of European-level political processes and the consequent emergence of 
a European polity as a distinct form of governance. At the same time, the understanding of 
Europeanisation as institutionalisation has also triggered the development of a significant 
                                                 
19 Research into policy formulation in the EU reveals important insights into various modes of reaching an 
agreement when formulating a policy in the European level. In their very interesting article, Elgström and 
Jönsson (2000: 685) set these modes as ‘negotiation’, ‘bargaining’ and ‘problem-solving’. As they argue, what 
characterises the policy-making in the EU is related to the differences between and within these modes. Elgström 
and Jönsson emphasise the difference between bargaining and problem-solving approaches and between 
“distributive” and “integrative” negotiations in terms of the weight given to “self-interests” or “common 
interests” on a particular policy issue. Therefore, on the issues where self-interests are more determining than the 
common interests, the policy attitude is shaped more as bargaining and/or as distributive negotiation and the 
parties aim at “getting as much as possible”, “relative advantages” are prioritised, the attitudes are “conflictual” 
and “manipulative tactics” are carried out. On the contrary, where common interests are identified as more 
important than the self-interests, the policy approaches are shaped as more problem-solving oriented and 
negotiations tend to be more integrative. In this case, policy-making is more “creative” and “co-operative” as 
there is a goal of “creating value” and the emphasis is on the “absolute advantages” (ibid., 685-6). However, 
Elgström and Jönsson also specify contextual factors that influence the policy attitude. As they argue, these 
factors are: i) decision-making rule; ii) level of politicisation; iii) stage in the decision-making process; iv) type of 
policy; and v) network characteristics (ibid., 690).  
20 These two modes of policy-making in the EU – positive integration vs negative integration – were earlier 
identified by Knill and Lehmkuh (1999: 2) as operating under different mechanisms of Europeanisation. As they 
argue, Europeanisation as a positive integration can be regarded as an ‘explicit’ mechanism, since it dictates an 
institutional model, which forms a benchmark for adjustment. However, Europeanisation as a negative 
integration is rather an ‘implicit’ mechanism, since it influences the way things are done, which result in the 
altering the opportunity structures, the distribution of power and resources. Knill and Lehmkuh (1999) also 
suggest a third mode – framing – that they define as a ‘weak’ mechanism of Europeanisation implying ‘indirect’ 
impact. In this third level, Europeanisation can be traced in the ways in which the beliefs and expectations of the 
domestic actors are changed. For Knill and Lehmkuh, different policy types can integrate various aspects of these 
mechanisms depending on the subject matter. 
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research agenda that opens up a complementary debate on the issues of “national adaptation”, 
in other terms, “the ways in which existing political structures and models are being redefined 
by the emergence of this new level of governance” (Harmsen, 2000: 52).  
 
Research on Europeanisation provides very rich empirical insights into its subject matter, and 
its conceptual frameworks are mainly derived from the new-institutionalist theoretical 
perspectives. As a matter of fact, institutionalist analyses of Europeanisation contributed a lot 
to the revision of the prior institutionalist theorising (Vink, 2002: 10). 
 
The scholars who define Europeanisation as institutionalisation (see Cowles et al., 2001; 
Börzel, 2004; Olsen, 2002; Radaelli, 2003) recognise the multifaceted interlink between the 
two understandings of institutionalisation: the creation of politico-administrative models at the 
European level and the reorientation of national models as a response to emerging European 
polity. However, in recent studies on Europeanisation, the emphasis is not particularly on the 
emergence of both formal and informal ways of doing things at the European level, but it is 
rather on how they are transferred and institutionalised within the national context (Radaelli, 
2004). Therefore, Europeanisation is most commonly defined as “a process by which 
domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making” (Börzel, 1999: 
574). 
 
Radaelli (2003: 35-6) suggests that Europeanisation may in fact affect a wide range of areas in 
a national context, mainly: i) macro-domestic structures (political and legal structures, the 
public administration, intergovernmental relations and the structures of representation); ii) 
public policy (actors, problems, style, instruments and resources); and iii) cognitive and 
normative structures (discourses, values and norms, policy paradigms and narratives). These 
domains overlap with what Börzel and Risse (2000) suggest as the major dimensions of the 
domestic effect of Europeanisation: polity, policies and politics. In a similar vein, Héritier 
(2001: 3) argues that Europeanisation covers “European decisions, the processes triggered by 
these decisions as well as the impacts of these processes on national policies, decision 
processes and institutional structures”. However, Cowles et al. (2001: 4-5) make a distinction 
between “institutions” and “domestic structures” and argue that Europeanisation affect both 
the “policy structures” and the historical/cultural specific “system-wide domestic structures”.  
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Among various understandings of Europeanisation, the definition offered by Radaelli (2003) 
appears as the most comprehensive one. It recognises the weaknesses of earlier approaches 
and seeks to clarify the important aspects of empirical analysis regarding the research agenda 
on Europeanisation. Radaelli (2003: 30) suggests that his definition recognises “the 
importance of change in the logic of political behaviour […] refers to process of 
institutionalization […] accommodates both organisations and individuals […] broad to cover 
variety of interests […] can be applied to both the member states and to other countries”. 
Europeanisation as he defines refers to: 
 
processes of (i) construction, (ii) diffusion, and (iii) institutionalisation of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of 
EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies (ibid.) 
 
However, noticeably, most of the empirical research on Europeanisation mainly focus on 
‘policy change’ and confirms the validity of the European impact whereas research into 
Europeanisation in terms of changes in domestic structures and cognitive/normative 
structures gives a greater role to the internal dynamics within a given context and issues of 
explanation and measurement are more complicated. The analytical difficulty of identifying 
and measuring the ‘change’ or the ‘impact’ as a consequence of Europeanisation is a central 
concern in the literature on Europeanisation. The effects of Europeanisation are generally 
regarded as “asymmetric” and “irregular” (Featherstone, 2003: 11-12). As Héritier (2001) 
adequately puts it: 
 
[T]he process patterns and policy outcomes of Europeanization have not been 
uniform across the member states and do not reflect either the well-defined will of a 
“unified supranational actor,” or a pervasive problem-solving rationality that imposes 
itself “automatically” so as to increase the overall efficiency of European policy 
decisions in the context of a transnational interdependence of policy problems. 
Instead, the political reality of European policymaking is “messy” insofar as it is 
uneven across policy areas and member states, institutionally cumbersome, and 
subject to the dynamics of domestic politics, each with its own particular logic. As a 
consequence, the outcomes of European policymaking tend to be much more 
diverse than one would expect and preclude any simplistic explanation of Europe-
induced changes (Héritier, 2001: 2). 
 
Taking up from this point, Radaelli (2003: 37) suggests that a further distinction is needed to 
distinguish the European elements within a specific national policy-making context from the 
underlying characteristics of the European impact itself. As he crucially points out, the change 
that is observed at the domestic level may not be related to Europe but rather be the outcome 
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of other processes. Featherstone (2003: 11-12) also argues that “the key point here is that of 
causality, between structure and agency: convergence may occur as a loose transnational 
phenomenon and may be described as Europeanisation, but for the European Union to be 
identified as a prime agent, or facilitating structure, in this process requires evidence of direct 
casual effect”. Here both scholars draw attention to a possible risk of degreeism as a result of 
giving great supremacy to the role of the EU, which may result in seeing the whole process as 
a one way flow. What makes Europeanisation a more intriguing research issue is actually its 
‘interactive’ aspect. Héritier (2001) accurately describes what ‘interactivity’ means in the 
context of Europeanisation;  
 
[W]e can detect a parallelism between European and national policy developments 
that, although they evolve independently of one another, also intersect and have a 
reciprocally reinforcing, counteracting and neutralizing impact. That is, endogenous 
national policy developments and Europe-generated processes of transformation 
merge and influence each other (Héritier, 2001: 2). 
 
Drawing upon the arguments of various scholars, Radaelli (2000: 14-15; 2003: 37) develops a 
typology for analysing ‘change’ as a consequence of Europeanisation covering the 
“magnitude” and the “direction” of change. Change may be in the form of: i) inertia (there is 
no change as the European level practice is totally incompatible with the domestic one); ii) 
absorption (change occurs as adaptation where certain changes are accommodated in the 
domestic context but the fundamental logic of the political behaviour remains the same; iii) 
transformation (a fundamental, paradigmatic change);21 iv) retrenchment (occurs paradoxically 
when domestic policy becomes less European than it used to be).  
 
Bache and Marshall (2004: 6) offer a different understanding of ‘change’ where they 
distinguish between the “direct-indirect” and the “voluntary-coercive” dimensions of 
Europeanisation effects. Accordingly, the European impact may be ‘intentional’ (or ‘direct’) 
and either ‘voluntarily’ accepted or ‘coercively’ realised despite the opposition at the national 
level. However, it may also be ‘unintentional’ (or ‘indirect’). In this case, Europeanisation may 
either unintentionally affect a policy area that was not predicted before (voluntary-indirect 
                                                 
21 Certainly, ‘transformation’ is a very dynamic concept. The kind of change it implies is not only a matter of 
degree but also of quality. Therefore, the empirical appearances of change may differ according to the grounds 
that we define what transformation is all about. Radaelli (2003: 39-40), drawing upon Laird’s (1999) work, 
distinguishes four “processes” of transformation that can facilitate the empirical research: i) interaction (do 
institutions get stronger positions in their interactions with other institutions or do they lose their power?); ii) 
robustness (do institutions gain more power gradually in terms of their organisational structures?); iii) equilibration 
(how do institutions reach a balance when they face with a crisis? Do they seek new alternatives rather than using 
existing institutional frameworks?); iv) discourse (are there any discourses available to facilitate change?). 
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Europeanisation) or coercive-direct Europeanisation may act as a ‘spillover’ for the emergence 
of coercive-indirect Europeanisation in other areas.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Types of Europeanisation 
Source: Bache and Marshall, 2004 
 
Once the aspects of change are identified, then the mechanisms of change become a central 
interest. From the institutionalist perspective, the process of Europeanisation is explained in 
two different frameworks (mechanisms) according to the focus given either on the actors 
involved or the institutions that are subjected to the shift. As Börzel and Risse (2000: 2) note, 
the rationalist/actor based and the sociological institutionalist perspectives depict “two logics 
of change” that “are not mutually exclusive” and “often occur simultaneously or characterize 
different phases in a process of adaptational change”. The differences in their explanations of 
change are, of course, rooted in their understandings of the concept of Europeanisation in 
general. The following section is devoted to highlight the main arguments on the particular 
mechanisms of Europeanisation. 
 
a) Rationalist/Actor Based Intitutionalist Perspective 
 
Börzel and Risse (2000) suggest that Europeanisation may trigger a domestic change under 
two conditions: i) there must be a certain degree of incompatibility between the European and 
national levels; and ii) institutions or actors may be willing to respond to the ‘adaptational 
pressures’.  
 
As Aspinwall and Schneider (2001: 7) argue, “the starting point of all rationalist reasoning on 
the EU is the assumption that actors in all relevant-decision making arenas behave strategically 
to reach their preferred outcome”. Therefore, the rationalist institutionalist approach seeks to 
explain Europeanisation with the actions of the policy actors who promote or resist the 
changes within the national policy-making context that emerge as policy demands come from 
 Voluntary  Coercive  
Direct  
intended impact of an EU 
initiative unopposed by dominant 
Member State actors  
intended impact of an EU initiative opposed 
by dominant Member State actors  
Indirect  
unintended or inadvertent impact 
of an EU initiative on the 
Member State unopposed by 
dominant Member State actors  
Spillover consequences of coercive-direct 
Europeanisation in one area to another.  
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the EU. Within this context, the emphasis is on match/mismatch (Héritier et al, 1996; Héritier 
2001) or fit/misfit (Börzel, 1999; Cowles et al., 2001) that is particularly important to regard 
the “reform capacity” of the national policy actors against the European policy demands. 
Börzel and Risse (2000: 5-6) suggest that misfit can be either in the form of “policy misfit” 
and/or “institutional misfit” that is mainly about general perceptions on how things are done. 
In this respect, the degree of adaptational pressure deriving from Europeanisation is very 
much dependent on the degree of misfit and this in return asserts how much change is needed 
in the domestic context (Cowles et al., 2001) The more congruence between the national and 
supra-national policy fabrics exists, the easier accommodation of Europeanisation takes place 
within the national context (Héritier 2000; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2000; Börzel, 2002).  
 
Encountering ‘adaptational pressures’ as a consequence of the fit/misfit in a particular 
national context does not necessarily mean that Europeanisation will trigger a change (Cowles 
et al., 2001). For example, Radaelli (2004) is critical about the notion of fit/misfit and the 
importance of pressure offered by the institutionalist perspective in understanding the process 
of Europeanisation. As he argues, the domestic actors seeking for new opportunity structures 
can use Europe as a force for change even if there is no existing pressure from EU institutions 
and the notion of fit/misfit is socially and discursively constructed. 
 
Within the actor based institutionalist perspective, ‘the logic of consequentalism’ (March and 
Olsen, 1998) is emphasised in explaining the process of Europeanisation according to which 
societal and political actors are equipped with new opportunities as a consequence of the 
misfit between the European and the domestic levels. In this respect, “Europeanization leads 
to domestic change through a differential empowerment of actors resulting from a 
redistribution of sources” (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 2). However, the capacity of the actors to 
make use of new opportunities provided by Europeanisation is explained to depend on two 
core factors: i) multiple veto points, and ii) the presence of formal institutions that will 
facilitate actors to pursue their interests (Cowles et al., 2001; Börzel and Risse 2000). 
According to the ‘multiple veto points’ perspective, “if the power is dispersed across the 
political system and more actors have a say in political decision-making, Europeanisation is 
difficult” (Cowles et al., 2001:9). Additionally, the degree of change may likely differ according 
to the attitudes of the existing formal institutions. Institutions may provide actors “material” 
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and “ideational” sources to foster change or they may show resistance (Börzel and Risse 
2000:1).22  
 
b) Sociological and Historical Intitutionalist Perspectives 
 
Whereas rationalist accounts of Europeanisation seek to explain ‘change’ by focusing on the 
preferences of actors, historical and sociological institutionalist perspectives attribute a greater 
role to existing institutional arrangements in shaping the possible outcomes of 
Europeanisation. 
 
Historical institutionalism suggests that “institutions are not necessarily the product of neutral 
bargaining or efficient historical evolution. They have ideas built into them, which then 
influence the chances of agents” (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 11). Within the sociological 
institutionalist approach the change generated from the Europeanisation process is regarded 
as a “socialization” and “collective learning process” that manifest itself as new administrative 
ideas and belief systems (March and Olsen, 1998; Knill and Lensehow, 2000). Both 
approaches use the notion of the ‘logic of appropriateness’ to explain how “actors are guided 
by collectively shared understandings of what constitutes proper, i.e. socially accepted 
behaviour in a given rule structure” (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 8). Here, ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ is used as “the variant that focuses on the cognitive dimension of institutions 
that provide particular interpretations of the world that convey ideas and belief systems” 
(Héritier, 2001: 4). According to historical institutionalism, these ‘collectively shared 
understandings’ are “path dependent” as former institutional frameworks and the structural 
arrangements within these frameworks determine what is available and possible for the actors 
(Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 10). On the other hand, sociological institutionalism refers to 
the concept of “institutional isomorphism” to imply that institutions that interact with one 
another or share a similar environment have the tendency to develop ‘homogeneity’ in terms 
of their ‘normative’ and ‘cognitive’ structures (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 8). 
                                                 
22 Börzel (2002: 194) very rightly points out the possible ‘costs’ of Europeanisation from the perspective of the 
national executives. As she argues, the implementation costs will be less, if there is a better fit between the 
European and domestic politics. Policy-makers may foster one of the three strategies against Europeanisation 
depending mainly on the country’s level of economic development: i) pace-setting (active persuasion), ii) foot-
dragging (resisting costly policies by blocking or by delaying) and iii) fence-sitting (establishing strategic alliances 
with the pace-setters and foot-draggers without revealing a certain policy attitude) (ibid., 194). Börzel argues that 
“uploading” national policy concerns to the European level as in the case of ‘pace-setting’ strategy is the most 
effective in terms of “maximising the benefits and minimising the costs” as uploading has the advantages of: i) 
“reducing the need for legal and administrative adaptation in downloading”; ii) “preventing competitive 
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As it was the case for actor based/rationalist perspective, the importance of the presence of 
mediating factors is also emphasised within the historical and sociological institutionalist 
perspectives. Two mediating factors are argued to influence the degree of change: i) the 
presence of “norm entrepreneurs” or “change agents” to “persuade others to redefine their 
interest and identities”;23 ii) the characteristics of the “political culture” (whether it is build on 
“consensus-building” and “cost-sharing” or not) (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 9). Although there is 
an underlying emphasis on ‘culture’ in both of the approaches, sociological institutionalism 
develops a more dynamic understanding of culture as it contextualises the concept by linking 
it to the ways in which it is constructed among actors as norms and identities.  
 
In terms of analysing change, a great attention is given to ‘learning,’ especially within 
sociological institutionalist literature. As Börzel and Risse (2000: 2) draws attention, 
“sociological institutionalism suggests that Europeanization leads to domestic change through 
a socialization and collective learning process resulting in norm internalization and the development 
of new identities” (emphasis added). They elsewhere argue that “actors are socialized into new 
norms and rules of appropriateness through processes of arguing, persuasion and social 
learning to redefine their interests and identities accordingly” (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 66). 
With its emphasis on learning, sociological institutionalism implicitly challenges the rational 
institutionalist account by questioning the possible lack of change in the ideas and interests of 
actors even when they are ‘empowered’ as a consequence of ‘redistribution of power 
resources’. Here, learning is argued to establish “an agency-centered mechanism to induce 
such transformations” (Cowles et al., 2001: 12). As Bulmer and Radaelli (2004: 11) point out, 
“it [learning] becomes an especially important feature of where the EU does not work as a law-
making system but, rather, as a platform for the convergence of ideas and policy transfer 
                                                                                                                                                    
disadvantages for domestic industry”; and iii) “enabling national governments to address problems which 
preoccupy their constituencies but can no longer be dealt with effectively at the domestic level” (ibid., 196).  
23 ‘Norm entreneurship’ is one of the most interesting concepts in research on Europeanisation. Börzel and Risse 
(2000: 9) suggest that there are two types of norm entrepreneurs: epistemic communities and advocacy or principled issue 
networks. As Radaelli (1999: 757) suggests, epistemic communities along with ‘technocracy’ and ‘bureaucratic 
politics’ imply “different modes of the politics of expertise”. According to Radaelli, understanding the role and 
politics of expertise in the EU is particularly important as the debate on the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU is in 
fact the criticism of the increasing technocracy in the Union that favours ‘expertise’ to democratic participation 
and consensus building in policy-making. Epistemic communities are identified to influence policy-making when 
‘uncertainty’ occurs as policy-makers facing uncertainty are not able to define their interests properly and actors 
providing “interpretation” are in a key position by facilitating the policy-makers in understanding the complex 
issues surrounding them (Radaelli, 1999: 762; George and Bache, 2001: 25). The establishment of the monetary 
union is one of the most significant cases in which the role of expertise was very influential in shaping the policy. 
However, advocacy or principled issue networks are different than the epistemic communities in a sense that they 
are linked to each other as they share same values, norms, beliefs rather than knowledge (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 
as cited in Börzel and Risse, 2000).  
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between member states. This is especially the case with the open method of coordination 
(OMC)”.  
 
However, the scope of the concept of ‘learning’ in explaining policy change is very broad. 
Within Europeanisation research, as shown by Schmidt and Radaelli (2004: 7), the concept of 
learning is distinguished between “simple institutional learning” (absorption) and “thick 
learning” (transformation). Yet, the reality of the European polity reveals that thick learning is 
unusual and as pointed out by Cowles et al. (2001: 12), it “usually takes place after critical 
policy failures or in perceived crises when actors reassess their set of preferences […] or even 
collective identities”. This is simply why greater attention has been given to reveal different 
aspects and even forms of simple learning. Within this context, ‘discourse’ comes to 
foreground as an important concept to be further analysed in explaining dynamics of change 
as discourses are essential in shaping ideas, values and beliefs that will trigger or halt the 
process of change (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004).  
 
2.3.3 Europeanisation as Discourse  
 
Certain aspects of historical and sociological institutionalist approaches clearly overlap with 
the understanding of Europeanisation as ‘discourse’ in which Europeanisation is regarded as a 
facilitating power for transformation of the cognitive and normative activities and preferences 
of the policy actors (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004). Here the emphasis is rather on the 
‘qualitative’ change caused by European policy processes and on the importance of the 
consequent shift in the ‘logic’ of policy-making (Héritier, 2001). Europeanisation can make an 
impact on the policy actors in reframing the existing policy problems and in evaluating the 
outcomes of choosing either a cooperative or a confrontational policy style on a particular 
policy issue. As Hay and Rosamond argue (2002), Europeanisation can form a discursive 
framework through which other discourses on globalisation are internalised and 
institutionalised within the domestic policy context. Or, in some cases, Europeanisation can 
also be used by domestic actors to push a certain policy agenda. For instance, in his analysis of 
the Danish reformation of taxation and competition legislations in the 1990s, Kallestrup 
(2001: 21) conclude that these policy reforms were legitimised with a discursive reference on 
the ‘inevitability’ of and the ‘necessity’ for adaptation to the EU although the EU itself did not 
demand these reforms. In both instances, as Schmidt and Radaelli (2004) suggest, discourse is 
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a constitutive aspect of change that makes it easier to coneptualise how agency and structure 
are linked. As they put it:  
 
Discourse is fundamental both in giving shape to new institutional structures, as a set 
of ideas about new rules, values and practices, and as a resource used by 
entrepreneurial actors to produce and legitimate those ideas, as a process of interaction 
focused on policy formulation and communication (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 192). 
 
Schmidt (2000: 278) elsewhere argues that processes of globalisation and European integration 
amplify the need to legitimise the necessity of change by policy-makers so that they get the 
approval of the public. In this respect, it is still arguable whether adaptation is inevitable, but 
the ways in which policy-makers present their choices are all about convincing the public 
about the ‘inevitability’ of change. According to Schmidt (2000):  
 
Such a legitimating discourse is especially important because the push for change 
comes not from bottom up, that is, from popularly expresses of support for global and 
European-induced change, but rather from the top-down, from modernising 
governmental as well as business elites intent on promoting national economic and 
institutional changes as the only solution to domestic as well as European and global 
economic and political problems (Schmidt, 2000: 278). 
 
In a similar vein, Hay and Rosamond (2002: 163) confirm that pressures for convergence are 
associated with globalisation and European integration in the policy rhetoric, but they also 
emphasise the importance of how “their strategic deployment and their domestic associations 
and connotation remain strikingly different in different national settings”. Therefore, 
globalisation and Europeanisation rhetorics can also be used by policy-makers to justify their 
administrative and policy failures in front of the public (see also Rosamond, 1999). 
 
But, of course, the key question here is then: ‘what is discourse?’ Are discourses different from 
ideas? If so, how are they different? Schmidt (2000: 279) identifies the nature of discourse on 
two dimensions: i) the ideational dimension of discourse which constitutes its cognitive and 
normative functions; ii) the interactive dimension of discourse which constitutes its 
coordinative and communicative functions. Accordingly, when a discourse is used to represent 
a set of ‘ideas’ it actually refers to “the sum of political actors’ public accounts of the polity’s 
purposes, goals and ideals which serve to explain political events, to justify political actions, to 
develop political identities, to reshape and/or reinterpret political history, and, all in all, to 
frame the national political discussion” (ibid.). In this respect, discourse functions to support 
the idea that ‘the preferred policy is the most appropriate one among other choices’ (cognitive 
function) and ‘it is the best option for the sake of the nation’ (normative function). On the 
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other hand, the interactive dimension of discourse refers to the creation of a “common 
language and an ideational framework” by policy-makers to frame the policy process 
(coordinative function) and it also implies the rhetorical frameworks used by the policy-
makers to convince the public on the aptness of their policy choices (communicative function) 
(ibid., 285).  
 
Obviously, ideas and discourses are very much linked. Fouilleux (2002: 7-8) distinguishes 
discourses from ideas by emphasising the ‘instrumentality’ of discourses. Ideas refer more to 
the perceptions of the policy actors about the reality they belong to, whilst discourses refer to 
the ways in which same actors communicate these ideas to other actors as well as to the 
public. Both are important in explaining change. To quote Hay (2002): 
 
For ideas often hold the key to unlock political dynamics – as change in policy is often 
preceded by changes in the ideas informing policy and as the ability to orchestrate 
shifts in societal preferences may play a crucial role in quickening the pace, altering the 
trajectory or raising the stakes of institutional reform (Hay, 2002: 278). 
 
Where Europeanisation is concerned, ideas and discourses are crucial in two ways. Firstly, in 
the case of enlargement, we need to take into account the role of ideas and discourses to 
understand the process of ‘collective decision-making’ for enlargement. For instance, 
Schimmelfening (2001: 76) introduces the concept of “rhetorical action” to conceptualise the 
calculated usage of “norm-based arguments” by policy actors to pursue their commitments to 
enlargement. In a similar vein, Sjursen and Smith (2001: n/p) argue that “enlargement is not 
merely reactive” and is “influenced by explicitly political objectives that aim to reshape 
political order in Europe”. For them, ‘legitimacy’ is particularly important since “if applicant 
states do not feel that the EU’s enlargement policy is legitimate, not only could the EU find it 
difficult to exercise influence over those states […] but doubts about the legitimacy of the 
EU’s decisions to include or exclude states could damage the credibility of the borders of the 
EU” (ibid.). Therefore, as Hughes et al. (2004) suggest: 
 
The rhetoric surrounding enlargement and EU conditionality was strongly embued by a 
mission civilasatrice approach of ‘Europeanization’. The perception was prompted 
whereby the political and economic models in core members states were seen as 
normatively ‘superior’ and readily transferable to displace ‘inferior models’ in candidate 
countries, and where a speedy substitution of values by candidates and their 
compliance with EU norms was equated with the quality of their commitment and 
Europeanness (Hughes et al., 2004: 13; emphasis in original). 
 
Although, this rhetoric on enlargement was pivotal in justifying EU conditionality to become a 
member of the ‘club’, it would not be sufficient to understand the dynamics of 
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Europeanisation from a non-membership perspective. Europeanisation of candidate countries 
that joined the EU in 2004 was in fact a very multi-layered process that needs to be explored 
with a particular focus on how EU conditionality operated in relation to Europeanisation.  
 
2.4 Europeanisation from a Non-Membership Perspective: Insights on the Accession 
Process  
 
The dynamics of European integration and enlargement processes, which resulted in the 
inclusion of ten more countries to the EU by mid-2004, triggered new research questions in 
European Studies. Clearly, the final phase of the EU’s eastwards enlargement has not been 
realised over a short period of time, but on the contrary, it took more than ten years to 
conclude. Over this period of time, not only the EU institutions evolved in different degrees 
but also the accession countries have undergone a major transformation of their socio-political 
and economic spheres. As Grabbe (2003: 303) argues, when the impact of the EU on 
accession countries is compared with the existing member countries, “the effects are likely to 
be similar in nature, but broader and deeper in scope”.  
 
An extensive body of the research focusing on the dynamics of Europeanisation from the 
perspective of the accession countries mainly problematise the experiences of eight CEEs as 
the new-comers to the Community. The underlying argument within these studies is that 
similar to west European context, the effects of Europeanisation have been differential for 
different CEEs and “EU pressures for adaptation have produced diverse and ambivalent 
responses and outcomes” (Hughes et al., 2002: 1). These differences are at first hand related to 
the structural dissimilarities among the CEEs, but they also need to be linked to how the 
governance of EU enlargement operated in relation to each and every candidate country. 
Moreover, the EU gain a more powerful status vis-à-vis the candidate countries in the process 
of Europeanisation as this is “an asymmetrical relationship which gives the European Union 
more coercive routes of influence in domestic policy making processes” (Grabbe, 2003: 303). 
As Grabbe puts it, “the applicants cannot influence EU policy making from the inside, and 
they have a stronger incentive than existing member states to implement EU policies because 
they are trying to gain admission” (ibid.). In a similar vein, Schimmelfenning and Sedelminer 
(2004: 61) suggest that “the desire of most CEE countries to join the EU, combined with the 
high volume and intrusiveness of the rules attached to its membership, have allowed the EU 
an unprecedented influence on the restructuring of the domestic institutions and the entire 
  
48 
48 
range of public policies in these countries”. In this respect, there is a crucial difference 
between “acting within the EU policy cycle” and “interacting within the EU system” (Lippert 
et al., 2001: 984).  
 
The key concern here is not to identify in which ways the mechanisms of Europeanisation 
operate similarly for candidate countries when compared with the members, but on the 
contrary, the focus is on the differences and offering various explanations for the differing 
mechanisms. As Schimmelfenning and Sedelminer (2004: 662) put it, the “external 
governance” dimension of the EU in the enlargement process, which is mainly about the ‘rule 
transfer’ (and its related aspects; “what is exported” and “how rule transfer happens”) is the 
central focus to explain the underlying mechanisms of possible change(s) as an outcome of 
Europeanisation effects.  
 
The main policy strategies of the EU in the enlargement process towards the applicant states 
are identified as a “policy of conditionality” and “accession negotiations” (see Checkel, 2000; 
Schimmelfenning et al., 2003). Checkel (2000: 1) defines conditionality as “the use of 
incentives to alter a state’s behaviour or policies through which international institutions 
promote compliance by national governments”. As Checkel notes, conditionality is originally 
attributed to the strategies of international organisations such as the World Bank and IMF, but 
the use of ‘political’ conditionality as a way of endorsing socio-political reforms along with the 
economic ones has been increasingly used in recent years (ibid.).  
 
At this point, it is important to note that ‘accession conditions’ within the EU were not 
compiled from an already existing pool of policy templates, but they were actually defined 
whilst the enlargement was already in progress. The case was very different for the 
Mediterranean applicants who became members to the EU in the 1970s and the 1980s 
(Grabbe, 2003: 305). As Pridham (2002a: 205) suggests, it was first with Spain’s application 
that the notion of ‘democratic conditionality’ emerged as a concern in the then EEC due to 
the implications of the Franco regime in Spain, but before that being a ‘liberal democracy’ was 
seen a sufficient condition to consider an application. Therefore, as Grabbe (1999: 7) points 
out, in the case of the CEEs, applicants were obliged to meet even higher standards than the 
current member states had. The accession conditions or criteria for the CEEs were first 
formulated in 1993 at the Copenhagen European Council Summit where the member states 
officially expressed the launch of the eastward enlargement process of the EU. As stated in 
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the summit, “[a]ccession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the 
obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required” (EU 
Council, 1993). By phrasing it this way, the EU compelled the CEEs and other candidate 
states to bear the costs of compliance during the accession process without taking any 
reciprocal responsibility.  
 
The core aspect of the ‘obligations of membership’ set in the Copenhagen Summit refers to 
the required commitment of the applicant state “to converge with a maximalist version of the 
EU policies” (Grabbe, 2003: 307). This convergence mainly covers embracing the whole body 
of the core legislation of the EU, which is widely known as the acquis communitaire, to the 
domestic legislative framework of the applicant states. As declared in the Copenhagen 
Summit, accession is also linked to the ‘ability’ of the applicant states “to assume the 
obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required” (EU 
Council, 1993). These sine qua non conditions are: i) the stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; ii) the 
existence of a functioning market economy; and iii) the capacity to cope with competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union. However, as Grabbe (1999: 6) suggests: 
 
The first two Copenhagen conditions require definitions of what constitutes a 
‘democracy’, a ‘market economy’ and ‘the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces’, highly debatable and slippery concepts. The EU has never 
provided an explicit definition of these concepts, although implicit assumptions about 
their content were made in the Commission’s opinions on readiness for membership 
(see Section II below). There is thus no published rationale for how various EU 
demands will bring applicants closer to west European political and economic norms. 
 
As might be seen, the accession criteria as stated in the Copenhagen Summit implicitly indicate 
two contexts of conditionality for accession; the “acquis conditionality” and the “democratic 
conditionality” (Schimmelfenning and Sedelminer, 2004: 663). However, again as Grabbe 
(1999: 6-7) points out, “the acquis is a dynamic concept because the body of legislation grows 
all the time […] the edges of the acquis remain fuzzy in legal terms because parts of it are open 
to interpretation […] it develops as a result of processes that inform debates over policy 
substance and agenda-setting, such as policy practices […] is thus open to minimalist and 
maximalist interpretations”. On the other hand, where the democratic conditionality is 
concerned, it is important to see that political criteria entitle the EU the supremacy to 
intervene in various ‘sensitive’ domestic policy areas of the applicant states where the existing 
member states have historically opposed the involvement of the EU for themselves (Pridham, 
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2002b; Grabbe, 2003). This, according to Pridham (2002a: 203), confirms that “the EU has 
moved beyond conditions of formal democracy to those pertaining to substantive democracy 
or qualitative conditions such as the role of political parties and political participation, the 
independence of the media and an active civil society as well as human and minority rights”. 
But then, as an international organisation, the strategy of the EU in regard to conditionality is 
“reactive reinforcement” by which the EU “merely reacts to the fulfilment or non-fulfilment 
of its conditions by granting or withholding grants but does not proactively punish or support 
non-compliant states” (Schmmelfenning et al., 2002: 1).24 In this respect, conditionality, as 
argued by Grabbe (2003: 17), “only works as a carrot, not as a stick”. Therefore, according to 
Pridham (2002a: 207), “what EU democratic conditionality lacks is an integral approach to 
regime change”. 
 
The ambiguities and inconsistencies surrounding conditionality make it difficult to analyse 
how much of Europeanisation in the accession countries took place directly as a result of 
conditionality and how much of other endogenous and exogenous factors have been 
influential during the process (Grabbe, 2003: 311). Lippert et al. (2001: 981-2) present three 
theses on the impact of accession on the applicant states: i) “adaptation-by-anticipation”; ii) 
“non-convergence”; and iii) “strengthening-the-role-of-civil-servants” thesis. Adaptation-by-
anticipation thesis relates the generation of administrative reforms to the eagerness of the state 
that was using membership as an incentive to modernise the state. Non-convergence 
emphasises the differentiated outcomes of the accession process on the applicant states, and 
finally strengthening-the-role-of-civil-servants thesis gives the central role to the formal policy 
actors (especially to the executive) as the administrative aspects of the accession process 
increases bureaucratisation. From a similar perspective, on the hypothesis of convergence with 
EU institutional models as an outcome of the accession process, Grabbe (2001) points out 
three factors of relevance. The first factor is “the speed of adjustment”, which identifies the 
adaptation process as “much faster and more thoroughly […] with very limited scope of 
negotiating transitional periods” (ibid., 1014). The second factor, which is “the openness of 
CEE national elites to EU influence”, corresponds to “adaptation-by-anticipation” thesis 
offered by Lippert et al. (2001: 981). Accordingly, as the CEEs were already in search of a 
                                                 
24 Schmmelfenning et al. (2002: 3) also identifies “proactive reinforcement” in regard to strategies of 
conditionality of international organisations apart from the EU. As they argue, proactive reinforcement can either 
be “coercive” or “supportive”. Accordingly, in the former strategy, the international organisation may reinforce 
the compliance of the conditions by imposing ‘punishment’ so that non-compliance becomes much more costly 
than the compliance. Alternatively, the international organization may prefer to foster a supportive reinforcement 
strategy to allow the state to comply the conditions by reducing the costs.  
  
51 
51 
‘vincolo esterno’25 (external tie), national elites are “open” to EU influence (Grabbe, 2001: 1014). 
And finally, the third factor on convergence suggested by Grabbe (2001: 1015) is “the breadth 
of the EU’s agenda for institutional and policy change in CEE”.  
 
The ambiguities of conditionality lie in the fact that the accession criteria do not offer any 
tools either to implement or to measure it (Hughes et al., 2002: 3). Conditionality is not a one-
off thing but is a process that comprises various aspects. As identified by Checkel (2000: 2), 
for any type of international organisation using conditionality, the process starts with the 
determination of a set of “pre-conditions” to be fulfilled before accession, but it also covers 
“trigger actions” that define what kind of “performance” will make the applicant move on to a 
further stage and finally there are also “policy provisions” that are least binding commitments. 
However, where the EU is considered, there have been major ambiguities and uncertainties 
that were criticised by the applicant states for not being offered the same benefits and for 
being obliged to fulfil normative standards that even the member states have not reached yet, 
such as ‘minority protection’ (Schimmelfenning et al., 2002: 11)26. Moreover, as Grabbe (2001, 
2003) argues, the EU operates with different actor groupings and this makes enlargement and 
issues of conditionality more complex. According to Schmmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2004: 
662), “conditionality might be encompassing, but it might not be effective in achieving rule 
transfer in certain issue areas or countries”. Therefore, the effectiveness of conditionality is 
dependent on certain factors, the most important one being the cost-benefit analysis of the 
applicant states. Schimmelfenning et al. (2002: 9) argue that conditionality will be effective, if: 
i) “the international material rewards offered for compliance outweigh the domestic power 
costs”; ii) “the smaller the policy changes a government has to implement or the less these 
changes affect the government’s power base”; and iii) “one or more governmental actors reap 
net power benefits from compliance and posses the bargaining power to make other 
governmental actors comply”. Elsewhere, Schimmelfenning together with Sedelmeier (2004: 
664-66) emphasise the importance of “determinacy” and “credibility” of the conditions for 
effective rule transfer and suggest that rule transfer is more likely to be effective if rules are 
“clear” and “set as conditions for rewards” (ibid., 664). On the issue of credibility, they note 
that the EU “must be able to withhold the rewards at no or low costs to itself” and “has to be 
                                                 
25 The term was first used by Dyson and Featherstone (1996) to identify the policy strategy of the states and its 
domestic actors that are seeking to rationalize their policy preferences by showing them as deriving from the EU. 
In doing so, opposition can be eliminated.  
26 On the issue of ‘uncertainity’, Grabbe (2003: 318-23) argues that there are five dimensions of uncertainty; 
uncertainty about: i) “the policy agenda that should be undertaken by the applicants”; ii) “the hierarchy of tasks”; 
iii) “timing”; iv) whom to satisfy; and v) “standards and thresholds”.  
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able to less interested in giving the reward than the target government is in getting it” (ibid., 
666). 
 
To sum up, as Hughes et al. (2004: 26) suggest, “[a] useful initial hypothesis would be that EU 
conditionality does not have a uniform logic, but rather has a waspish nature that shifts and 
transforms depending on the content of the acquis, the policy area, the country concerned, and 
the political context”. In this respect, although this research aims at looking in the dynamics of 
EU influence on broadcasting policy-making in Turkey, it first needs to present the political 
context through which EU-Turkey relations has developed over the years. This is particularly 
important since Turkey’s association with the EU has been very different than those of the 
CEEs. This difference inevitably influenced how EU conditionality was first perceived and 
later translated into specific policy initiatives in Turkey both in the course and the aftermath of 
the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. Therefore, the next chapter delves into the dynamics 
of Turkey’s association with the EU by putting EU-Turkey relations in a historical context.  
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Chapter 3: 
 
SO NEAR, YET SO FAR:  
THE CONTEXT OF TURKEY– EU RELATIONS 
 
 
Dozens of countries in the last century have joined many 
international organizations without this issue becoming a 
focal point of their identity or the key political 
controversy of the day for them. In fact, it could be 
argued that the question of Turkish membership in the 
EU is proportionately the most important issue of this 
type for any state in history (Rubin, 2003: 1). 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction: The Shadows of the Past 
 
In December 1999, after almost a five decade long association with the EU, the European 
Council in Helsinki concluded that “Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on 
the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States” (EU Council, 1999). In 
March 2001, Turkey announced its first version of ‘National Programme for the Adoption of 
the Acquis’ (hereafter National Programme) introducing the policy framework and the time 
frame for accomplishing a comprehensive agenda of political and economic reform. The real 
challenge has begun following the European Council’s decision in December 2004 to start 
accession talks with Turkey on 3 October 2005.  
 
In this section, the contours of Turkey-EU relations are presented by tracing back what 
Raymond Williams (1961) called “the structure of feeling”. Here, no novel analysis of this 
forty-five years long period of Turkey’s engagement with the EU is developed, but instead, a 
well-organised background of Turkey-EU relations is presented by highlighting the key shifts 
over the years and their political and societal implications that emerged accordingly. Within 
the scope of this research, the reason why this historical background should be captured is 
very evident. The initial answers to the why questions on the differentiated impact of the EU 
and Europeanisation on different domestic contexts and across various policy areas are, in 
fact, hidden in the individual histories of the countries that interact with the EU. Although, at 
its current stage, the ‘accession talks’ have added new dynamics to the ways in which Turkey 
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has been positioned vis-à-vis Europe in general and the EU in particular, these dynamics are 
loaded with the traces of the past. 
 
This history of Turkey-EU relations presented here is a mere extract in the history of Europe 
and Turkey that could have been articulated very differently. The arrival of Turks to Asia 
Minor in the eleventh century is, in fact, the starting point of what one might call the ‘Turkish 
issue’ as emerging within the proximity of Europe. Taking up from this starting point, 
Erdogdu (2002: 40) identifies four “turning points” in the history of relations between 
Europeans and Turks: i) the Paris Conference in 1856; ii) the establishment of Republic of 
Turkey in 1923; iii) the application of Turkey to the ECC for associate membership in 1959; 
and iv) the end of the Cold War.  
 
The history of relations between Turks and Europeans that precedes the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic in 1923 and the institution building processes in Europe in the aftermath of 
the Second World War needs a different conceptual perspective. There is a voluminous 
literature focusing on different periods in the history and raising questions such as ‘what is 
Europe?’, ‘is Turkey part of Europe?’ or ‘why Turkey wants to be part of Europe?’ which are, 
undoubtedly, still relevant in the context of Turkey-EU relations today. However, questions as 
such are regarded ‘ontological’ inquiries that did not guide the set of questions formulated in 
this research. Therefore, in this section, the focus is deliberately shifted to the aftermath of the 
Second World War. In this respect, certain initial arguments that have been elaborated 
through similar interpretations of various scholarly periodisiations on Turkey’s association 
with the EU before the second half of the twentieth century are adhered to rather than 
challenged. Within this scholarly work there are mainly two points that are relevant to the 
scope of this research.  
 
Firstly, the question whether Turkey is European is not novel and has always been an issue of 
debate. The politicisation of the quest for a definition of a ‘European identity’ coincided with 
the decadence of the Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth century. The history of 
emerging nation-states in Europe following the French Revolution of 1789 is also the history 
of the construction of Europe as an ‘idea’. The key mechanism operated in this construction 
was ‘otherisation’ through which ‘ethnocultural’ differences were first created and then used as 
an argumentative justification for legitimising the idea of Europe and Europeaness (Müftüler-
Baç, 2000: 25). Various negative connotations attached to the ‘Ottoman Empire’ and 
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‘Turkishness’ have well served for the construction of what the idea of Europe and 
Europeaness was all about by defining what it was not. Europe was ‘enlightened’, ‘civilised’, 
‘Christian’, whereas the Ottoman was ‘dark’, ‘despotic’, ‘barbarian’ and ‘Muslim’. For the 
Ottoman Empire, its image that was ‘fearfully’ perceived as a threat in Europe was not a 
challenge during its growth and expansion.27 This might be helpful in understanding why some 
scholars such as Erdogdu (2002: 41) recognise the initiation of ‘Westernisation’ as a project in 
the Ottoman Empire in the early seventeenth century solely having a ‘pragmatic’ basis that 
manifested itself with an aspiration not to lack behind technological developments. As the 
argument goes, there was not any ‘ideological’ tie attached to this project. However, what 
Erdogdu identifies as the continuation of this rationale by the Turkish political elite in the 
construction of their understanding of ‘Westernisation’ is, in fact, not that much tenable 
following the stagnation period. The reformation process of the Tanzimat period (1839-1876) 
in the decline of the Ottoman Empire was a quest for ‘Westernisation’ or ‘Europeanisation’ in 
its own right targeting the reformation of the administrative structures by diminishing the 
influence of religion on the establishment (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 19). A reform process on such a 
scale, taking place in the decline of an Empire, undoubtedly, embodies a discursive dimension 
that challenges the idea of ‘good governance’ and the ‘way of life’. In this respect, as Heper 
(2005: 43) suggests, the quest for Europeanisation in the Ottoman polity could well be 
regarded as the “Europeanization of identity”, which emerged as “state Europeanization”. In 
the course of the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the military emerged as both the object and 
the subject of modernisation that eventually led to the establishment of the Turkish Republic 
in 1923 (Karaosmanoglu, 2000; Heper, 2005: 33). Inevitably, the architects of the early 
Westernisation projects in the Ottoman Empire became familiar with not only the technical 
advancements in the West but also with the newly emerged nationalist and libertarian ideals of 
Europe (Müftüler-Baç, 2000: 28). Nevertheless, although early Westernisation projects 
triggered the questioning of certain dichotomies, mainly ‘modern vs traditional’ and ‘West vs 
Islam’, the underlying motive for both the modernists and the traditionalists was the same 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 20). Both of these camps “were still motivated by the goal of rendering the 
Ottoman political system viable” (ibid.).  
 
The ‘viability’ of the Ottoman political system was increasingly coming under scrutiny in the 
context of rising nationalisms in the Balkans starting from the late nineteenth century. It was 
the Turkish subjects of the Ottoman Empire resident in the Balkans who were dislocated, if 
                                                 
27 For changing images of Turks in the European thought from sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, see: Cirakman 
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not killed, because of their religio-ethnic ‘identities’. Kalaycıoğlu (2005: 21) argues that the rise 
of Balkan nationalisms and the treatment of Muslim Turks triggered an in-depth questioning 
of their own ethnic and national identities among Turkish intellectuals, officers and soldiers. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Turkish intellectuals had a different focus in their 
thinking of ‘Turkish nationalism’. What was debated at the time was framed as the rise of 
‘pan-Turkic’ nationalism, which had a greater focus on ‘ethnicity’, although the religious 
sentiments were still intact. The signing of the Treaty of Servès in August 1920 with the Western 
powers at the end of the First World War was the breaking point for the Turkish nationalists 
from the Ottoman order. Servès was designed for the partition of the Ottoman territories, but 
was never implemented as it was not recognised by the newly established Turkish Parliament 
in Ankara in April 1920. Servès was surpassed by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 following the 
proclamation of the Republic. This historical background is very important in understanding 
why Turkey responded very negatively to EU conditionality on granting broadcasting rights to 
ethnic communities in Turkey. This issue is discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
This carries us to the second point that needs to be highlighted before contextualising Turkey-
EU relations. The question whether Turkey is European or not has always been asserted 
together with another question: why does Turkey want to become part of Europe? The 
answer to this question can only be fully developed with a very close look into the early 
history of the Turkish Republic. Within the Republican project, ‘modernisation’ and 
‘Westernisation’ have always been interlinked and even used synonymously. As it is 
continuously repeated, the War of Independence was a war against the ‘Western occupation’, 
but not against the ‘West’ or “a Western type of polity” (Karaosmanoglu, 2000: 207). On the 
contrary, uniting with ‘Western civilisation’ was presented as the ultimate aspiration of the 
Republican elite and an integral part of the nation-building project. However, although 
Western occupation was brought to an end with the War of Independence, the Turkish 
political elite remained cautious about the possible ‘tendencies’ of the Western countries to 
‘divide’ Turkey in some way. It is this context where issues on ‘national sovereignty’ and 
‘unity’ gained increasing importance. This fear has often been referred to as the ‘Servès syndrome’ 
and as Yilmaz (2006: 29) suggests, the Serves syndrome together with the ‘Tanzimat Syndrome’ 
“represent two premises of the genealogical narrative of modern Turkish nationalism”, which 
in return constitute “the two pillars of nationalist Eurosceptism in Turkey”. He argues that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
(2001).  
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The Sèvres syndrome is more central, focuses upon Turkey’s foreign relations, and 
offers a general account of the Western strategy towards Turkey and of what Turkey 
should do in order to put off direct foreign intervention and subversion. The 
Tanzimat syndrome, on the other hand, focuses upon domestic politics and identifies 
the West’s likely collaborators within Turkey itself. These potential collaborators of 
the West have typically been identified as the Christian minorities (Armenians and 
Greeks); Muslim but non-Turkish communities (Arabs and Kurds); Muslim and 
Turkish but over-Westernized segments of the society (Yilmaz, 2006: 29). 
 
This concern on security and unity emerged as one of the landmarks of the political culture in 
Turkey. Additionally, the underlying aspects of the modernity and nation-building project in 
Turkey did not develop in isolation from the Ottoman legacy. As Heper (2000: 66) puts it, the 
state had precedence over the society within the Ottoman political culture and this in return 
led not only the belief on the welfare of the society relying on the state, but it also “led to the 
emergence of a center-periphery cleavage along cultural lines”.28 Heper (2000: 71-2) suggests 
that the Republican modernisation project inherited this “Ottoman desire for a strong state 
that would regulate the polity and society from above” which in return resulted in the 
“bifurcation of the elite”. As the argument goes:  
 
 
On the one side stood the state elite (Atatürk, Inönü, the intellectual-bureaucratic 
elite and, increasingly, military officers), who acted as guardians of the secular-
democratic state and believed in rational democracy. On the other side was the 
political elite- until the early 1970s, the leadership cadres of political parties other 
than the Republican People’s Party 29, and after 1975, those of the Republican 
People’s Party as well- which tried to render the Republican modernization project 
more palatable to the masses. The political elite subscribed to popular democracy and 
placed narrow interests over the general public interest. For the state elite, the 
Republic came first and democracy second. For the political elite, the reverse held 
true (ibid.).30 
 
The civil-military relations in Turkey actually developed in this context. The influence of the 
army on politics in Turkey has always been one of the central criticisms of the EU. However, 
as this influence is deeply rooted in the very Republican foundations of the Turkish state and 
broadened to the civil sphere, it is not something that can be easily abandoned. As noted by 
various scholars, the military was both the object and the subject of the modernisation project 
(Heper, 2005) and the military has always presented itself both as the ‘defender’ and the 
                                                 
28 For the origins of the theory of this dichotomy, see the seminal work by Mardin (1973).  
29 The Republican People’s Party (CHP) is the first political party in Turkey. Until the first multi-party elections 
in 1946, the CHP was the centre of Turkish politics.  
30 It should also be noted that despite the wide currency of this centre-periphery dichotomy in analysing Turkish 
politics, there has been some criticisms of the emphasis on continuity of this perspective for taking the state as 
accepted and neglecting the impact of social-formation on the emergence of this dichotomy. See: Güngen and 
Ergen (2005). 
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‘guardian’ of the secular Republic (Cizre, 2004; Narli, 2000). This self-proclaimed dual role of 
the Turkish military has often been used to explain why and how Turkey had gone through 
three direct military interventions (in 1960, 1971 and 1980) and one ‘post-modern coup’ (in 
1997).31 As Heper (2000: 74) argues, “none of those interventions ended up in a long-term 
authoritarian regime. This was because the military officers perceived democracy not as a 
means (popular representation), but as and end (rational policymaking)”.32 However, this is 
one of the main reasons why the consolidation of democracy beyond parliamentary politics 
has always been problematic in Turkey.  
 
The Turkish project of modernity is, in fact, a research project in itself. Up to the early 1990s, 
the Turkish experience has often been cited as a ‘success story’ that inspired movements 
elsewhere for liberation and independence. However, since the early 1990s, there have been 
more critical voices that seek to unearth this story and the project itself by particularly 
focusing on the problematical aspects, ambiguities and the downfalls that existed from the 
very beginning. As Köker (1990) suggests, the missing link in the Republican modernisation 
project was the lack of a perspective on democratisation that derived from a pluralistic view of 
the society as valued in Western democracies. Modernisation in Turkey is seen as a project 
imposed by the modernising elite from top-to-down with the aim of establishing a Republic 
that is ‘secular’, ‘ethnically homogenous’ that would modernise through a ‘linear’ process 
(Kasaba, 1997: 17). From this perspective, the rise of the Kurdish separatist movements and 
the political Islam in the second half of the 1980s is regarded as the manifestations of the 
crisis of the Turkish modernity project.33 But recently the emphasis of this critical literature is 
more on the complexity and the uniqueness of the Turkish experience of modernity rather 
than its compatibility with Western paradigms (see Navaro-Yashin, 2002; Kandiyoti and 
Saktanber, 2002).  
                                                 
31 For a brief account on the grounds of military action in 1960, 1971 and 1980 together with an analysis of the 
political context preceding the so-called ‘post-modern coup’, see: Lombardi (1997), and for a detailed account 
specifically of the post-modern coup, see: Heper and Güney (2000). 
32 Narli (2000) discusses the civil-military relations in Turkey within the ‘concordance model’ as developed by 
Schiff (1995) to explain how military intervention occurs. As the argument goes, the ways in which the military, 
the political elite and the society reach an agreement and cooperation on: i) the composition of the officer corps; 
ii) the political decision making process; iii) recruitment method; and iv) military style influence the civil-military 
relations in a particular national context. According to Narli (2000: 119) what is seen in Turkey is an “imperfect 
concordance” that is: the concordance exists between the military and the society on the role and the status of 
the army in Turkish politics, but it is not the case between the military and the political elites. As Heper (2005: 
35) suggests, the establishment of the National Security Council (MGK) with the 1962 Constitution 
“institutionalized the (guardianship) role of the military” and although MGK was set up as an ‘advisory body’ on 
the issues of internal/external security, the imprinting of the notion of security in the constitution provided the 
legal ground for the army for intervention in politics.  
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This is the background context in which Turkey-EU relations developed. Below, the history of 
this relation is presented in two major parts. Firstly, the ways in which Turkey positioned itself 
in the emerging structures of Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War until 1999 are 
highlighted. In this first part, special emphasis is given on: i) how Turkey’s quest for 
membership developed in the wake of the Mediterranean expansion of the then EC and the 
changing character of the European integration process; ii) the emergence of accession criteria 
in the EU and Turkey’s isolation from the eastern enlargement in the course of the European 
Council Luxemburg Summit in 1997; iii) the period that led up to the European Council 
Helsinki Summit in 1999, which marked a shift in Turkey-EU relations. In the second part, 
the democratisation process triggered by the EU is contextualised. The first section in this part 
reveals the political context of first wave of Europeanisation in Turkey from the conclusion of 
the Helsinki Summit in 1999 to general election held in November 2002. This section is 
followed by a discussion on how political and non-political actors, namely political parties, the 
army, business circles, non-political elite and the public reacted to political processes triggered 
by EU influence. 
 
3.2 Europe-Turkey Relations, 1945-1999: From ‘Strategic Partnership’ to ‘Candidacy’ 
3.2.1 The Aftermath of the Second World War 
 
Having ‘Westernisation’ as the core aspect of its ‘modernisation’ project since the 
establishment of the Republic, Turkey drew the main lines of its foreign policy by presenting 
itself as the ‘alliance’ of West. As Eralp (1993: 23) argues, within the scope of Turkish policy 
in the immediate aftermath of the World War II, both Europe and the US were regarded “as 
the two pillars of what was seen as a progressive and powerful alliance”. The way Turkey 
positioned itself as such was not an issue of debate until the1980s as the institutionalisation of 
the EC was initially driven with concerns over security and economic integration in Europe, 
neither the political nor the cultural dimension of European integration was apparent at that 
time (Önis, 2001: 106). In the eye of the EC, alliance with Turkey had a great strategic 
importance due to Turkey’s geo-political positioning. Turkey’s membership in security 
oriented arrangements as well as its engagement in newly emerging economic cooperation in 
post-war Europe was welcomed without any discussion on whether it is European enough to 
be eligible for such a partnership. Turkey became the member of Council of Europe in 1949, 
fought together with the Western Alliance in Korea in 1950, joined NATO in 1950 and the 
                                                                                                                                                    
33 For a very good discussion on the critique of the Turkish experience of modernity, see: Bozdoğan and Kasaba 
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OECD in 1961. As Müftüler-Baç (2000: 29) puts it, “Turkey’s incorporation into western 
security arrangements after World War II seemed to afford Turkey the European legitimacy it 
always sought.” For Europe the new ‘others’ were now the Soviets and the Communist Bloc.  
 
In this context, Turkey’s application to the EC for associate membership in 1959 was, in fact, 
a natural step in the process of increasing cooperation between Turkey and Europe (Erdoğdu, 
2002: 41). Besides, at the time, Turkey was going through an economic crisis under the rule of 
the Democratic Party and there was an urgent need to find new financial sources. There was 
also another motive behind the timing of Turkey’s application to the EC as it happened to be 
two weeks after the application of Greece to the EC. Eralp (1993: 26) identifies the “Greek 
factor” regarding the timing of Turkey’s application that “can be understood in terms of the 
long-standing conflict between the two countries” that manifested itself in the psyche of 
Turkish political elite that believed in the necessity of being “present on each and every 
platform where the Greeks figured”.  
 
Despite a delay in the signing of the Association Agreement due to the 1960 military coup in 
Turkey, there was not any evident opposition to Turkey in terms of its part in Europe when 
the Agreement was signed in Ankara in 1963 (Tekin, 2005). The Agreement laid out a multi-
staged association that was designed to progress over three phases that would finalise with 
Turkey’s joining the Customs Union by 1995. The rationale behind the EC in establishing this 
multi-staged integration, which was also agreed by the Turkish political elite, was to protect 
the Turkish economy and its ongoing industrial development from the possible destructive 
affects of the European free market (Önis, 2000: 467). This argumentation proved its validity 
in the upcoming years following the 1973 oil crisis, which resulted in “the emergence of 
tension between two of Turkey’s basic national projects, Westernisation and development, 
which had hitherto seemed quite compatible” (Eralp, 1993: 29). 
 
During the 1970s, Turkey’s association with the EC was rather uneasy and very thorny. When 
issues on how to tackle the final phase of the preparatory stage were on the agenda between 
the EC and Turkey, the second military intervention in Turkey took place in March 1971. 
Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974; the increasing scepticism on the benefits of the 
Association Agreement; serious economic and political problems emerging in the Turkish 
domestic context; and finally the 1980 military intervention gave great damage to Turkey’s 
                                                                                                                                                    
(1997). 
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association with the EC (Önis, 2000; Eralp, 1993). Nevertheless, up until the 1980 military 
intervention, the EC was keen on maintaining its relations with Turkey at a certain level. In his 
focus on EC-Turkey relations during the 1973-1979 period, Ugur (1996: 13) suggests that the 
policy approach of the EC was “to strike a balance between the EU’s desire to minimize its 
commitments towards Turkey, and the need to prevent the latter’s alienation”. The EC 
“adopted a wait-and-see attitude in its relations with Turkey” in the short aftermath of the 
1980 military intervention (Eralp, 1993: 32). However, In January 1982, the EC decided to 
suspend the Association Agreement and froze political relations. Turkey’s first serious 
marginalisation in Europe occurred at this time. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, when 
Turkey was surrounded by all sorts of political and economic problems, the Mediterranean 
expansion began to gain momentum within the EC.  
 
3.2.2 The Mediterranean Expansion and the End of the Cold War  
 
There was not any apparent Mediterranean dimension attached to the early institutionalisation 
processes of the EC until 1973, when the first wave of enlargement was concluded to include 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom to the Community (Williams, 1993: 45). The EC 
maintained its relations with the Mediterranean countries situated in its far reach under 
bilateral ‘trade’ and ‘association’ agreements. However, by the end of 1970s, the EC was in 
urgent need of expanding its market to strengthen its position against the US and Japan and a 
second wave of enlargement within its immediate borders to include southern Mediterranean 
countries – Greece, Spain and Portugal – was inevitable (Eralp, 1993: 30). Besides, this time, 
there was a political dimension attached to the enlargement process as the EC as well as the 
applicant countries – particularly Greece – regarded membership of these countries to the 
Community as a way of “strengthening” and “consolidating” their patchy democracies (Önis, 
2001: 107). This was, in fact, the first time that the EC was attaching a ‘political’ dimension to 
enlargement.  
 
Turkey’s economic position vis-à-vis the Southern-trio before the second wave of enlargement 
was actually not that much different. They also shared similar drawbacks in the consolidation 
of the democratic regime in their own domestic political spheres. Önis (2001: 112) identifies 
Turkey’s exclusion from this second wave of enlargement as “a case of self-exclusion as 
opposed to exclusion by the community itself”. Turkey’s failure in applying to the EC at the 
same time as the Southern-trio has always seen as a ‘missed opportunity’.  
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When parliamentary democracy was restored in Turkey in 1983 following the third military 
intervention in 1980, the economic and political parameters in Europe were already 
transformed drastically. On the political front, the southern enlargement brought a new set of 
political issues regarding principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Kahraman 
(2000: 5) identifies this deepening focus on political issues as “a reformulation of the external 
identity of the community” that eventually influenced the determinants of further expansion 
of the EC. This external identity became very apparent in the late 1980s when the Soviet 
Block was in the process of dissolution.  
 
On the economic front, the EC was increasingly becoming aware of its “loss of global 
competitiveness” vis-à-vis Japan and the US in the early 1980s and the launch of the Single 
Market Programme was regarded as “a principal response to these economic weaknesses” 
(Williams, 1993: 55). The completion of the Single Market was an original goal of the 
Community as articulated in the Treaty of Rome, but the conclusion of the Customs Union in 
1968 was not more than a phase, which was no more sufficient to uplift the European 
economy. In this respect, signing of the Single European Act in 1986 was the initiation of the 
process of gradual removal of the existing non-tariff barriers for the free movement of people, 
goods, services and money (see McCormick, 2002). 
 
In the Turkish case, the 1980s came along with a great transformation marked by radical 
structural changes in the economic sphere. Under the leadership of Turgut Özal, the then 
Prime Minister of Turkey, the highly protected Turkish economy under the ‘import 
substitution industrialisation’ policy framework of the 1960s and the 1970s was altered to an 
export-oriented, liberal economy. Given this dynamic, Turkey’s application for full 
membership to the EC in 1987 was seen as an extension of this radical transformation (Balkir 
and Williams, 1993: 14). As Önis (2001) puts it: 
 
Turkey’s position under Özal was no longer the timid and defensive attitude, which 
had characterised its approach to a potential customs union in the early 1960s and 
1970s. With a more open economy and substantially stronger industrial base, Turkey 
in the late 1970s adopted a more positive approach towards the Community based 
on the notion of active participation and geared towards maximising the 
opportunities provided by the Community (Önis, 2001: 113). 
 
This emerging “notion of active participation” was also very much related to the realisation of 
the fact that unless there was a financial benefit obtained from the EC, there was no point in 
pursuing an ‘association’ (Eralp, 1993: 35). Association in the form of Customs Union was, in 
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fact, a very asymmetrical relation in which Turkey had to bear the costs without having any 
say in the decision making processes (Erdoğdu, 2002: 44). However, on the basis of Turkey’s 
‘courageous’ move towards the EC, paradoxically, there was the failure of Turkish political 
elite to fully understand where Europe was heading in economic and political terms. They had 
the misperception that committing to the liberalisation of the economy would justify Turkey’s 
eligibility for full membership (Kahraman, 2000:5). In contrast, following the launch of the 
Single Market Programme, the emerging economic imperatives of the EC were making the 
conditions of membership more demanding and complicated. According to Williams (1993: 
60) “the competition, liberalisation and harmonisation rules, and reductions required in state 
procurement and state subsidies significantly increased the problems of adaptation for new 
member states”. Additionally, together with the imperatives of economics, it was also the 
imperatives of politics that were increasingly gaining importance in mapping out the 
significance of integration in Europe in the late 1980s. In the eye of the EC, “the mere 
existence of representative democracy no longer sufficed as a qualification for full-
membership” (Önis, 2001: 113). However, while the EC was strengthening its emphasis on 
the importance of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the political regime in Turkey 
was increasingly being challenged by two movements in the course of late 1980s: ‘Kurdish 
separatism’ and ‘political Islam’. The then EC and now the EU has always been critical about 
the ways in which these challenges have been politically handled. As Eralp (1993) adequately 
puts it: 
 
 
While the former [Europe] regarded democracy as a sine qua non for inclusion into 
Europe, Turkey’s leaders considered it to be an internal problem. Furthermore, 
Turkish leaders saw democracy in relative rather than absolute terms and believed 
that relations with Europe would resume a smooth course once Turkey was able to 
announce a timetable for transition to its version of democracy. The inability of 
Turkish policy makers to assess correctly the importance played by Europe on the 
questions of democracy, even in the view of the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese 
examples, served to escalate tensions between Turkey and the EC (Eralp, 1993: 32). 
 
The response to Turkey’s application for membership was announced by the European 
Council in 1990. Following the publication of the Commission’s opinion on Turkey in 
December 1989, the Council rejected Turkey’s application on the basis of political reasons as 
it was expected (see EC, 1989). However, the doors were not completely closed as the 
Commission confirmed Turkey’s “eligibility for membership”. Turkey was left with the 
Customs Union together with an open-ended ticket to Europe. As Önis (2000: 469) argues, 
the Turkish political elite was content with the result as full membership was still an option for 
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the future and the Customs Union “constituted the deepest form of integration possible short 
of full membership”, which put Turkey “ahead of all the other potential applicants.” 
 
Whilst Turkey was moving to a new phase in regard to its association with the EC, the EC 
itself was also moving to a new phase in the course of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
central issue for the EC was now how to integrate former communist CEEs to the political 
and economic structures of the EC without upsetting the balance between ‘widening’ and 
‘deepening’ (Kahraman, 2000: 6). Although Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Europe might seem as 
‘marginalisation’, it was hardly ‘isolation’ where changes in the bigger political scale were 
concerned. When the Soviet Union dropped out from the bipolar equation of global powers, 
it was only the US that remained unchallenged. Turkey was much closer to the US than ever 
from late 1970s onwards, but what actually increased the intensity of this partnership was the 
Gulf Crisis in 1990 (Balkir and Williams, 1993: 14). Turkey’s importance was once again 
confirmed in having a ‘geostrategic role’ especially in relation to the Middle East. This time, 
having the US as its supporter, Turkey embraced the ‘role model’ post in the region much 
more willingly. 
  
It would be fair to argue that Turkey boosted its self-confidence in the early 1990s by pursuing 
its new role in Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasuss. As Ugur (1996: 21) suggests, this is 
why establishing a Customs Union, which was earlier regarded as ‘costly’, became a viable 
option once again despite the lack of any financial assistance due to the Greek veto. 
Eventually, the Customs Union came into effect in January 1996.  
 
3.2.3 The Copenhagen Criteria and Beyond 
 
In the course of the 1990s, the EU directed all its energy and resources to integrating the 
CEEs to Europe in cultural, political and economic terms. As suggested by Sjursen (2002: 
508) the eastern enlargement was “based not only on the norms of a liberal-democratic 
international community but on a community based identity”. As the East-West conflict 
within Europe was over, the discursive incentive – the unification of Europe – became 
increasingly apparent in the justification of the eastern enlargement. Turkey was excluded 
from this “civilizational project” (Önis, 1999: 108) on the basis of its “incompatibility” (Tekin, 
2005: 288). This exclusion became a fact at the European Council Luxemburg Summit in 
December 1997, where the CEEs were organised in a two-tier structure for membership. 
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Turkey was left out with some open-ended statements as articulated in the Presidency 
Conclusions of the Summit: 
 
The Council confirms Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the European Union. 
Turkey will be judged on the basis of the same criteria as the other applicant States. 
While the political and economic conditions allowing accession negotiations to be 
envisaged are not satisfied, the European Council considers that it is nevertheless 
important for a strategy to be drawn up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing 
it closer to the European Union in every field (EU Council, 1997). 
 
Although the grounds for Turkey’s exclusion were not well-documented in the conclusion of 
the Luxemburg Summit, the enlargement strategy for the CEEs was much clearer when 
compared to the conclusions of the earlier summits. The EU developed the major principles 
of its enlargement strategy and its concomitant policy tools within the period between the 
European Council Copenhagen Summit in June 1993 and to the Luxemburg Summit in 
December 1997. In the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the EU established the initial criteria for 
accession which then famously became known as the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’. In the Essen 
Summit in December 1994, the general framework of the pre-accession strategy to prepare the 
CEEs to accession was formalised. The following Madrid Summit in December 1995 was 
important in terms of defining the challenges waiting for the EU in the course of enlargement. 
However, these challenges were not seen as a ‘burden’ and the EU expressed its eagerness to 
bear the ‘costs’ of enlargement. As it is stated in the Presidency Conclusions of the Madrid 
Summit: 
 
 
That next enlargement provides a great opportunity for the political reunification of 
Europe […] enlargement is not an easy exercise. Its impact upon the development of 
the Union’s policies will have to be assessed. It will require efforts both by applicants 
and present Union members that will have to be equitably shared. It is therefore not 
only a great chance for Europe but also a challenge. We must do it, but we have to 
do it well (EU Council, 1995). 
 
The adoption of the strategy paper ‘Agenda 2000’ by the European Commission in July 1997, 
just a couple of months before the Luxemburg Summit, was the finalisation of the 
enlargement strategy. Within the Agenda 2000 framework, the EU added two more pre-
accession instruments to its enlargement strategy. Firstly, it introduced ‘accession partnerships’ 
to set the agenda and the timetable for the candidate countries in implementing the pre-
accession strategy. Secondly, the EU extended the participation of the CEEs in community 
programmes to prepare them for accession. The all-embracing strategy of enlargement of the 
EU was set.  
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The European Council Luxemburg Summit in December 1997 was, in fact, designed to 
celebrate the return of the CEEs back ‘home’. In her qualitative analysis on how various EU 
actors articulated different reasons in order to justify the eastern enlargement, Sjursen (2002: 
508) very neatly reveals that “a sense of ‘kinship-based duty’ contributes to an explanation not 
only of the general decision to enlarge to central and eastern Europe but of the differentiated 
support for enlargement to this group of states in comparison to Turkey” (see also Inthorn, 
2006). The language used in the Presidency Conclusions of the Luxemburg Summit illustrates 
how Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Europe was sealed within the ambiguous realm of ‘strategic 
partnership’ once again: 
 
The European Council recalls that strengthening Turkey’s links with the European 
Union also depends on that country's pursuit of the political and economic reforms on 
which it has embarked, including the alignment of human rights standards and 
practices on those in force in the European Union; respect for and protection of 
minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and 
Turkey; the settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the 
International Court of Justice; and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN 
on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council 
(EU Council, 1997). 
 
The Agenda 2000 strategy paper was actually signalling the exclusion of Turkey from the 
enlargement process, as there was not any concrete reference to Turkey in the enlargement 
agenda. It was this report that the agenda in Luxemburg was based on but at the summit, the 
EU leaders were actually much more ‘self-assured’ in phrasing Turkey’s lacking behind the 
political criteria of membership. The reason for this attitude was simple. The ‘Copenhagen 
criteria’ of 1993, which can be regarded as the initial policy approach of the EU for 
enlargement, were enshrined in the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in October 1997.34 The 
emphasis on democracy and human rights was no longer a subjective reference point; it was 
now a ‘norm’ as articulated in the binding legal framework of the EU.  
 
Turkey’s reaction to the conclusions of the Luxemburg Summit was very strong. The then 
Prime Minister, Mesut Yılmaz, declared that Turkey was freezing its relations with the EU but 
would continue bilateral relations with European countries. The Helsinki Summit was in fact 
the lowest ebb in Turkey-EU relations heading to a very uncertain future.  
 
 
                                                 
34 Article 6(1) of the Treaty stipulates: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law”. Article 49 stipulates: “Any European State which 
respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union”.  
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3.2.4 The Helsinki Turn: Turkey as a Candidate for Accession 
 
The history of Turkey-EU relations shifted to a new phase when Turkey was granted 
candidacy at the European Council Helsinki Summit in December 1999. Where the exclusion 
of Turkey from the enlargement package of the Luxemburg Summit is concerned, the 
Helsinki Summit marked a very drastic turn in the EU’s attitude towards Turkey. By the time 
of the Helsinki Summit there was not any ‘improvement’ in Turkey on the basis of earlier 
criticisms that were put forward as the justification of its exclusion from the eastern 
enlargement. The shift in the EU was rather the culmination of changes of the perception on 
Turkey and its role in Europe by individual countries, which then led up to recognition of 
Turkey in Europe as a candidate in the EU level. Önis (2000: 470) identifies the EU’s turn in 
its foreign policy on Turkey at Helsinki Summit as a typical example of the underlying traits of 
EU foreign policy in general: “paradoxes and ambiguities”. Önis recognises these ambiguities 
as the “bye-products” of the EU’s foreign policy that swings “between the principles of 
idealism and realism” (ibid.; emphasis added). In the Turkish context, this fluctuation operates as 
follows:  
 
[A]n idealistic perspective pointed towards exclusion of Turkey from potential full 
membership of the Union on consideration of its deficient record in terms of 
democracy and human rights. Yet, a realistic understanding of the situation drew 
attention to the important role of Turkey for the EU as an economic and strategic 
partner. Given the tremendous resentment on Turkey’s part at the decision taken at 
Luxemburg, there was growing recognition on the part of the European elites, during 
the course of 1998 and 1999, that Europe’s own economic and security interests 
would not be adequately served if Turkey was allowed to drift in isolation and 
authoritarianism (Önis, 2000: 470). 
 
 
Shortly after the Luxemburg Summit, EU leaders realised the fact that the prevailing foreign 
policy stance of the EU towards Turkey, which aimed at preserving the relation between 
Turkey and Europe as an “undivided but not united” (Erdogdu, 2002: 48) partnership was no 
more tenable. It was certain developments that facilitated this volte-face in European leaders’ 
attitudes towards Turkey after the Luxembourg Summit. Firstly, the replacement of the 
Christian Democratic government with the Social Democrats after the 1998 elections in 
Germany worked greatly to Turkey’s benefit. Social Democrats led by Chancellor Schröder 
promoted Turkey’s membership to make Europe more ‘multi-ethnic’ and ‘multi-cultural’ and 
not keep it as a ‘Christian Club’ (Önis, 2000: 470; Avci, 2002: 98; Kirisci, 2004: 41). Secondly, 
in the course of 1999, the relations between Greece and Turkey started changing as well. The 
consecutive earthquakes in both countries united them as never happened before. As Önis 
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(2000: 473) suggests, experiencing these similarly destructive disasters “resulted in a bottom-
up process of self-questioning and self-criticism in both societies, a process which has also 
subsequently influenced political leadership in both countries”. Additionally, the Greek 
political elite increasingly realised that, in the long run, Turkey’s isolation would give more 
harm than bring benefit to the interests of Greece both at the national and the EU levels 
(Önis, 2000: 470; Avci, 2002: 98). And finally, as an external factor of Turkey-EU relations, 
the US constantly lobbied in favour of Turkey’s membership. 
 
However, as Ugur (2003: 171) argues, “the absence of these developments cannot explain EU’s 
failure to put forward the same offer two years ago in Luxemburg” (emphasis in original). It is 
clear that the Greek veto has long been decisive within the EU in terms of the Community’s 
overall decisions on Turkey, including the conclusion of the Luxemburg Summit. As Önis 
(2001: 113) rightly points out, the question of whether Greece has been used “as a scapegoat 
by other dominant powers within the Community who basically subscribed to the decisions 
taken by the Union” needs to be further explored. Nevertheless, granting a candidate status to 
Turkey at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 was a huge step in resolving the 
“anchor/credibility dilemma” as identified by Ugur (1999, 2003). It was this dilemma that 
marked Turkey-EU relations for decades as “Turkey’s European orientation has been a non-
credible commitment and the EU has failed to emerge as an effective anchor for Turkey’s 
policy reform” (Ugur, 2003: 165). In a similar vein, Önis (1999: 130-1) suggests that both 
southern and eastern enlargement waves entailed a strong “mix of conditions and incentives” 
to promote transformation of the political regimes of these countries; whereas for Turkey “the 
conditions imposed have been harsh, but the incentives that would elicit the desired response 
from the political and business elites have not been forthcoming”. In this respect, scholars 
agree that Helsinki Summit was a ‘turning-point’ both for Turkey and Europe as “it tightened 
the rules of the game […] by providing a front-loaded package of democratisation reforms to 
be undertaken by Turkey and a back-loaded package of rewards (accession negotiations) to be 
granted by the EU” (Ugur, 2003: 174).  
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3.3 Turkey-EU Relations in the Aftermath of the Helsinki Summit  
3.3.1 The Political Context  
 
When Turkey was granted candidacy status at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the 
then government in Turkey was just over its first six months in office. Following the 
dominant pattern in the 1990s in Turkey, the general elections of April 1999 concluded with 
the establishment of a coalition government. This time it was a tripartite coalition between the 
Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP). At first sight, this was rather an ‘awkward’ coalition as these parties were supposedly 
representing a different political agenda that might have made the possibility of a ‘competent’ 
partnership less likely. The DSP has been conventionally situated on the centre-left, whereas 
the Motherland Party (ANAP) on the centre-right and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) on 
the far-right of the political spectrum in Turkey. The other two parties, the Virtue Party (FP) 
and the True Path Party (DYP) formed the opposition.35  
 
The twenty-first term of the Turkish Parliament with its three-party governing coalition was a 
difficult one. The whole agenda about establishing pre-accession strategies to the EU caused a 
lot of backbiting and bickering in Parliament, especially among the governing parties, and also 
outside Parliament, among the political elite. Nevertheless, the tripartite coalition government 
lasted more than it was anticipated. Moreover, majority of the reform packages prepared in 
the name of the EU passed when this government was in office until the time of the general 
election held in November 2002. 
 
The EU Commission drafted the first Accession Partnership (AP) document for Turkey in 
November 2000 to identify short and medium priorities and intermediate objectives for 
Turkey and was approved at the European Council Summit at Nice in December 2000. 
According to the AP (2000), the EU required Turkey to implement certain political criteria 
such as strengthening legal and constitutional guarantees for the right to freedom of 
                                                 
35 The Turkish political scenery was very diversified until the November 2002 election in regard to the number of 
political parties represented in Parliament. In fact, the history of political parties in Turkey reveals a lot about the 
ways in which Turkish political culture is institutionalised since the establishment of the Republic. Recent 
research reveals that from 1923 to 2006, 228 political parties were established in Turkey. 49 of these could attend 
general elections and so far 22 were represented in Parliament. Again, of these 228 parties 178 were closed. 
Among the closed political parties, 30 per cent were banned by the state. Only after the military intervention, the 
number of political parties withdrawing from political life amounts to 100 (For more details on all these figures, 
see: Kaynar, 2007). Where November 2002 election is considered, 16 parties attended the election, of which 
seven had already seats in Parliament. For a list of these 16 political parties, thier ideological positions and 
orienatations towards the EU, see: Appendix II. For an edited collection in English, see: Rubin and Heper, 2002. 
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expression; freedom of association and peaceful assembly; reinforcing the fight against torture 
and ill-treatment and all violations of human rights; improving functioning and the efficiency 
of the judiciary, maintaining the de facto moratorium on death penalty; and finally, removing 
all the legal barriers prohibiting the use of mother tongue of Turkish citizens in broadcasting 
in the ‘short term’, which was foreseen to happen sometime in 2001 (ibid., 7). Regarding the 
scope of the ‘medium-term’ political criteria, the EU required Turkey to guarantee full 
enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms; set up a constitutional basis and 
formulate the legal framework for these rights and freedoms; abolish death penalty; lift the 
state of emergency in remaining cities in the south east; align the constitutional role of the 
National Security Council (MGK) and ensure cultural diversity and guarantee cultural rights 
for all citizens and in every field, including education (ibid., 11). These were all controversial 
issues in Turkey. 
 
Turkey’s official response to the AP document was the preparation of the “National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis” (hereafter National Programme), which was 
approved in March 2001. The National Programme was drafted at a time when Turkey was in 
the midst of a very serious financial crisis that erupted in February 2001.36 Nevertheless, 
despite the crisis, the coalition partners reached a consensus and finalised drafting the 
programme. However, although the time framework outlined in the National Programme was 
mostly in accordance with the AP, there were also some important discrepancies and 
uncertainties. For example, in the document, Turkey expressed its commitment to the 
realisation of reforms on the issues of ‘individual rights and freedoms’ and ‘freedom of 
thought and expression’ alongside with some other important issues emphasised by the EU in 
the “short or middle term” (National Programme, 2001: 5; emphasis added). The preference of 
such a phrasing gives one the idea that there might have been some political bargaining in the 
drafting of the National Programme. Because the National Programme was prepared in a very 
short period of time by the coalition government and was not discussed in Parliament, this 
bargaining actually took place behind closed doors. It was, in fact, the MHP leader Devlet 
Bahçeli who pressured the other coalition partners to phrase the document as such. 
                                                 
36 This crisis that is often cited as the ‘Crisis of February 21’ is regarded as one of the most destructive economic 
crises in the history of the Republic. It sparked after a MGK meeting during which President Sezer and Prime 
Minister Ecevit had a row over the management of the banking sector, but full details on what has really 
happened at the meeting were never made public. Just in two days, all the markets crashed down and the crisis 
forced the government to abandon its controlled currency regime that was an important part of the IMF-
supported economic stabilisation programme for the preceding three years. The crisis also resulted in an 
important change in the Cabinet. The World Bank Vice-President Kemal Dervis was appointed as the new state 
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Throughout the whole process, Bahçeli remained opposed to EU reforms and constantly 
bargained with his coalition partners on the management of EU political criteria. 
 
Following the adoption of the National Programme, the first step was to make the necessary 
amendments to the constitution. The constitutional amendments were seen as the prerequisite 
for the reformation of the related laws. Parliament adopted a package of thirty-four 
amendments to the constitution in October 2001.37 At the time of the parliamentary 
discussions, the composition of Parliament was different. The Constitutional Court declared 
its decision of closing the Virtue Party that was one of the two opposition parties in 
Parliament on 22 June 2001 on the grounds of its anti-secular activities. Following the closure, 
the seats of the party were divided between two newly established parties; the Felicity Party 
(SP) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP). However, more than the fragmentation in 
Parliament, it was the strife within the coalition partners on the issues of EU conditionality 
that affected the workings of Parliament. The crisis in government heightened in the 
aftermath of the October 2001 and in less than a year the tripartite coalition government fell 
apart and Parliament approved an early general election to take place on 3 November 2002. 
The bargaining in Parliament on setting a date for an early election went along with the 
bargaining on the issues of abolishing the death penalty and granting broadcasting and 
educational rights to ethnic communities, specifically to Kurds. This process is thoroughly 
analysed in Chapter 5. 
 
Despite the intensity of ‘Punch and Judy’ politics in the aftermath of the constitutional 
amendments, Parliament was successful in adopting three major reform packages as of August 
2002. The motive behind the timing and the speed of the reform packages was to clinch a date 
from the EU at the upcoming December 2002 Copenhagen Summit to begin accession talks. 
However, in its long awaited 2002 Progress Report on Turkey, the European Commission 
acknowledged Turkey’s “noticeable progress towards meeting the Copenhagen political 
criteria” but remained silent about whether or when to begin the accession talks. The 
Commission was still critical about the lack of effective implementation of political criteria and 
                                                                                                                                                    
minister in charge of the economy. Dervis was directly involved in the drafting of the National Programme and 
later influenced the establishment of a new party. 
37 By amending the Constitution, Parliament took the first step to tackle the most controversial issues in the 
scope of the Copenhagen criteria. It limited the execution of death penalty; withdrew the language bias to pave 
the way for broadcasts in other languages than Turkish; increased the civilian powers in the MGK; removed the 
legal barriers to freedom of assembly and demonstrations; enhanced property rights and made it more difficult to 
ban political parties. 
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emphasised that there were still lots to be fulfilled in regard to changing the ‘mental set’ in 
Turkey. 
 
The result of the 3rd November general election was a great surprise to the country. Despite 
increasing Euroscepticism in Turkey, the public did not vote for the nationalist and anti-EU 
MHP. Interestingly, it did not vote for the liberal and pro-EU ANAP either. The AKP, which 
presented itself promoting ‘conservative democracy’, headed the general election by getting 
the 34 per cent of the votes.38 From the former composition of Parliament, there was only one 
more party who managed to pass the national threshold. The CHP got 19 per cent of the 
votes and became the second party and main opposition. All the other parties were wiped out. 
It was in 1983, almost two decades ago, that ANAP came to power by getting 45 per cent of 
the votes. After two decades, Turkey was witnessing another milestone in its political history. 
AKP now had 353 of the 550 seats in Parliament. 
 
From the early days of its establishment the AKP was very favourable towards Turkey’s EU 
membership. This approach was even enshrined in the party programme.39 In her comparison 
of the positions of the political parties in the post-Helsinki period Avcı (2004) suggests: 
 
The AKP, on the other hand, has preferred to ‘decouple’ the EU issue from ideology 
politics. If ideology were sufficient to predict party positions, the AKP should be 
more opposed to the EU. Yet despite its ideological heritage, the AKP prefers a 
more Europhile stance. Utility rather than ideology has come to the forefront when 
approaching or framing the issue of membership. This of course does not mean that 
ideological tendencies are irrelevant, but rather that opportunity structures offered by 
European integration have lured the AKP away from Euro-scepticism (Avcı, 2004: 
210). 
 
 
However, the AKP’s Islamist roots continued to antagonise the Turkish political elite, 
particularly the army. On the other hand, the AKP’s liberal undercurrents were a matter of 
concern within the party itself. The conservative wing of the AKP cadres was also critical of 
the EU agenda. The reactions of the AKP and other political parties to Europeanisation are 
further assessed in the following section.  
 
 
 
                                                 
38 The turnout rate in 3 November 2002 election was 79.14 per cent.  
39 See: The Justice and Development Party (2001) Development and Democratisation Programme, 19 August 
2001, Ankara. Available at: http://www.belgenet.com/parti/program/ak_1.html [Retrieved 15.12.2004]. 
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3.3.2 Reactions to Europeanisation: Political Parties, the Army, the Public and Beyond 
a) Political Parties  
 
Turkey has been undergoing a drastic transformation since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, 
where key decisions on the enlargement of the EU were taken. Turkey’s ‘journey’ to Europe 
has been officially started at Helsinki, where it was granted candidate status and shifted to a 
new phase in October 2005 with the start of accession talks. In between two dates, Turkey has 
gone through a very important process of ‘Europeanisation’ of its public policies to fulfil the 
candidate criteria. However, as Tocci (2005: 75) notes, just like any other country in transition, 
the relation between the domestic change in Turkey and EU conditionality has not been a 
“linear relationship”, but it has rather been a multilayered process. 
 
Research conducted in April/May 2000 among sixty-one MPs in Parliament precisely reveal 
how the policy-makers at that time regarded Turkey’s EU bid at the very beginning of the 
candidacy process. Müftüler-Bac and McLaren (2003) in this research illustrated that the MPs 
regarded political problems such as human rights violations and democratisation as the most 
important obstacle for Turkey’s accession to the EU (43 per cent). In relation to this, most of 
the MPs (33 per cent) regarded the improvements in human rights and democratisation as the 
most important advantages of becoming an EU member, whereas 27 per cent of the 
respondents saw the advantage in socio-economic development. When the possible 
disadvantages/costs of becoming a member were asked, 26 per cent responded that there 
would be none; 24 per cent mentioned “cultural degeneration” and 23 per cent emphasised 
“economic deterioration”. On the issue of sovereignty, 44 per cent of the MPs surveyed stated 
that there would be an increase in Turkey’s sovereignty once it becomes a full member. And 
finally, some responses to other questions on the euro, possible changes in the structure of the 
EU member states revealed the fact that the Turkish MPs had a limited knowledge on how 
things work in the EU.  
 
The results of this research confirm, to a great extent, what Rumford (2003: 379) observes in 
the Turkish political elite: “[c]osmopolitan and transnational processes of democratisation are 
frequently perceived by Turkey’s Kemalist political elites as being contrary to the interests of 
democratic harmony and a threat to national integrity”. However, it is also important to 
recognise the fact, which was also pointed by Rumford (ibid., 381), that the uncertainty 
surrounding the political climate in the process of democratisation has been an important 
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factor influencing the reactions of the Turkish political elite against Europeanisation. As 
Kulahci (2005: 393) argues, the EU had an influence on four important areas in Turkey: i) 
“capital/labour cleavage”; ii) “centre/periphery cleavage”; iii) “clerical/anticlerical cleavage”; 
and iv) “liberty/authority” political axis. In this respect, issues on democratisation that were 
crosscutting these areas, such as granting cultural rights to ethnic communities or diminishing 
the influence of the army in politics, were seen extremely ‘costly’ (Kubicek, 2005: 365). 
November 2002 elections are particularly important in this context as it took place at a point 
when the debate on the costs and benefits of compliance with EU conditionality reached its 
peak in Turkey. As Kulahci (2005: 393-4) rightly points out, although elections and electors 
are not regarded as important factors in research on the effects of EU conditionality on the 
domestic context, they have great importance in the Turkish context to understand Turkey’s 
reactions to Europeanisation and EU conditionality. 
 
Where the coalition government of the time is considered, the ANAP and its leader Mesut 
Yılmaz was the most proactive in pushing the EU agenda (Önis, 2003: 17). In contrast, the 
major party DSP and its leader, the then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, was not efficient in 
leading the agenda and moderating different sides of the debate.40 However, not surprisingly, it 
was the MHP and its leader Devlet Bahçeli who had the most rigorous anti-EU stance. 
Bahçeli started blocking the Europeanisation process shortly after the adoption of the 
National Programme in March 2001. He was the main actor of major crises during the process 
and he constantly kept ‘pace-setting’ and ‘foot-dragging’ to contest the reforms.41 As Canefe 
and Bora (2003: 128) points out, MHP’s positioning in Turkish politics should be regarded as 
the continuation of the “nationalist-conservative” tradition, which is in fact a blend of other 
traditions of “Turkism, Islamism, cultural purism, defensive nationalism and reverse 
Orientalism”. As the analysis in Chapter 5 confirms, the MHP’s foot-dragging during the 
discussions on granting broadcasting rights to ethnic communities in Turkey, especially to 
Kurds, was completely based on these sentiments.  
 
                                                 
40 There is actually a great paradox here. The Left in Turkey – of which its centre is represented by the DSP – 
swung between pro-Europe and Eurosceptic stances throughout the whole debate. This paradox should be 
understood in relation to the party’s positioning in Turkish political life and the dynamics within the party. For a 
very interesting critique of the organisational structure in the DSP and Ecevits’s leadership, see: Kiniklioglu 
(2002).  
41 I borrow ‘pace setting’ and ‘foot dragging’ concepts from Börzel (2002), who uses these concepts to explain 
how EU member states upload their policies to the EU level in order to minimise the costs of Europeanisation in 
their domestic policy environments. The reason why I use these concepts to characterise the MHP leader Devlet 
Bahçeli’s approach towards the EU agenda is because I identify these as strategies deliberately used by him 
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However, in terms of the political context of Europeanisation in Turkey, the most important 
party is, undoubtedly, the AKP. Its election victory in November 2002 marked a great shift in 
Turkish politics. This shift can only be understood in the context of first the rise of political 
Islam in Turkey from late 1970s onwards and then of its transformation in the late 1990s. 
Within this transformation, the changing attitude of Islamist parties towards the EU is also 
very important. The AKP is actually very unique in terms of how it used the EU in a very 
pragmatic way. From the very beginning of its establishment, the AKP situated itself in the 
centre-right and presented its political aspirations as ‘pro-European’, ‘pro-reform’ and 
committed to the IMF led economic programme. As Dogan (2005: 430) suggests, “for the 
pragmatic AKP leadership, the quest for EU membership is a useful way of avoiding conflict, 
staying in power and executing their declared program, which is not in conflict with the EU 
case”. Kulahci (2005: 402) takes this argument one step further by stating that “the AKP 
concentrated significantly on using Europe in order to transform Turkish domestic polity to 
the extent that this can ensure further the political survival or even the consolidation of the party 
as well as Sunni political Islam”. And in this respect, according to the author, “AKP is closer 
to absorption which ‘indicates changes as adaptation’ than transformation which is about 
paradigmatic change” in relation to the substance of Europeanisation it governs (ibid.; 
emphasis in original).42 Although Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the AKP and the 
current Prime Minister, has many times declared a non-attachment with Islamic circles and 
labelled the party as ‘Conservative Democrat’, this perception on “its democratization 
attempts as attempts to weaken the secular, Kemalist aspects of the Turkish state and 
therefore as having a hidden Islamist agenda” has continued (Müftüler-Bac, 2005: 25). For the 
Kemalist political elite, the AKP was not sincere about EU reforms and would not hesitate to 
veil its ‘anti-secular’ policy agenda under the ‘democratisation’ cover. Therefore, as might be 
expected, it was foremost the Turkish army that was very ‘vigilant’ about the rise of the AKP 
in particular and the whole EU agenda in general. As of May 2007, this mistrust of the secular 
circles towards the AKP resulted in a very severe crisis that unfolded during the Presidential 
election.  
                                                                                                                                                    
throughout the process. In this respect, I do not use these concepts in order to indicate an aspect of Turkey-EU 
relations, but instead I use them to specify an aspect of domestic politics. 
42 Dogan (2005) and Kulahci (2005) both acknowledge that this shift in rhetoric in Islamic parties towards 
Europe took place before the AKP. As Dogan (2005: 428) puts it, when the army pressured the Welfare Party 
(the predecessor of the AKP) to resign from the coalition government in 1997 by announcing its ‘February 28 
memorandum’, the cadres of the party realised that any level of democratisation that would be triggered by the 
EU would also help to secure their political future. Moreover, Islamist business entrepreneurs represented by 
MÜSIAD (the Independent Association of Industrialists and Businessmen) demanded this shift to promote their 
businesses. This shift was also demanded by the socio-economic Islamic capital. In Turkey, the debate on ‘liberal 
Islam’ or ‘Islamic liberalism’ emerged in this context. See also: Önis (2001b). 
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b) The Army 
 
Where the underlying motives behind the reactions of different political and non-political 
actors against Europeanisation in Turkey are concerned, it was not actually the ‘anti’ vs ‘pro’ 
axis that divided the sides of the debate. As Aydinli and Waxman (2001: 384) suggest, the real 
division was rather in between the “integralists” vs “gradualists” as the rift between different 
sides was not on Turkey’s eventual membership to the EU, but it was on the “speed” and 
“management” of change. The authors argue that in the process of EU reforms, the integralist 
camp was mainly represented by “centrist political parties [especially ANAP], the media 
[except some individual columnists], the foreign ministry and the business world as 
represented by groups such as the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association 
(TÜSIAD) and even the more conservative, Islamically oriented Individual Industrialists’ and 
Businessmen’s Association (MÜSIAD)” who affirmed a rapid transformation with the belief 
that Turkey is capable of a transformation on this scale and EU reforms would be to Turkey’s 
benefit in regard to democratisation and modernisation (ibid., 385). In contrast with the 
integralists, the gradualists were the army, the MHP, the Republican elite43 (mostly the centre-
left) and some top level officers of the Turkish judiciary who regarded some of EU conditions 
very costly and argued that more time is needed so that the society could ‘digest’ the changes. 
This division offered by Aydinli and Waxman (2001) is extremely useful, but it would also be 
fair to argue that the army’s stance in the debate has been definitely more influential than any 
other group during the whole process.  
 
The ways in which the army got involved with the political process of Europeanisation in 
Turkey by no means has a linear manifestation. Despite the substance of its influence, the 
army itself was also affected by the process. As noted earlier, the army’s involvement in 
politics in Turkey has often been justified on the grounds of its ‘guardianship’ of the secular 
Republic role. Yet, as Cizre (2004) suggests, from the second half of 1980s onwards: 
 
The main instrument affecting the military’s expanded influence over Turkey’s 
development and its autonomy from civilian actors has been the redefinition of the 
‘national security concept’. Internal political discord has been re-interpreted in the 
language of internal security threats. Hence, Islamic activism and Kurdish nationalism 
were singled out as internal security threats and given primacy over the external ones 
(Cizre, 2004: 108; emphasis added).  
 
                                                 
43 The term ‘Republican elite’ is used interchangeably with the term ‘Kemalist elite’ in this study. 
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It is this context where the ‘sensitivities’ of the army overlapped with the EU agenda. The 
army’s reaction against EU reforms had more to do with its scepticism towards the 
‘competence’ of Turkish politicians to tackle all the related issues attached to the 
‘democratisation’ debate (Heper, 2005: 37). According to the top level army generals, EU-
driven democratisation initiatives were all related to the crucial aspects of sovereignty, which 
in return increased various concerns on national security. To put it differently, what the EU 
regarded as the ‘meddling’ of the army in politics in Turkey, the army itself regarded as 
‘appropriate’. The main instrument that the army asserted its influence over civilian politics 
was its significance in the National Security Council (MGK). This is why the MGK became 
the target of EU criticism. Although the EU has never attached the ‘elimination of the 
influence of the army’ to its conditionality, the criticism has been significant in almost every 
progress report.44 The EU had the belief that MGK’s influence on politics could only be 
‘reduced’ by increasing the civilian powers represented in the Council. 
 
Despite its general scepticism towards the EU related reforms and having conflicting views on 
related matters, taking an anti-EU stance was simply not affordable for the army.45 This 
became very significant for the top level army officials when hardcore Eurosceptics – the 
MHP and the nationalist left – started using the army to support their arguments against EU 
reforms when the debate on granting cultural rights to Kurds was at its peak. The army was 
also very well aware of the fact that a ‘transformation’ within was inevitable, otherwise the 
most important future prospect for the country would just vanish. Besides, all in all, EU 
membership was an integral part of the modernisation project as articulated in Kemalist 
ideology. ‘Uniting with the West’ was set as the ultimate national target for Turkey since the 
establishment of the Republic and EU membership corresponded to what ‘West’ came to 
represent itself as in 2000s. Therefore, the army would conflict with itself if it opposed 
Turkey’s EU membership prospect. It is this context that the army’s attitude towards EU 
reforms eventually altered from a very negative reactionary approach to a supportive role in 
two years time. Consequently, the army did not only turn on the ‘green lights’ for EU reforms 
related to the political criteria, but it also agreed on the subsequent reforms on the structure 
and functions of the MGK. Accordingly, first, the number of the civilians in the MGK was 
increased from five to nine with the constitutional amendments that Parliament adopted in 
                                                 
44 For instance, see: European Commission (1999: 8; 2001: 13; 2002: 25).  
45 For a very interesting comparison between the then Secrretary-General of the MGK, General Tuncer Kilinc, 
and General Hilmi Özkök, the then Chief of Staff, in regard to their reactions to the EU reform in 2003, see: M. 
Heper (2005).  
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October 2001. But, the most important structural changes took place after the adoption of the 
seventh reform package in July 2003. With the changes, the MGK was turned into an advisory 
body that would no longer “recommend measures” that the government “has to give top 
priority” as stipulated in the 1982 Constitution, but it was now to “convey its views upon 
request” that would only be “assessed” by the government. Additionally, the Secretary 
General post of the MGK would no longer be occupied by a military general and was replaced 
by a civilian in August 2004.  
 
To put in very simple terms, the outcome of the influence of the EU on democratising policy-
making in Turkey by asserting indirect pressure for reducing, if not completely eliminating, the 
intervention of the army in politics proved to be an example of Europeanisation as 
“absorption” (Radaelli, 2003: 37). Limited changes were accommodated within the legislative 
framework, but no change could be made in the fundamental logics of the policy actors and in 
the dynamics of their relationship. The army kept intervening in politics and the particular 
developments in Iraq and their perceived impacts on Turkey became the key grounds on 
which the army legitimised its intervention on the basis of ‘national security’. As of 2006, the 
picture was much more complicated. The AKP government tried to rebuff the army’s 
influence in politics by overtly challenging it in public but since it was not successful in 
reconciling the nationalist and anti-EU sentiments among the public, the army kept steering 
the political agenda by relying its guardianship role. To put it differently, the army never 
exposed its Euroscepticism by directly targeting the EU; it veiled its scepticism by criticising 
the AKP government. Within this context, the army strengthened its status as the most 
trusted national institution in the public eye but the EU reform process started losing its 
momentum since the AKP government was stuck in the hurdles of domestic politics.  
 
             c) The Public, Civil Society, Business Circles and Other Non-Political Actors  
 
Overall, it would be fair to argue that the process of change in Turkey following the Helsinki 
Summit in 1999 to December 2004 when Turkey clinched a date from the EU for the launch 
of accession talks was initially a top-down democratisation process in which domestic political 
constraints directed the agenda to a larger extent. However, discussing this process only in 
relation to parliamentary politics and excluding the role of the civil society, business circles 
and the public would be misleading.  
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Then again, defining what civil society refers to in the Turkish context is a very difficult task. 
As Kubicek (2005: 366) put is, “Turkish civil society has traditionally been portrayed as weak, 
passive, and controlled or channelled by the state through corporatist structures”. The reason 
why Turkish civil society developed as such is obviously a historical matter, which has been 
usually discussed in the context of ‘centre vs periphery’ dichotomy in Turkey. The étatism 
tradition in Turkey in which the raison d’etre and the prolongation of the state is prioritised over 
the prosperity of the individual, centre asserted itself the role to educate the “ignorant masses” 
of the periphery that were always seen as rebellious and disorderly (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 250). As 
Güneş-Ayata (1994: 49) suggests, this “dependency of the periphery on the centre […] has led 
to the endurance and proliferation of personal dependencies in the form of patron-client 
relationships” and under these circumstances the development of an autonomous, 
decentralised and self-instructed civil society was not possible. But Kalaycıoğlu (2002) 
persuasively argues that: 
 
[I]t is not the strength but the relative weakness of the Turkish state that impedes the 
full development of civil society. The weakness leads to lack of regulatory, extractive 
and distributive capacity on the part of the state, which renders the elite (centre) 
vulnerable and fearful about the discontent of the masses (periphery) (Kalaycıoğlu, 
2002: 261).  
 
From the 1980s onwards another type of civil society formation began to emerge in Turkey, 
which quickly became highly politicised. According to Keyman and Icduygu (2003: 222-5), 
four interrelated processes influenced the formation of civil society in Turkey: i) the 
emergence of alternative modernities (e.g., the rise of political Islam); ii) the legitimacy crisis of 
the strong-state tradition (e.g., the rise of identity politics); iii) the process of globalisation; and 
finally iv) the process of European integration. However, Keyman and Icduygu (2003: 228) 
regard the formation of civil society parallel to these processes as having a “boundary 
problem” since “to what extent civil society organizations in Turkey are in fact operating as 
‘civil society organization’ in terms of the scope and the content of their activities, their 
relation to the state, and their normative and ideological formations” is very problematic. 
Although exact figures vary, as of 2004, there were over 100,000 associations in Turkey. Some 
of them grouped around issues such as business, academic, human rights, peace, and 
environment and so forth, but only a limited number of these actively engaged with 
influencing policy-making processes (see Göksel and Güneş, 2005). However, two of these 
associations is worthy of mentioning here. The first one is the Turkish Economic and Social 
Studies Foundation (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı – TESEV) and the second one is 
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the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (Türkiye Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği 
– TÜSİAD). 
 
TESEV is an Istanbul based think-tank established in 1994 which promotes a policy agenda 
through studies it publishes. It is funded by private sector and its research agenda focuses on 
three major areas: ‘democratisation of Turkey’; ‘governance and transparency’; and ‘foreign 
policy and international relations’. TESEV contributed to the EU debate by actively engaging 
with political circles. One of its most important contributions to the process was to provide 
financial support for a major national survey conducted in May and June 2002. This survey 
was conducted at a time when the controversy over EU conditionality on the protection of 
minority rights in Turkey was at its peak. It consisted of interviews with 3,060 citizens and 
aimed at measuring the attitudes of the public toward the EU in general and EU conditionality 
in particular (TESEV, 2002). This survey was significant since it was the first time that the 
voice of the public was heard and the results were striking. The survey revealed that the 
majority of the public was in favour of basic rights and freedoms (73 per cent). However, the 
results changed when these rights and freedoms were phrased as the requirements of EU 
conditionality. In this case, the support of the public was dropped to 41 per cent for the 
condition to abolish the restrictions on broadcasting in citizens’ own native languages and to 
38 per cent for the condition to abolish the death penalty. When some of these conditions 
were phrased as “the only condition to join the EU”, there was not much of a difference in 
general, but most of the support came from the Kurdish speakers. Accordingly, when asked 
whether they approve abolishing restrictions on the language of broadcasting, if it is presented 
as the only condition for EU membership, 38.9 per cent of the public of which 69 per cent 
consisted of Kurdish speakers approved. When a similar question was presented on the issue 
of abolishing restrictions on education in native languages, 37.3 per cent approved of which 
68 per cent consisted of Kurdish speakers. All in all, the survey concluded that the Turkish 
public had a very limited knowledge on the EU and their attitudes were context-dependant. In 
October 2002, just before the elections on the 3rd of November, and in January-February 
2003 a follow-up research was conducted. This research revealed that the public’s attention to 
the EU agenda dropped after the elections. The results of this follow-up research confirmed 
that party affiliations did not matter for the public in their attitudes towards Turkey’s EU 
membership. It was rather personal expectations and geographical as well as generational 
differences that mattered. This also explains why political parties did not solely focus the 
election ‘Europe’. However, the lack of information about the process made the public more 
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vulnerable to manipulation. Therefore, Çarkoğlu (2004: 42) who was the head of the research 
group conducted these surveys concludes that “leadership and public relations campaigns in 
favour of EU membership may be highly effective” in the long-run given the fact that EU 
support levels in Turkey change in clusters, not margins (see also Çarkoğlu, 2003).  
 
The most vocal group in their support to the EU related reforms was the national business 
community in Turkey, mostly represented by TÜSİAD. TÜSİAD has been very active in 
pressuring the consecutive governments to improve the civil and human rights in the country 
since 1997 especially by delivering public statements and publishing its own reports. Its 
representatives in Brussels carried out a very active lobbying role during the process leading 
up to the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. The involvement of TÜSİAD in the EU 
agenda is, of course, directly related to how big Turkish business corporations viewed the 
prospective of Turkey’s EU membership as a great benefit to their current and future 
investments. In this respect, it can well be argued that in TÜSİAD’s democratisation agenda, 
the emphasis on the urgency of improving democracy in Turkey was grounded in its reaction 
to the lack of economic stability in the country. As Gündem (2004) suggests: 
 
TÜSİAD progressively pushed for smaller and accountable government and the 
implementation of the rule of law as a means of accomplishing a stable and 
predictable environment in which a competitive market system could flourish. 
Stability, predictability and accountability emerged as the key concerns underlying 
TÜSİAD’s drive for democratization (Gündem, 2004: 86). 
 
 
It is true that TÜSİAD has always been a very influential organisation, but this influence 
became very powerful in the context of Turkey-EU relations. As Gündem (2004: 103) points 
out, “TÜSİAD’s lobbying activities are very effective because the organization knows the style 
to act. Their activities are persistent, morally charged and professional.” It is organised in such 
a way that it “fills the diplomatic and social gaps that other actors are ill-equipped to fill” 
(ibid., 100) However, in contrast with the business circles, the labour unions in Turkey were 
very sceptic about the EU agenda. The Confederation of Turkish Labour Unions (Türkiye İşçi 
Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – TÜRK-İŞ) situated itself in line with the nationalist-left and right 
circles, which kept bringing up issues on national sovereignty and autonomy in their criticisms 
towards the EU (Önis, 2003: 20). In this respect, the contradiction between the two is 
remarkable.  
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The emphasis on economic issues was also evident in the views of the non-political actors in 
Turkey. Although it is limited in scope, the only available research revealing the perspectives 
of academics, journalists and government ministers alongside with businessmen was 
conducted by Lauren M. Mclaren in Ankara in March-April 1999.46 Mclaren (2000: 118) 
observes “disconnectedness” between the EU and the Turkish elites regarding the problems 
with Turkey’s membership to the EU. As she suggests, “this imbalance appears in the form of 
over-emphasis on economic problems and a lack of emphasis on political problems, such as 
human rights violations, the lack of civilian control over the military, and the resolution of the 
Cyprus dispute with Greece” (ibid.). However, in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit in 
December 1999, the core of the EU process was not an interpretation of these non-political 
actors on what they believe the core of the EU process should be, the EU itself asserted the 
core of the process by prioritising the compliance of EU democratic conditionality.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
When EU-Turkey relations are put in an historical context, it is seen that one way or the other 
Turkey has always been part of the process of European integration from the very beginning, 
without integrating with Europe. The most challenging question at this point is whether being 
an official candidate and starting accession talks will really be effective enough to overcome 
the legacy of Turkey’s almost half century long association with European integration. Clearly, 
this is not only a matter of Turkey’s ‘performance’ as a candidate country, but is also a matter 
of the EU’s commitment to enlargement. 
 
The most complex intervening variable influencing the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations 
continues to be ‘uncertainty’ built into the process. As the experiences of the CEEs 
confirmed, the stick of conditionality works at its best when candidates are given a concrete 
timetable regarding when they will have the carrot of membership. As Grabbe (2001: 320) 
points out, this uncertainty about timing makes it very difficult for the candidate state to 
balance the costs with the benefits of the membership and since there is a huge time lapse 
between the unfolding of costs and the prospect of rewards, conditionality becomes “a blunt 
instrument when it comes to persuading countries to change possible practices”. Where 
                                                 
46 McLaren (2000: 117) regards these groups as belonging to what she calls as “Turkish elite”. In fact, the 
research, in her own terms, was conducted with the aim of providing “some insight into Turkish opinions 
relating to Turkey’s application for full membership to the EU by interviewing Turkish elites”. However, 
although I found some of the conclusions of this research extremely useful, I still believe that it suffers from 
certain definitional problems, especially regarding the notion of the ‘elite’.  
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Turkey is concerned, the EU is neither committed to any timetable to be announced in a 
foreseeable future, nor is Turkey entitled to demand one. This, in return, undermines the 
effectiveness of democratic conditionality that the EU reinforces on Turkey. On the other 
hand, Schimmelfening et al. (2003: 496) argue that in Turkey where the society is not well-
integrated to the process and there is a high level of “electoral volatility”, reinforcement of 
democratic conditionality can mostly be effective via intergovernmental bargaining – i.e., “the 
government’s cost-benefit calculations and commitment to ‘Europe’” (ibid., 498). In this 
respect, it is true that EU conditionality has proven to be effective following the adoption of 
the National Programme in March 2001 when ‘democratisation’ became the catch-phrase of 
the emerging reform agenda. However, since democratic conditionality was perceived to be 
very ‘costly’ by the establishment, compliance has been limited and subjected to bargaining 
between different actor constellations. Accession negotiations are carried our between the 
Turkish government and the European Commission on behalf of the EU, but since there is 
too much dispute in Turkey over how EU conditionality should be handled, “government 
leadership is a very difficult act in balancing these different domestic demands, all of which 
can materially affect its ability to succeed” (Pridham, 2002a: 204). As Pridham (2002b: 954) 
elsewhere suggests, “strengthening executive and bureaucratic power without active popular 
engagement […] creates a potential for widening the gap between political elite and masses 
[…] creating a disillusionment when democratic attitudes have not fully taken”. In Turkey, it 
was exactly the strengthening of the executive and the bureaucracy that caused a particular 
problem. The Kemalist elite, especially the army, was/still is very uncomfortable with the 
additional power the EU process gave to the AKP government in executing the contested EU 
democratic reforms. As Schimmelfening et al. (2003: 507) observes, “[a]lthough there is a 
cleavage within the Turkish elite between reform-oriented and pro-European forces, on the 
one hand, and hard-line Kemalists on the other, the veto position of the military works against 
structural change”.  
 
In this framework, broadcasting regulation is a very intriguing area of enquiry to look into the 
ways in which EU influence operated in Turkey in the post-Helsinki period on different 
grounds. Firstly, it is one of the first policy areas where Turkey was introduced to EU 
democratic conditionality. Thus, the above mentioned political struggle between different 
actor constellations in Turkey on the issues of Turkey’s EU bid first unfolded in the context 
of broadcasting policy-making, specifically at a time when granting broadcasting rights to 
ethnic communities became a central issue in the political agenda from 2001 onwards. In this 
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respect, the policy-process behind the change of language policy in broadcasting offers us 
valuable insights on how EU conditionality operated from policy formulation to the 
implementation phase. Secondly, although EU influence is most apparent where political 
conditions are concerned, Europeanisation has broader implications for the regulation of 
broadcasting in Turkey. The EU also channels the international/global competitive pressures 
on the Turkish broadcasting market to a certain direction to make sure that Turkey’s response 
to these pressures as a candidate country does not conflict with EU’s objectives in regard to 
the European Single Market. In relation to this, the debate on opening the broadcasting 
market to foreign ownership in Turkey offers a very interesting case. Thus, the above- 
mentioned political context of EU-Turkey relations and specific remarks on politics and 
policy-making in Turkey are also significant in understanding how EU influence has operated 
beyond the context of democratic conditionality in Turkey in the aftermath of the Helsinki 
Summit in 1999. The following three chapters will be looking into the policy-processes behind 
key regulatory issues of broadcasting that emerged between 1999 and 2005 in the context of 
the dynamics of Turkish politics presented in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4: 
 
APPROACHES TO BROADCASTING REGULATION  
IN THE POST-HELSINKI PERIOD:  
THE ACQUIS CONDITIONALITY vs TURKISH POLITICS 
 
 
 
Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it 
everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the 
wrong remedies.  
Groucho Marx (1890-1977) – American Comedian  
 
Broadcasting […] is a social invention, not a technical 
one.   (Seaton, 1981/1997: 111)   
 
 
4.1 The Context 
 
By the time Turkey’s EU bid became a political reality following the Helsinki Summit in 1999, 
there were a number of issues regarding the regulation of broadcasting in Turkey which were 
highly contentious but could not be resolved due to the ongoing deadlock in the field. This 
deadlock was mainly the by-product of the complexity of the relation between the state actors 
and the media owners as well as the lack of independence of the regulatory authorities from 
political circles.  
 
In the following chapters, the changes in the regulatory framework for broadcasting from 
1999 to 2005 are assessed by relating the key policy issues to the debates on accession to the 
EU in general and EU conditionality in particular. It is true that broadcasting was one of the 
first policy areas that Turkey was acquainted with EU influence, but this influence operated 
differently for different policy issues in broadcasting. The first EU influence was an outcome 
of the EU’s emphasis on the political criteria as stated in the Copenhagen European Council 
Summit in 1993. The EU required the candidate countries to achieve “stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities” to obtain membership (EU Council, 1993). In the eye of the EU, Turkey had the 
basic institutional structures required in a democratic society, yet there were all sorts of crucial 
shortcomings regarding the effective functioning of the democracy. Therefore, it was in the 
scope of the political criteria that the EU pressured for more democratisation in the field of 
broadcasting on the issues of freedom of expression, freedom of press and minority rights 
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once it granted Turkey candidacy status in the Helsinki Summit. Leaving the quality of the 
implementation aside, this pressure was particularly forceful in the launch of the debate on 
granting broadcasting rights to ethnic communities and the consecutive policy change in the 
language of broadcasts in Turkey, which is the focus of the next chapter in this study. 
 
Alongside with this democratisation agenda, the EU has been also monitoring the compliance 
of the acquis criteria for the ‘audio-visual’ sector in Turkey. However, when the first Progress 
Report on Turkey was published in November 1998, it was evident that the European 
Commission had very limited information on the conditions of the sector in Turkey. 
Regarding broadcasting, the 1998 Report concluded that: 
  
On the basis of information currently available, however, it is difficult to assess the 
extent of the harmonisation achieved by Turkey in this field, in particular as far as the 
‘Television without frontiers’ Directive […] is concerned. Further contacts with the 
Turkish authorities will be necessary (European Commission, 1998: 47). 
 
 
A similar comment was also made in the second 1999 Progress Report, but this time the 
European Commission cautiously commented that “Turkish broadcasting legislation can not be 
considered as being in full conformity with the acquis” (European Commission, 1999: 39; emphasis 
added). The reluctance of the European Commission in drafting a more detailed assessment 
of the audio-visual sector in Turkey was mostly due to its lacking of sources to obtain more 
information, which was also acknowledged in both reports. However, it is also important to 
note that Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the EU was still very unclear even at the time when the 
second report was published. Regular reports were important for assessing the pre-accession 
process in candidate countries and Turkey was, in fact, the only non-candidate monitored by 
the European Commission.47 Besides, as widely known, the main audio-visual policy tool of 
the EU within the scope of the community acquis has been the Television Without Frontiers 
Directive. Therefore, in its early reports, the European Commission did not go any further 
than emphasising the importance of compliance with the directive in the Turkish case. After 
Turkey was granted candidacy status at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the scope of 
the assessment as developed in the progress report became more in-depth. The 2000 Progress 
                                                 
47 The decision to prepare progress reports on the status of each candidate country was confirmed at European 
Council Cardiff Summit held in 15-16 June 1998. In the case of Turkey, the Council asked the Commission to 
prepare the report on Turkey on the basis of Article 28 of the Association Agreement and the conclusions of the 
Luxemburg European Council. Article 28 of the Agreement stipulates that “as soon as the operation of the 
Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out 
of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession 
of Turkey to the Community” (EEC Council, 1963). 
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Report on Turkey published in November was the first fully-fledged report prepared by the 
Commission. Even the name of the main broadcasting regulatory authority in Turkey was 
cited for the first time in this report, not surprisingly, under the section of ‘civil and political’ 
rights. The very first remark of the Commission on the Radio and Television Supreme 
Council (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu – RTÜK) was a referral to its sanctioning activities. In 
its overall assessment of the culture and audio-visual policy in Turkey, the EU Commission 
concluded in its 2000 Progress Report that:  
 
A preliminary analysis of the Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television 
Enterprises and their Broadcasts suggests that the legislation is not aligned with the 
acquis. Major discrepancies have been identified, in particular, concerning definitions, 
jurisdiction, freedom of reception, and discrimination on the grounds of nationality, 
promotion of European and independent works, advertising and teleshopping, and 
protection of minors. Furthermore, the law sets limits to the share of foreign capital in 
radio and television enterprise. (European Commission, 2000: 59). 
 
 
This conclusion was particularly important as it set the contours of the EU’s aquis criteria 
regarding broadcasting in the scope of pre-accession talks with Turkey.48 In this chapter, 
taking up from this conclusion, the ways in which certain issues on broadcasting were brought 
into the policy agenda and their specific policy outcomes are analysed. Specifically, the chapter 
looks at: i) EU influence on the emergence of new policies to regulate broadcasting and ii) the 
ways in which the then tripartite coalition government from April 1999 to November 2002 
and the consecutive AKP government that has been in office since November 2002 used the 
EU as a ‘discursive tool’ to change the regulatory framework for broadcasting by promoting 
certain policy options but not others. In order to do so, a particular attention is given to what 
Colebatch (2002: 23) identifies as the ‘horizontal’ dimension of policy in which policy is 
regarded as “the structuring of action” and the focus is on interaction between different policy 
actors. Since EU influence has not always been direct, but also engineered by policy-makers 
seeking to exploit new approaches to broadcasting policy, EU influence identified throughout 
is also contextualised within this horizontal dimension as well.  
 
In this chapter, before moving on to the anlaysis of the policy issues, a brief historical 
overview of the emergence of broadcast media is presented in order to give an idea about the 
origins of  the complexities of broadcasting in Turkey. The first policy process analysed after 
                                                 
48 Until the 2003 Progress Report, the European Commission also cautioned Turkey on the contradictions 
between its commitments in the WTO/GATTS framework and those related to acquis conditionality. This 
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this overview is the amendment of the Broadcasting Law No. 3984 (hereafter Broadcasting 
Law) that was enacted in 1994. The Law amending the Broadcasting Law was first adopted in 
May 2001 and vetoed by President Necdet Sezer. Despite this veto, Parliament adopted the 
same Law unchanged a year later in May 2002. The impasse continued following the 
Constitutional Court’s intervention upon the President’s claim of unconstitutionality until 
September 2004 when the Court announced its final verdict. The first section of this chapter 
looks at this process by putting the scope and the timing of the amendments package in a 
context. The reactions that occurred at various stages during the policy process which 
influenced the policy outcome are also highlighted here. The following section gets into detail 
by focusing on specific policy issues such as ownership regulations and the regulation on the 
composition, supervision and the functions of the regulatory authority for broadcasting 
(RTÜK), which were the major issues covered in the draft law. The third section covers other 
amendments that are specifically relevant to Turkey’s conformity with the Television Without 
Frontiers Directive, mainly the regulations on advertising/teleshopping/sponsorship and the 
lifting of the ban on the re-transmission of broadcasts in Turkey.  
 
The second and the final policy-process analysed in this chapter is on the attempts to open the 
broadcast media market to foreign investment, which was not initiated but promoted by the 
AKP government from late 2004 onwards. The chapter concludes with a discussion on 
Europeanisation in the context of the policy-processes analysed in the chapter.  
 
4.2 A Brief Overview of Broadcasting in Turkey 
4.2.1 From Commercial Radio to Public Service Broadcasting 
  
Radio broadcasting in Turkey started in 1927. Considering that the Turkish Republic was 
established just a few years earlier in 1923, when broadcasting in Europe was in its infancy, 
Turkey’s swiftness in adapting wireless technology to create a broadcasting system was 
remarkable. What made broadcasting a very important social invention in the Turkish context 
was the pivotal role attributed to it in the nation-building project of the Republican elite. 
Therefore, the history of broadcasting in Turkey cannot be considered in isolation from the 
history of Turkey’s nation-building project, incorporating deep-rooted discourses on 
modernisation, development, industrialisation and westernisation (Çelenk, 2005). As Cankaya 
(2003: 18) observes of the 1920s, launching radio broadcasting was not simply an option but a 
                                                                                                                                                    
caution was withdrawn when Turkey declared at WTO Doha Round of negotiations that it will not offer to make 
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necessity for the young Turkish Republic. Radio could provide a means of galvanising public 
support for the Republican agenda and for elite in search of new venues to spread its reforms. 
 
However, in the 1920s, Turkey was a very young and impoverished Republic. It was clear at 
the very beginning that the required technical infrastructure could only be built by foreign 
companies expanding into new markets. Consequently, it was a French company – Telephonie 
Sans File – that won the state bid to set up the infrastructure of the Turkish PTT (Kejanlıoğlu, 
2001: 87). The company started building transmitters in 1925 and two of them were equipped 
to transmit radio broadcasts (Cankaya, 2003: 19). However, the state did not have the financial 
resources to run a broadcasting corporation and the best way to start broadcasts was to let a 
private company run broadcasting as a business. In the early years of the Republic the most 
significant economic policy was to support the creation of a national bourgeoisie by 
transferring the management of the public economic enterprises to national private companies 
in which politicians either held shares or were active in their administration (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001: 
87). This model was also adopted in broadcasting and in 1926 Turkish Wireless Telephony 
(Türk Telsiz Telefon AŞ. – TTAŞ) was the first and only joint-stock company to be granted a 
ten year broadcasting licence. In order to finance its broadcasts, TTAŞ was also active in radio 
merchandising receiving a tariff on broadcasting sets. The shareholders of TTAŞ were the 
Anatolian News Agency, the Bank of Affairs, two MPs and a retailer (see Kocabaşoğlu, 1980). 
What made this model very interesting was the fact that broadcasting became part of the state 
machinery from day one even though it was not directly run by the state. The state did not 
even feel the need to regulate broadcasting with a separate law, instead applied existing 
legislation that regulated wireless communication and telephony.  
 
During the first ten years, radio broadcasts were limited to between 4 and 5 hours a day both 
for Radio Istanbul and Radio Ankara. The 1929 economic crisis hit Turkey severely and had a 
very negative impact on the expansion of broadcasting. Nevertheless, what makes this period 
significant is the rise of broadcasting as a cultural phenomenon, which centred on utilising its 
content, particularly entertainment, to convey the modernisation/westernisation project of the 
state to its public. Indeed, this strict top-down approach to modernisation even resulted in the 
banning of Turkish music from the air in 1935 for almost two years (Cankaya, 2003: 23).    
 
                                                                                                                                                    
any commitments in the audio-visual sector. 
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The broadcasting licence of the TTAŞ was not renewed in 1936 on the basis that it did not 
provide the standard of broadcasting that was expected from it (Cankaya, 2003: 25). For 
example, in its first decade, the number of radio receivers sold did not exceed 10,000 and 
broadcasting still lacked a professional perspective and was not institutionalised (Kejanlıoğlu, 
1997: n/p). Moreover, in the 1930s, there were also changes in the state’s approach to 
economic and political life due to increasing international tensions. Turkey quickly became 
protectionist and statist, which also resulted in the nationalisation of broadcasting 
(Kocabaşoğlu, 1985: 2733).  The PTT was given control of radio between 1936 and 1940 and 
once this “transitional phase” was completed, the “period of state monopoly” began, lasting 
until 1964 (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001: 88). From 1940 onwards, broadcasting in Turkey was run by the 
Press Department until the establishment of the Turkish Radio Television Corporation 
(Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu – TRT) as an autonomous public body in 1964.  
 
It was during the years of the Second World War that radio broadcasting in Turkey started to 
fully establish itself. Ankara became the heart of broadcasting and the new Radio Centre with 
its powerful broadcast transmitter, constructed by the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company, 
became one of the most advanced broadcasting centres of its time in Europe. The popularity 
of radio increased during the war years as it became a key source of information for the 
public. As of 1939, the number of radio sets had increased to 56,000, but in terms of 
broadcast technology Turkey continued to depend upon the West (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 142). 
Where programming was concerned, however, the state increasingly became more conscious 
about how to use the radio for propagandist ends. Turkey’s foreign policy at the time was 
based on not getting involved in the war, while its domestic policy centred upon coping with 
the war’s impact in a manner that did not compromise its nation-building agenda. Under the 
single party regime, the then government used the radio to realise both of these objectives. As 
Cankaya (2003: 34) puts it, the demands of the listeners were not reflected in programming 
output and with its state-centric and paternalistic style the radio told the public “what was 
good and right for them”.  
 
In 1946, Turkey moved from a single-party regime to a multi-party system. Four years later, 
after the election of 1950, the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti – DP) came to power, staying 
in office for a decade. It was the reaction of the public to the strict statist regime of the 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP), imposed in a top-down fashion, 
that brought the DP to power. As Kejanlıoğlu (1997) suggests, the DP’s populist approach to 
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politics and its pro-market economic policy influenced its approach to broadcasting as well. 
For instance, the DP government breached the secular code, established under one party rule, 
by introducing religious programming from late 1950s. It was again the DP government who 
introduced advertising to finance programmes. It is also important to remember that from the 
second half of the 1940s onwards, Turkey sought to develop its economy by establishing close 
ties with the West, especially the US. Turkey was included in the Marshall Aid Plan in 1948 
and joined NATO in 1950.  As a consequence, increased ties with the West also had a direct 
impact on Turkish broadcasting. For instance, broadcasters were trained by Americans and 
special programmes on Marshall Aid, NATO, UNESCO and the United Nations were 
introduced, while collaborations with the BBC and Voice of America also began (Cankaya, 
2003: 50). Additionally, the country’s third broadcasting station was established in Izmir in 
1951 with the technical aid of the American News Centre. It was incorporated into the state 
broadcasting network a couple of years later (Kocabaşoğlu 1985: 2734-2735). 
  
However, under the DP rule broadcasting increasingly became a propaganda tool, especially 
after the party’s second election victory in 1954. This is why the 1950s are known as the 
“partisan radio” years (Aksoy, 1960). The DP’s control over broadcasting reached a stage 
where even the opposition was barred from the air. In the following years, the DP 
government’s mismanagement of politics and the economy resulted in great social unrest and 
Turkey dragged into a process where the contours of its political life changed drastically. The 
first military intervention in Turkey’s political history took place in May 1960 and the public 
was informed about this intervention via a radio broadcast. Later it became clear that one of 
the reasons why the army had stepped in was due to the increasingly partisan use of the radio 
by the DP. 
 
Although it appears to be contradictory, the 1960 military intervention was aimed at restoring 
democracy to Turkish politics. The 1961 Constitution, drafted after the coup, has always been 
regarded as Turkey’s most advanced constitution with its emphasis on democratic rights and 
freedoms. This emphasis on democratisation was also reflected in the new broadcasting order 
that was soon to emerge. Article 121 of the 1961 Constitution proclaimed the establishment 
of an “autonomous public juridical person” for the administration of broadcasting in Turkey. 
It was on this basis that the Turkish Radio Television Corporation (TRT) was established by 
law in May 1964. The Corporation started operating with 13 radio broadcast transmitters and 
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was able to reach only 42.6 per cent of the population; there were approximately 2 million 
radio sets in the country (Kocabaşoğlu 1985: 2736). 
 
The TRT’s autonomy did not last long and was abolished after the second military 
intervention in 1971. The Corporation’s troubled association with autonomy inevitably 
affected the organisation of television broadcasting in Turkey, which was introduced in 1968. 
The implications of this lack of autonomy on the management and the financing of the TRT 
are considered in-depth in Chapter 6. However, it is important to note here that the 
constitutional and legal basis of the TRT’s autonomy did not prevent policy-makers from 
asserting their influence over the Corporation. Its technical outlook and broadcast content 
advanced over the years, but it always remained in the centre of controversy.   
 
From 1965 onwards, the TRT directed its focus towards television broadcasting with 
television itself introduced with the help of German technical aid. The first technical 
personnel of the television centre were trained in Germany and Britain while collaborations 
with these two countries also continued in the area of programming in television’s early years 
(Kejanlıoğlu, 2001: 93; Cankaya, 2003: 81). Unfortunately, archival information on the early 
years of Turkish television is very limited. 
 
Throughout the 1970s, tensions between officials at the TRT and various governments 
continued. In terms of its organisational structure and programming output, the radio 
channels of the Corporation were divided into three stations and among them TRT 1 started 
broadcasting 24 hours a day in the mid-1970s. By this stage, television broadcasts were also 
able to reach 55 per cent of the population and with advertising for television programmes 
introduced in 1972, this type of financing soon became the main source of revenue for the 
Corporation (Kejanlıoğlu, 1997).   
 
The 1980 military intervention introduced a new regulatory framework for the TRT. It was the 
government of the Motherland Party (ANAP) that introduced this law in November 1983 
which had originally been drafted by the National Security Council. This law was heavily 
influenced by the ‘national security’ oriented perspective of the army and introduced a new 
regulatory body, the Radio Television High Board (Radyo Televizyon Yüksek Kurulu – RTYK), to 
monitor broadcasts. 
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The ANAP was in office from 1983 to 1991 and its approach to broadcasting gradually 
transformed television in Turkey. As Kejanlıoğlu (2001: 94) suggests, a transition from a state 
monopoly to a dual system of broadcasting started to unfold from the second half of the 
1980s.  The key signals of this transition were: i) a steady increase in independent productions 
aired by the TRT (see also Çelenk, 1998); ii) the introduction of Cable TV by the PTT in 1998; 
iii) the handover of broadcasting transmitters from the TRT to the PTT. However, these were 
not standalone policies and they were, in fact, the by-products of the restructuring of the 
economic and political spheres in Turkey in accordance with the recently introduced 
neoliberalist agenda. This process began in January 1980 with the launch of a new economic 
restructuring programme. It aimed at liberalising the Turkish economy by abolishing state-
protectionism and introducing an export-led growth policy. Similar to the developments 
taking place in Western Europe in the area of broadcasting, neoliberalism meant the 
introduction of a deregulatory (or actually a re-regulatory) policy framework, which 
emphasised the benefits of competition in the market, the ineffectiveness of state monopolies, 
the importance of convergence, and the prevalence of consumer choice.   
 
Throughout the 1980s, Turkey had witnessed the transformation of its press, which resulted in 
the creation of a media sector during the 1990s. This transition from press to media altered all 
the organisational structures of the press sector, from ownership patterns to editorial 
management and created the rules of the game for the emerging media (Adaklı, forthcoming). 
The milestones of this transition are briefly discussed below to demonstrate the background 
story of the breakdown of the state monopoly in broadcasting in 1990. 
 
4.2.2 From Press Barons to Media Tycoons: The Emergence of the Turkish Media 
Market  
 
Until the 1980s, the press sector in Turkey was dominated by four major newspapers 
(Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Tercüman and Hürriyet) run by family firms. As Adaklı (forthcoming) 
suggests, although the press started to industrialise from the 1950s onwards, ‘artisan-like’ 
organisational structures and editorial processes were its prevalent characteristics. These 
papers were owned by various well-known families, whose members did not just run the press 
but also worked as journalists. This structure started to change from the late 1970s onwards 
due to the increasing interest of business groups in expanding to the press sector. The 
acquisition of Milliyet by the Doğan Group in 1979 was a milestone in the transformation of 
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the press sector. As Adaklı (2006: 131) argues, the acquisition of Milliyet by the Doğan Group 
was not a simple handover operation. Rather it was the beginning of the ‘factory-like’ 
organisational structure of the press, triggering vertical and horizontal integration in the sector 
and resulting in the gradual merging of the press with non-media businesses such as banking, 
tourism and energy. This transformation even altered the physical organisational structures of 
the press. The head offices of the newspapers that were traditionally based in a specific part of 
Istanbul called ‘Bab-ı Ali’, gradually transferred to the big ‘media plazas’ built in the outskirts 
of Istanbul (see Tuncel, 1994). What Fleet Street in London signified for the traditional British 
press until the 1980s, Bab-ı Ali was its equivalent in the Turkish context; they shared the same 
finale.  
 
According to Sönmez (1996: 77), the economic and political atmosphere in Turkey 
throughout 1980s created the motives for the expansion of business groups into the media 
sector. These venture capital groups wanted to expand their economic bases through the 
power of owning media. This resulted in the emergence of a very hazardous interdependence 
between the new press owners and the political elite. Owning media proved to be a very 
effective way of having financial deals with the state, which were arranged by politicians who 
were in constant need of media support to protect their own power base. As Tuncel (1994: 34) 
persuasively argues, these new newspaper owners used the ‘press as the fourth estate’ 
argument to conceal their real interests. In this respect, it is not a coincidence that the banking 
sector was also transformed as a result of these emerging business patterns. As of the early 
1990s, all of the big business groups in Turkey owned a bank as well as a media organisation. 
These banks did not have to contribute to the accumulation of real capital by supplying credit 
to markets; instead, they were used by the parent business groups to borrow credit from the 
state to finance their own businesses (Adaklı, forthcoming).  As Tuncel (1994: 37) points out, 
the sum of the amalgamation of business, media and banking sectors drastically altered the 
way things were originally done in each area. What this meant for the press was the emergence 
of “aggressive bosses, professional managers, extravagant headquarters to boost the feeling of 
power and high-tech” (ibid.). By the end of the 1980s, the parent groups of Milliyet, Sabah, 
Hürriyet and Tercüman newspapers started to publicise their eagerness to invest in private radio 
and television broadcasting in Turkey (Kejanlıoğlu, 2004).    
 
However, it was another business group that took the first step to breakdown the TRT’s 
monopoly in broadcasting. By the end of 1989, the preparations of Rumeli Holdings, owned 
by the Uzan family, to launch Turkey’s first satellite TV station were all over the papers. The 
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then Prime Minister of the ANAP government Turgut Özal publicly announced his support 
by declaring that there was no legal barrier for satellite broadcasts targeting a Turkish 
audience. Turkey’s first private channel, Star 1, started to broadcast in March 1990 from 
Germany just a few months after Özal’s statement. What was most interesting was that a few 
months later the Turkish public realised that the Prime Minister’s oldest son was also one of 
the shareholders of Star 1’s parent company (Çaplı and Dündar, 1995: 1377). 
 
As Kaya (1994: 393) suggests, this operation was a complete fait accompli as there was no 
political debate on the introduction of private television via satellite. Nobody knew how the 
process would evolve as there was no preparation at all of a legal framework to regulate 
private broadcasting. In the following years, private broadcasters started to mushroom one 
after another and a chaos emerged. The Uzan family launched another channel in January 
1992 and four other new channels were introduced in the same year. In 1993, the owners of 
Milliyet (and Hürriyet), Türkiye, Sabah and Zaman all launched their own broadcasts. In the 
meantime, new radio stations also started to proliferate. As of January 1993, there were 110 
radio and 76 television broadcasting transmitter towers erected across the country in the 
country (Çaplı, 1994). This chaos resulted in an ‘electronic pollution’ due to constant 
frequency interference. On the other hand, the Turkish public seemed to be very positive 
about the ongoing changes since  identities (ethnic, religious, sexual) previously excluded from 
public debate, were now able to articulate themselves in the context of the emerging private 
media market (Şahin and Aksoy, 1993).  
 
In just a few years, a broadcasting ‘market’ had emerged in Turkey without any regulation or 
accompanied supervision. The November 1992 election ended the ANAP’s almost decade 
long office in power.  The new coalition government announced that resolving the chaos in 
broadcasting would be their first priority. There were two major issues to deal with. Firstly, 
according to the constitution, the TRT continued to hold the monopoly in broadcasting. 
Therefore, the related article of the constitution needed to be amended to legalise the launch 
of private broadcasters. Secondly, a broadcasting law needed to be issued to regulate the 
proliferating broadcasting market. However, despite the urgency of the situation it took more 
than a year to amend the constitution. TRT’s monopoly was not abolished until July 1993. It 
took another year for Turkey’s first broadcasting law to be adopted with Parliament passing 
this law in April 1994 (see Çaplı, 1994; Kejanlıoğlu, 2004) 
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The Broadcasting Law of 1994 envisaged the establishment a new regulatory body called the 
Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu – RTÜK). Its initial 
responsibility was to map out a frequency plan, allocate frequencies to broadcasters and award 
them with licences. However, the regulator became the centre of controversy from day one. 
According to the initial criticisms, the appointment procedures for the members of its 
governing board were open to political influence and the board was endowed with extensive 
punitive powers (Çaplı, 1991). 
 
From 1995 onwards, the key debate with regard to broadcasting market regulation centred on 
the allocation of frequencies. There were already five big business groups (Doğan, Bilgin, Aksoy, 
İhlas, Uzan) operating in the broadcasting market and there were others (Çukurova, Doğuş) 
publicising their increasing interest in media. As Adaklı (2001: 160) puts it, these groups 
competed vigorously with each other because they all regarded owning media as instrumental 
for having access to political circles. In this respect, what they were actually competing for was 
not the broadcasting market itself, but rather the increasing benefits that could be gained from 
the new wave of privatisation, as well the financing of their expanding businesses through 
state funds. None of them wanted to be excluded from the frequency allocations. 
 
By the end of 1995, the frequency plan was completed and broadcasters were already asked to 
apply to the RTÜK to be considered in the allocations. This was a very important phase in the 
development of the broadcasting market in Turkey. Broadcasters occupied scarce sources 
originally belonging to the public without paying any licence fee for five years. This was a huge 
step in establishing the rules of the game from a regulatory perspective.  
 
After a long wait, the RTÜK completed the applications procedures and announced that 
tenders would take place in September 1997. The plan was to start awarding licences for local 
television stations with national television licences as the next step. However, the National 
Security Council (MGK) interfered in the process on the basis that wealthy Islamic circles 
could be the winners of these allocations and pose a threat to national security once they were 
awarded with broadcasting licences (Çaplı, 2001: 52). The Ministry of Interior acted upon the 
MGK’s ‘advice’ to suspend the allocations and the regulator ceased the process. According to 
the procedures advised by the MGK, the RTÜK would ask the owners and the top managers 
of the broadcasters to provide a ‘national security clearance’ document to be attached to their 
applications, with the Prime Ministry authorising these documents. The regulator announced 
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that this process would be concluded by the end of 1999. However, no progress could be 
made until 2001. 
 
The RTÜK attempted to complete frequency allocations and licensing once again in April 
2001. This time several broadcasters filed a court case against the tenders on the basis that the 
RTÜK’s decision to consider applications processed before 1995 was a breach of the freedom 
of communication. According to the regulators announcement, only eleven licences would be 
awarded meaning that five broadcasters would be excluded. The Council of State ruled in 
favour of the broadcasters and revoked the tender process. However, in his memoirs, the then 
head of the RTÜK Board, Nuri Kayış, presents a very different picture on why broadcasters 
disputed the tenders. Turkey was hit by two consecutive economic crises in November 2000 
and February 2001, and the last thing broadcasters wanted was to pay millions of dollars for 
these licences. Kayış openly writes in his memoirs that broadcasters were very vocal about the 
financial constraints with the top level executives of one TV channel even contacting him to 
request a rescheduling of the tendering process (Kayış, 2006: 105-6). All in all, broadcasters 
gained what they wanted and a great source of revenue for the state was eroded. As of today, 
private and radio television broadcasters continue to operate without a licence. Discussions 
about a digital switchover are currently in progress and in effect this means that the debate 
over the allocation of terrestrial frequencies is over. These issues are further considered in the 
following sections of this chapter. 
 
Nevertheless, it is true that the consecutive crises in November 2000 and February 2001 had a 
dramatic impact on the reorganisation of the broadcasting market in Turkey. The business-
media-banking cycle is no longer valid. The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
(Bankacılık Denetleme ve Düzenleme Kurulu – BDDK) revoked the banking licences of many 
business groups which also operated in media. The Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf 
Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu – TMSF) took over the management of bankrupt banks. This transition 
even reached a stage where the TMSF became a key media owner in the broadcasting market 
as of 2004. The TMSF’s involvement in the field resulted in the emergence of new policy 
issues, which are analysed in-depth in the next chapter.    
 
Currently, there are three major cross-media groups in Turkey: Doğan, Merkez and Çukurova. 
However, in April 2007 the TMSF confiscated all the media assets of the Merkez Group due 
to breach of contract. Within these three groups, the Doğan Group has the biggest share of 
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the market. There are also smaller cross-media groups such as İhlas, Doğuş and Samanyolu. 
Where the broadcasting market is concerned, there are 23 national and 16 regional television 
broadcasters; 36 national and 100 regional broadcasters. The figures about local radio and 
television broadcasters constantly change. 
 
Table 3. Major cross-media groups in Turkey (March 2007)  
 
Source: Adapted from Capli and Tuncel, 2005 
* The TMSF confiscated this group in April 2007 and took over the administration of tits media companies.    
 
Considering that all major media groups have business interests with the state, the editorial 
lines of their newspapers and broadcast media are carefully crafted. Lack of editorial 
independence is a serious issue in the Turkish media. Throughout the 1990s, Turkey witnessed 
‘media wars’ between big media groups sharing similar interests in regard to their businesses 
with the state. The restructuring of the banking sector, in some ways, had a positive impact on 
how media operates by forcing the players to become more business oriented since they lost 
their banking arms. However, this also led to tabloidisation and sensationalisation of media.  
 
Within the dailies used in this research, The Doğan Group’s interests were mostly reflected in 
the editorial line of its newspaper Hürriyet. It was another daily Yeni Şafak, owned by the 
Albayraklar Group, contested the Doğan Group’s interests throughout the period covered in 
this research. Yeni Şafak, with its religious conservative line, was highly critical about Aydın 
 
Dogan (Owner: Aydin Dogan) Merkez* 
(Owner: Turgay Ciner) 
Çukurova 
(Owner: Mehmet Emin 
Karamehmet) 
National 
terrestrial 
television 
Kanal D, CNN-Türk, Star ATV Show TV 
Cable/ 
Satellite 
Dream, FunTV, Galaxy Kanal1 SkyTurk (news channel), 
DigiTurk and Lig TV (digital 
packages) 
Radio Hür FM, Radyo CNN-Türk, 
Radyo D 
Radio City Alem FM 
Newspaper Hürriyet, Milliyet, 
Posta, Radikal, 
Referans, Turkish Daily News, 
Fanatik 
Sabah, Yeni Asir, 
Takvim, Pasfotomaç, 
Cumhuriyet (Partial) 
Aksam, Günes, 
Tercüman 
Publishing Online publishing, 
magazine publishing, 
book publishing, 
print distribution, 
music publishing, 
music and books retail, printing 
Online publishing, 
magazine publishing, 
book publishing, 
print distribution, 
printing 
Online publishing, 
magazine publishing (Alem, 
Platin), 
book publishing, 
printing 
Other media Production, DHA News Agency, 
media marketing 
Production, 
Merkez News Agency, media 
marketing 
Eksen facility provider, media 
marketing (MEPAS) 
ICT ISP, telecoms, cable operator  GSM operator Turkcell, 
telecoms, ISP (Superonline), 
cable operator (Topaz) 
Non-media Energy, automotive, 
health, trade, 
manufacturing  
Energy, 
construction, 
hospitality 
Trade, automotive, 
steel, manufacturing, hospitality, 
maritime and air freight 
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Doğan for pressuring the government for its own business interests. In the later satges, Yeni 
Şafak supported the AKP. The ways in which the columnists of these dailies disputed 
eachother are revealed in further sections.  
 
4.3 The Battle for Amending the Broadcasting Law of 1994 
4.3.1 The Draft Law Comes to Parliament 
  
Although amending the Broadcasting Law was on the political agenda since 1997, it took 
seven years to conclude the process. The first amendment proposal was drafted by a State 
Minister from the ANAP that was the then leading party of the three-party-coalition 
government and was led by Mesut Yılmaz. The major force pressuring the then government 
for amending the Broadcasting Law was the big media groups who were lobbying against the 
restrictions on ownership and the ban on media proprietors having more than a 10 per cent 
share in any media enterprise to take part in public tenders or any related businesses as well as 
to operate in the stock market. Turkish media moguls, particularly Aydın Doğan, wanted to 
take part in privatisation tenders, but regulations restricting the financial operations of media 
owners continued to be a major barrier. The first amendment proposal dated November 1997 
was placed on the parliamentary agenda in May 1998; however, it was rebuffed by the then 
opposition parties – FP, DYP, CHP.49 Shortly after the establishment of the DSP-MHP-
ANAP coalition government in April 1999, the debate came back once again. This time the 
conditions were different as Turkey’s EU bid offered new opportunities for the policy-makers 
that are in search for approval for their policy agenda on broadcasting.  
  
The changes proposed in a twenty-four-point amendments package was mainly on: i) the 
definitions and standards of broadcasts; ii) the ownership structures in media enterprises and 
the financial operations of their proprietors; iii) the composition, revenues and workings of 
the regulator RTÜK; and iv) the sanctions and fines imposed by the RTÜK. The amendments 
package also introduced a new regulatory body – i.e., the Telecommunications Authority 
(Telekomünikasyon Kurumu – TK) to carry out frequency planning; lifted the ban on 
retransmission and made the public broadcaster TRT responsible for launching and operating 
the broadcasting transmitters. Interestingly, although the amendment to the ownership  
 
                                                 
49 For full discussions, see: TBMM Journal of Minutes (21 May 1998) Term: 20, Legislative year: 3, Session: 92, 
Vol. 52. Ankara: TBMM. 
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regulations was the focal point of this proposal, there was no mention of it in the general 
justification statement of the draft law on the amendments. Yet, there was one reference to 
the European Convention on Transfrontier Television in the justification of the proposed 
changes on the standards of the broadcasts.50  
 
The new draft law signed by the Cabinet51 was presented to the Presidency of Parliament in 
June 2000 and Parliament started discussing the proposal in May 2001, shortly after the 
announcement of the National Programme. When considered in relation to the EU agenda, 
although the timing of this amendment proposal was explicable, the scope of the amendments 
was rather awkward. In the National Programme, under the section on ‘Culture and Audio-
visual Policy’ Turkey confirmed that the relevant articles of the Broadcasting Law were in 
accordance with the major EU Directives – i.e., the TVWF (89/552 and 97/36) and further 
alignment would be carried out in time for the non-conforming articles. Additionally, it was 
also stated that “[a]t this stage there is no need for institutional change within the Supreme 
Board of Radio and Television” (National Programme, 2001: 392). However, the 
contradiction was that one of the key amendments proposed in this draft law was on changing 
the composition of the regulatory board. Additionally, where other issues are concerned, the 
amendments package was far from bringing any solution to any of the regulatory problems in 
broadcasting in Turkey let alone complying with EU standards in broadcasting.  
 
In Turkey, according to the parliamentary procedures, the draft laws are first discussed and 
redrafted if seen necessary in related parliamentary committees before it comes to Parliament. 
In this case, it was the Constitutional Committee that discussed the amendments to the 
Broadcasting Law. The minutes of the meeting summarised in the Committee’s report is very 
interesting on two grounds. Firstly, what Schimidt (2000) argues about the ways in which 
policy-makers use discourse to legitimise their preferred policies can also be traced in this 
context very explicitly. The State Minister briefing on the details of the package justified the 
proposed amendments by relying heavily on discursively loaded statements that contained 
phrases such as “in the course of globalisation”, “with the aim of expanding the limits of 
freedom”; “ending the conflict between the fast changes in the communications sector and 
the socio economic dynamics”, etc.52 Secondly, the discussions in the Committee also reveal 
                                                 
50 See: “Draft Law Amending Certain Articles of the Law on the Establishment and Broadcasts of Radio and 
Television, the Press Law, the Income Tax Law and the Corporate Tax Law”, 14 June 2002, Ankara, p. 18.  
51 In Turkish political vocabulary the Cabinet is called as ‘Council Of Ministers’. In this study, the term is left as it 
is if it takes place in an official document.  
52 Constitutional Committee Report, Initial No: 1/705, Decision No: 10, 21 May 2001, Ankara. 
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how the then government was not successful in using EU cause to justify its own policy 
agenda on broadcasting by simply contradicting its declared commitments to the EU. For 
instance, where the specific amendments to the composition of the RTÜK Board were 
considered, the same State Minister justified the amendments on the basis of the need to 
comply with the international agreements in the course of Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
However, no such necessity was mentioned in the National Programme that was drafted by 
the government just a couple of months earlier. During the meeting, the representatives of the 
opposition parties did not only expose this contradiction but they also suggested that the 
whole package is problematic as many amendments do not comply with EU norms in 
broadcasting regulation. The most problematic amendment was removing the limitations on 
media ownership and there was a great confusion in the meeting on whether the new 
approach would be effective. The Committee members, on one hand, were cautious about the 
new regulation knowing that monopolisation continues to be a serious problem in Turkey; 
but, on the other hand, all believed that transparency of ownership would bring real 
proprietors of media enterprises into light and the rules of the game for free movement of the 
capital should be clarified as in the EU. The discussions in the Constitutional Committee were 
important in signalling how the actual parliamentary debate would take place, which is the 
focus of the following section.  
 
The amendments package was an issue of controversy outside Parliament as well. The TV 
Broadcasters Association (Televizyon Yayıncıları Derneği – TVYD) lobbied in favour of amending 
the Broadcasting Law for almost a year and it showed its support for the draft law by issuing a 
public statement a couple of days before it came to Parliament. In this statement the members 
of the TVYD – i.e., top level executives of the broadcasting organisations – asserted that 
during its seven years long enforcement the existing law created a ‘transparency’ problem in 
the Turkish media and this new draft law provided the chance to overcome it. In their eyes, 
illegality through establishing ‘shell corporations’ emerged as an accepted practice since the 
existing law limited the shares and business ventures of the media proprietors (Radikal, 25 
May 2001). However, the then head of the sole regulator for broadcasting, Nuri Kayış, did not 
share this view and he was in fact one of the most vocal opponents of the amendments. Kayış, 
sent a personal letter to the MPs two days before the discussions on the amendments began in 
Parliament and suggested that it would be a great mistake to pass this law since the 
amendments would give pace to monopolisation in the Turkish media and terminate the 
independence of the RTÜK. He also emphasised that most of the amendments proposed 
  
102 
102 
were in contradiction with EU norms and the proposed changes in the structure of the RTÜK 
did not comply with what was stated in the National Programme submitted to the EU.53  
 
Parliament discussed the draft law in seven sessions from 23 May to 6 June 2001. The 
opposition parties tried to block the discussions by using every opportunity laid out in the 
internal regulations of Parliament, but they were not successful. The draft law amending the 
Broadcasting Law of 1994 was adopted on 07 June 2001.54 However, the process did not 
conclude there. According to the procedures in Turkey, the President has the right to veto the 
law and this was exactly what President Necdet Sezer did. President Sezer did not ratify the 
law but sent it back to Parliament for further discussion in the light of his sixteen-page long 
declaration grounding the terms of his veto on 18 July 2001. According to the President, 
monopolisation and cartelisation in the media industry were still crucial problems and the 
proposed amendments reinforced the situation rather than taking active measures against it; 
the financial ties between the media and the state should be prohibited and necessary 
measures should be taken to avoid the usage of media to assert power in the state tenders; the 
impartiality of the regulator RTÜK should be ensured and its members should be chosen 
among those having expertise in the relevant fields to broadcasting; and the law should be 
eliminated from the indefinite and non-objective criteria and definitions for punishing the 
broadcasters.55  
 
4.3.2 The Aftermath of the President’s Veto 
 
Following the President’s veto, it took almost a year for Parliament to discuss the law once 
again. One of the valid reasons behind this delay was the significance of the EU agenda in 
which the priorities were reshuffled. When the draft law came in front of Parliament the first 
time in May 2001, the Inter-party Conciliation Committee was in its final phase for concluding 
its proposal to amend the constitution to pave the way for further alignment of the legislation 
in the scope of EU conditionality and the commitments laid out in the National Programme. 
The enactment of the constitutional amendments package in October 2001 was followed by 
the amendments of the Turkish Civil Code in January 2002, the enactment of the first EU 
harmonisation package in February, and the second package in March 2002. Therefore, 
                                                 
53 The full letter can be reached at: http://www.tissad.org.tr/RTÜK_aciklama.html 
54 Law No. 4676, Law Amending the Radio and Television Law, Press Law, Income Tax Law and Law on 
Institutional Taxes, 7 June 2001, Ankara. 
55 Official Communication of the President to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 18 June 2001, Ankara. The 
full veto statement of the President can be reached at: http://www.belgenet.com/2001/RTÜK_veto.html 
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although in relation to broadcasting policy the debate on granting broadcasting rights to ethnic 
communities was a key issue in the political agenda, there was not much room for further 
discussing the vetoed broadcasting law until mid-2002. The reason why the draft law was 
brought in front of Parliament once again in May 2002 was never made clear by any coalition 
partner. However, the reason was actually very clear. Turkey’s biggest media tycoon Aydın 
Doğan acquired a 51 per cent share of the state petroleum enterprise Petrol Office (POAŞ) 
together with a bank and did not want the regulations in the Broadcasting Law to get in his 
way. Some columnists writing at that time claimed that the media – i.e., the Doğan Group – 
started fostering a new agenda on the rising of a ‘new’ leader in the centre-right that would 
replace the ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz unless the draft law was adopted.56 What Aydın 
Doğan wanted was the elimination of the Law from regulations restricting the financial 
operations of media proprietors as well as the limitations on ownership. Therefore, one of the 
ways to pressure the government to bring the broadcasting policy amendments back to the 
agenda was to use his newspapers. In this respect, all the news stories on the leadership of the 
centre-right political wing in Turkey were, in fact, engineered.  
 
The opponents of the amendments started raising their voice against the government soon 
after it became clear that the draft law would be brought in front of Parliament once again 
sometime in May 2002. The Local Televisions Union (Yerel Televizyonlar Birliği – YTB) sent 
letters to the MPs; five local television stations in Izmir blanked their screens for five minutes 
to protest the amendments; different organisations kept organising press conferences and 
issued public statements. In contrast with the TVYD’s support for the draft law, the 
Professional Union of Radio and Television Broadcasters (Radyo Televizyon Yayıncıları Meslek 
Birliği – RATEM) sought after support of the press associations and internet service providers 
associations to voice its criticisms (Yeni Şafak, 17 April 2002; 24 April 2002). Nuri Kayış, the 
then head of the RTÜK, although generally disregarded by the mainstream press, continued to 
be very vocal at every possible occasion by criticising the changes that the new law might 
bring and overtly accused media proprietors for pressuring the government to bring the draft 
law in front of Parliament despite the veto.57 The most striking comment came from President 
                                                 
56 On 6 April 2002, the daily Hürriyet, owned by the Doğan Group, made a news story on this so-called ‘new 
leader’. This link between the broadcasting law and the timing of the agenda setting on the possible upcoming of 
new establishment in the centre-right was captured by some columnists of another daily: Yeni Şafak. For this 
story see, Hürriyet, 5 April 2002; M. Barlas (Yeni Şafak, 10 April 2002); T. Kıvanç (Yeni Şafak, 9 April 2002).  
57 According to a news website, Nuri Kayış in a panel organised in Izmir, brought up the issue once again and 
claimed that an MP who was also the member of the Constitutional Commission told him that they know that 
the President was right on his grounds of veto but they have to pass the draft law as the way it is as the “bosses” 
want it that way (Haberx, 30 April 2002).  
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Sezer who was asked by a journalist at an official reception on whether he believed there was a 
disagreement between him and the government on drafting policies as he vetoed ‘some’ laws. 
President Sezer, knowing that this question implicitly addressed the RTÜK Law, stated that he 
reminded Prime Minister Ecevit once again of their conversation that took place almost a year 
earlier. The President told journalists that during that informal conversation the Prime 
Minister expressed his support for the President’s veto of the law since he also had issues 
about it (Yeni Şafak, 24 April 2002). In short, the coalition partners were divided in their views 
on the draft law and apart from the big media groups there was not any single institution that 
supported the amendments.  
 
Although the Prime Minister’s discomfort about the amendments package was disclosed to 
public, Yılmaz Karakoyunlu, the State Minister responsible from the press, kept rejecting any 
possibility to withdraw the draft law from the agenda and delivered statements such as “let’s 
pass the law this time and do the better one later” (Yeni Şafak, 01 May 2002). It was clear that 
the government would play the deaf card by disregarding criticisms and insist bringing the 
draft law in front of Parliament no matter what. The draft law was finally taken into the 
parliamentary agenda by the beginning of May 2002. This time the discussions were more 
nerve-racking than before. The first dispute was on whether the draft law should be reassessed 
by the Constitutional Committee or Parliament should discuss the vetoed articles straightaway. 
Since the workings of Parliament were also partially amended with the constitutional changes 
of October 2001, Parliament could now discuss only the articles stated in the President’s veto. 
However, the SP and the AKP parties, with the belief that they could gain more time if not 
rebuff the amendments package, argued that the former regulations should be applied since 
the President vetoed the law before the constitutional amendments. Despite the protests in 
Parliament, the Presidency of Parliament represented by an MHP MP rejected sending the 
draft law back to the Constitutional Committee and announced the launch of the discussions 
to take place the following day.58  
 
During the discussions on the following day, the tension reached a peak when State Ministers 
started blocking opposition MPs from commenting on their own proposed changes on the 
articles. The MPs even got in a physical fight during the discussions and the President of the 
AKP party group declared that they would withdraw from the Inter-party Conciliation  
                                                 
58 For full discussions, see: TBMM Journal of Minutes (1 May 2002) Term: 21, Legislative year: 4, Session: 94, 
Vol. 93. Ankara: TBMM.  
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Committee working on drafting the constitutional amendments that would be the first set of 
EU related reforms. The leaders of the tripartite coalition finally agreed on postponing the 
discussions for a short time so that the tension could settle down (Hürriyet, 6 May 2002). 
Meanwhile, the vice chairman of the SP organised a press conference to announce that they 
would struggle to block the passing of the package and wanted support from other parties, 
civil society organisations and the media. Not surprisingly, this press conference was only 
covered by the daily Yeni Şafak, which was known to be close to the party line (Yeni Şafak, 5 
May 2002). Additionally, different organisations were already vocal against the law, but they 
were not represented in the mainstream press. On 3 May, World Press Freedom Day, press 
related associations together with the Journalists’ Union of Turkey (Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası 
– TGS) issued a public statement campaigning against the law with a particular emphasis on 
the concentration and cartelisation in media.59 The TGS later sent letters to the MPs; 
journalists associations in the local level kept organising press conferences; the Internet 
Service Providers posted protest statements on their websites, but none of these protests 
made a difference at all (Zaman, 14 May 2002).  
 
The discussions were finalised in two weeks and the vetoed package adopted unchanged later 
on 14 May 2002.60 Since President Sezer did not have any right to veto it for the second time, 
he referred the case to the Constitutional Court. In June 2002, the Court issued an order to 
suspend the enforcement of certain articles and finally gave its final verdict to annul two 
articles in September 2004: the article amending the composition of the RTÜK Board and the 
two paragraphs of the article amending the media ownership regulation.61 The annulment of 
the article on the composition of the RTÜK Board resulted in a deadlock that could only be 
resolved in July 2005. In 2005, the debate on relaxing the limits on foreign ownership of 
media enterprises was introduced once again and another round of political rows began. 
 
4.3.3 The Press Coverage of the Debate 
 
Following the debate on amending the broadcasting law through the press coverage reveals 
another story on the complexity of the relations between media proprietors, the state and the 
                                                 
59 Full statement can be reached at: 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/2002/mayis2002.htm 
60 Law No. 4756, Law on the Amendment to the Law on the Establishment and Broadcasts of Radio and 
Television, Official Gazette No. 24761, 21 May 2002, Ankara. 
61 The Decision of the Constitutional Court, Initial No: 2002/100, Decision No: 2004/9, 21 September 2004, 
Ankara. 
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press in Turkey. As might be expected, the mainstream press owned by the Doğan Group 
covered the debate as the supporter of the proposed changes. The most well-known and 
influential columnists celebrated the amendments, especially those on media ownership, by 
arguing that the changes not only would bring transparency to the media capital but they 
would also help to prevent concentration in media market. None of these arguments were, in 
fact, strongly grounded. Besides, there were actually different sets of issues needed to be 
considered separately, but it was not possible to do so as the influential columnists of Doğan 
papers – particularly Hürriyet – constantly kept ‘gate-keeping’. They tried to present the 
amendment on relaxing the limits of share that individuals or companies could hold in media 
enterprises as something that would bring ‘transparency’ to the media capital and would 
consequently help to ‘unmask’ media owners having ‘separatist’ and ‘Islamic revivalist’ tenets. 
For them, the media capital that masks a hidden agenda was dangerous, not the Doğan Group 
that was in a vigorous search to expand its businesses. When President Sezer vetoed the law, 
none of the columnists from the Doğan Group dailies commented on it. Moreover, the news 
on the veto was not even treated as an important news item in these papers. In Hürriyet’s 
coverage on the veto, one of the key warnings of the President on the possible cartelisation 
and monopolisation in media as a result of the lifting of restrictions was not even mentioned 
(Hürriyet, 19 June 2002).  
 
However, a key event revealed the contradictions of different Hürriyet columnists, which was 
also important in terms of seeing the bigger picture in which columnists of the biggest daily in 
Turkey militantly supported their parent group’s interests. Just a couple days before the 
discussions began in Parliament in May 2001; Oktay Ekşi, the leading columnist of Hürriyet 
and the chairman of Turkish Press Council, wrote in his column that he supported the 
amended law’s proposals for regulating shares in media enterprises as it would also bring 
transparency to media capital. However, in the same column, Ekşi stated that he did not 
approve the amendment allowing media proprietors to bid in public tenders and the existing 
regulation should be kept for the sake of ‘public interest’ due to the massive power that people 
achieve by owning media (O. Ekşi, Hürriyet, 22 May 2001). The next day, Ekşi changed his 
tone in his column and stated that although he expressed his disapproval against the particular 
amendment in his previous column, he felt himself obliged to quote ‘two other views’ on the 
issue. As he wrote, ‘some’ argued that not only the amount of shares in radio and television 
should be taken as a base to limit media proprietors to bid in public tenders, but others having 
shares in the press as well as web-casters or web-publishers should also be limited. And the 
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second argument, as he quoted, was that the state should be responsible of punishing media 
owners who abuse their power in order to win a public tender rather than disallowing them 
from bidding altogether (O. Ekşi, Hürriyet, 23 May 2001).  
 
It was Nazlı Ilıcak, an FP MP and a columnist of the daily Yeni Şafak who commented first on 
this contradiction and questioned Ekşi about why he changed his opinion (N. Ilıcak, Yeni 
Şafak, 6 June 2001). Ekşi, in return, suggested that his views did not change and offered a very 
interesting distinction between his views as the chairman of the Turkish Press Council and the 
leading columnist of a daily in Turkey. This distinction is worthy of quoting here:  
 
Why would Oktay Ekşi, the chair of the Press Council, write any of his views that 
he holds under this title in his column in Hürriyet? Is Hürriyet a publication of the 
Council? [...] The truth of the matter is that a leading columnist of a newspaper reflects the 
editorial policy of the paper more than his individual view. This is the ground rule. Oktay 
Ekşi, the writer of this column for many years, revealed his view on the issue that 
Nazlı Ilıcak has been talking about the first – and most likely the last – time. What 
has been done was professionally wrong. What makes Hürriyet different is that it 
was tolerant about it (O. Ekşi, Hürriyet, 8 June 2001; emphasis added). 
 
 
Oktay Ekşi’s comments are striking as they reveal what journalism is/became in Turkey. This 
is exactly one of the core aspects of the transformation of the press in Turkey since 1980s 
through which Adaklı (2006: 12) identifies the press in today’s Turkey as “a sector that is 
embedded into the big capital groups”. In this context, Oktay Ekşi did not hesitate to 
prioritise the interests of the Doğan Group in the discussions on the Broadcasting Law 
despite his status as the chair of the Turkish Press Council of which its members at the time 
were highly critical on the proposed changes in the regulatory framework. This contradiction 
eventually led to a bigger dispute in the course of other events and the Merkez Group (owning 
the television channel ATV and the dailies Sabah, Takvim, Fotomaç) was the first to resign from 
the Council membership in April 2005. Ergun Babahan, the then editor-in-chief of Sabah, 
announced the Merkez Group’s decision on the resignation via his column in Sabah criticising 
the Council for acting according to the benefits of the media group that its chair is entitled to. 
Babahan stated in his column that “[i]n a country aiming at the European Union membership, 
the existence of a representation system that is mono-vocal and relying entirely on the benefits 
of a particular group is not acceptable” and from now on they would recognise the Journalists 
Association of Turkey as the sole organisational representative of media and journalists (E. 
Babahan, Sabah, 9 April 2005). Merkez Group’s resignation from the Council was shortly 
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followed by the resignations of the Çukurova Group (owning Show TV, Sky Türk channels, 
Akşam and Güneş dailies), and two other dailies: Yeni Şafak and Dünden Bugüne Tercüman.  
 
The real name behind Hürriyet’s editorial line was not Oktay Ekşi, but it was in fact Ertuğrul 
Özkök, the editor-in-chief of the paper. This corresponds to Adaklı’s (2006) observation on 
how the traditional segregation between the editorial and administrative operations of the 
press enterprises got blurred in Turkey from the 1980s, which resulted in the editor-in-chiefs 
of major dailies prioritising the interests of their parent group’s in generating content. As 
Adaklı (2006: 341-4) suggests, Ertuğrul Özkök as a major figure in the Doğan Group for 
many years is a perfect example for this new generation of editors in Turkish dailies. A careful 
examination of Özkök’s comments in his column during the battle for amending the 
Broadcasting Law supports Adaklı’s arguments. Throughout the debate, Özkök wrote in 
favour of the proposed changes. According to him, bringing an ‘audience share’ criterion for 
regulating media ownership would prevent ‘black money’ operations in media by shedding 
light on the ‘already-known-secrets’ behind media capital. On the issue of banning media 
proprietors from biddıng in the state tenders, Ertuğrul Özkök argued that Turkey could not 
afford excluding media proprietors from these tenders since they are the real entrepreneurs of 
the country and the revenue expected from privatisation would fall if they are excluded. His 
suggestion to prevent media owners to use their power to assert influence on the outcome of 
state tenders was to make sure that the Public Tenders Law includes necessary measures 
against the misuse of power (E. Özkök, Hürriyet, 23 May 2001).  
 
It was in fact very obvious that Ertuğrul Özkök’s perspective on the debate was one of the 
two ‘other’ views that Oktay Ekşi felt himself ‘obliged to cite’ in his column the same day and 
contradicted himself considering what he expressed in his column just a day before. This line 
of thinking was also supported by other important Hürriyet columnists such as Fatih Altaylı 
and Emin Çölaşan. Çölaşan vigorously attacked the FP MPs in his column, accusing them for 
acting for the benefit of Islamic capital behind certain media enterprises with their attempts to 
block the discussions in Parliament (E. Çöleşan, Hürriyet, 8 June 2001). The major target of 
Çölaşan was Nazlı Ilıcak – an FP MP and a columnist of Yeni Şafak – who was one of the 
major figures that was vocal against the financial operations of Aydın Doğan and the draft law 
both in Parliament as well as via her column. Çölaşan, at some point, shifted the whole debate 
to a very personal level and accused Nazlı Ilıcak of abusing her political status to channel her 
‘deep resentment’ and ‘hatred’ against Aydın Doğan (E. Çöleşan, Hürriyet, 9 June 2001). This is 
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one of the perfect examples that reveal how ‘bullying’ in the Turkish press can steer the debate 
on important issues.  
 
Hardly surprisingly, the President’s veto of the draft law was covered none of the columnists 
of the Doğan Group’s dailies. They were all silent until May 2002, when the government 
decided to bring the draft law back to the agenda once again. Yet, when it was adopted in 
Parliament unchanged, the next day headline of Hürriyet was just the way one could expect: 
“The era of transparent broadcasting begins” (Hürriyet, 16 May 2002).  
 
As seen, changes in media ownership regulations dominated the debate on the amendments 
package, but it was not possible to discuss the overall change in approach to broadcasting 
policy in a broader scope. Understandably, the controversy between the ‘pro vs anti-Doğan 
Group’ camps was most heard. The amendments proposed in the draft law had actually 
broader implications on the regulation of broadcasting in Turkey. Since the amendments 
package was not well-designed, the changes it brought were very problematic. Some of its 
implications were directly related to Turkey’s compliance with EU standards in broadcasting. 
Additionally, the process got further complicated following the Constitutional Court’s 
intervention in June 2002 by suspending the enforcement of two core amendments in the 
package: the new ownership regulations and the composition of the regulatory body. The 
section below looks into the scope and the implications of the key amendments in the package 
further in-depth.  
 
4.4 The Scope of the Amendments to the Broadcasting Law 
4.4.1 Ownership Regulations 
 
When the long awaited Broadcasting Law came into affect in 1994, the key policy concern was 
to carry out the frequency allocations as soon as possible to regulate the de facto operations of 
the broadcasters, not regulating ownership. As Çaplı and Tuncel (2005: 1573) suggests, 
following the breakdown of the state monopoly in broadcasting in Turkey in the early 1990s, 
the policy rationale behind the ownership regulation was not to design precautionary 
measurements to prevent concentration in the media market, but it rather aimed at preventing 
“media outlets from serving their owners’ interests”. However, as stated earlier, over the years, 
frequency allocations became the key deadlock in the broadcasting sector in Turkey since the 
regulatory body RTÜK was not successful in executing the allocations despite its various 
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attempts. Consequently, the mushrooming of commercial broadcasters got out of control and 
the loopholes in media ownership regulations enshrined in law were abused by the media 
proprietors to increase their power.  
 
In the Broadcasting Law, media ownership was regulated under Article 29. First of all, the 
Law outlawed “political parties, associations, labour and employer unions, professional 
associations, co-operatives, foundations, local governments and companies established or 
partially owned by local governments, commercial companies, unions, and organisations and 
enterprises dealing with investment, import, export, marketing and financial affairs” to own 
any media as well as have partnerships with media enterprises having a broadcast permit. In 
regard to share limits of individual media proprietors, the same article stipulated a 20 per cent 
ceiling in broadcasting enterprises. The same ceiling was applied to the total shares of 
individuals having shares in more than one media enterprises. Shareholders’ next of kin were 
banned from having a share in the same media enterprise. The same corporation could only 
set up one radio and television broadcasting enterprise. Cross-media ownership as well as 
foreign ownership was also limited to 20 per cent. One foreign investor could have a share 
only in one media enterprise. And finally, the law prevented individuals having a 10 per cent 
share in a broadcasting enterprise to take part in state tenders and related businesses.  
 
As strict as it seemed on the paper, these limitations on ownership did not restrain the 
emergence of media tycoons in the Turkish media sector as the media proprietors abused the 
loopholes in the monitoring of the law and kept ‘veiling’ their actual shares. The proposed 
amendment was in a way bringing transparency to these shares as constantly emphasised by its 
supporters. With the proposed amendment, limits on ownership were removed. According to 
the new regulation, ‘annual viewing or listening ratio’ was brought in as the new ownership 
criterion. If the average annual viewing or listening ratio of a broadcasting enterprise was to 
exceed 25 per cent, then the capital share in that enterprise could not exceed 50 per cent. 
Additionally, in the case of owning more than one radio and television that exceed the annual 
rating ratio, the shareholders were asked to decrease their shares under 50 per cent through 
selling certain amount of their shares. The amended article also stipulated that the broadcast 
permits of the enterprises would be annulled in case of violation of the regulation. However, 
as rightly pointed out by Çaplı and Tuncel (2005: 1574), the usage of ‘ratio’ here was very 
problematic. Although ‘share’ and ‘rating’ were taken as the basis in audience measurement, 
the law did not clarify what is meant by ratio.  
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The aim of this amendment was practically impossible to implement when the fragmented 
structure of the broadcasting market in Turkey is considered. None of the radio and TV 
stations could exceed this 25 per cent share anyway. Individual shares have always been much 
lower. On the other hand, this ratio measurement might have suggested a new way of 
measuring the size of the market as well. According to the new regulatory framework, it was 
the RTÜK’s responsibility to establish a new audience measurement system, but it was not 
clear how it would do it. In Turkey, TV audience measurement has been carried out by AGB 
Anadolu since 1989.62 As of 2006, AGB Anadolu had people-meters only in 2,201 household 
measuring national TV channels that subscribed to the system.63 However, there has always 
been a controversy around the reliability of the data provided by AGB Anadolu. Given this, it 
was clear that RTÜK could not take the audience figures provided by AGB Anadolu as the 
basis of regulating ownership since the data provided was limited. Then again, if the regulator 
chose to establish its own measurement system, a couple of years and extensive financial 
investment was needed to carry out these required measurements. All of these points were 
expressed by the MPs from the opposition parties during the parliamentary discussions. With 
its own proposal to amend the article, the government decreased the proposed 25 per cent 
audience threshold to 20 per cent, but no further change was made.64 
 
Within the same article, the most controversial amendment was on the financial operations of 
the media proprietors. As noted earlier, the existing Broadcasting Law barred anyone having 
more than 10 per cent share in any media enterprise from the state tenders and any other 
related businesses. With the amendment, this ban was totally removed. After years of 
lobbying, the government gave the media proprietors – especially Aydın Doğan – what they 
pressured for. As far as the discussions in Parliament a year after the President’s veto are 
concerned, although a few MPs from the governing coalition parties commented on the 
related amendments anyway, the same justifications were continuously articulated. Rather than 
questioning why the existing regulatory framework could have never been applied since the 
beginning, they targeted the law itself. An ANAP MP stated that with these amendments they 
                                                 
62 AGB Anadolu is the subsidiary of AGB Nielsen Media Research, the joint venture between AGB Group and 
Nielsen Media Research International set up in 2004. It was the Turkish Audience Research Board (Türkiye İzleyici 
Araştırmaları Kurumu – TİAK) that commissioned the conducting of the audience measurement research to AGB 
Anadolu.  
63 These people-meters were set up in twenty-one cities and the provinces of these cities having more than 20,000 
residents. The scale was stated to represent 40,900,052 people living in the selected areas who are over five years 
old. For further information, see the official website of RTÜK: http://www.RTÜK.org.tr  
64 TBMM Journal of Minutes (31 May 2001) Term: 21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 111, Vol. 65. Ankara: TBMM. 
  
112 
112 
aimed at ‘strengthening competition’ and any abuse of power could be prevented in the 
framework of the Law on Competition.65 In a similar vein, but in contrast to the party’s 
conventional leftist tradition, a DSP MP echoed the editorial line of the editor-in-chief of 
Hürriyet, Ertuğrul Özkök. A short excerpt from his speech in Parliament is worthy of quoting 
here:  
 
Today, in Turkey, as far as I know, except from the Koç Group, Sabancı Group 
and the Anadolu Group, all capital groups own radio and television. If you ban all 
capital groups from public tenders when this is the case, how will we carry on with 
privatisation? […] By excluding media groups from the tenders, are we going to 
give away the state enterprises as a gift to the freeholders or to the three groups I 
have mentioned above?66  
 
 
This DSP MP’s comments, of course, unfold a bigger picture on privatisation policies in 
Turkey, through which politics of left need to be further discussed. At this point, it is also 
important to note that the amendments package in general and this particular article regulating 
ownership and the financial operations of media proprietors was an issue of internal strife 
between the MPs of the coalition government. As presented earlier, a reading through the 
minutes of the discussions in the Constitution Committee finalising the draft reveals that 
policy-makers were divided from the beginning on the amendments proposed. The ones 
opposing the amendments stated that the new article would be against EU norms, the 
constitution and the existing ban on cartelisation. They argued that unless the existing 
limitations in the law were preserved, monopolisation in the media would emerge and this 
would consequently lead to the establishment of a ‘media state’ as freedom of communication 
that is integral to any democratic regime would deteriorate. On the other hand, others 
supporting the amendments argued that the existing regulation was not applicable and needed 
to be amended as it represented a view of ‘close society’. For them, everybody should know 
who owns what in Turkey and media owners should be aware of their rights and 
responsibilities. Therefore, as it was also suggested during the discussions in Parliament, the 
possible downsides of the proposed amendments could well be balanced by adding media 
ownership provisions to the Law on Competition. However, this debate could not be taken 
one step further in the actual parliamentary sessions and MPs from the opposition parties kept 
                                                 
65 TBMM Journal of Minutes (23 May 2002) Term: 21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 107, Vol. 64. Ankara: TBMM, 
pp. 21-3. 
66 ibid., 25. 
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criticising other MPs for expressing different views in the backstage, yet still voting in favour 
of the amendments in Parliament.67 
 
When President Sezer vetoed the law, not surprisingly, his criticisms towards the amendments 
to Article 29 were central in his statement justifying his veto:68 
 
• There was no clarity in how the ‘audience ratio’ criterion is used; 
 
• The 20 per cent audience threshold was not applicable considering that the highest 
audience share in Turkey is 14-16 per cent. As he suggested, a ‘rating’ threshold 
would be a better way of regulating media ownership; 
 
• The amendments would facilitate the cartelisation of big capital groups in the fields 
of radio and television broadcasting. Citing Article 167 of the constitution, the 
President stated that cartelisation and monopolisation is barred in Turkey and the 
State has a direct responsibility in ensuring the well-functioning of the markets as 
well as the enjoyment of the basic freedoms in communication by preserving this 
ban;  
 
• Allowing media proprietors to bid in the state tenders could result with unfair 
competition and engineered speculation in the stock market. President Sezer stated 
that all media should have a public service remit and by removing the restrictions 
enshrined in law, media were encouraged to further commercialise without any 
measures to prevent the misuse of the media accompanied. According to Sezer, 
Turkey neither had a well-developed democracy, nor completed its privatisation 
processes and therefore existing limitations on the financial operations of the 
media proprietors should be preserved to prevent the organic interdependence 
between the state and the media.  
 
When the vetoed amendments package came in front of Parliament once again in May 2002, 
there were some important changes in the political agenda. The Virtue Party was closed by the 
Constitutional Court in June 2001 for ‘posing a threat to the state’ and therefore the main 
opposition now was split between the SP and the AKP parties. Additionally, political circles 
were much more committed to the EU agenda this time and lots of political bargaining already 
started taking place particularly on the issue of broadcasting rights in languages other than 
                                                 
67 Yet, in the final voting, three MPs from the DSP voted against the law and three MPs (including one state 
minister, one MP from the DSP and one from the ANAP parties) used abstaining vote. Among the DSP cadres, 
there was only one MP who was against the amendments throughout the whole process: Uluç Gürkan. Gürkan 
was the only MP who stood up against his party leadership and tried to influence policy by proposing changes 
during the parliamentary discussions on the most controversial articles such as Article 29. In his speeches 
addressed to Parliament during the amendment discussions both before and after the veto, Gürkan strongly 
criticised the proposed changes by arguing that the proposed draft law is in contradiction with the EU standards 
as well as democratic norms. He could not make any difference, but his opposing stance as an MP of the ruling 
party was constantly emphasised by the MPs from the opposition during the discussions. For the records of his 
speeches; see: TBMM Journal of Minutes (30 May 2001) Term: 21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 110, Vol. 65. 
Ankara: TBMM, pp. 57-8.  
68 Official Communication of the President to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 18 June 2001, Ankara. 
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Turkish that was integral to EU political criteria. Therefore, this time, the EU cause was much 
more articulated by the opposition party members to oppose the Broadcasting Law and to 
emphasise its contradictions with Turkey’s commitments to the EU. MPs from both parties in 
opposition once again disputed the amendments, but with the help of the DYP’s ‘hidden 
support’ for the government, Article 29 – just like the rest of the law – passed from 
Parliament without any further change.69 
 
President Sezer had to ratify the law as he did not have any right to veto for the second time. 
However, he brought the law in front of the Constutional Court for the suspension of certain 
articles, including pargraphs (d) and (e) of Article 29. The Constitutional Court first suspended 
related paragraphs in June 2002 and then annulled them in September 2004 following the 
assessment of other applications.70 In this respect, the story of Article 29 is a unique example 
revealing the dynamics of policy-making in Turkey. A very important broadcasting policy issue 
could not be resolved within parliamentary politics. It was the civil bureaucracy – i.e., the 
Constitutional Court in this case – that finalised the debate. As there has not been any further 
attempt to open up the debate, limitations on ownership and financial operations of domestic 
media proprietors as enshrined in the Broadcasting Law remained valid. As of 2005, 
regulations on media ownership became the centre of attention on a different but related 
ground: foreign investors managed to penetrate into Turkish market by veiling their real 
shares in media assets they acquired with their Turkish investor partners. This process is 
thoroughly analysed under section 4.6 in this chapter. 
 
4.4.2 Regulating the Regulator: Issues on the Organisation of the RTÜK 
a) The Composition and the Supervision of the RTÜK 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, shortly after RTÜK was established in 1994, it became the 
centre of criticism due to its overtly political composition. RTÜK’s impartiality has been in 
question from the very beginning and with the scope of the sanctioning powers it had, which 
its board did not hesitate to apply quite often, it was seen as a ‘penalising’ body, rather than a 
regulatory one over the years. 
                                                 
69 Law No. 4756, Law on the Amendment to the Law on the Establishment and Broadcasts of Radio and 
Television, Official Gazette No. 24761, 21 May 2002, Ankara. 
70 Apart from the President, 117 MPs representing various opposition parties – mainly from the AKP and the SP 
parties – applied to the Constitutional Court following the adoption of the law. In Turkey, it takes a very long 
time for the Constitutional Court to announce its reasoned ruling; this is why the process of the annulment of 
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As stipulated in the Broadcasting Law (Article 6), the RTÜK Board consisted of nine 
members and all are appointed by Parliament. Among these nine members, Parliament elected 
five members upon nominations of ten candidates by the party/parties forming the 
government and the other four were again elected by Parliament upon nominations of eight 
candidates of the opposition party/parties. The candidates are required to have ‘experience’ in 
the fields of “press, broadcasting, information and communications technologies, culture, 
religion, education and law”. The term of duty for the board members was set as six years and 
three members had to be renewed every two years.  
 
Although, as enshrined in law, the RTÜK is an ‘autonomous’ and ‘impartial’ public legal 
person, this highly complex calculation behind the election of the members of its governing 
board reveals the political struggle that has been at stake behind the regulation of broadcasting 
from the very beginning. In order to restrain political influence over the election of its 
members, any discussion over the nominations in Parliament is barred and ‘secret voting’ is 
preferred as the election method. Yet, considering the dynamics of politics in Turkey, these 
measures are far from being influential. As Yıldız (2003: 46) observes, the members of the 
RTÜK Board have always been associated with the political parties that they were nominated 
by. Moreover, politicians constantly kept intervening in the day-to-day working routines of the 
RTÜK. In this respect, the personal memoirs of Nuri Kayış (2005) – the head of the RTÜK 
Board from May 2000 to June 2002 – is a great source portraying how far these interventions 
could go.71  
 
Taking all these dynamics as the background of the amendments package, one could easily 
expect that the proposed draft law would bring a kind of solution to the composition of the 
RTÜK Board that has been a major problem since 1994. However, that was not the case. As 
Çaplı and Tuncel (2005: 1551) suggests, “[w]hile the new law was being drafted, it was almost 
impossible to reach a consensus on the main parameters of the representational aspects of the 
regulatory body. The need to bargain and compromise between conflicting interests overrode 
all other concerns”. The new draft law amending the Broadcasting Law did not change the 
number of the RTÜK Board members, but it re-regulated the nomination and election 
                                                                                                                                                    
certain articles took two years to conclude. See: Constitutional Court Decree No. 2004/9, 21 September 2004, 
Official Gazette No. 25593, 24 September 2004, Ankara. 
71 It is interesting to note that the DSP MP Uluç Gürkan, who was the only MP from the ruling party standing 
against the draft law throughout the whole process, in his interview he gave to Yıldız (2003: 48) stated that Nuri 
Kayış ‘was the only person who gave the due of the seat he occupied’.  
  
116 
116 
processes for the membership posts. According to the new Article 6, the term of duty for the 
members was decreased to four years and among nine members of the RTÜK Board:  
 
• five members are to be appointed by Parliament, from the nominees of the 
political party groups determined according to the seats distribution in Parliament;  
 
• two members are to be appointed by Council of Ministers, from four nominees of 
the Higher Education Council (academics in electrical or electronic engineering, 
communication, culture/arts and print/audiovisual media fields);  
 
• one member is to be appointed by Council of Ministers, from two nominees jointly 
presented by the two largest associations of journalists and the Press Council;  
 
• one member is to be appointed by Council of Ministers, from two candidates 
nominated by the National Security Council, from among civil servants. 
 
It is very ironic that this new ‘mixed’ system in the election of the RTÜK Board members was 
justified on the basis that it would help members distance themselves from any type of 
influence and enable them to make ‘impartial’ and ‘independent’ decisions. Clearly, the means 
and ends were totally at odds with each other. The power of the elected was completely 
disregarded with this amendment. Additionally, by allowing the Cabinet (Council of Ministers) 
to appoint four members out of nine, the amendment made the government gain great 
influence over the composition of the governing board.  
 
There were also other important problems with the proposed amendments in regard to 
Turkey’s commitments to the EU as a part of the candidacy process. Firstly, the involvement 
of the National Security Council (MGK) in the regulation of broadcasting through the 
appointment of one of the two candidates it nominates could not be justified at a time when 
reducing, if not completely eliminating, the army’s influence on Turkish politics was 
increasingly becoming a crucial issue within the conditionality of Turkey’s EU membership. 
Secondly, as a member of the Council of Europe, Turkey was part of the debate on 
strengthening the independence and functions of the regulatory authorities for the 
broadcasting sector, which was recommended to member states and adopted by the Cabinet 
in December 2000. The proposed composition was totally in contradiction with what was 
adopted in the Council of Europe that stated: “The rules governing regulatory authorities for 
the broadcasting sector, especially their membership, are a key element of their independence. 
Therefore, they should be defined so as to protect them against any interference, in particular 
by political forces or economic interests” (CoE, 2000). All of these points were emphasised by 
the opposition MPs during the discussions in Parliament before and after the President’s 
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veto.72 When the amendments came to Parliament the second time in May 2002, the 
government was in the midst of an internal strife on how to manage EU conditionality on 
broadcasting rights in languages other than Turkish. Therefore, this time, the opposition MPs 
were very keen on reminding the government of Turkey’s commitments to the EU.73  
 
On the other hand, in his veto statement, President Sezer made no reference to Turkey’s EU 
process. On this specific amendment, what he basically opposed was the selection of the 
board members by Parliament no matter what kind of nomination method was chosen. For 
him, the RTÜK had immense regulatory powers that required it to be impartial, but the 
proposed composition, in contrast, would allow the selection of individuals with certain 
political leanings. This is why he only commented on the first sub-paragraph of amended 
Article 6 and it was this paragraph that the Constitutional Court first suspended the first sub-
paragraph of the amended article in June 2002 and then annulled it in September 2004 (see 
Appendix I).  
 
The Constitutional Court’s decision process juxtaposed with the renewal of the head of the 
RTÜK Board both in June 2002 and September 2004. As the law stipulated the renewal of the 
head of the board every two years, the then head of the RTÜK – Nuri Kayış – was in the final 
days of his duty when the draft law was brought in front of Parliament in May 2002. In June 
2002, just a few days before the Constitutional Court announced its decision, the RTÜK 
members elected the new head of the board: Fatih Karaca.74 As the Court decided to suspend 
the related article, there was no change in the existing composition of the board. Throughout 
the policy process regarding the debate on changing the language policy for broadcasting in 
Turkey, as is further analysed in the following chapter, Karaca was the head of the RTÜK 
Board. 
 
However, issues related to the selection and appointment of the RTÜK Board got 
complicated following the Constitutional Court’s ruling on suspending the enforcement of the 
                                                 
72 For full records of the discussions, see: TBMM Journal of Minutes (24 May 2001) Term: 21, Legislative year: 3, 
Session: 108, Vol. 64. Ankara: TBMM, pp. 14-20. 
73 TBMM Journal of Minutes (14 May 2002) Term: 21, Legislative year: 4, Session: 99, Vol. 95. Ankara: TBMM. 
74 Karaca, who does no more have any association with the RTÜK, was a member of the board since 1995 and 
was also one of the most influential members throughout the beginning. Yet, it was widely known that there was 
a great dispute within the RTÜK Board and Karaca was one of the main actors. This dispute reached to a point 
that none of the RTÜK members publicly backed Nuri Kayış in his lobbying against the draft law and just two 
months before the due of Kayış’s end of term Karaca asked for his resignation from Kayış with the backing of 
some other members. Although the reasons behind this final conflict were totally different, it could be well 
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related paragraph in June 2002. The Constitutional Court granted six months to the 
government to issue new legislation that would begin once the Court publicised its reasoned 
decision. As it takes quite a long time for the Constitutional Court to release its reasoned 
decisions, the government was stuck in tackling the issue on how to appoint new members for 
the RTÜK Board. By 2004, most of the board members’ term of duty was already over and 
new members had to be appointed as soon as possible. The only solution was to change one 
article of the constitution so that RTÜK could be converted to a constitutional body. As odd 
as it might sound, first setting up a statutory body and then granting it a constitutional status 
was not something novel in Turkish policy-making.75  
 
The method was not novel, but the composition of Parliament was completely different from 
how it was when the draft law was brought to Parliament in May 2002, almost a year after the 
President’s veto. The AKP was now leading the government following the November 2002 
elections and the CHP was in opposition. Both parties agreed on drafting a proposal to amend 
the Article 133 of the constitution regulating “Radio and Television Administrations and 
State-Financed News Agencies”.76 The related article was amended by the end of May 2005 
and by doing so the regulation on the composition of the Board became identical with how it 
was in the original Broadcasting Law.77 Accordingly, it would consist of nine members to be 
elected by Parliament upon the nomination of political party groups determined according to 
the Presidency Council formulation quota. This meant that at least six members would be 
elected from the AKP’s and the other three would be elected from the CHP’s nominations. 
To prevent another crisis, both party representatives were in close contact throughout the 
whole process. The CHP leader Deniz Baykal compromised on his earlier decision not to 
approve any amendment to the constitution as long as no attempt was made to abolish the 
‘immunity’ law for the politicians. On the other side, the AKP agreed not to nominate 
controversial names for membership (Radikal, 27 April 2005, 24 May 2005; Hürriyet, 28 April 
2005).  
                                                                                                                                                    
argued that it was rather the final phase of a long running polarisation in the board. Karaca was elected as the 
new chair with five votes against four in June 2002 (N. Akman, Zaman, 9 June 2002; Zaman, 12 February 2002).  
75 One example is the establishment of the Turkish Higher Education Council (Yükseköğretim Kurulu – YÖK).  
76 As noted earlier, Article 133 was first amended in 1993 to lift the state monopoly in broadcasting in Turkey to 
pave the way for the establishment of private broadcasting market. After this amendment the article stipulated: 
“Radio and television stations shall be established and administered freely in conformity with rules to be 
regulated by law. [2nd paragraph] The unique radio and television administration established by the state as a 
public corporate body and the news agencies which receive aid from public corporate bodies shall be 
autonomous and their broadcasts shall be impartial.”  
77 TBMM Journal of Minutes (24 May 2005) Term: 22, Legislative year: 3, Session: 101, Vol. 85. Ankara: TBMM. 
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As might be expected, President Sezer vetoed the proposed law amending the constitution on 
the basis that it would give rise to party favouritism in the candidacy nominations for the 
RTÜK membership and once again he emphasised the importance of establishing an 
independent and impartial regulatory body for broadcasting.78 Following the President’s veto, 
the Constitutional Committee had one final meeting to discuss whether any changes were 
required. Reading the minutes of this meeting reveals that members of the Committee 
regarded this amendment as a return to the prior practice that had been applied since the 
establishment of the RTÜK, which was not in contradiction with the practices in different 
European countries. The members agreed that there was no other way to end the deadlock. 
They also emphasised that the members’ selection method could not be seen as the only 
criterion to ensure independence; the candidates themselves and established working practices 
had equal importance.79 The Committee decided to pass the proposed amendment to the 
constitution to Parliament without any further change made with a majority vote. Finally, 
Parliament voted the proposed amendment to the constitution and passed it without 
discussing it any further.80 
 
As seen, the composition of the RTÜK Board was at the heart of the debate of the 
independence of RTÜK throughout the amendment process of the Broadcasting Law. When 
the amendments are seen in their integrity, it was actually quite evident that the then tripartite 
government aimed at asserting greater influence on the RTÜK by various means. If one of the 
major blows to the independence of the RTÜK Board was the amendment to its composition, 
the second one was the amendment to the supervision of it as stipulated in Article 9 of the 
original law. With an added sub-paragraph, the supervision of the RTÜK Board was granted 
to the High Auditing Board of the Prime Ministry (Başbakanlık Yüksek Denetleme Kurumu – 
BYDK).  
 
During the discussions on the article, the opposition parties strongly disputed the proposed 
amendment and stated that if there would be a type of supervision and/or inspection 
regarding the activities of the board members, the responsible body should be the Turkish 
Court of Accounts (Sayıştay), which was responsible for auditing the revenues and the 
expenditures of the government offices operating under the general and annexed budgets on 
                                                 
78 Official Communication of the President to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 10 June 2005, Ankara. 
79 TBMM Constitutional Committee Report, Initial No: 1/1052, Decision No: 5, 14 June 2005, Ankara.  
80 Law No. 5370, Law Amending an Article of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Official Gazette No. 
25854, 23 July 2005, Ankara. For the records on the Parliamentary session, see: TBMM Journal of Minutes (21 
June 2005) Term: 22, Legislative year: 3, Session: 114, Vol. 88. Ankara: TBMM. 
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behalf of Parliament, not the BYDK.81 This was also emphasised by President Necdet Sezer in 
his veto statement. Following the President’s veto, it was the AKP MPs who argued against 
the amendment this time, but they could not make any difference.  
 
b) The Functions of the RTÜK: To Regulate or to Monitor? 
i.) Deadlock in Regulation: Frequency Allocations 
 
When RTÜK was established by the Broadcasting Law of 1994, it was designed both to 
regulate the broadcasting market as well as monitor whether the broadcasts comply with the 
standards enshrined in law. The main regulatory responsibility assigned to RTÜK was to 
allocate frequencies and award licences to the broadcasters.82 However, due to the reasons 
outlined earlier, RTÜK was not able to carry out its initial regulator responsibility. The last 
attempt to carry out the tenders in April 2001 overlapped with the process of amending the 
Broadcasting Law. RTÜK could not succeed once again as the broadcasters appealed to court 
at the Council of State and won their case.83  
 
It is in fact very interesting to see that the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition was already in search of 
a different policy regime to end the deadlock in frequency allocations as a part of the process 
to amend the Broadcasting Law. Yet, there was a very interesting and even hardly explicable 
contradiction in the timing of the draft law coming in front of Parliament in May 2001 and the 
announcement of the tenders for the frequency allocations a month earlier, in April. To put it 
differently, if the allocations could be carried out in April 2001, what was proposed in the 
draft law to change the approach in planning and allocating the broadcasting frequencies 
would be completely ineffective. This reveals that within the period between the referral of the 
draft law to the Presidency of the Assembly in June 2000 and the beginning of discussions in 
Parliament in May 2001, the government either disregarded the RTÜK’s schedule for the 
                                                 
81 For the complete record of the discussions on the article, see: TBMM Journal of Minutes (24 May 2001) Term: 
21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 108, Vol. 64. Ankara: TBMM, pp. 29-35. 
82 Broadcasting Law, Article 8. 
83 The reason why some broadcasters took the issue in front of the Council of State was related to the RTÜK’s 
earlier announcement that only eleven licences would be granted to national broadcasters. This meant that five 
broadcasters would be excluded from the tender. The Council of State found the broadcasters claimed that 
excluding five broadcasters would be in contradiction with the equality principle stated in the Constitution. The 
then head of the RTÜK, Nuri Kayış, reacted against the decision and accused broadcasters of trying to keep their 
de facto broadcasts and escaping the financial responsibilities that they had to bear once the tenders are carried 
out. Interestingly, the ignorance of the mainstream press – especially of those belonging to the Doğan Group – to 
cover this important issue makes us think that everybody was in fact quite pleased with the decision of the 
Council of State. See: Medyakronik, 25 April 2001.  
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frequency allocations or knew that the tenders would not be carried out one way or the other. 
This issue was never discussed.  
 
What was proposed in the draft law was a dramatic change in the regulatory regime for 
broadcasting. With the amendment to the Article 24 of the Broadcasting Law, the government 
proposed to take the responsibility for frequency planning from the RTÜK and assign it to 
another regulatory body that was established a year before: the Telecommunications Authority 
(Telekomünikasyon Kurumu – TK).84 TK’s main responsibility was originally to facilitate the 
developments in the telecommunications sector during the liberalisation and privatisation 
process. The amendment to Article 24 included the TK in the regulation of broadcasting by 
assigning it the responsibility for frequency planning, which was actually completed by the 
RTÜK years ago. Additionally, with the amendment, the authority to approve the frequency 
plan and decide the numbers and the timing of the frequency allocations was given to another 
council: the Communications High Council (Haberleşme Yüksek Kurulu – HYK).85 As the 
amendment stipulated, HYK would ask RTÜK to initiate the tender process for allocating 
frequencies once it approved the plans. This new approach to broadcasting regulation made 
the issue more complicated. First of all, it terminated the main regulatory function of the 
RTÜK and reduced it to a monitoring body. Secondly, out of the blue, the HYK became the 
main decision maker on the most problematic issue of broadcasting regulation in Turkey. Yet, 
as also noted by Çaplı and Tuncel (2005: 1555), HYK did not have the competence to carry 
out the supervisory role to tackle the frequency allocations since it was just a board without 
any organisational structure that was supposed to convene only twice a year. It can be argued 
that the rationale behind the policy preference of the government at the time to equip the 
HYK with such a massive authority in broadcasting regulation was related to the politically 
complex nature of the problem. After years of chaos, only top level government officials 
could end the deadlock in frequency allocations and the HYK had a perfect composition 
through which any type of fait accompli could be put into practice. This was actually what 
happened in March 2005. The HYK decided that there was no interest in pursuing analogue 
frequency allocations any longer and the planning of digital switchover in Turkey would be the 
next step (Hürriyet, 30 March 2005). 
                                                 
84 TK was set up by law in January 2000 and it was in fact the continuation of the body formerly known as 
Wireless General Directorate under a new organisational chart.  
85 HYK was set up in 1983 to approve communications policies in Turkey. Its members are the Minister of 
Internal Affairs, the Minister of Transport, the Under-Secretary of the National Intelligence Organisation and the 
Head of Electronic Communications of the General Staff, meeting under the presidency of the Prime Minister 
(or a State Minister authorised by the Prime Minister). 
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These contradictions in the proposed regulation were emphasised by different MPs during the 
discussions in Parliament. They mainly criticised the government for further damaging the 
independence of the RTÜK by giving greater authority to the HYK, which represented civic 
and military bureaucracy. Yet, their efforts to change the article did not make any difference.86 
 
The debate on how and when to switchover to digital has been on the RTÜK’s agenda since 
late 2002. In fact, a road map for digital switchover was prepared by the RTÜK in 2002 and it 
was influential behind the decision of the HYK in March 2005. Yet, only from mid-2005 
onwards, ‘digital switchover’ became the catch-phrase in broadcasting related circles. The then 
head of the RTÜK, Fatih Karaca, announced that Turkey was aiming at 2014 for the 
switchover, which he thought to be quite late. By the end of 2005, which is the cut-off date 
for this research, there was no significant progress regarding the switchover policy. It is still 
unknown to what extent the designed road map will be employed. In its current stage, the 
approach of the policy makers within the AKP government suggests that switchover to digital 
is mainly regarded as a technological turn resembling the switchover to colour TV in Turkey 
more than two decades ago. Although switchover to digital may help to end the frequency 
deadlock in Turkey, it is as yet unknown whether the full potential of digitalisation would be 
realised in the long run.  
 
ii.) To Monitor or to Sanction?: The Debate on Broadcasting Standards 
 
The vagueness of broadcasting standards and the ways in which the RTÜK relied on these 
standards to sanction broadcasters were at the centre of criticism towards the RTÜK from the 
very beginning (Çaplı, 2001). When the RTÜK was established in 1994, in contrast to the 
former regulator it replaced – High Commission for Radio and Television (Radyo Televizyon 
Yüksek Kurulu – RTYK) – it was granted the authority to sanction the broadcasters, the most 
extreme being the confiscation of the broadcaster’s licence. The sanctioning powers of the 
RTÜK were always regarded as far too broad and anti-democratic and since the regulator did 
not hesitate to exercise these sanctions quite often, it started to be regarded as a ‘penalising’ 
and ‘censoring’ authority more than a broadcasting regulator (Kejanlıoğlu et al., 2001: 134).87 
In the amendments package presented to Parliament first in May 2001, the then tripartite 
                                                 
86 For the complete record of the discussions on the article, see: TBMM Journal of Minutes (30 May 2001) Term: 
21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 110, Vol. 65. Ankara: TBMM, pp. 30-7. 
87 From 1995 to 2005, RTÜK issued 2951 warnings and suspended 1034 channels. See: Çaplı and Tuncel (2005: 
1560).  
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government wanted to reformulate broadcasting standards and the types of sanctions 
stipulated in law. However, none of these changes were in fact well-formulated and the 
amendments further complicated the situation.  
 
At the core of the problem was Article 4 of the Broadcasting Law which laid out the standards 
that broadcasts should comply with. Within the twenty-point list, together with some universal 
standards for broadcasting as enshrined in domestic regulations of almost every European 
country that is party to European Convention on Human Rights or the Convention on 
Transfrontier Television, there were plenty of other standards as well. As Irvan (1999: 264) 
argues, the rationale behind these standards was to protect the state and the individual from 
broadcasts by obliging the broadcasters to be in line with the ‘establishment’ rather than 
promoting a pluralistic view on what broadcasting meant for the society. According to some 
of these most contentious standards stated in the Broadcasting Law, the broadcasts should be 
in compliance with:  
 
• the existence and independence of the Turkish Republic and the indivisible integrity 
of the State with its territory and nation (Article 4/a); 
 
• the national and moral values of the community (Article 4/b); 
 
• general moral values, tranquillity of the community and Turkish family structure 
(Article 4/d). 
 
• the principle on not allowing broadcasts that shall instigate the community to 
violence, terror, ethnical discrimination or incite hate (Article 4/g); 
 
• the general objectives and basic principles of the Turkish national education system 
and the principle on the fostering of the national culture (Article 4/u). 
 
When the sanctioning powers of the RTÜK are combined with the ambiguity of these 
standards, the picture emerging from the broadcasting scenery in Turkey has always been very 
problematic. For instance, as Yıldız (2004: 79 and 80) presents in his research, during the 
period from 1994 to 2002, RTÜK suspended the broadcasts of sixteen radio stations for 2,781 
days and three TV stations for 458 days on the grounds of violation of Article 4/a; forty-four 
radio stations for 8,620 days and nineteen TV stations for 1,662 days on the grounds of 
violation of Article 4/g.88  
                                                 
88 At this point one might question how RTÜK monitors both radio and TV broadcasts all over Turkey. 
Actually, it has been running a massive operation from the beginning. Under the ‘Head of Monitoring and 
Evaluation Department’ there are forty-one personnel (who are called ‘experts’) responsible for monitoring and 
recording the broadcasts. RTÜK also has regional branches. However, it collaborates with the local police forces 
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When the Broadcasting Law was to be amended in May 2001, new regulations regarding 
broadcasting standards as well as the sanctioning powers of the RTÜK were in the whole 
package. However, the picture did not get any better as the amendment proposed on Article 4 
did not shorten the twenty-point list; in contrast, it became longer. The standards were 
basically rearranged according to the proposed amendment and two additional ambiguous 
standards were enshrined. The first one stipulated that “any programme item that leads people 
to commit a crime or raise the feeling of fear shall not be broadcast” (as amended Article 4/k) 
and the second one stipulated that “the broadcasts shall not encourage the use of violence or 
incite feelings of racial hatred” (as amended Article 4/v; see Appendix I). 
 
The real change was on the sanctioning powers of the RTÜK, which was one of the central 
issues on which the broadcasters kept pressuring the government to be amended. According 
to the amendment to Article 33 of the Broadcasting Law, the RTÜK could no longer suspend 
the broadcasts of any TV or radio station altogether, but instead it could now suspend the 
particular programme violating the broadcasting standards. Moreover, the RTÜK now was 
required to warn the channel before suspending the programme and it could not suspend the 
airing of the programme more than twelve times. In the case that a programme was 
suspended, the broadcaster had to fill in the schedule with a different programme of public 
service nature focusing on “education, culture, traffic, women and children’s right, physical 
and moral development of adolescents, struggle against drugs and harmful habits”. The 
RTÜK had the right to impose fines as a last resort in case of the repetition of the violation.  
 
The amendments brought to both articles – Article 4 and 33 – were full of problems. Firstly, 
the vagueness of the broadcasting standards, which was an initial criticism expressed by 
various circles against the Broadcasting Law for more than a decade, remained unchanged. 
The opposition parties, especially the FP, put forward their most well-grounded criticisms 
towards the draft law in Parliament during the discussions on this article. An FP MP criticised 
the over-protectionist rationale behind the standards for disregarding the protection of a 
democratic society.89 The same MP also criticised the ‘militaristic’ tone in the standards 
through the usage of vague concepts such as ‘national security’, ‘indivisible integrity’ and ‘fear’. 
                                                                                                                                                    
in cities out of its reach to monitor local broadcasts, which has been criticised by broadcasters. Since the 
beginning of 1998, the RTÜK also uses an audience/listener complaint phone line that has been often used as a 
complementary justification for its decisions, see: Kejanlıoğlu et al. (2001: 123-30) and Yıldız (2004: 70-6). 
Specifically on the RTÜK’s view on its complaint line as discussed in its own magazine, see: Karakaşoğlu (1998); 
Kent (1999); Özdiker (1999).  
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As he stated, this vagueness of the concepts was totally in contradiction with not only what 
Turkey should do in relation to its commitments to the EU but also with the main principle of 
the Convention on Transfrontier Television that necessities clarity in the definition of 
standards.  
 
Secondly, the fines set in the amendment of Article 33 were extremely high. In the case of 
repetition of a violation, the amended article proposed the fines to amount to approximately 
US$189,000 for national TV broadcasters. There was neither a reasonable logic nor a 
thorough thinking behind these fines. What was proposed here completely contradicted the 
practicalities of broadcasting in Turkey. If applied, these fines had the potential to do great 
harm particularly to regional and local broadcasters which have been already operating under 
extensive financial constraints. This was emphasised by the opposition parties during the 
discussions in Parliament. Going through the minutes of these discussions, although it is not 
clear whether the government was influenced by the opposition parties or not, the 
government ministers themselves proposed a change on the article to make it more flexible. 
This was actually one of the few articles where government ministers changed the original 
proposal with a further amendment. The government’s new proposal was accepted and rather 
than a definite fine, lower and upper limits were classified.90  
 
The amendments to Article 4 and 33 were both criticised by President Sezer in his veto 
statement. The President stated that the vagueness of broadcasting standards is in 
contradiction to the initial principal of clarity in the penal code. He emphasised that the 
obligation of the broadcasters to comply with these ambiguous and subjective standards 
would result in uneasiness on the side of the broadcasters and therefore jeopardize their 
journalistic practices. And specifically on the amendment of the sanctioning powers of the 
RTÜK, President Sezer stated that the new regulatory framework contradicted the 
constitution by giving judiciary powers to the RTÜK, which was in fact set up as an 
administrative body.91 However, his criticism did not make any difference and when the draft 
law came in front of Parliament the second time in May 2002 the amendments were readopted 
unchanged.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
89 TBMM Journal of Minutes (23 May 2001) Term: 21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 107, Vol. 64. Ankara: TBMM, 
pp. 45-6. 
90 ibid., 79-80.  
91 Official Communication of the President to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 18 June 2001, Ankara. 
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4.5 Issues on Turkey’s Compliance with the European Standards for Broadcasting 
4.5.1 European Convention on Transfrontier Television and Television Without 
Frontiers Directive  
 
The Convention of Transfrontier Television (hereafter Convention) is the first European level 
policy instrument provididng certain principles for the transfrontier circulation of television 
programmes. As an initiative of the Council of Europe, the Convention lays down certain 
‘minimum’ regulatory principles on issues regarding individual rights; the responsibilities of 
broadcasters; the promotion of European programming; advertising; teleshopping, and 
sponsorship. These principles have been important as the Convention formed a basis for the 
drafting of the Television Without Frontiers Directive (hereafter TWF) in 1989, the same year 
that the Convention was presented to signature of the members states. In contrast to the 
Convention’s approach to implementation of its principles, which left the decision to apply 
more or less stringent rules to the State Parties, the TWF’s approach to implementation to 
almost the same principles was very different. Leaving aside the question whether it was 
successful or not, the TWF was in fact the first legal instrument which served to Europeanise 
certain aspects of the member states’ broadcasting regulations above the national level. In this 
respect, the TWF is now an integral part of the entire body of the EU law, the Acquis 
Communautaire. It is binding not only for the member states, but also for the candidate 
countries, including Turkey.  
 
Turkey became a signatory to the Convention in 1992 and ratified it a year after. The 
principles outlined in the Convention also served as a base for the Broadcasting Law of 1994. 
There are explicit references to the Convention enshrined in law (see Article 8, paragraph f 
and p). Therefore, neither the Convention nor the TWF are unfamiliar legal instruments in 
Turkey. However, there are major problems in Turkey’s compliance with the principles 
outlined in both policy instruments and the emergence of these problems dates back to the 
drafting of the Broadcasting Law. As Kejanlioglu (2004) neatly portrays, the drafting of the 
Broadcasting Law was in fact more a process of political bargaining than consensus building. 
The articles adopted from the Convention greatly suffered from misinterpretation as well as 
mistranslation (Pekman, 1994). The Broadcasting Law of 1994 was originally designed to 
regulate both radio and television broadcasts, but the Convention only dealt with television 
broadcasts. The majority of the discrepancies resulting from the 
misinterpretation/mistranslation of the Convention were about the regulations on advertising 
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and teleshopping, and retransmission of broadcasts. Additionally, issues such as how to 
promote European works, broadcasts of major events, protection of minors were totally 
disregarded. These long-neglected discrepancies surfaced when the European Commission 
started monitoring Turkey’s progress in the alignment process. The Commission, in every 
progress report, constantly emphasised Turkey’s non-compliance with the provisions of the 
TWF and asked for a policy change.  
 
Among these discrepancies there are two issues that need further consideration: regulations on 
advertising/teleshopping and retransmission of broadcasts. Regulations for broadcast 
advertising will be an important problem in the near future since there are already huge gaps in 
the implementation of the relevant principles in the Convention in the Turkish context. On 
the other hand, the issue of retransmission of broadcasts became a major crisis between 
Turkey and the EU in the course of 2001 following the banning of the retransmission of 
Deutsche Welle and BBC Turkish broadcasts.  
 
a) Advertising/Teleshopping/Sponsorship 
 
Both in the Convention and the TWF, great importance is given the development of a 
European level of regulatory framework for the commercial activities of broadcasters, mainly 
in the form of advertising. When both legal instruments are situated in a historical context, the 
rationale behind this consideration becomes very clear. Advertising became the driving force 
of the commercial media market in the 1980s in the course of increasing importance of 
information and communication industries in Europe. Yet, the key aim of the TWF was to 
promote the effective functioning of the Single Market by ensuring the free movement of 
broadcasts in Europe, whereas the underlying motive behind the Convention was mainly 
related to Council of Europe’s greater aims of ‘safeguarding’ and ‘enhancing’ pluralism as well 
as Europe’s cultural heritage. In this respect, although the TWF differs from the Convention’s 
emphasis on culture by its emphasis on the Single Market, they use very similar – in most of 
the cases even identical – instruments to achieve their objectives. 
 
In Turkey, the regulations on advertising outlined in the Convention (Articles 19 to 22) were 
tailored to the Broadcasting Law of 1994 (Articles 11-16), but the spirit of the Convention’s 
principles was lost during the adaptation (Pekman, 1994; Kejanlioglu et al., 2001). Leaving the 
translation mistakes aside, the major problem was to adopt the Convention’s principles to 
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regulate radio broadcasts as well, which had nothing to with the Convention. The regulations 
on advertising were considered as a part of the ‘Obligations of Private Radio and Television 
Enterprises’ and the importance given to advertising regulation as a separate issue in the 
Convention was disregarded. The provisions in the law were later rearranged as part of the 
May 2002 amendments package, but no other correction was made. 
 
When compared with the 1989 version of the Convention, the adoption of the provisions on 
the duration and the placement of advertising in the programmes was the most problematic. 
According to the Convention (Article 14/3), broadcasters could insert only one advertising 
break for each complete period of forty-five minutes during the transmission of the feature 
films and films made for the television and a further commercial break would be allowed only 
“if their duration is at least twenty minutes longer than two or more complete periods of 
forty-five minutes”. To simplify this calculation, only two breaks for a ninety minute and three 
breaks for a hundred minute programme would be allowed (Pekman 1994 and 2001). 
However, in the Turkish Broadcasting Law (Article 21/3) this became: “may be interrupted once 
for each complete period of forty-five minutes. If a film lasts longer than forty-five minutes, it may be 
interrupted once for each additional period of twenty minutes after the first complete period 
of forty-five minutes”. On the other hand, regarding the placement of advertisement, the 
Convention (Article 14/2) required the protection of the integrity of the programmes by 
allowing advertisements to be placed between the parts in programmes having natural breaks 
(such as sports, concerts, theatrical performances) or only after elapsing twenty minutes 
between each consecutive commercial break during programmes lacking natural breaks 
(Article 14/4). In the Broadcasting Law, these two separate paragraphs were consolidated and 
the regulation which emerged from this consolidated article was totally different than that 
envisaged in the Convention. Accordingly, Article 21/2 of the Broadcasting Law stipulates as 
follows:  
 
In programmes consisting of autonomous parts or in sports programmes or 
similarly structured events and performances comprising intervals, advertisements 
shall only be inserted between the parts or in the intervals. A period of at least 
twenty minutes should elapse between each successive advertising break. 
 
  
As Pekman (1994: 72) suggests, the provisions on advertising in the Broadcasting Law, despite 
being adopted from the Convention, were very misleading and almost impossible to 
implement. The logic behind placing advertising by taking a forty-five minute long programme 
as a base in the Convention was completely misinterpreted. The broadcasters were obliged to 
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give a commercial break after forty-five minutes and allowed to give as many breaks as they 
wanted following the first with twenty minutes elapsed-time between each.  
 
Although the problems in the drafting of the provisions on advertising in the law were not 
minor, the real problem was in fact quite different. Overall, most of the provisions of the 
convention were adequately enshrined. However, the real problem was about the 
implementation. In the mid-1990s, Turkey witnessed the mushrooming of new broadcasting 
channels, without any adequate regulation accompanying the process. All of these channels 
were – and still are – basically targeting the same advertising cake, which was not big enough 
to accommodate all. When the political instability and the consecutive economic crises were 
added on, the advertising market was a battle zone for broadcasters who kept breaching the 
law with their practices for the sake of increasing their share of the cake. And for the RTÜK, 
as the regulator, the situation was much more complex. It hardly implemented the provisions 
laid out either in the Broadcasting Law or in its directive92 regulating advertising and kept 
ignoring the breach of the law by broadcasters. The independence of RTÜK, which was 
discussed earlier, was not only a matter of its positioning vis-á-vis political powers, but it was 
also a matter of its relation to the broadcasting market as a whole. As Pekman (2001: 226) 
suggests, the RTÜK’s incompetence in regulating advertising is easier to explain when its 
income budget is considered. At the end of the day, one of the main sources of income of the 
RTÜK was 5 per cent share of annual gross advertising revenues transferred from both radio 
and television enterprises.93 Pekman (2001) relates the reasons for the reluctance of 
broadcasters to comply with the provisions on advertising enshrined in law to the vigorous 
competition in broadcasting market:  
 
 
In a context, where there is an issue of political-economy, there is no point in 
wondering about calculating whether advertising on radio and television should be 
three or five minutes, whether this is a surreptitious advertising or not, or whether 
another one [advertisement] is harmful for children or not (Pekman, 2001: 237). 
 
 
                                                 
92 Directive on the Principles and Rules of Radio and Television Broadcasts, Official Gazette No.22296, 28 May 
1995, Ankara. This Directive was replaced with another having the same title on 17 April 2003, Official Gazette 
No. 25082, 17 April 2003, Ankara. 
93Article 12 of the Broadcasting Law lists RTÜK as follows: a) Television and radio frequency annual allocation 
fees from private radio and television enterprises; b) Five percent share of annual gross advertising receipts of 
private radio and television enterprises; c) When needed, appropriations included under the section on transfers 
in the budget of Turkish Grand National Assembly Presidency; d) Administrative fines imposed on the radio and 
television enterprises in accordance with the Article 33. 
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However, from 2004 onwards, RTÜK started becoming very critical about the breach of 
advertising provisions, as there was an increasing unrest in the society about the lacking of 
quality in broadcast content in general. Although people kept bombarding RTÜK to complain 
about broadcasts in general as well as TV advertisements, it was the Advertising Council 
(Reklam Kurulu – RK) that was most active in imposing sanctions on the broadcasters on the 
basis of breaching the Law on the Protection of Consumers.94 Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the RTÜK’s warnings mainly targeted advertisements breaching the principle on the 
protection of children from harmful content. However, the real struggle between the RTÜK 
and the broadcasters was different. RTÜK’s directive was already in conflict with the 
European standards of broadcast advertising since it legitimised the exploitation of advertising 
insertions in the form of framing, sub-titling, pop-ups and even programme sponsorship. Yet, 
broadcasters wanted more and kept pressuring RTÜK to relax the existing rules. In February 
2005, the RTÜK amended its directive and increased the maximum length of advertising 
breaks between the programmes; legalised advertising insertions within the programmes, and 
relaxed the rules on sponsorship. It is clear that this will be a serious problem between Turkey 
and the European Commission in the later stages of the alignment process.  
 
To sum up, the current regulatory framework for television advertising in Turkey does not 
comply with the European standards as laid out either in the Convention or the TWF 
Directive. However, it should also be noted that there have been all sorts of implementation 
problems concerning the TWF Directive all around Europe most evident being on the 
provisions of European programming quotas.95 Following the revision in 1997, the TWF 
Directive has been undergoing another revision process since May 2003. The European 
Commission presented its first draft directive amending the TWF on 13 December 2005. The 
draft directive is a milestone in the mutation of the TWF Directive going as far as to change 
its name to “Audio-visual Media Services Directive”. This is particularly important since the 
approach in the new directive mirrors a radical departure from its origins; broadcasting is now 
defined as a “traditional”, “linear media service”. The new directive expands its scope to 
include different sorts of “non-linear” media where on-demand media consumption is 
                                                 
94 Alone in 2004, the RK imposed sanctions on forty-eight radio and television broadcasters. See: Netgazete, 23 
January 2005. 
95 Research on the policy processes behind the materialisation of the TWF Directive suggests that the 
Community level policy framework arising from the TWF Directive was more of a product of bargaining and 
negotiation rather than consensus building. The TWF directive in fact reflects the ongoing tensions between the 
member states as well as between the European Commission acting on behalf of the interests of the EU and the 
Council of the European Council representing the interests of the member states. This is mainly why the issues 
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prevalent. This new approach has very important consequences for the regulation for 
advertising as well. Interestingly, the Commission used the same rhetoric on the importance of 
the changes in media technologies as well as media consumption patterns not only for 
justifying the need for relaxation of the rules on advertising, but also to expand its scope of 
regulation to include online content, which was not an issue before. Therefore, according to 
the new directive, although the quantity of advertising would not be increased, insertion rules 
would be made more flexible and most importantly product placement would now be allowed, 
on-demand content would also be subjected to minimum level of regulation.  
 
In this framework, although the regulation of television broadcasting in Turkey does not 
comply with the current standards in Europe, it is still early to depict how the future changes 
in the TWF Directive will influence advertising regulation in Turkey. Additionally, in the short 
term, it is not likely that RTÜK will change its ‘light-touch’ approach to regulating television 
advertising since the broadcasters are very effective in pressurising RTÜK.  
 
b) Retransmission of Broadcasts 
 
Facilitating the transfrontier transmission and retransmission of television programmes within 
member states through a minimum set of rules has been the initial objective of both the 
Convention and the TWF Directive. In this respect, both policy instruments recognise that 
‘transfrontier television’ is possible only if programmes transmitted in one member state 
would be made available for reception in another member state without any restrictions 
employed. The provisions concerning the regulation of retransmission of television 
programmes in both the Convention (Article 4) and the TWF Directive (Article 2a) are 
designed in a way that the country of origin of the programmes would be where the 
programmes are subjected to regulation and retransmission of these programmes in other 
member states could not be restricted. The restriction of retransmission would only be 
accepted if violation of the provisions was in evidence as described both in the Convention 
(Article 24) and the TWF Directive (Article 2a).  
 
When the Convention was tailored to broadcasting legislation in Turkey, ‘retransmission’ was 
one of the major concepts that were seriously misinterpreted. In the Convention (Article 2b)  
                                                                                                                                                    
concerning promoting European programming via increasing quotas and the broadcasting of major events have 
been most difficult to legislate in the European level. 
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retransmission was defined as “the fact of receiving and simultaneously transmitting, 
irrespective of the technical means employed, complete and unchanged television programme 
services, or important parts of such services, transmitted by broadcasters for reception by the 
general public”. However, in the Broadcasting Law of 1994 (Article 3/n amended as 3/r in 
May 2002), retransmission was defined as “receiving completely or partly of radio and 
television program services in an unchanged form and transmitting simultaneously or later by 
the general public, irrespective of the technical means employed, by the competent 
broadcasting enterprise”. This definition was very ambiguous since – from a technical point of 
view – broadcasting a programme later than its original transmission time could not again be 
named as ‘transmission’ (Pekman, 1994: 69; Kejanlığlu, 2004: 430).96 
 
The ambiguity in the definition of the concept of ‘retransmission’ was in fact a minor issue 
when compared to the regulatory framework laid out in Article 26 for retransmission of 
broadcasts. Article 26 was totally in contradiction with the Convention since it stipulated that 
only retransmission via ‘cable’ would be allowed. As Pekman (1994: 70) suggests, this article 
was designed to prevent the repetition of early experiences in Turkey when municipalities 
facilitated the retransmission of satellite broadcasts that originated in Europe by relaying the 
signals to their residents through massive dishes.97 Then again, as stipulated in Article 26, 
broadcasters that were established outside Turkey, but targeting the domestic audience in 
Turkey were also banned from transmitting their programmes. The rationale behind this 
provision was to block satellite broadcasts in Kurdish targeting the Kurdish population in the 
south eastern region. Turkey wanted to prevent the broadcasts of first MED-TV and later Roj 
TV on the basis of this article. In both cases, the debate resulted in major political crises in 
which Turkey condemned several European countries (Britain, Belgium and Holland) for 
allowing these broadcasters to use their territory to broadcast their ‘separatist propaganda’ 
targeting the south eastern region in Turkey. On the other side of the fence, these countries 
and the EU accused Turkey of violating human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
 
                                                 
96 It gets more complicated when the original text is compared to its official translation. The adverb ‘sonra’, 
which is ‘later’ in English, is replaced with the phrase “with a delay” in the official translation of the law used by 
RTÜK. In this respect, the English translation of the law is closer to the spirit of the Convention since the word 
delay may refer to a technicality.  
97 In Turkey, when private broadcasting began via satellite in 1990, the mayors of several cities quickly established 
television stations in their constituencies to turn the satellite transmission to terrestrial broadcasts to be 
distributed to the local inhabitants via giant dishes. Considering that the satellite dishes market for households 
were yet to emerge, what the mayors provided was a very creative public service. See, Çaplı (2001: 47).  
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Retransmission of broadcasts was one of the most troubled issues between the EU and 
Turkey following the RTÜK’s decision to ban two very important stations at different times: 
BBC Turkish and Deutsche Welle on the grounds that they posed a threat to security. BBC 
Turkish was, in fact, one of the first radio services of the BBC World that was broadcast on 
the FM Band. Although retransmission was not allowed according to the Broadcasting Law, 
the first members of the RTÜK Board allowed the retransmission of the BBC Turkish 
programmes in 1993. BBC Turkish continued its broadcasts until 1999 without any 
interruption. However, in 1999 RTÜK ordered a suspension of thirty days for Radyo Foreks – 
an Istanbul based radio station hosting the BBC Turkish service – due to the coverage of the 
PKK in the BBC Turkish broadcasts. Although the tailoring of the Convention to the 
domestic law during the drafting of Broadcasting Law was completely wrong, RTÜK’s 
interpretation of the provision in 1999 further complicated the issue. Following the 
suspension, it took eighteen months for the BBC Turkish service to be able to retransmit its 
broadcasts to the Turkish audience. In April 2001, RTÜK allowed a radio station to retransmit 
Deutsche Welle programmes for a couple of hours per day. Following the RTÜK’s decision, 
the BBC Turkish service also applied for permission to restart its broadcasts in Turkey. In 
June 2001, NTV Radio became the service’s second host in Turkey and retransmission from 
the FM band began once again. However, the attitude in the RTÜK Board towards the BBC 
Turkish and the Deutsche Welle services changed in a couple of months and the members 
decided to ban both services in August 2001. Ironically, even the then head of the RTÜK 
Board Nuri Kayış could not suggest any specific reason for this change. As he sarcastically 
writes in his memoirs:  
 
 
Some board members have probably approved the transmission of these 
broadcasts only because they woke up from their right sides on 11 April 2001, and 
they disapproved on 8 August 2001 because they woke up from the left side 
(Kayış, 2006: 42). 
 
  
The decision to ban retransmission of both services was not taken unanimously. Nuri Kayış 
argued against this decision, but could not influence other members. However, Kayış was so 
determined that he did something extremely unusual; he filed an appeal before the court for 
the annulment of the decision. In Turkish broadcasting history there was no other case that 
manifested the internal disputes within RTÜK so explicitly. Nuri Kayış, in his memoirs, 
reasoned his appeal by quoting his own statement of appeal: 
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Ceasing the broadcasts of the Deutsche Welle and the BBC radios will put Turkey 
in a difficult position. Turkey will look like an anti-democratic, censoring country 
in which there is no freedom of communication. One of the basic principles of 
international law is the principle of reciprocity. If Turkey ceases the broadcasts of 
foreign radios, European countries might also limit the broadcasts of Turkish 
radios and televisions […] Ceasing the broadcasts of the Deutsche Welle and the 
BBC would mean restricting their freedom to disseminate thought and right to 
information (Kayış, 2006: 43). 
 
  
As might be expected, reactions of the international circles, especially of the EU, human rights 
watchdogs, press associations were not much different. It was especially the Foreign Ministry 
that had to bear the consequences of RTÜK’s decision. Both in Britain and Germany, Turkish 
ambassadors were given notices. As Nuri Kayış writes in his memoirs, the then Foreign 
Minister İsmail Cem kept sending official letters to RTÜK to ‘remind’ board members of the 
importance of reassessing and annulling their decisions. However, as Kayış suggests, the board 
members ignored these letters on the grounds that RTÜK is an independent regulatory body 
and that was how they interpreted the relevant provision in the law (ibid., 43).  
 
The Administrative Court rejected Kayış’s appeal on the grounds that only broadcasters 
subjected to this decision could bring the case in front of the court. Nuri Kayış appealed 
against the Court’s decision by applying to the State Council. The Council approved Kayış’s 
claim and sent the case back to the Administrative Court for reassessment. However, the 
political agenda changed before the Court concluded its reassessment. Amendment to Article 
26 was in the package adopted by Parliament unchanged in May 2002. If the President did not 
veto the amendment package in June 2001, it was less likely that RTÜK could ban the 
retransmission of the BBC and Deutsche Welle programmes since the amendment to Article 
26 legalised retransmissions. It is very interesting to note that the RTÜK Board banned the 
retransmission of these programmes at a time when amending the Broadcasting Law was 
already on the agenda. It is hard to say whether RTÜK members ignored the scope of the 
amendments or they would still be able to justify their decisions on the basis of the amended 
article. The amendment to Article 26 in May 2002 was still full of restrictions. According to 
the amended Article 26, only ‘occasional’ retransmission was allowed and suspension was 
justified on the basis of Article 25 and 33 of the law, which regulated suspension and 
sanctions.98 As might be expected, the EU was very critical about the existing restrictions. 
                                                 
98 Among these two articles, Article 25 is particularly important since it grants the Prime Minister the authority to 
suspend a broadcast “in cases of acute necessity for reasons of national security or of a strong possibility that 
public order may be disturbed”. The same article also stipulates that the Council of State would be the court in 
charge for assessing the appeals against relevant decisions. 
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Consequently, the Article was amended once again in August 2002 as a part of the third EU 
reform package.99 The difference between occasional and regular retransmission was 
withdrawn. The crisis between the EU and Turkey could only be settled after this amendment. 
Currently, the retransmission of both the BBC Turkish and Deutsche Welle programmes are 
legal in Turkey.  
 
4.6 Who Owns the Media?: The Debate on Opening the Turkish Media to Foreign 
Ownership 
4.6.1 The Background 
 
As noted earlier, the major structural change in Turkish broadcasting market started to unfold 
following the two consecutive financial crises in November 2000 and February 2001. As 
happened in every financial crisis in Turkey, it was again the banking sector that was most 
affected. Besides, the banking sector in Turkey was already in flux at the time since the whole 
sector was suffering from the lack of effective macroeconomic policies governing financial 
markets in which banking was the key activity. Not surprisingly, this flux was the by-product 
of the mismanagement of the liberalisation of the financial system that was introduced in the 
early 1980s which became unmanageable by the end of the 1990s. As explained in the 
previous chapter, in the early 1990s, it was under these circumstances that the large business 
conglomerates started acquiring the already existing banks or setting up new ones to finance 
their businesses. At the same time, acquiring media became a key interest for these 
conglomerates who were very well aware that owning media would strengthen their business 
ties with consecutive governments seeking for more and better publicity (Çaplı and Tuncel, 
2005: 1576). This bond between media, politics and finance started fracturing when the 
Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu – TMSF) took over nine banks 
in 1999. By 2002, twenty banks were taken over by the TMSF. 
 
Following the takeovers of the management of the businesses of the Media Group in 2000 
and the Aksoy Group in 2001 in return for their debts resulting from the ill-management and 
corruption in their banks, the TMSF took over the Imar Bank of the Uzan Group in July 
2003. The Uzan Group was one of the major players in media market in Turkey owning the 
second biggest mobile phone operator Telsim, seven radio stations, two television channels 
and one daily newspaper. TMSF seised all these assets in February 2004 in return for the debts 
                                                 
99 Law No. 4771, Law on the Amendment to the Law on the Establishment and Broadcasts of Radio and 
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of the Uzan Group due to its siphoning of around US$6 billion from its bank. After this final 
handover operation, the TMSF became the key player in the Turkish media sector. However, 
this was a serious problem since all the assets owned by the TMSF were considered as the 
assets of the state as stipulated in the Banks Act enacted in 1999. Thus, by 2004, the key player 
in media in Turkey was not the TMSF, but the Turkish state. As might be expected, it was 
foremost the RTÜK that was most affected by this awkward situation as the regulator. Shortly 
after the takeover operation was concluded, the RTÜK started pressuring the TMSF to sell all 
the media assets it owns and withdraw from the broadcasting market.  
 
From the perspective of the TMSF, especially for its chairman Ahmet Ertürk, it was time to 
open the Turkish media to foreign investment thinking that the goal behind these sales should 
not just be to hand them to market players but also to receive considerable amount of 
revenue. Where Turkey’s position vis-á-vis the EU was considered there could not be any 
better timing for opening the media to foreign ownership since Turkey’s closure to foreign 
ownership in its media market has already been criticised by the European Commission in its 
various progress reports on Turkey.100 At least from the EU perspective, Turkey had to open 
its media market to European investors sooner rather than later. However, neither the 
regulatory framework nor the dominant political rhetoric was ready for a policy change in 
media ownership of this scale. Firstly, as stipulated in the Broadcasting Law (Article 29/h) 
amended in May 2002, foreign ownership in media was only 25 per cent (up from 20 per cent 
before the amendment), and one foreign individual could have shares only in one radio or 
television enterprise. Secondly and most importantly, despite the AKP government’s liberal 
approach to media ownership policy, there was a rigorous opposition to opening media 
ownership to foreign investment. The support for keeping media as ‘national’ as possible was 
even apparent in the AKP cadres below the government level. As might be expected, the 
opposition party CHP was also against foreign media ownership, but the strongest opponent 
was President Necdet Sezer.  
 
By September 2004, the RTÜK and the TMSF started publicising their own perspectives on 
how to sell the Uzan Group’s media assets, especially its Star TV. The chairman of the TMSF, 
Ahmet Ertürk, was in favour of selling all the Star TV’s assets in one lot, whereas Fatih 
Karaca, the then head of the RTÜK, persisted in arguing that rather than sale of assets, sales 
of shares should be the approach. According to the regulator, frequencies could not be sold to 
                                                                                                                                                    
Television, Official Gazette No. 24841, 9 August 2002, Ankara. 
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foreigners since the issue of frequency allocations was still in deadlock and Star TV was a de 
facto broadcaster just like the others. Additionally, as the argument went, the RTÜK was not in 
a position to approve any sales exceeding the 25 per cent ceiling of foreign ownership. Under 
these circumstances, although the TMSF could have already sold what it owned with the 
authority granted to it by law, it was well aware that the aftermath of these sales would result 
in chaos. The chaos meant that either the RTÜK might not approve the sales or the TMSF 
would have to pay compensation to third parties who owned shares in these media assets. 
Considering that the real owners of the media were veiled on paper as the shares were 
distributed to close staff, even to secretaries and auxiliary staff working for these media 
proprietors, compensation procedures would simply further complicate the process. After 
auditing all of the company records of Uzans’ assets, the TMSF knew the real picture of media 
ownership patterns in Turkey more than anybody else. Therefore, the TMSF could only sell 
these assets when the gaps in the legislation were filled in. Eventually the RTÜK also agreed 
the sales of the frequencies, which meant that amending the legislation was now inevitable.101  
 
4.6.2 How and How Much To Sell? The Battle over Per Cents of Shares 
 
The details of the draft proposal to amend an article of the Banks Act (No. 4389) and the 
Article 29 of the Broadcasting Law were originally prepared by the TMSF. Seven AKP MPs 
adapted this draft as a proposed law and presented to the Presidency of the Assembly by the 
end of December 2004.  
  
According to the proposal, the TMSF was granted the authority to sell not only more than 49 
per cent of the shares of the companies that it overtook the management of, but also the 
assets of these companies together with its shares to foreign individuals of groups. With the 
amendment, the TMSF was also exempted from certain procedural requirements as stipulated 
in the Law on Procedures for Recovery of Public Receivables (Law No. 6183) to make the 
selling procedures bureaucratically more straight forward. Additionally, no reimbursement 
claim could be made once the assets were handed over to the buyer. Only compensation 
claims limited to the tender price added to its legal interest rate were to be accepted, including 
those put forward by the third parties affected from these sales. In order to avoid the delay 
that due to the length of the paper work resulted from the sales, the amendment also 
                                                                                                                                                    
100 See: European Commission (2000: 37; 2002: 72; 2003: 70). 
101 For a collection of news articles on this debate, see: Haberanliz, 30 September 2004; Radikal, 3 December 
2004; Netgazete, 26 December 2004; Yeni Şafak, 1 January 2005.  
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stipulated the conclusion of the handovers in a month’s time. And finally, limit of foreign 
ownership in media as stipulated in the Broadcasting Law was increased to 49 per cent from 
25 per cent.  
 
As was usual practice, both of these amendments were proposed with short statements added 
to the text justifying the reasons why they were needed. However, the justification of the 
second amendment on increasing the limits of shares available to foreign ownership in media 
was significant as it linked the policy to the EU cause:102  
 
 
In view of the harmonisation process with the European Union, the amendment to 
this paragraph aims to encourage the international investors to bid in possible auctions 
and thus to further the competition by increasing the share of foreign capital in private 
radio and television broadcasting establishments. 
 
The draft proposal was discussed in the Planning and Budget Committee in January 2005 for 
the first time. However, the committee could not decide on the final version of the proposal 
in its first meeting. The decision was to set up a sub-committee to discuss the amendments in-
depth before finalising the proposal in the main committee. The sub-committee met twice in 
February and concluded its discussions. The main points from these discussions were also 
included in the minutes of the main committee meeting held in March; and a couple of 
important points emerged from the sub-committee meetings: i) the general belief was that 
these amendments should be brought in front of Parliament as a draft law presented by the 
government, not as a proposal signed by a couple of MPs since the scale of the amendments 
marked an important shift in media ownership policy originally promoted by the government 
in office; ii) it was emphasised that the RTÜK should present its opinion on the issue since 
there were different approaches to regulate foreign ownership in different countries and the 
regulator should advise on which one would best fit Turkey’s conditions. The sub-committee 
also emphasised that the possible buyers should be aware of the deadlock in frequency 
allocations and they would be operating under the same circumstances as exisiting 
broadcasters.103  
 
Apart from these important debates, the most important change proposed in the sub-
committee was to fully open the media to foreign ownership rather than limiting it to 49 per 
cent. Therefore, in its final two meetings held in February and March 2005, the approach to  
                                                 
102 Law No. 5317, Law Amending the Banks Act and the Radio and Television Law, 16 March 2005, Ankara, p.3. 
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foreign media ownership as discussed in the Plan and Budget Committee was drastically 
different from the original proposal. RTÜK’s position was clear in these final meetings; it was 
against the increase in the limits of media shares open to foreign ownership. There were two 
conflicting views on the table. Some argued that the RTÜK’s view should be considered 
carefully and removing the limits on foreign ownership should be assessed particularly in 
relation to Turkey’s concerns on security and its ‘psychology’. Others argued that removing 
the limits for foreign ownership would raise the standards of competition and besides, foreign 
media could not attempt to disregard the ‘national sensitivities’ since broadcasting standards 
enshrined in law would be binding for them as well. Additionally, rather than limiting the per 
cent of the shares that foreign investors can buy, a limitation on the numbers of media 
enterprises that one foreign investor could have a share of was presented as a better policy 
approach by the market liberalisers during the discussions. Although it was not agreed by all 
the members, especially by those representing the CHP, the main committee finally reached a 
conclusion and revised the original proposal. According to the new amendment proposed, the 
limits on foreign ownership of a single media enterprise was scrubbed all together, but the 
number of media enterprises that could have foreign investors with more than 50 per cent 
shares were limited to one quarter of the broadcasting market. Besides, prohibition on cross 
media ownership was kept and foreign ownership was allowed neither for regional nor for 
local media.104 The proposed law on amending the relevant legislations was now ready to be 
discussed in Parliament.  
 
4.6.3 The Proposal Comes to Parliament  
 
Parliament started discussing the proposed amendments in mid-March 2005, shortly after the 
main committee submitted its conclusion to the Presidency. There were mainly two arguments 
that shaped the debate throughout. The AKP ministers and its MPs in general supported 
opening the media to foreign investors with the underlying motive that foreign ownership 
would increase competition in the broadcasting market. For them, this competition would 
consequently bring ‘quality’ to the broadcasts in Turkey, which they argued to be in sharp 
decline. As they also argued, the working conditions in the broadcast media would also 
improve once foreign ownership was introduced as foreign investors would bring new 
business models.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
103 Planning and Budget Committee Report, Initial No: 2/363, Decision No: 24, 9 March 2005, Ankara.  
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The opposition MPs of the CHP, on the other hand, were against the proposed amendments 
on various grounds. The first criticism they put forward was on the technicality of the law. 
They argued that since it was the government who promoted policy change on this scale, it 
should be the one officially proposing it to Parliament. Regarding the scope of the 
amendments, as might be expected, the CHP’s criticisms were grounded on its anti-IMF and 
anti-privatisation stance. As the bottom line, for the CHP MPs, broadcast media had ‘strategic 
national importance’ due to their influence on public opinion and agenda setting; therefore, 
should not be sold to foreigners. As they argued, although Turkey’s future membership 
prospects to the EU were as yet unclear, the government was using the EU as a tactical shield 
to justify opening the broadcast media to foreign ownership. From their perspective, as one 
MP put it very strikingly: “[T]his sale is not the sale of a soft drink firm. This sale is directly 
related to freedom of thought, freedom of press that form the public opinion.”105 
 
This CHP’s resistance to open the broadcast media market to foreign investment could in fact 
be regarded as a resistance to globalisation, which manifested itself with the surfacing of 
various fears. At various times during the parliamentary discussions on the amendments, the 
CHP MPs vocalised these fears in different ways. These were: a belief that foreign media 
would not act in a responsible manner and consider Turkey’s ‘national sensitivities’; RTÜK 
would not be able to monitor these media; these media under foreign ownership might well 
support ethnic, sectarian movements and carry out missionary activities to spread Christianity; 
and finally, they might not even need words to influence society and use ‘subliminal’ visual 
techniques instead. These MPs, strangely enough, were expressing these assumptions at a time 
when Turkey was expected to start accession negotiations with the EU in a couple of months. 
Clearly, as discussed earlier, the long established ‘Serves syndrome’, that is a deeply rooted 
mistrust of foreigners having an interest in Turkey, was still intact and evident in the 
opposition’s approach to foreign investment in media. Just to give one concrete example, one 
CHP MP stated that:106 
 
News and informational programmes are the most important tools to influence, 
control the entire society. Besides, they [foreign media] don’t need to use words […] 
Control can be achieved through images and commercials that pass so fast that cannot 
be recognised. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is not possible to talk about 
competition. And it is not possible to talk about carrying out the necessities of the 
relationship with the European Union. The competition here can only be described as 
                                                                                                                                                    
104 ibid.  
105 TBMM Journal of Minutes (15 March 2005) Term: 22, Legislative year: 3, Session: 70, Vol. 77. Ankara: 
TBMM, p. 66. 
106 ibid., 76. 
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the competition between the ones who want to protect the unity and the integrity of 
our country and the ones who try to wipe away the Lausanne.  
 
The contradiction was that this line of thought was also shared by some of the AKP MPs. For 
some MPs, their government was in conflict with its own foundations, namely with its 
‘conservative’ character. It was an influential name in the AKP, Nevzat Yalçıntaş (Istanbul 
constituency), who vocalised the opposition in the ruling party during the parliamentary 
discussions. Yalçıntaş strongly criticised his own party and argued that ‘conservatism’, which 
was argued to be one of the AKP’s policy stance, should be apparent in the party’s approach 
to national and moral values. Yalçıntaş, at one point, even suggested that if the whole 
operation was aimed at rescuing Star TV, either a ‘national charity’ could be set up or Star TV 
could be sold to the state broadcaster, the TRT.107 During the discussions, Nevzat Yalçıntaş, 
together with three other AKP MPs proposed an amendment to limit foreign ownership to 49 
per cent, which was initially proposed in the first committee before it came in front of 
Parliament. This amendment proposal was also backed by some other AKP MPs. However, 
the government ministers did not accept the proposal.  
 
It was Abdüllatif Şener, the State Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, who had to defend 
the proposal on removing the limits on foreign media ownership. As might be expected, 
Şener’s first emphasis was on the importance of increasing the competition in the broadcast 
media market. He reminded all the MPs that Turkish media have been open to foreign 
investment from the beginning and foreign players have already been part of the market. 
Şener tried to explain the regulatory framework in the EU by emphasising the free market 
character of the EU. Regarding the fears mentioned earlier, he stated that perceiving foreign 
media ownership as a threat to ‘our’ national interest was simply not realistic. He argued that 
foreign capital would always be very considerate about the sensitivities wherever it operated 
knowing that acting the opposite way would mean losing audiences.108 Interestingly, Şener 
presented the twenty-three-point broadcasting standards enlisted in the law as the initial 
reference point that the foreign media owners would be obliged to comply with. The 
standards Şener relied on were the same with the ones that the AKP criticised as being 
ambiguous and even anti-democratic before the 2002 general elections at the time when the 
Broadcasting Law was amended. 
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The discussion on the amendments was finally concluded in one session and the AKP 
succeeded in taking the first step to open a quarter of the Turkish broadcasting media market 
to foreign investment by using its majority in Parliament. Yet, most of the MPs, especially 
those from the opposition, were sure that President Sezer would certainly veto the law, which 
was not even approved by the broadcasting regulator, the RTÜK. They were correct. 
 
4.6.4 The President’s Veto and its Aftermath  
 
As it was expected, President Sezer vetoed the law. He had three major criticisms. Firstly, he 
did not approve the regulation to be applied if any of the TMSF tenders was annulled. The 
amendment stipulated that in case of annulment of the tender, no demand could be made to 
the buyer to return the assets back to the TMSF, which was a precautionary measure to 
discourage third parties (especially any member of the Uzan family) from applying to the court 
for the annulment of the tenders. President Sezer stated that if the assets would not be 
returned back to the TMSF in case of an annulment, then the annulment decision of the court 
would in fact be inoperative since a new tender could not be announced without anything to 
sell. Secondly, the President stated that by bringing an upper limit to the possible 
compensation charges, the proposed amendment was intervening in the competence of the 
judiciary. As he argued, if the tender was somehow annulled by the court due to misconduct, 
then the tender price might not represent the actual value of the asset and the third parties 
might be able to prove that the cost of their damages exceeded this upper limit. And finally, 
on the issue of opening the broadcasting media market to foreign investors, the President 
grounded his veto on similar lines to the other opponents of the law. He basically stated that 
foreign investment in media without any limits would be in conflict with “national interests” 
and the “common good”.109 Considering that the President is the highest officer of the 
Turkish State, his views on foreign ownership cannot just be seen as ‘personal’. His opposition 
was also shared by some other circles both from the nationalist right and left.  
 
In his veto statement, President Sezer suggested that the Turkish legislative framework 
required broadcasts to be carried as ‘public service’ and the frequencies that have been used by 
the broadcasters belonged to public. According to him, the reason why broadcasting should 
be regulated was due to the power that media hold in asserting influence over the public, 
which has the right to receive impartial and objective information. The President regarded 
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impartial and objective broadcasting as the sine qua non of the principle of public service. 
Although there was nothing special about these views and they could be emphasised by any 
political figure in any other country, the President’s scepticism towards foreign ownership 
media along these lines and on the eve of the start of the accession talks with the EU was 
remarkable. In his statement, President Sezer openly challenged the justification of the 
amendment abandoning the 25 per cent foreign ownership limit in broadcast media and 
argued that the initiatives had nothing to do with the harmonisation process with the EU. By 
referencing a Constitutional Court decision taken in 1994 on privatisation, which concluded 
that privatisation should not be understood as foreign ownership, the President suggested that 
broadcasting should be considered along the same line. As he stated: 
 
 
Bringing certain limitations or restrictions to the rights granted to foreigners should be 
understood along the lines of protecting the state, securing its prolongation. Rendering 
realistic restrictions to prevent the supremacy of the foreigners on issues of vital 
importance and issues that have a direct affect on the future of the state is a must for 
protecting sovereignty and the national interests.110   
 
Under these circumstances, the AKP government could no longer pursue its case. The 
President’s veto heightened the tone of criticism towards the AKP. Days before the 
President’s veto, there were angry voices heard in various dailies, even in the ones known to 
be close to the AKP cadres. It was the same criticism although articulated in different venues: 
the AKP had become far too liberal and started contradicting its own societal and electoral 
basis, which favoured national capital and had conservative values (See F. Koru, Yeni Şafak, 18 
March 2005; N. Şener, Sabah, 18 March 2005). The problem for the AKP and of course for 
the TMSF as well was to tackle the problem as soon as possible by coming up with a new 
approach to selling these media assets without losing not only too much credibility but also 
profit. However, some officials were already talking about the inevitability of a decrease in the 
financial value of these assets as a result of the veto (N. Şener, Milliyet, 2 April 2005).  
 
Following the veto, although Abdüllatif Şener, the State Minister and the Deputy Prime 
Minister, openly challenged the President in his statements to the press by emphasising the 
importance of EU harmonisation process and by disputing the unconstitutionality claims, he 
started working on a new formula with the chairman of the TMSF, Ahmet Ertürk. The new 
formula became clear in a very short time. They both agreed to change the proposal according  
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to the President’s veto and keep the existing 25 per cent foreign ownership limit. The TMSF 
would now target the domestic market players to sell Star TV. The new proposal came in 
front of Parliament by the end of May and in just one session it was adopted without any 
further discussion.111  
 
Thinking that the veto might decrease the value of the Uzan Group’s media assets, the TMSF 
decided to divide the media group into ten and sell each asset separately and 5 September 
2005 was announced as the auction date for Star TV (Dünya Gazetesi, 18 July 2005). The initial 
value of Star TV was declared as US$155 million. Following the announcement of the auction 
date, there were already nine contenders lined up in a week. Interestingly, despite the decision 
to keep the existing foreign ownership limits, there were global media players among the 
contenders which were anticipating a change in ownership regulations in Turkey one way or 
the other. Some of these players were: RTL (Germany), SBS Broadcasting (Netherlands), 
Canwest (Canada) (Yeni Şafak, 25 July 2005). However, the TMSF postponed the auctions to 
21 September to increase the competition and provide additional time to the applicants for the 
preparation of the paperwork (Milliyet, 24 July 2005). 26 September 2005 was now the new 
auction date for Star TV. 
 
The winner of the auction for Star TV was the Doğan Group. Işıl TV Broadcasting which 
belonged to the Doğan Group offered two times more than the estimated price and acquired 
it for US$306 million. Yet, shortly after the sale there were doubts that the Competition 
Authority might approve the acquisition since the Doğan Group had already a dominant 
position in the broadcasting market. In that case, Star TV would be handed over to the second 
contender, the Ciner Group. By the end of October, the Competition Authority announced its 
decision: the acquisition was approved.112 
 
The result of the auction of the Uzan Group’s radio stations was actually more remarkable. 
The most aggressive contenders for the radio channels auctions turned out to be the Canadian 
group Canwest. Canwest acquired two of the Uzans’ radio stations – Super FM and Metro FM 
– for US$56 million. It also won the second round auctions of two more radio stations of the 
Uzans’ – Joy FM and Joy Turk FM – in January 2006 for US$5 million. Of course, CanWest 
                                                 
111 Law No. 5354, the Law on Amending the Banks Law, Official Gazette No. 25828, 28 May 2005, Ankara. For 
the official records of the Parliament, see: TBMM Journal of Minutes (25 May 2005) Term: 22, Legislative year: 3, 
Session: 102, Vol. 85. Ankara: TBMM. 
112 For a collection of news articles on this debate, see: NetGazete, 7 October 2005; Hürriyet, 8 October 2005; 
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did not enter any of these auctions by itself, but it rather acted together with a Turkish 
partner: Turkcom. In doing so, the shares were veiled and Canwest’s acquisitions perfectly 
accorded with the existing regulatory framework which did not allow one foreign investor to 
have shares in more than one media asset and set 25 per cent limit. In short, the resistance to 
opening the broadcasting market to foreign ownership failed in a way. Star TV was acquired 
by the most dominant group in Turkish media market, but a new international player also 
made a way into the Turkish broadcasting market. The rest was yet to come. Turkish media 
proprietors have long been in search of partnerships with foreign investors and they were 
ready to challenge the resistance in their own ways. 
 
4.6.5 Who Wants to Own Media in Turkey? The Winners and the Losers 
 
Without a doubt, Turkey emerged as a very important market for international investors once 
its EU bid and the prospect of the launch of accession talks by the end of 2005 became a solid 
process in the final months of 2004. The Turkish media market became the centre of attention 
following the signs of a possible market liberalisation to sell the media assets owned by the 
TMSF. Turkey’s growing potential was assessed and confirmed also by international 
consultants such as International Media Consultants Associés (IMCA) and Morgan Stanley. 
For months and months, the Turkish press covered news stories on the international media 
market players who aspired to enter to the Turkish media. The most important candidates 
were: the biggest media mogul in the world Rupert Murdoch; the owner of the Chelsea 
Football Club Roman Abramovich; the second biggest broadcasting company in Europe, the 
SBS Broadcasting Group; the owner of the American company CME and also the heir of the 
cosmetics empire Estee Lauder, Ronald Lauder; and the Canadian group Canwest. 
 
a) The SBS Broadcasting Group 
 
As early as March 2005, one of the most eager contenders to buy Star TV was the SBS 
Broadcasting Group. The SBS is based in Luxemburg and was established in 1989 in Sweden. 
KKR and Permira, two private equity firms, acquired the SBS in 2005 and 20 per cent shares 
of the company is hold by Netherlands based Telegraaf Media Groep N.V. (TMG). The 
Group has very important investments all around Europe with eighteen commercial TV 
stations, twenty-one premium Pay-TV channels, fourteen radio networks and ten stand-alone 
radio stations. It is also active in publishing for broadcasting and owns three television guides 
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published in various European countries. The company became an important player in the 
Central and Eastern European media markets during the initial pre-accession period in the 
mid-1990s, benefiting hugely from the liberalisation processes. For the SBS, Turkey was an 
ideal market to enter, with its growing advertising market. However, when there was no 
change made in the 25 per cent limit for foreign ownership in media, the SBS changed its 
plans. When Markus Tellenbach, the CEO of the SBS Televisions, came to Istanbul in June 
2005 for a conference, he gave a very striking interview to some of the Turkish dailies. 
Tellenbach made very clear that they would only invest in countries where they would be 
accepted and wanted to be there and stated that Turkey has not yet been ready for that. The 
way he expressed his views on the overriding attitude in Turkey towards foreign investment in 
media is worthy quoting here: 
 
Media is a very sensitive topic in Turkey for the policy-makers as well as for the 
regulators. For me, what is most important is the recognition of the policy-makers and 
the regulators that foreign ownership is not a threat. They act as if they are protecting 
Turkey from the evil empires that would conquer the lands of the country and eat all 
children. We are just businessmen who do commercial broadcasting business as an 
industry […] For many companies wishing to enter the Turkish market, there is no 
other interest than expending their businesses as the professional operators. We neither 
belong to one entrepreneur nor to a group that promote certain interests. We are 
independent because we are a publicly-held company and everything we do is 
monitored […] We should be able to defend our businesses in front of our 
shareholders in the stock-exchange and it will be very difficult to do so unless we have 
51 per cent share (Vatanım, 15 June 2005). 
 
Markus Tellenbach was not only well aware of the resistance to foreign investment in Turkey, 
but he was also well informed on the political psyche behind this resistance. As the CEO of 
the SBS Televisions, he used every chance to make clear his company’s position. Although 
Tellenbach continued to emphasise the SBS’s interest in Turkish media even though the 
regulatory framework was very strict, the SBS did not pursue seeking a Turkish partner to join 
the auctions for any of the Uzan’s media assets any further.  
 
b) Rupert Murdoch – News Corporation 
 
International media mogul Rupert Murdoch’s interest in Turkey was known for a long time. 
Although no progress was made, as early as 1989, Murdoch made a deal with the public 
broadcaster TRT, which was in the process of making its third channel a pay-TV service (see 
Kejanlıoğlu, 2004: 287). This time Murdoch was an important contender to buy the Turkish 
pay-TV platform Digiturk, which was owned by the Çukurova Group, another media group 
  
147 
147 
indebted to the TMSF due to the mismanagement of its bank, Pamukbank. However, the sale 
of Digitürk did not materialise and Rupert Murdoch shifted his interest to other venues in 
Turkey. As might be expected, Murdoch’s interest in buying media in Turkey was also a great 
chance for all the media proprietors looking for international partnerships. Not surprisingly, 
the first one approaching Murdoch was in fact Aydın Doğan, ‘the’ Rupert Murdoch of Turkey. 
Cüneyd Zapsu, an AKP MP, got in contact with Murdoch in New York on behalf of Aydın 
Doğan and told him that Doğan was in search of international partnerships to sell 50 per cent 
shares of his major dailies as well as his broadcasting group (NetGazete, 4 April 2005). 
Although it was meant to be secret, the get-together of Murdoch and Zapsu in New York was 
all over the papers in Turkey, informing that the parties agreed in ‘principal’. Therefore, from 
May 2005 onwards, Murdoch’s interest in buying media assets in Turkey was frequently 
covered in Turkish dailies.  
 
Murdoch’s connection with the AKP was particularly interesting. Despite the prevalent 
resistance to opening the media to foreign ownership, the AKP government pursued a shift in 
policy through its lobbying activities. Even Prime Minister Erdoğan was involved in these 
lobbying activities. In June 2005, Turkish dailies covered news stories announcing that Tayyip 
Erdoğan scheduled a visit to the US to attend to the Sun Valley Summit in California in July 
2005 as the keynote speaker, during which he would meet Murdoch. Prime Minister already 
knew that not only Murdoch but also other international media players would lobby on policy 
matters by vocalising their expectations for the preparation of a new regulatory framework 
that would enable them to enter into the Turkish media.  
 
However, Murdoch did not wait for a new regulation to enter in to the Turkish media. News 
Outdoor acquired 60 per cent shares of a well-known Turkish outdoor advertising company – 
Kamera Reklam – in June 2005. This was a very strategic acquisition since one of the major 
share holders of the company had family ties with Cüneyt Zapsu. Shortly after the acquisition, 
columnists revealing these close connections speculated that Murdoch started building up 
strategic partnerships before confirming his interest in the auction of Star TV (see M. Övür, 
Sabah, 23 June 2005).  
 
Interestingly, Murdoch neither bid for Star TV nor pursued talks with the Doğan Group. By 
September 2005, Murdoch’s News Corporation started talks with Enver Ören, the owner of 
Ihlas Holding, the parent company of the TGRT channel. Ören wanted to sell his entire 
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shares in the Holding, including 56.5 per cent of the shares of the TV channel of which 
broadcasting rights were held by the holding’s subsidiary Huzur Radio TV. Ören’s timing for 
publicising his interest in selling his stake is not a coincidence. Knowing the international 
media conglomerates’ interest in Turkey, especially in Star TV, he simply wanted to benefit 
from the glut of interest. Following Star TV’s acquisition by Doğan Group in September, all 
the attention was diverted to the sale of the TGRT. By November 2005, together with News 
Corp, Canwest and Central European Media Enterprises (CME, owned by Ronald Lauder) 
were lined up to strike a deal with Enver Ören. After months of talks behind talks, News 
Corp was the winner. In July 2006, News Corp acquired Ören’s stake for US$98 million 
together with Ahmet Ertegün, founding chairman of Atlantic Records, who was also a 
Turkish citizen.113 All the partnership procedures were carried out according to the book. 
Since the restrictions on foreign ownership did not allow Murdoch to be the ‘big’ partner, he 
appeared as the ‘small’ partner on paper with 22 per cent stake as the News Netherland B.V. 
However, the joint-stock company which was set up to run the channel had a totally different 
ownership structure. The News Netherland B.V. held 99 per cent of the shares in this 
company, whereas Ahmet Ertegün hold only one per cent (Vatanım, 2 November 2006).  
 
Although the time span of this study does not go further than December 2005, it is important 
to cite some major reactions to Murdoch’s entry to the Turkish media market by acquiring an 
important television channel which used to represent the liberal Islamic capital in Turkey. As 
might be expected, there were mixed reactions. Some insisted on not believing the sale since 
they have never heard any Murdoch representative commenting on the acquisition publicly. 
Besides, it was confusing for many that Ertegün was also involved with another contender, 
CME, owned by Ronald Lauder. Others tried to predict what kind of commercial and political 
interests Murdoch might have in Turkey by commenting on his history of strategic media 
market oriented moves around the world. Some columnists emphasised Murdoch’s neo-
conservative agenda may not be appreciated by the Turkish public, whereas others argued that 
News Corp. is a commercial entity and has the potential to increase the benchmark in 
broadcasting in Turkey (see T. Kıvanç, Yeni Şafak, 26 July 2006; S. Yılmaz, Milliyet, 5 
September 2005; A Saydam, Akşam, 26 July 2005).  
 
                                                 
113 Turkish dailies were very quick to trace Ahmet Ertegün’s citizenship records. Following the acquisition of the 
TGRT, it is revealed that Ertegün actually renounced his Turkish citizenship in 1967, but regained it in August 
2005 to be able to buy the TGRT with Murdoch (see for instance, K. Ercan, Sabah, 4 August 2006; Milliyet, 4 
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Murdoch’s entry into the Turkish market in July 2006 perfectly proved how neither the 
general resistance against foreign media ownership nor the existing restrictions in the 
regulatory framework prevented the entry of foreign ownership to Turkish media. The debate 
which was initially on how to sell Uzan Group’s media assets quickly gained a different 
dimension. In fact, it was neither surprising nor inevitable to see Turkish media proprietors 
seeking to benefit fully from this changing media environment.  
 
Ahmet Ertegün’s unexpected death in December 2006 further complicated the position of 
Murdoch in the Turkish broadcasting market. Since Ertegün did not have any Turkish heirs, 
his 75 per cent share in the TGRT was supposed to be handed over according to the 
Broadcasting Law if his partnership with Murdoch would still be effective. Some members of 
the RTÜK Board, nominated by the CHP, filed a court case against the annulment of the 
regulator’s earlier decision to approve the acquisition. However, the Administrative Court in 
charge rejected the application. As of February 2007, the TGRT logo was replaced with ‘Fox’ 
since Ihlas Holding retained the royalty of the TGRT brand. The controversy over Ertegün’s 
shares continues.  
 
c) Canwest Global Communications Corporation 
 
Among international media conglomerates having an interest in Turkey, the Canadian group 
Canwest was actually the least known. Canwest, besides having a reach of more than 94 per 
cent of English-speaking population in Canada through Global Television owned by its 
subsidiary Canwest Media works, is also known through its operations in New Zealand, 
Australia, the Irish Republic and the UK media markets.114 
 
Canwest was, in fact, the most aggressive contender during the auctions of the Uzan’s 
Group’s media assets conducted by the TMSF. In September 2005, it acquired four of Uzans’s 
radios – Super FM (national), Metro FM (national), Joy FM (local/Istanbul) and Joy Turk FM 
(local/Istanbul) – out of seven by paying US$61 million in total. The minimum price set by 
the TMSF was US$18.5 million for Super FM and US$15.5 million for Metro FM. By paying 
almost double the expected sales, Canwest revealed how aggressive it planned to be in 
                                                 
114 Canwest is the first international media company that was granted a radio broadcasting licence in September 
2005. A year later it got its second licence. Currently, it operates the radio brand “Original106” in the Solent 
region and Bristol. It also held interests in TV3 television network in Ireland, but it sold its interests to the UK-
based private equity firm Doughty Hanson & Co. in August 2006 for approximately €132m. See: 
www.canwest.global.com 
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entering the Turkish media. However, it could not win the auction for Star TV and had to 
withdraw for the auction when the Doğan Group offered US$306.5 million, doubling the 
minimum price of US$155 million. After the auctions were concluded, some commentators 
argued that Canwest could have been the winner of the Star TV’s auction had it not paid too 
much for its radio stations (see A. Ayaydın, Sabah, 27 September 2005).  
 
The question emerging at this point is the same: how did Canwest manage to acquire four 
radio stations in Turkey when the same restrictions for foreign media ownership were intact? 
As might be expected, everything was according to the book. In the auctions for Super FM 
and the Star TV, CGS was the bidder. And CGS was set up as a joint-stock company in which 
Canwest’s Netherlands based subsidiary CGS NZ TV had 25 per cent share and the private 
Turkish investment company Turkcom had a 75 per cent share. The real name behind 
Turkcom was Mehmet Kutman, who was the owner of the Global Investment Holdings in 
Turkey, which acted as an adviser to Turkcom during the process.115 Kutman was a relative of 
Mesut Yılmaz, who was the Prime Minister during the 53rd and 55th governments as the head 
of the ANAP and the Deputy Prime Minister during the tripartite coalition from 1999 to 
2002. As it was claimed, the Israeli billionaire and the shipping tycoon Sami Offer was the 
name who mediated between Canwest and Mehmet Kutman.116 For other stations acquired by 
Canwest, the subsidiaries of Turkcom were the bidders on paper: it was Pasifik Radio and TV 
for Metro FM, Galata Radio and TV for Joy FM and Haliç Radio and TV for Joy Turk FM. 
Canwest appeared to have a share only in Super FM and in all the others it was shown as the 
advising company.  
 
This Israeli connection was particularly important considering that Canwest was set up by 
Israel (Izzy) Asper who was a Jewish businessman and a Ukrainian immigrant. Asper was the 
leader of the Manitonba Liberal Party from 1970 to 1975 and his support for Israel was well 
known. As might be expected, this Israeli connection was particularly discomforting for 
columnists writing for liberal Islamic dailies, especially for Yeni Şafak. However, Yeni Şafak was 
also known for its support for the AKP government in general and these columnists framed 
their reactions more in terms of a cynical inquiry on why Canwest would insist entering into 
                                                 
115 Global Investment Holdings (Global Yatırım Holding) operates in the infrastructure, energy and finance sectors. 
It also owns a public equity house called “Global Securities” (Global Menkul Değerler A.Ş.) which provides 
corporate finance, fund management and securities services since 1990. 
116 Mehmet Kutman sold his shares in the Turkish Petrelium Refineries Corporation (Türkiye Petrol Rafineleri A.Ş. 
– TÜPRAŞ) amount to 14.76 per cent to Sami Offer in 2005 for $446 million. For details, see: Adaklı (2006: 
359). 
  
151 
151 
Turkish market knowing that the existing regulation sets a limit on ownership rather than 
attacking the web of relations involved (see, T. Kıvanç, Yeni Şafak, 24 September 2005; F. 
Koru, Yeni Şafak, 24 September 2005). In contrast to this cynicism, the AKP leader and the 
Prime Minister Necmettin Erdoğan was extremely pleased with the outcome. During an 
opening ceremony of a factory in Izmit he expressed his views on the auction of Super FM as 
follows:  
 
A Canadian company won the auction for Super FM. Turkey is now departing from 
monopolisation. Monopolisation in the media is now due to end. This will bring 
strength, competition, and control over our markets (Hürriyet, 22 September 2005). 
 
Following Canwest’s acquisitions of four radio stations in Turkey, all eyes were on the 
company’s next move. Canwest could not win the Star TV auction, but its representatives did 
not delay in announcing the company’s interest in the TGRT channel. Some commentators 
even claimed that Canwest did not increase its bid for Star TV since it was already in talks with 
Enver Ören for the TGRT (Haber7, 27 September 2005). However, as noted earlier, Ören set 
the pace of talks with all the contenders lined up to buy his shares in the TGRT. At some 
point, he even considered auctioning his shares, but this alienated all the contenders. Ronald 
Lauder was first to withdraw from talks, followed by Canwest (Vatanım, 5 October 2005).  
 
Canwest took over the management of the four radio stations in September 2006, with a 
seven month long delay. Following the auctions, Canwest had issues with RTÜK and also 
with Mehmet Kutman on matters of ownership structures. CanWest was so frustrated by the 
bureaucratic procedures that it even considered handing the radio stations back to the TMSF, 
but the TMSF mediated between the parties for tackling the issues.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter looked into the dynamics of broadcasting-policy making in Turkey by particularly 
focusing on three issues: i) the May 2002 amendments to the Broadcasting Law of 1994; ii) 
compliance of broadcasting regulation with European standards laid out in the Convention on 
Transfrontier Television and the TWF Directive; and finally iii) the controversy over foreign 
media ownership. In all these cases, EU influence operated differently.  
 
The policy-process behind the amendments to the Broadcasting Law has very clearly revealed 
that policy-makers used EU conditionality as a ‘discursive’ tool to justify their own political 
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agenda. The market pressures on policy-makers to further liberalise the broadcasting market 
by lifting the restrictions on ownership was on the agenda since 1997. Thus, the origin of the 
process had, in fact, nothing to do with Turkey’s EU bid. Yet, it is true that Europeanisation 
might have an impact on a particular domestic policy context in such a way that existing policy 
issues might need to be reframed/redefined in relation to Europe. However, this was not the 
case where the amendments to the Broadcasting Law where concerned. Following the 
discussion offered by Schmidt (2000: 279-80) on the ideational dimension of discourse, the 
discourse on the EU used by the government ministers in the early stages of the policy-
process aimed at justifying the ‘relevance’, ‘coherence’ and ‘applicability’ of the proposed 
changes. On the other hand, the adoption of the amendments by Parliament should not be 
interpreted as a successful utilisation of EU discourse. In the adoption of the amendments, 
self-interests of the then government, which were originally dictated by the interests of 
powerful media proprietors, determined the policy agenda. Since there were no common 
interests shared by all party groups in Parliament in regard to proposed amendments to the 
Broadcasting Law, the policy attitudes of the parties during the parliamentary discussions were 
extremely ‘conflictual’ and even ‘manipulative’. The ways in which the government ministers 
used tactics to block the amendment proposals of the opposition parties and different levels 
of bargaining took place at different stages during the process are important examples 
revealing the conflictual and manipulative aspects of policy-making which were not dictated 
by EU accession conditions.  
 
It is very clear that one of the reasons why the policy-process behind the amendment package 
was this controversial was because the then government attached an EU dimension to its 
policy agenda to justify it. However, since the EU connection was not well-grounded and well-
presented, the partners of the coalition government were not able to explain the drawbacks of 
the adopted amendments in a similar way to how they justified them. For instance, the need to 
comply with the TWF Directive was presented as the justification of the amendments to the 
broadcasting standards enshrined in the Broadcasting Law, but the policy outcome was still far 
from compliance. Additionally, there was not even a consensus between the government 
representatives on whether the amended law would be fully supported or whether there would 
be room for self-reflexive criticism on its drawbacks. Just to give one example; following the 
re-adoption of the amendments package in May 2002, the State Minister in charge of the press 
briefed the European Commission representative in Ankara on the amendments and stated 
that the amended Broadcasting Law was in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria. Just a 
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month after this briefing, the ANAP leader and the Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz 
responded to an official enquiry on the compliance of the amended Broadcasting Law with 
the EU standards submitted by an AKP MP. Yılmaz in his response conceded that the 
compliance of the new law was dubious. Additionally, he condemned his coalition partners for 
not reaching an agreement on the details to improve the provisions of the law (Yeni Şafak, 30 
June 2002).  
 
The chapter also illustrated that the most contentious policy issue in Turkey is regulating 
media ownership. Media proprietors are very powerful and policy-makers cannot risk acting 
against their interests. The relationship between media proprietors and the state becomes 
more problematic since the regulator RTÜK is also highly politicised and not able to impose 
any effective regulation on the key issues of media. Neither the 25 per cent ceiling on 
ownership nor the 10 per cent limit for media proprietors for participating in public tenders 
and stock exchange were applied in practice. As a result, ‘nominal/veiled ownership’ became 
very common in Turkey. As explained in this chapter, the core of the amendments package 
was to lift all the restrictions on media ownership and the financial operations of media 
proprietors stated in the Broadcasting Law. According to the process analysed here, the timing 
of the amendments package was the outcome of the lobbying of media proprietors, 
particularly of Aydın Doğan. However, there is still something unclear about the proposed 
media ownership regulation. The proposed 20 per cent ‘audience threshold’ for regulating 
media ownership echoes the European Commission led policy initiative in the early 1990s to 
replace traditional regulatory instruments for ownership control with an audience share 
model.117 It is very difficult to suggest a causal link between the debates in the EU on this 
model and the proposed instruments in the amendments package in Turkey. Where the details 
of the proposed amendment are concerned, the suggested model was in fact very under-
developed. Concerns over media pluralism and diversity were very much in the heart of the 
debates in the EU, but in Turkey, these concerns were not articulated even in the official 
justification statement of the amendments package.  
 
The controversy over the regulatory framework for media ownership in Turkey also had 
implications for the debate on opening the broadcasting market to foreign ownership. As 
suggested earlier, media ownership is foremost associated with political power in Turkey and 
the abuse of this power is a fact rather than a probability. Interestingly, the EU connection 
                                                 
117 For a detailed analysis of this debate in the EU, see: Harcourt (1998, 2005). 
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that was again used to justify the policy agenda it made the debate more controversial. The 
AKP’s liberal approach to foreign ownership could not transform the deeply embedded 
mistrust of EU conditionality of any kind. This mistrust was even evident in the cadres of the 
AKP. The President’s veto on the grounds of a rejection of the EU cause and his emphasis on 
issues of national sovereignty should also be understood in this context. However, at the end 
of the process, although the 25 per cent limit on foreign ownership was preserved, the entry 
of the foreign capital could not be prevented. This chapter demonstrated that the loopholes in 
the Broadcasting Law made it possible for foreign capital to break in to the broadcasting 
market both in the case of News Corporation and the Canwest Group. Both companies found 
Turkish partners and made deals to acquire their shares at some point in the future.  
 
The analysis presented in this chapter has also confirmed that it is very difficult to locate 
where the policy exactly occurs in Turkey. The policy-process behind the amendments 
package revealed that policy did not emerge as a consequence of the actions and preferences 
of the formal policy actors involved in the process. The policy-process behind the 
amendments package was a political battle between the government, the opposition and the 
President. However, at the end of the process, it was in fact the judiciary, specifically the 
Constitutional Court, that determined the policy outcome. The Court’s ruling on annulling the 
amendments to media ownership regulations and the provision on the composition of the 
RTÜK Board caused a serious deadlock in the field. The media ownership issue could not be 
brought back to Parliament again and the regulatory gap on the composition of the RTÜK 
Board could only be resolved in July 2005. However, the key question here is how far we can 
cast the Constitutional Court as a policy actor in its own right? It is the routine responsibility 
of the Constitutional Court to consider the claims of unconstitutionality that are referred to it 
and since the Constitution of Turkey is a rigid one, these cases take place very often. In this 
respect, the Court is neither an agenda-setter nor can we distinguish a body of media case law 
derived from its rulings. Therefore, where the amendments to the Broadcasting Law are 
considered, the Court’s ruling was significant; however, the Court did not point to any 
approach to future policy. 
 
Except the issue on lifting the ban on retransmission of broadcasts, EU conditionality proved 
to be ineffective on all the other policy issues focused in this chapter. In its 2001 Progress 
Report on Turkey, the European Commission stated that “[t]he new law […] represented a 
clear step backwards for Turkey away from compliance with international media standards” 
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(p.77). However, the criticisms of the EU did not make any difference to the policy-makers’ 
approach to the issue. When the amendments were readopted unchanged in Parliament in 
May 2002, a year after the President’s veto, the EU was again disappointed. Jean-Christophe 
Filori, the EU’s enlargement spokesman, emphasised the law’s incompatibility with the 
Copenhagen criteria in international circles and the assessment on broadcasting sector in the 
2002 Progress Report was highly critical. However, discrepancies in the Broadcasting Law 
remained unaffected.  
 
Although the European Commission was very critical about how policy-makers in Turkey 
handled the amendments process, the major area where it wanted to see progress was actually 
related to broadcasts in languages other than Turkish. There was no mention of a change in 
the language policy for broadcasting in the amendments package EU. Turkey took the first 
step to comply with this particular EU conditionality in October 2001. This controversial 
process is the next chapter’s subject.  
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Chapter 5: 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONDITIONALITY AND MINORITY RIGHTS: THE 
CONTROVERSY OVER THE LANGUAGE POLICY AND BROADCAST MEDIA 
IN TURKEY  
       
At the heart of debates concerning minority languages 
are questions of politics and culture – politics because 
issues concerning minority languages are essentially 
concerned with issues of power, culture because language 
difference (whether in the form of separate languages, or 
simply in the form of subcultural differences of 
vocabulary) is at the heart of cultural difference 
(Cormack, 2005: 108).  
 
5.1 Background 
 
This chapter looks at EU influence on broadcasting policy in Turkey by focusing on the policy 
process behind the new regulatory framework for broadcasts in languages other than 
Turkish.118 The process began in October 2001 following the adoption of the amendments to 
the 1982 Constitution and concluded in June 2004 when the Turkish public broadcaster TRT 
started its first broadcasts in five other languages. As of 2006, some local radio and television 
stations in south eastern Turkey were also permitted to broadcast in Kurdish within the 
framework of the new legislation. However, as the analysis in this chapter reveals, both the 
legislation and its implementation are far from fulfilling the expectations, especially of the EU.  
 
Looking into the dynamics of the policy process behind the change of language policy for 
broadcast media in Turkey is very important since it is the major policy change that was made 
as a response to the EU pressures. From the very beginning, one of the EU’s main concerns 
has been the reconciliation of the Kurdish question in Turkey and the improvement of the 
conditions of Kurds in all spheres. The only way the EU could assert influence on the issue 
was through the enforcement of democratic conditionality, specifically the Copenhagen 
criterion on “respect for and protection of minorities”. The first Regular Report on Turkey 
                                                 
118 Technically speaking, the analysis covers the policy process behind these laws: i) Law No. 4709, Law on 
Amending Certain Articles of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, Official Gazette No. 24556-bis, 17 
October 2001, Ankara; ii) Law No. 4771, Law on Amending Various Laws, Official Gazette No. 24841, 9 August 
2002, Ankara; iii) Law No. 4928, Law on Amending Various Laws, Official Gazette No. 25173, 19 July 2003, 
Ankara; iv) Directive on Radio and Television Broadcasts to be Made in Different Languages and Dialects 
Traditionally Used by Turkish Citizens in their Daily Lives, Official Gazette No. 25357, 25 January 2004, Ankara. 
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published in 1998 sets the framework on how the EU links the Kurdish issue to its 
conditionality of treatment of minorities in Turkey:  
 
The Turkish authorities do not recognise the existence of a Kurdish minority, 
considering them to be simply Turks of Kurdish origin. Kurds […] are 
economically and socially disadvantaged, and in the provinces where the state of 
emergency is in force they suffer all the consequences of continued terrorist action 
and the restrictions on the normal exercise of civil and political rights resulting 
from the state of emergency […] Turkey will have to find a political and non-
military solution to the problem of the south-east. The largely military response 
seen so far […] It has also damaged Turkey’s international image. A civil solution 
could include recognition of certain forms of Kurdish cultural identity and greater tolerance of the 
ways of expressing that identity, provided it does not advocate separatism or terrorism 
(Progress Report, 1998: 20; emphasis added). 
 
There is no doubt that any discussion on ‘cultural identity’ is directly related to the usage of 
language. That’s why the EU started emphasising the lack of broadcasting content and 
educational rights for the Kurdish population just after indicating what the ‘misfit’ is in 
relation to the minority rights in Turkey. On the other hand, it is hardly surprising that the 
‘Kurdish issue’ emerged as one of the most difficult challenges that Turkey encountered 
within the ‘democratisation’ process as a candidate country to the EU. What the EU asked for 
was actually a paradigm shift in the state’s policy towards the recognition of ethnic minorities 
in general, but also to the Kurdish question in particular, both dating back to the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Therefore, the first political reaction to EU 
conditionality was a condemnation of the EU for trying to create a new minority group in 
Turkey. It should also be remembered that the first Progress Report on Turkey was drafted 
only a year after the EU leaders declined to grant candidate status to Turkey. In relation to 
this, the EU further complicated EU-Turkey relations by openly identifying the Kurdish 
population as a minority group in Turkey in its first Progress Report, which has never been 
officially recognised as such. Then again, the EU’s approach to Kurdish question in Turkey 
was not welcomed equally in Kurdish community. For Kurdish nationalists, minority status 
has always been very problematic since they argued Kurds to be one of two founding 
components of the Turkish Republic together with Turks (see Oran, 2004: 77).  
 
Turkey’s response to EU conditionality on minority rights can only be understood if the 
sources of the official discourse on minorities are uncovered. In the background of the 
Turkish Republic there is the legacy of the Ottoman Empire which ruled over a very diverse, 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious population for centuries. The Ottoman political regime was 
not based on a hierarchy drawn on the basis of ethnicities, but instead it was based on religion. 
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Accordingly, Turks, Kurds, Arabs and many others were perceived as the Muslim subjects of 
the Ottomans Dynasty; whereas Greeks, Armenians and Jews were the non-Muslim subjects. 
As Oran (2004: 48) puts it, since in Islamic tradition all Muslims are seen as a part of the 
‘whole’ [ümmet], the Muslim subjects were seen as the superior nation [millet] in the Ottoman 
Empire, and non-Muslims were seen as minorities that were separate nations having different 
religions. This minority definition became the official state policy of the Turkish Republic as 
articulated in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which included provisions on protecting 
minorities in the newly established republic. Again as Oran (2004: 61-2) highlights, the Treaty 
of Lausanne differs from other international agreements on protecting minorities in the 
aftermath of the First World War since it replaced the definition of minority that was 
internationally recognised along the lines of ‘race, language and religion’ with the concept of 
‘non-Muslims’ to define minorities in Turkey. In doing so, not only differences of race and 
language were excluded from the definition of minority, but also differences based on the 
fractions within the Muslim faith were also eliminated. In a similar vein, when the Kurdish 
issue came up during the negotiations, the Turkish delegation rejected the British delegation’s 
argument that Kurds should be treated as a distinctive ‘race’ and emphasised the unity of the 
Turkish and Kurdish populations under the newly established republic (Taspinar, 2005: 76). In 
short, one of the core pillars of the Turkish modernisation project – establishing an ethnically 
homogenous state – was in fact solidified in Lausanne. Of course, there is still the question of 
how Turkey challenged internationally recognised norms on minority protection even then. As 
Oran (2004: 62) puts it, Turkey had a great bargaining power during Lausanne negotiations 
since it won its War of Independence that was fought from 1919 to 1923. Therefore, the 
Treaty of Lausanne did not only end the First World War for Turkey, but it also confirmed 
Turkey’s success in its fight to become a self-governing nation-state.  
 
In this respect, it is easier to understand why Eurosceptics in Turkey – especially the army, the 
national right and left wings – perceive the key EU conditionality to recognise minority rights 
as a threat to ‘national sovereignty’. Eurosceptics want to hold on to the official line drawn at 
Lausanne and oppose EU pressure to articulate the Kurdish question in the frame of minority 
rights. On the other hand, pro-reform circles, especially academics, argue that it has always 
been a historical mistake to see the rights articulated in the Treaty of Lausanne as only granted 
to non-Muslims. As they emphasise, apart from non-Muslims; ‘Turkish nationals’, ‘Turkish 
nationals of non-Turkish speech’ and even ‘inhabitants of Turkey’ were listed as the recipients 
of various rights as articulated in different provisions of the Treaty (Oran, 2001 and 2004). 
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Therefore, the Article 39/4 of the Treaty, which is relevant to the discussions on EU 
conditionality, is actually very clear regarding its recipient:  
 
No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any 
language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in 
publications of any kind or at public meetings (emphasis added). 
 
But of course, when the debate heated up in the course of 2002, there was a very specific 
reason why some circles insisted on maintaining the official definition of minority as non-
Muslims and not let the EU meddle in cultural politics in regard to the Kurdish issue. 
Granting cultural rights to Kurds including the right to broadcast was an issue of debate since 
the beginning of the 1990s (see Kejanlıoğlu, 2004: 376; Kubiliay, 2004: 73-4), but this debate 
was overshadowed by the armed struggle with the PKK.119 In a similar vein, the nationalists 
and conservatives from either end of the political spectrum as well as the high-ranking 
generals of the army supported the view that once the restrictions in language policy for 
broadcasting are lifted in order to comply with the EU, the consequence would be the 
creation of new platforms for the PKK and its sympathisers to carry out propaganda activities. 
In doing so, the Kurdish question was once again reduced to a question of ‘national security’. 
In his analysis of the continuities in the Turkish State Discourse (TSD) towards the Kurdish 
question, Yegen (1999: 555) points out the fact that “[w]henever the Kurdish question was 
mentioned in TSD, it was mentioned as an issue of either political reaction, tribal resistance or 
regional backwardness, but never as an ethno-political question”. The controversy around 
granting broadcasting rights in Kurdish confirmed that this discourse would also be preserved 
in the context of EU politics.  
 
In this respect, it is evident why the policy process behind the fulfilment of EU conditionality 
on granting broadcasting rights to ethnic communities in Turkey took almost three years to 
conclude. Within the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government, there was hardly a consensus 
on how EU conditionality on minority rights should be handled. On the contrary, the MHP 
leader and coalition partner Devlet Bahçeli soon became the main antagonist behind a major 
                                                 
119 The PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) was founded by Abdullah Öcalan as a Kurdish Marxist-Leninist 
organisation in 1977 with a separatist agenda. It gained popularity in south-eastern Turkey in the course of 
increasing oppression of the military regime following the 1980 military intervention. By 1985 the PKK became 
very active in deploying a guerrilla war against the security forces and the conflict reached its peak in 1993. From 
1993 onwards the army carried out massive counter-insurgency operations to weaken the PKK and the conflict 
resulted in a huge death toll claimed to amount tens of thousands of people. Its leader Abdullah Öcalan was 
captured in February 1999 and started preaching for a democratic solution to resolve the Kurdish question. 
Currently, the PKK is recognised as a terrorist organisation by some states and international organisations such 
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crisis in the government. As the political representative of the far nationalist right in Turkey, 
he constantly contested EU-driven reforms on minority rights by ‘pace-setting’ and ‘foot-
dragging’.  
 
On the other hand, the AKP government positioned itself differently within this debate. On 
the Kurdish issue, as of the end of 2003, Prime Minister Erdoğan challenged the prevalent 
state discourse on ‘Turkishness’ by opening up a debate on the need to overhaul the heavy 
loaded blood-tie connation in the term by developing a new understanding of Turkishness 
along the lines of its territorial dimension. The reason why Tayyip Erdoğan, but not anybody 
else was able to take this step, was actually very simple. Traditionally, the centre of politics in 
Turkey has always been occupied by political parties that share the same Republican 
sentiments on governance and preserve the prevalent discourses on ethnic homogeneity, 
secularism, the guardianship role of the army so forth. In this respect, not coming from the 
political establishment made the AKP government adopt a more liberated approach to policy 
during the EU process. Additionally, the talks with the EU provided the AKP with the 
opportunity to frame the existing policy issues differently than how they were articulated 
before. However, the Prime Minister’s departure from the official line on minority issues 
antagonised not only the Republican establishment represented by the CHP in Parliament, but 
also some nationalist circles within the AKP cadres. In October 2004, the release of a report 
commissioned by the Human Rights Advisory Council of the Prime Ministry to its Minority 
and Cultural Rights Commission provoked such a huge political row that even some 
government ministers rejected any involvement with the commissioning of this report.120 As 
of the summer 2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan kept repeating his calls for a democratic 
solution to the Kurdish question, but he could not prevent the rekindling of violence in the 
south-east.  
 
This is the brief background summary of the main historical and political developments that is 
linked to the policy process on allowing broadcasts in languages other than Turkish. This 
chapter starts off by identifying the grounds of EU’s policy competence on the issues of 
minority protection. The analysis that follows looks into a four-year period, from the 
constitutional amendments of 2001, which was the first political step taken to pave the way 
                                                                                                                                                    
as the US, the EU and NATO. Its current alleged political successor is the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik 
Toplum Partisi – DTP). For more on the PKK, see: Taspinar (2005: 94-113).  
120 Human Rights Advisory Council of the Prime Ministry (2004) A Reporrt on Minority and Cultural Rights, 
Minority and Cultural Rights Commission, 22 October 2004, Ankara.  
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for these broadcasts, until the end of 2005. Although a chronological order of the events is 
followed, each sub-heading indicates a ‘defining point’ that carries the whole process to 
another stage. The chapter concludes with a discussion on what the dynamics of this policy 
process tell us about Europeanisation of broadcasting policy in Turkey.  
 
 
5.2 Protection of Minorities in the EU: Relevant Policy Instruments 
 
5.2.1 The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the 
European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages 
 
The main policy instrument of the EU to assert influence on the protection of minorities in 
the candidate states is the political conditionality articulated in the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ of 
1993. Although the historical background in the EU that led to the adoption of this political 
criterion was explained to a large extent in Chapter 3, there are some other policy instruments 
that need to be taken into consideration at this point to see how policies on languages and 
media became central to the debates. 
 
The debate on minority rights in Europe is first developed within the scope of ‘human rights’, 
and its linkage to ‘languages’ and ‘media’ has been part of the debate from the early 1980s 
onwards (Cormack, 2005: 110). It was not the EU, but the Council of Europe (CoE) and the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)121 that actively shaped the 
debate (Smith, 2003). Because of its limited policy competence to intervene in the cultural 
matters of its member states, the EU’s approach was based on that as developed by the CoE 
and OSCE. However, the debate on minority rights in Europe became very important once 
EU took steps to enlarge eastwards. Although at the core of the enlargement project lay 
economy and security were prominent concerns, the question of how to combine the 
‘Western’ ideas of what Europe is all about with the unfolding multi-ethnic characteristic of 
post-communist Central and East Europe within the future of EU eventually became more 
significant. In this respect, the “Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities” (FCNM), which was first signed on 1 February 1995 and came into force on 2 
January 1998, is very important. The FCNM is, in fact, the first binding multilateral agreement 
                                                 
121 OSCE was first established as a ‘conference’ in 1973. The idea on having an international debate on Security 
in Europe was on the agenda since the beginning of 1950s, but the psyche of the Cold War prevented the 
establishment of an international initiative. With the disintegration of communism and the Soviet Bloc, the role 
of the OSCE in Europe became more significant. The working structure of the OSCE changed over the years 
and it gained more competence in the area of international conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict 
rehabilitation. It has now fifty-five states as members, including Turkey. 
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specifically on the issues of minority rights. It is important to note that ‘linguistic rights’ in the 
context of minority rights is an integral part of FCNM. However, the specific agenda on 
linguistic rights in Europe facilitated the establishment of two other international documents: 
the “European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages” (hereafter European Charter) 
and the “Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights” (hereafter Barcelona Declaration), which 
can be regarded as parallel developments.122  
 
In the European Charter, traditional regional and minority languages are defined as languages 
that are used by the nationals of the State Parties. Therefore, languages used by immigrants are 
excluded from the Charter, but languages that are used within a specific territory in a state or 
languages that are used by certain communities without a territorial specification are included. 
It is Article 11 of the Charter that deals with media and it lays out what states can “encourage 
and/or facilitate” in the field of media to promote regional or minority languages, but does 
not suggest any ways of doing so.123 And in the Barcelona Declaration, it is Section IV that 
deals with the issues of “communications media and new technologies”.124  
 
The initial problem shared by both the FCNM and the European Charter is, not surprisingly, 
the lack of clarity in terms and definitions. In both of the documents there is not a clear 
definition of what constitutes ‘minority’. Commentators such as Grin (2003: 9) see the 
European Charter as an “aspirational” text that was inspired by the notion of ‘diversity’. 
According to the author: 
 
The Charter is not about rights. It is not about standards. It is not about national 
minorities. It is not even about the members of minorities. It does not mention peace 
and security either. The Charter is about languages – more precisely, the regional and 
minority languages of Europe – and about the measures required for safeguarding 
their existence in the long run (Grin, 2003: 10; emphasis in original). 
 
                                                 
122 It was the Council of Europe that fostered the agenda for the European Charter since 1988, which was later 
adopted as a Convention in November 1992 and came into force in March 1998. On the other hand, the 
Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights was drafted at the end of the ‘World Conference on Linguistic Rights’ 
that took place in Barcelona in June 1996. The declaration was signed by UNESCO, the PEN Clubs and by 
various NGOs; however, it has not yet been adopted by the United Nations. The underlying aim of the 
declaration was “to correct linguistic imbalances […] in the maintenance of harmonious social relations”. 
123 As stated, states should have at least one radio station, one TV channel and one newspaper in the regional or 
minority languages operating on a regular basis. Additionally, states should allow the reception and 
retransmission of radio and television broadcasts from the neighbouring countries.  
124 It is especially Article 35 that is very important within the scope of this research. According to Article 35, “[a]ll 
language communities have the right to decide the extent to which their language is be present in all the 
communications media in their territory, whether local and traditional media, those with a wider scope, or those 
using more advanced technology, regardless of the method of dissemination or transmission employed.”  
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However, reducing an international legal instrument – on which dozens of countries negotiate 
– to an aspirational text may risk overlooking the political struggles behind the drafting of 
international documents as such. The reason why the states that are party to these agreements 
cannot agree on a definition is actually very straightforward: any debate on minorities within a 
specific national context is, in fact, part of the debate on issues of sovereignty within the 
borders of that state. As Smith (2003: 5) notes, a similar controversy has occurred in the 
activities of the OSCE as well, which resulted in a distinction between ‘national’ minorities 
that are seen as “historically rooted ‘indigenous’ groups” and the category of minorities “under 
the label of ‘ethnic’/‘new’/’immigrant’”. This is a very complex dimension of the international 
debate on minority rights emerging following the involvement of the OSCE. To quote Smith 
(2003): 
 
One reason why existing OSCE member states were so reluctant to sanction a far-
reaching policy based on positive rights was the fear that this might have a 
destabilizing effect on their own societies as well as those of the post-communist 
East. Thus far, for instance, the policies of European international organizations 
have eschewed the multinational paradigm of statehood in favour of a more limited 
conception of minority rights (Smith, 2003: 7). 
 
In a similar vein, Ozalins (2003: 220) rightly argues that ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘promoting 
linguistic rights’ might be very conflicting activities. In countries where there are human rights 
violations, promoting linguistic rights for minority groups may actually promote conflict. In 
this respect, it is hardly surprising that although Turkey is a member of the CoE as well as 
OSCE, it signed neither the FCNM nor the European Charter. And all of these are very 
relevant to the ways in which the dynamics of the process on granting cultural rights to ethnic 
communities in Turkey evolved as presented here.  
 
5.2.2 Monitoring Compliance 
 
The problems with compliance and monitoring are, inevitably, related to this lack of clarity of 
definitions. Within the context of the CoE, the monitoring of the implementation the FCNM 
is laid out in Article 25. As stated, the State Parties are obliged to prepare regular reports every 
five years regarding the implementation of the FCNM to the Committee of Ministers. The 
reports are then assessed by the Advisory Committee consisting of twelve experts. The 
Advisory Committee gives its response to the Committee of Ministers as ‘opinions’. However, 
as Perez-Solla (2002) notes: 
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National legislators may opt for self-definition by national minorities, or they may 
construct their own definition. Article 3 (1) of the FCNM obliges State Parties to 
guarantee freedom to every member of a minority to decide freely whether or not to 
be treated as a member of the minority. This presents a legal question for monitoring 
in Europe: how to interpret the individualist approach assumed by existing 
instruments. Current protection mechanisms do not envisage, in general, the 
recognition of collective rights, even in states that have ratified the FCNM (Perez-
Solla, 2002: n/p). 
 
The lack of clarification of definitions and monitoring has also been a problem in the 
procedures of the European Commission in assessing the performance of the candidate states 
from Central and Eastern Europe during their pre-accession period (see Hughes and Sasse, 
2003). The EU’s approach to minority issues in candidate countries was and still is very much 
in line with the approach of the CoE, but the EU Commission gradually started developing its 
own instruments in defining the ‘conditionality’ and assessing the compliance with it. Apart 
from the Copenhagen criteria, it was mainly through the ‘Europe agreements’ or commonly 
known as the ‘association agreements’ that the EU Commission communicated the 
importance of “respect for and protection of minorities” in candidate countries bidding to 
become a member of the EU. Together with the Europe agreements, the accession 
partnerships and the national programmes for the adoption of the acquis are an important part 
of the pre-accession strategy building both for the EU and the applicant states.125 The EU, in 
return, assesses the performance of compliance through the publication of regular reports on 
each candidate country. All of these instruments are actually designed to assist candidate 
countries along the way to the accession. However, it is important to note that the EU has 
developed these tools over the years after the Copenhagen Summit in 1993. This takes us back 
to how the EU approaches ‘conditionality’ as an international organisation. In this respect, the 
design of the pre-accession strategy from the EU’s viewpoint has the exact characteristic that 
was argued by Grabbe (2003: 17) that it “only works as a carrot, not as a stick”. To put it 
differently by quoting Schmmelfenning et al. (2002: 1), once again, the EU “merely reacts to 
the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of its conditions by granting or withholding grants but does 
not proactively punish or support non-compliant states”. The EU’s approach to the 
compliance with the conditionality of “respect for and protection of minorities” in candidates 
countries is very much shaped within this framework.  
 
Despite the controversies around the European Charter and the FCNM, the European 
Commission cited both of these policy instruments in its progress reports on Turkey to base 
                                                 
125 For more on how these instruments work, see: Baun (2000).  
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its criticisms.126 In doing so, it can be argued, the EU tried to justify the appropriateness of its 
conditionality. However, in Turkey, the costs of compliance with conditionality on minority 
rights were perceived to be so high that no change could be made in the ‘mental set’ of policy-
makers as well as the officialdom. Therefore, it is still very unclear whether changes in the 
policy framework will accumulate towards ‘transformative change’ at some point in the future.  
 
5.3 Analysis of the Policy Process 
5.3.1 An Overview of the Key Stages in the Process  
 
In order to comply with EU conditionality on granting broadcasting rights to ethnic minorities 
in Turkey a three-step reform of the related legislation was required. Firstly, one of the most 
problematic articles of the 1982 Constitution had to be amended. Secondly, Article 4/t of the 
Broadcasting Law that required broadcasts to be in Turkish should also be amended. And 
finally, the regulatory authority RTÜK had to prepare a directive specifying standards of these 
broadcasts.  
 
October 2001 amendments to the constitution came as a thirty-four-point package in front of 
Parliament. It was the first major EU related harmonisation package that was adopted in 
accordance with the National Programme prepared by the DSP-MHP-ANAP government in 
March 2001. Since the government declared its commitment to take the necessary pre-
accession initiatives to fulfil democratic criteria in the short term, the constitutional 
amendments were seen as the prerequisite for the reform of the related laws. These 
amendments were followed by the enactment of various reform packages harmonising the 
Turkish legislation with the EU Acquis. Between February 2002 and July 2004, Turkey 
achieved significant legislative progress by passing eight reform packages in Parliament.  
 
The policy process behind the October 2001 constitutional amendments is very interesting on 
various grounds. First of all, although the long-standing debate in Turkish politics that a more 
civilian constitution is needed was significant, the major driving force was exogenous this 
time: EU conditionality. This was even explicitly stated in the justification of the proposal for 
changing the constitution.127 In regard to timing, apart from the time frame set in the National 
                                                 
126 See: for example, the section on “minority rights and protection of minorites” in 1999 Regular Report on 
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, p. 14.  
127 As it is quoted from the official proposal for changing the constitution: “The necessity to renew the 1982 
Constitution of the Turkish Republic emerged in accordance with the needs emerging during the time of its 
implementation, with the expectations of the public and in the light of new political prospects. Additionally, in 
the period of full membership to the European Union, it is inevitable to realise certain changes in the 
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Programme, the approaching publication date of the 2001 Progress Report in November also 
provided an important impetus.128 Secondly, had there been no pressures of the membership 
candidacy, it would have been almost impossible to get the amendments through Parliament 
given its composition at the time. The composition of Parliament was different during the 
drafting of the amendments and the dynamics in Parliament drastically changed when the 
Constitutional Court announced its decision to ban the Virtue Party from politics in June 
2001. As noted earlier, the SP and the AKP were established as splinters of this party. 
 
The constitutional amendments package caused a lot of bickering in Parliament. Although the 
spirit of the 1982 Constitution was a controversial issue in itself, in regard to the agenda on 
EU conditionality on broadcasts in languages other than Turkish, it was a specific statement 
repeated in Articles 26 and 28 of the constitution that was at the heart of the controversy. In 
Article 26 it was stated that “no language prohibited by law may be used in the expression and 
dissemination of thought”; and Article 28 stipulated that “publication may not be made in any 
language prohibited by law”. In both cases, the 1982 Constitution did not order but allowed 
the restriction of freedoms by leaving it to the authority of the legislator to exert restriction, if 
deemed necessary. These provisions were used by the legislators in 1983 to enact a law 
prohibiting broadcasts in any other language than Turkish.129 This law was later abolished in 
1991. Therefore, although there has not been any law in Turkey that effectively banned the 
usage of any language other than Turkish, unless this particular statement was annulled, 
prohibiting another language would still be probable according to the constitutional 
framework. 
 
Legislative preparations gained momentum following the constitutional amendments. 
According to the calendar stated in the National Programme, ‘the short term’ was due to end 
by 19 March 2002, which meant that the Turkish government had to act promptly in issuing 
related legislation of alignment in accordance with the constitutional amendments. The 
revision of the current regulatory framework for broadcasting to pave the way for broadcasts 
in languages other than Turkish was pivotal at this time. The significance that the EU gives to 
                                                                                                                                                    
Constitution as a prerequisite to fulfil the economic and democratic criteria and accomplish related necessary 
legal arrangements” (Law No. 4709, the Law on Amending Certain Articles of the Constitution of the Turkish 
Republic, Official Gazette No. 24556, 17 October 2001, Ankara). 
128 Especially Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of ANAP and the partner of the coalition, was very vocal in reminding 
about the approaching publication of the report of the Commission on Turkey’s progress, see: Milliyet, 26 June 
2001.  
129 Law No. 2932, the Law on Broadcasts other than Turkish, Official Gazette, No. 18199, 22 October 1983, 
Ankara. 
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Turkey’s progress on the issue was even ‘unofficially’ conveyed to the government via 
Turkey’s top-level officers in Brussels (Radikal, 29 February 2002). Therefore, two of the 
coalition partners – DSP and ANAP – aimed at adopting the second reform package in 
Parliament before the due date and include the amendment to the broadcasting legislation in 
this package. In doing so, the government wished to improve its status in the eyes of the EU 
before 2003 with the belief that any change in the agenda of the EU might influence Turkey 
negatively.130 However, due to strife between the coalition partners, the required change to be 
made in the Broadcasting Law could not be accomplished as a part of the second reform 
package adopted in March 2002.  
 
The bickering within the coalition government was also the reflection of the shift in attitudes 
to the EU which came to dominate the discussions on the second reform package. This shift 
was triggered by certain events131 and resulted in the manufacture of a very negative and 
reactionary atmosphere towards the EU. Political links between Turkey and the EU were 
downgraded to a debate about ‘sovereignty’ and centred on three issues: ‘the abolition of 
death penalty’; broadcasting in Kurdish; and education in Kurdish. In the eye of hard-core 
Eurosceptics – mainly the nationalist right and left – the EU was ‘asking too much’ and 
intervening in Turkey’s internal politics or to put it bluntly, ‘they’ were trying to ‘divide’ us by 
intervening in the Kurdish question. The coalition partner, the nationalist MHP used this 
argument to campaign against the EU. These reactions represented the surfacing of two major 
‘fears’ in Turkey: ‘ethnic separatism’ and ‘irtica’ (religious fundamentalism). It was believed that 
granting cultural rights – broadcasting and education in the mother tongue – to ethnic 
minorities could trigger the ‘awakening of the national consciousness’, especially in the case of 
the Kurdish population. 
 
                                                 
130 There were mainly two reasons behind the development of this perception. Firstly, the Presidency of the EU 
was to pass on to Greece from Denmark by the beginning of January. Turkish politicians had the belief that the 
six months long Greek Presidency might work to Turkey’s disadvantage, which never happened. Secondly, the 
accession preparations of ten candidate countries to become members by mid 2004 were expected to speed up 
from the second half of 2003 onwards. In Turkey, it was again believed that the shift in the European agenda 
could distract the attention away from Turkey. This was also a misperception. This scepticism actually reveals the 
lack of knowledge on the day-to-day politics of the European Union. See: D. Zeyrek, Radikal, 24 December 
2001.  
131 At the beginning of February, a series of internal emails sent by the Representative of the European 
Commission to Turkey, Ambassador Karen Fog, to the EU officials were leaked to the press. These internal 
emails were published in Aydinlık, which is a weekly paper run by the left-wing Worker’s Party. Although these 
emails were personal ‘commentaries’ of Karen Fogg on EU-Turkey relations, they revealed a great deal about 
Fogg’s personal contacts in EU related circles, her views on the Cyprus issue and so forth. The content of these 
emails quickly ignited a major crisis.  
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One of the reasons, maybe the major one, for the heightening of Euroscepticism was the 
influence of the army. The Eurosceptics in Turkey were encouraged to express their 
arguments by a false belief that the army was also against Turkey’s accession to the EU. The 
army’s involvement in the debate was expected, but its influence on the process was 
controversial. It was controversial because Parliament took the first step to diminish the 
influence of the army on politics in Turkey by increasing the civilian powers in the Security 
Council (MGK) – the main institutional body through which the army asserts its influence – 
within the October 2001 constitutional amendments. The amendment rephrased the role of 
the MGK by emphasising the ‘advisory’ nature of its ‘decisions’. According to the new 
composition of the Council, deputy prime ministers and the minister of justice became the 
new additional members. In doing so, the number of civilian members was increased from 
five to nine, whereas non-civilian members remained five.132 This was, in fact, a very important 
step. However, the influence of the MGK on Turkish politics was not something that could 
be diminished either with rephrasing the nature of its ‘decisions’ or its composition, especially 
where the scope of EU reforms was considered. The aftermath of the constitutional 
amendments would prove the validity of this argument. Even the European Commission in its 
2001 Progress Report on Turkey, commenting on the constitutional amendment, 
acknowledged that “[t]he extent to which the constitutional amendment will enhance de facto 
civilian control over the military will need to be monitored” (European Commission, 2001: 
19). What is interesting in this specific case on broadcasting is that the government itself 
invited the army to have a say in the process by officially consulting the General Staff of the 
army and by deliberately taking the key decisions at a couple of important MGK meetings.  
 
The army’s influence on the process unfolded at a stage when the question was whether the 
public broadcaster TRT or the private broadcasters should do these broadcasts. The initial 
view was to allow private national broadcasters to carry out these broadcasts since the 
coalition partner MHP opposed the TRT’s involvement in the debate due to reasons that are 
highlighted further in this chapter. However, the army wanted the TRT to carry out these 
broadcasts not because its public service remit required it to do so, but because it was the 
‘safest’ option. The army generals believed that if the scope of these broadcasts was extended 
to include private broadcasters, ‘separatist propaganda’ might be an issue.  
 
                                                 
132 According to the new composition, the MGK members are: the President, Prime Minister, Chief of the 
General Staff, ministers of National Defence, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the 
Army, Navy and Air Forces and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie.  
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As of May 2002, the strife between the coalition partners on how to handle EU conditionality 
reached its peak and an unexpected crisis emerged behind the scenes. Rumours about the 
wellbeing of the 77 year old Prime Minister began to spread in political circles. Two of the 
opposition parties – DYP and SP – were very quick to proclaim that a new temporary 
government should be set up as soon as possible since the government was no longer 
competent. The Prime Minister Ecevit tried to govern the coalition from his sick-bed, but he 
could not prevent the sharpening of divisions within the coalition partners. As of July 2002, all 
the possible options to progress with EU reforms were exhausted. The MHP resisted 
compromising on the issues of abolishing death penalty and granting education and 
broadcasting rights in languages other than Turkish. The leaders of the opposition parties 
were eager to support the government in passing the laws related to the fulfilment of the 
democratic criteria, but they used the EU cause as a trump card to guarantee that the DSP and 
ANAP parties agree to call for early elections. The two remaining coalition partners – DSP 
and ANAP – were desperate to tackle the controversy and were trying hard to keep the 
momentum of the EU agenda so that Turkey could clinch a date from the EU at the 
upcoming European Council Summit scheduled for December 2002. Reforms could be 
adopted this fast only if all parties reach a consensus. In this respect, an early election was 
inevitable.  
 
Parliament adopted the reform package in July 2002 and the general election was held on 3 
November 2002. There were now only two parties in Parliament: the AKP formed the 
government and the CHP became the main opposition. The AKP was now responsible for 
implementing the amendment to the Broadcasting Law and ensuring the adoption of a 
regulation by the RTÜK to pave the way for broadcasts in other languages. However, the 
implementation process turned out to be full of twists and turns just like the policy-making 
process. There were still many uncertainties over who should carry out these broadcasts and 
what the content should be. The AKP wanted the RTÜK to be more active in the process, 
but the regulator remained hesitant. Additionally, the public broadcaster TRT was not happy 
about being asked to get involved in such a controversial process. Although the Broadcasting 
Law was amended in August 2002 to pave the way for broadcasts in languages other than 
Turkish, it took almost two more years to implement this policy-change. The dispute between 
the regulator and the public broadcasters was a major factor behind this delay.  
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5.3.2 The Constitutional Amendments 
  
a) The Preparation Phase 
 
The 1982 Constitution, which was drafted after the military coup in 1980, has long been the 
centre of controversy in Turkish politics. It is seen as deficient because since military rule 
ended in 1983, there has been a debate on the need to draft a ‘new’ constitution as partial 
amendment has not been regarded as an adequate solution. However, over two decades, the 
political will to enact a new constitution did not occur, but the debate yet remained and heated 
up before every election. The most extensive amendments to the constitution preceding the 
2001 reform package were realised in 1995. By mid 2004, the 1982 Constitution was amended 
nine times; in total sixty-five articles were amended and three articles were withdrawn in 
total.133  
 
This time, the proposal for amending the constitution was prepared by a sub-committee and 
finalised by an Inter-party Conciliation Committee whose members represented all political 
parties with seats in Parliament. Two MPs from each political party acted as members to the 
committee. The method preferred for the drafting of the proposal was important in two 
respects. Firstly, as this was the last phase of the continuing debate on the need for a civilian 
constitution, the initial aim was to amend all the articles that were believed to be hindering 
Turkey’s progress towards the accession to the EU. Secondly, because the political 
composition of Parliament was very fragmented and different political parties had different 
interests and concerns regarding Turkey’s membership candidacy to the EU, the drafting of 
the proposal had to be based on a solid political debate that would lead up to a consensus 
which could only be reached within a certain legislative framework.134 In this respect, the 
drafting of the proposal for changing the constitution was, in fact, a bargaining process that 
was initiated in the name of Europe, but was shaped according to the competing political 
interests of the parties. These were very difficult to reconcile. This is mainly why the proposed 
fifty-one amendments as drafted by the sub-committee were decreased to thirty-seven when 
finalised at the Inter-party Conciliation Committee after months of debate.135  
                                                 
133 For a detailed list of the amendments, see: http://www.belgenet.com/arsiv/anayasa/1982_dm.html  
134 In Turkey, the process for changing the constitution is different to that for enacting ordinary laws. 
Constitutional amendments can only be proposed with the consensus of at least one-third of the total number of 
the MPs in Parliament (which is 186 members). The proposal is then discussed twice in Parliament. For the final 
approval, the secret ballot of at least three-fifths (330) of the total number of members is required. 
135 This draft that was prepared by the sub-committee was not made available to public. According to the press 
coverage of the debate, it was stated that, in the preparation of the draft the considerations of experts, academics, 
NGOs and the expectations of various social groups were integrated to the proposal. However, the 
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The 1982 Constitution is a rigid constitution that places heavy emphasis on ‘national unity’ 
and the ‘integrity of the state’. Article 3, which is one of the few articles that cannot be 
amended under any circumstances, stipulates that “The Turkish State, with its territory and 
nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.” Even this article alone reveals the 
limits of any discussion on minority rights within the constitutional framework. Therefore, the 
official justification of Article 26 was carefully crafted; there was not any reference to EU 
conditionality. As stated, “to broaden the limits of freedom of thought and freedom of 
speech” was the underlying objective of the proposed amendment.136 However, as quoted 
below, the proposed amendment contradicted this justification. Although the phrase stating 
“no language that has been prohibited by law in expressing or disseminating thoughts can be 
used” was withdrawn from the text, the second paragraph of the article that lays out the 
conditions for restriction of the exercise of these freedoms was extended so broadly that the 
article became more ambiguous than it was before: 
 
The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purposes of preventing 
crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly classified as a State Secret, 
protecting the reputation and rights and the private and family life of others, or 
protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or ensuring the proper 
functioning of the judiciary (Article 26/2, before the amendment). 
 
The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purposes of protecting 
national security, public order and public safety, the basic characteristics of the 
Republic and safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and 
nation, preventing crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly 
classified as a state secret, protecting the reputation and rights and private and family 
life of others, or protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or ensuring the 
proper functioning of the judiciary (Article 26/2, after the amendment). 
 
b) Parliamentary Discussions on the Amendments 
 
The parliamentary discussions of the 2001 constitutional amendments are worthy of looking 
at since the amendments package was the first major EU related legislative initiative that 
materialised with the involvement of all parties in Parliament from the drafting stage to the 
end. There are two important themes arising from these discussions and both reveal how the 
then members of Parliament perceive the dynamics of the process.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
representatives of the political parties put reservation on most of the articles before it was to be debated within 
the Inter-party Conciliation Committee. For more information regarding the political stance of different parties 
on the initial draft, see: Milliyet, 24 May 2001; Sabah, 24 May 2001.  
136 Law No. 4709, Law on Amending Certain Articles of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, Official Gazette 
No. 24556-bis, 17 October 2001, Ankara. 
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Firstly, the whole process was regarded by every political party as worthy of appreciation as it 
contributed to the ‘culture of reconciliation’, which is not something that occurs very often in 
Turkey. The 1982 Constitution was seen as the major hindrance for democracy in Turkey and 
the proposed amendments were seen as an important step towards establishing a more civilian 
constitution as the 1982 Constitution was drafted under the military rule. As stated by a DYP 
MP: 
 
[T]he characteristic of the Turkish constitutions is that they are made by the state, 
not by the nation. They are the blessings [lütuf] of the centre to the provinces […] 
Although I don’t question their good will; constitution makers prioritised their 
views before the social necessities, demands, principles whilst they were making 
these constitutions. There was no participation, no voice of the public. Therefore, 
Turkish constitutions are constitutions without the public.137  
 
Despite its rhetorical power, this remained a cautious statement. Hardly surprisingly, since all 
political parties were very keen on not ‘offending’ the army in any way, all of the speakers 
were very careful in how they criticised the 1982 Constitution. They criticised it for excessively 
favouring ‘statism’ without condemning the military regime that drafted the constitution that 
way. Yet, they celebrated the proposed amendment package as the result of ‘the will of the 
public’. As one MP from the SP stated during the discussions on amending the Article 13 of 
the constitution in accordance with the principles of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: 
 
[U]p until now, in all the workings [of drafting constitution], the State has been 
considered as given; the nation is described according to the state […] Here, for 
the first time, again, the state and the individual were written as equals […] This is 
a very important change in Turkey in terms of constitutional studies.138  
 
Within the ‘festive’ mood of reconciliation, self-criticism was hardly articulated. The majority 
of the MPs addressing Parliament regarded the proposed amendments as being ‘not enough’ 
to fulfil what was actually needed. However, none of the MPs raised the fact that the extended 
original amendment package was reduced to its current scope due to the disputes between the 
political parties during the drafting process. Additionally, although the need to clarify the 
conceptual ambiguities and vagueness in the constitution has long been emphasised, similar 
problems were raised in the drafting process of the amendments. During the discussions, 
                                                 
137 TBMM Journal of Minutes (24 September 2001) Term: 21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 131, Vol. 70, Ankara: 
TBMM, p.19. 
138 TBMM Journal of Minutes (25 September 2001) Term: 21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 132, Vol. 70, Ankara: 
TBMM, p. 23. 
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among six parties, this was mainly criticised by the SP and AKP MPs. As an SP MP 
commented: 
 
[T]he 1982 Constitution cannot be constructed [adam olmak] by alterations, fixtures, 
we need to know this […] We have always feared of fears, always slept over and 
waken up with apprehensions [vehim] […] Let’s scare these fears, let’s get rid of 
these apprehensions […] We still insist on using the same words, concepts like 
‘national security’, ‘public order’. I like them too, but Gentlemen, do we need 
them?!139  
 
The second and the most important theme arising from the discussions was clearly the 
‘impact’ of the EU on the whole process. Various discourses on ‘globalisation’ and 
‘Europeanisation’ overlapped in these discussions. As stated by the AKP spokesman: 
 
[T]he necessities of both globalisation and integration with the European Union 
oblige Turkey to re-evaluate its system. Turkey is seriously in the need of renewal 
in each and every sphere; political, judicial, and economic. This need for renewal is 
not only an obligation that has emerged due to external conditions or international 
conjuncture.140  
 
One of the most common repeats of the speeches was the ‘motivation’ behind these reforms. 
The key question was: ‘whom are we making these changes for?’ All of the speakers, no matter 
which party they represented, suggested that these changes were not made due to the EU 
pressures, but were rather made since the ‘country’ needed these changes. Although, there 
were significant references to the Copenhagen criteria and the issues of ‘conditionality’, the 
MPs were rather ‘uncomfortable’ in relating the constitutional amendments directly to the EU. 
However, not surprisingly, this emphasis on the internal needs for change shifted to an 
emphasis on external demands from the EU when the MPs started discussing the amendment 
on Article 26 under the heading of ‘Freedom of Expression and Dissemination of Thought’ in 
the 1982 Constitution. Simply, the MPs did not want to diverge from the official state line on 
the Kurdish issue. It was now mainly the MPs from the opposition parties raising the ‘EU 
asked for it’ line. Although the MPs approved the related amendment, they directed some 
indirect criticisms as well. During the discussions only three MPs from different parties 
delivered a statement. The MHP did not have any say during the discussion on the related 
article. It was an AKP MP who regarded the criteria as “imposed” alongside confirming 
Turkey’s need to have a more ‘libertarian’ constitution:  
                                                 
139 TBMM Journal of Minutes (24 September 2001) Term: 21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 131, Vol. 70, Ankara: 
TBMM, p. 14. 
140 ibid., 8. 
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[P]roblems in implementation that emerge in relation to the world’s progress, the 
longing of the public for a more libertarian, more civilian constitution […] will not 
remove from the agenda the necessity of drafting the constitution from scratch 
[…] Besides, unfortunately, we are face to face with the need or the imposition on 
the rapid reflection of the economic and political criteria to our internal law.141  
 
Interestingly, and maybe not coincidentally, the next speaker was from ANAP, representing 
the Diyarbakır constituency that is well known for its high Kurdish population. As might be 
expected, during the parliamentary discussions on the EU agenda, all of the MPs from the 
ANAP and DSP gave full support to the reforms either on a personal basis or as a party 
representative. Therefore, this MP’s statement representing the ANAP party line was 
important in view of his constituency. As he stated: 
 
[I]n contemporary democracies, rights deriving from people’s identities always 
receive respect and immunity. Of course, this respect and immunity can never be 
converted to armour that protects a separatist movement; however, giving people 
the possibility of developing their ethnic and cultural characteristics within the 
framework of national unity is also the requisite of a democracy […] A right which 
is not used is not a right just like a freedom that is steered by an ideology is not a 
freedom. Why can’t we see the consequences of convicting our millions of 
Kurdish speaking citizens who use the media of the illegal organisations by 
language prohibition? Besides, up until today, no legal and rational justifications 
could be brought forward – except the ideological and security related ones – for 
the continuation of this prohibition.142  
 
The last statement was delivered by a DYP MP, who mainly followed the opposition line 
emphasising that EU pressures ‘will bring harm’: 
 
The constitutional changes on the agenda were, unfortunately, prepared as a result 
of coercion of the integration process with the European Union […] We consider 
adopting constitutional amendments before the progress report is submitted to the 
European Union on 22 November 2002 as a necessity […] The two most 
important dangers emerging from globalisation are tendencies towards minority 
racism and religious radicalism […] As the proposal amending the constitution is 
not a product of a social demand, but is in the framework of demands required 
from us in the accession document to the European Union, this issue is 
disregarded.143  
 
These extracts from the speeches delivered by various MPs are important as they also reveal 
how the discussions on EU-Turkey revolved around issues on national sovereignty and 
security. The process of amending the constitution was the first occasion that relations with 
                                                 
141 TBMM Journal of Minutes (25 September 2001) Term: 21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 132, Vol. 70, Ankara: 
TBMM, p. 43. 
142 ibid., 44. 
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the EU officially became the main agenda in Parliament, but the majority of the then members 
of Parliament had very limited knowledge of how EU conditionality actually works. Therefore, 
they were careful in how they acknowledged EU influence on the process. The effort they put 
into emphasising their commitment to ‘national sovereignty’ even resulted in the rejection of a 
technical but a very important amendment proposed in the package. According to the 1982 
Constitution, international agreements carry the force of law once adopted by Parliament by a 
law approving the ratification. However, Article 90 regulating the ‘ratification of international 
treaties’ did not state what would happen in case of conflict between the domestic laws and 
international agreements. In international law, international agreements are considered above 
national legislation and the proposed amendment would just provide a technical clarification 
by putting this hierarchical significance in text. As simple as it sounded in technical terms, this 
amendment was very important for two reasons. Firstly, Turkey has always been either very 
hesitant in ratifying international agreements or has put reservations on various articles of 
these agreements that it was a party to. Amending the related article of the constitution could 
have potentially increased Turkey’s credibility in the international arena as an EU candidate. 
Secondly, unless this uncertainty was resolved, the number of cases brought against Turkey 
before the European Court of Human Rights would have kept increasing. These points were 
even emphasised by some speakers during the discussions. However, unexpectedly, the 
amendment could not get enough votes from Parliament either in the first or in the second 
round.144  
 
In its 2001 Progress Report on Turkey, the European Commission welcomed the 
constitutional amendments and stated that “Parliament worked swiftly and effectively”, but it 
also emphasised the importance of “effective implementation” (European Commission, 2001: 
125). Abolishing the death penalty, allowing broadcasting and education in languages other 
than Turkish (meaning Kurdish) were now the three major issues that had to be implemented 
by amending related legislation. However, this was easier said than done. Treating these three 
issues as one big issue of a requirement of EU conditionality gradually undermined the 
significance of each one that should be approached separately. Therefore, the adoption of the 
constitutional amendments was the beginning of a very long implementation process full of 
bickering in and outside of Parliament.  
                                                                                                                                                    
143 ibid., 45.  
144 For the first tour discussions of the proposed amendment, see: TBMM Journal of Minutes (28 September 
2001) Term: 21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 135, Vol. 70, Ankara: TBMM, pp.8-13; for the second tour 
discussions, see: TBMM Journal of Minutes (3 October 2001) Term: 21, Legislative year: 4, Session: 3, Vol. 71, 
Ankara: TBMM, pp. 19-23.  
  
176 
176 
5.3.3 The Aftermath of the Constitutional Amendments 
a) Debates on Amending the Broadcasting Law: The Increasing Tension 
 
The amendment to be made in the Broadcasting Law was, in fact, very simple and straight 
forward. The regulator RTÜK briefed policy-makers that broadcasting in Kurdish would be 
possible once the Article 4/f of the Law, which stipulates that “Broadcasts shall be in Turkish 
language”, was amended. However, there were two other important issues. Firstly, given the 
dynamics of the tripartite coalition government, it was very clear from the beginning that 
reaching an agreement on issues such as who will do these broadcasts and how they will 
look/sound would be very difficult. In relation to this, the second issue was on the timing of 
amending the Broadcasting Law. Two of the coalition partners – DSP and ANAP – aimed at 
committing to the schedule expressed in the National Programme and passing the amendment 
before March 2002, preferably within the second Reform Package together with other 
legislative reforms. However, it soon became clear that this time frame was not realistic since 
the ‘controversy’ around the issue was very critical.  
 
As stated earlier, the initial idea was to allow private broadcasters to broadcast in Kurdish, 
rather than the public broadcaster the TRT (Radikal, 12 March 2002). This preference was, in 
fact, very important as it revealed a lot about how policy-makers perceive cultural aspects of 
broadcasting in Turkey. All those ideas – universality of service, diversity of programming, and 
provision for ‘minority’ audiences – that underpin the role of public service broadcasting were 
missing in the discussions in Turkey. Although the other two partners in the coalition 
government (ANAP and DSP) were stressing the importance of broadcasting in minority 
languages for the ‘cultural enrichment’ of the country, it was the political concerns that shaped 
the debate. Within the coalition government, it was the MHP that strongly opposed the idea 
of the TRT doing these broadcasts. The MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli argued that it was not 
acceptable for the state – meaning the TRT – to broadcast in Kurdish as it would help the 
politicisation of ‘separatist’ activity.145 
                                                 
145 In fact, this perception of the use of broadcasting as ‘propaganda’ was there from the very beginning. It is very 
interesting that at the beginning of the debate, in the second half of year 2000, the head of the National 
Intelligence Organisation (MIT) suggested that broadcasting in Kurdish by using the regional TRT channel Gap-
TV would be a good idea to reach the ‘citizens’ in the eastern part of Turkey. Although the DSP and the ANAP 
were positive about the idea, the MHP and the General Staff of the army gave a very quick negative reaction. The 
timing of the General Staff’s statement on the issue was very interesting as it coincided with the departure of the 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to the EU Summit in Nice in December. The Prime Minister was shaking hands 
with the EU leaders and posing for the pictures of the ‘future of Europe’ for the very first time as the 
representative of a ‘member candidate’ country in Nice, whilst the General Staff, the most influential 
establishment in Turkey, was expressing its views directly for the very first time on the issue of broadcasting in 
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However, anyone with a rudimentary understanding of media economics would know that 
broadcasting in any other language than Turkish would not appeal to national commercial 
broadcasters. Simply, it would not be profitable. Broadcasting in other languages would only 
be profitable for regional or local broadcasters. However, as the issue of ‘security’ was at the 
core of the debate, monitoring these broadcasts at the regional and local levels meant 
allocating extra funds for adopting a monitoring technology and recruitment of new personnel 
for RTÜK. Therefore, although both options were on the table at the beginning, a version of 
French Corsica model soon became the prevailing option for regulating these broadcasts.146 
According to this, broadcasts in Kurdish were to be transmitted from GAP-TV, the regional 
channel of the TRT. The programmes would last one hour per day and the content would be 
news. There would be no entertainment, sports or education content. However, neither the 
question of which dialect of Kurdish would be used nor whether the proposed one-hour 
would be broadcast as a single, continuous hour or would be divided into different slots 
within the daily schedule was answered. Since coalition partners were not able to overcome 
their internal strife, the final decision was to discuss the details of the implementation in the 
upcoming National Secority Council meeting scheduled for the end of March 2002 (Radikal, 
14 March 2002). 
 
The RTÜK, as the regulator for broadcasting, could actually decide on the model to be 
adopted and regulate related technical details of these broadcasts by drafting a directive. 
However, rather than acting as a ‘policy entrepreneur’, the RTÜK made it very clear that it 
does not have the required competence on finalising the decisions on the details of these 
broadcasts and the timing and the substance of the amendments to be made on the issue was 
up to legislators, depended on their ‘political will’ (Radikal, 1 March 2002). The reluctance of 
the RTÜK to become more active in the debate was actually the by-product of 
Euroscepticism prevalent among its members of the governing board. The then head of the 
RTÜK Nuri Kayış, who lobbied against the amendments to the Broadcasting Law a year 
earlier, was this time openly critical about EU conditionality on broadcasting. In March 2002, 
at a time when everything was in flux and anti-EU attitudes were on the increase in political 
circles, Nuri Kayış publicly announced that he did not approve EU reforms and was sceptical 
about the legitimacy of EU conditionality. Murat Yetkin, the Ankara representative of Radikal, 
                                                                                                                                                    
Kurdish and stating that “the discussions on Kurdish TV correspond to the demands of the PKK”. E. Çölaşan, 
Hurriyet, 29 November 2000; E. Özkök, Hurriyet, 8 December 2000.  
146 In France, broadcasts in Corsican are carried out by the designated state radio and television channels in 
France. These broadcasts are aired two times a day in twenty minutes long blocks and consist of news, culture, 
arts and music content.  
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who was also one of the hosts of the programme revealed the contradictions in Kayış’s 
approach to the EU reforms agenda:  
 
[A] view that became wide spread backstage started almost accusing the officially 
declared goal of Turkey’s EU membership as ‘betraying the motherland’. The 
articulation of this view by some bureaucrats carry the EU debates to an uneasy 
dimension […] Nuri Kayış, in a live broadcast, crticised “the promises and 
compromises given to the EU”. When we reminded him that these promises are 
given via the National Programme that has also been approved by MGK and signed 
by Prime Minister Ecevit who had him elected as the head of RTÜK, he then said 
that the National Programme should “certainly be changed” […] He has finished his 
word by saying “I am a bureaucrat of Ankara, not Brussels”. We then did not ask ‘is 
Ecevit not the Prime Minister of Ankara’. The statements of Kayış do not only 
represent his attitude as the head of RTÜK, but it also reflects the tendency in the 
bureaucracy that has been growing in the last couple of weeks (M. Yetkin, Radikal, 5 
March 2002).  
 
 
By the end of March 2002, divisions within political circles on how to handle EU 
conditionality were very sharp. The tripartite coalition government’s decision to determine the 
policy approach to be adopted in amending the Broadcasting Law in the MGK meeting was 
important in revealing the seriousness of the strife within the government. All three partners 
had a different perspective on the issue. The DSP leader and the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit 
was now more positive about the idea that it should be the TRT carrying out these broadcasts; 
the ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz still believed that private broadcasters could also broadcast in 
Kurdish, and the MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli was still against the involvement of the TRT in 
these broadcasts since he believed “broadcasting in Kurdish by the state can be regarded as 
the language of the state, which means creating a minority or recognising a minority” (Radikal, 
25 March 2002). However, Bahçeli confirmed that he would agree the private broadcasters 
carrying out these broadcasts as long as the decision is taken in the MGK.  
 
However, the long awaited MGK meeting did not conclude with a definite decision. What 
came out was rather a set of ‘assessments’, especially on the status of the TRT. Where the 
follow-up statements are considered, there were two important issues arising from the 
meeting. Firstly, broadcasting in Kurdish by the TRT was presented as an important step 
towards weakening the satellite broadcasts of MED TV to the region. The Turkish 
government was many times in conflict with first Britain and later with Belgium over MED 
TV for its pro-PKK broadcast. Therefore, what appeared as significant in the meeting was not 
the EU dimension of the debate, but was rather concerns over ‘national security’ and ‘counter 
propaganda’. Secondly, for the very first time broadening these broadcasts to include some 
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other local languages was expressed (Radikal, 30 March 2002). In doing so, it was believed, the 
emphasis on the Kurdish issue would be displaced by bringing in other languages spoken in 
Turkey to the agenda. Once gain the army was very influential in moulding the policy. 
 
b) The Army ‘Communicates’ to the Public, ‘Advises’ the Government 
 
Although the army remained sceptic about EU related reforms throughout the process, it used 
different tactics to steer the political agenda and asserted its influence on policy-making in 
different ways. In March 2002, following the unfolding of the crisis on the leaking of the 
internal communication of the Representative of the European Commission to Turkey with 
EU officials in Brussels to the press, the army was very quick in expressing its views through 
various means, particularly by sending letters to journalists. In these very carefully crafted 
messages, the army spokesmen confirmed the army’s criticism of how the EU agenda was 
being ‘handled’ without directly targeting either the government or the EU itself. It was İsmet 
Berkan, the editor in chief of Radikal, who quoted from a letter, sent from the Head of the 
Press and Public Relations Office of General Staff to another columnist at Posta daily to clarify 
the army’s standpoint in the debate. It was stated in this letter:  
 
[T]he Turkish Armed Forces, throughout its history, has pioneered the innovations 
and Westernisation in this country. It is not possible for Atatürk’s Army to take a 
different line today. What is for the benefit of this country and the Turkish nation 
is always sacred for the Turkish Armed Forces. However, the Turkish Armed 
Forces are also against accession to the European Union by saying yes to 
everything unconditionally, without questioning whether this would really be for 
the benefit of the country. We support Turkey’s accession to the European Union 
cordially, if it is to enter with pride, self-esteem and on equal terms (quoted in I. 
Berkan, Radikal, 2 March 2002).  
 
The way İsmet Berkan commented on this quotation was very important as he revealed how 
the army, the nationalist left and the right wings (particularly the coalition partner MHP) 
united around “a common denominator in the discursive level”. Berkan noted that he agreed 
with the army’s call for the importance of thoroughly assessing the value of the EU 
conditionality, but he also suggested that the army’s perspective on the debate: 
 
Was gradually adopted with pretty bad intentions by both the nationalist left and 
the nationalist right. In this way, by using this discourse, both the MHP and the 
nationalist left try to suggest that the TAF [Turkish Armed Forces], in fact, is against 
the European Union like them (I. Berkan, Radikal, 2 March 2002). 
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Berkan’s observation was very accurate. The MHP’s foot-dragging and insistence on taking 
the key decisions at the MGK meetings from the beginning had very much to do with its 
leader Devlet Bahçeli’s search to justify his antagonistic position within the coalition 
government. On the other hand, from the end of February to mid-March 2002, well-known 
columnists of major dailies in Turkey commented on the importance of not falling into the 
trap of these ‘engineered fears’. It is true that the media in Turkey have never been in the 
position of attacking let alone overtly criticising the army, but nevertheless journalists 
reporting or commenting on the process during that time tried to shift the debate to a 
discursive level by emphasising the importance of keeping the EU prospect alive for the 
country. Under these circumstances, the army could neither afford to be associated with the 
nationalist MHP nor contradict its Republican legacy by rejecting EU conditionality, which 
was a major milestone in the accomplishment of the country’s ‘national project’. Therefore, 
when the Prime Minister’s Office consulted the General Staff of the army on its view 
regarding broadcasting in Kurdish, the General Staff delivered its opinion as ‘positive’, but 
under two conditions: only if the broadcasts were to be ‘limited’ and ‘kept under control’ 
(Radikal, 11 March 2002).  
 
By approving broadcasts in Kurdish, the army distanced itself from the MHP’s position on the 
issue. However, this does not mean that the army generals were pleased with the reform 
agenda. In the later stages, they continued to communicate with the public via the columnists 
of some dailies that they trust. For instance by the end of May 2002, just before a critical 
MGK meeting at which crucial issues regarding the accession criteria would be discussed, the 
army expressed its views via Emin Çölaşan’s column in Hürriyet, who is known to be close to 
the military establishment. Emin Çölaşan presented the army’s views on broadcasting in 
Kurdish as if they were his ‘impressions’ of what the General Staff of the army thought on the 
issue. According to these ‘impressions’, the army believed that: i) Kurdish broadcasts could 
only be made by the TRT from its regional channel TRT-GAP in the form of news at some 
hours of the day and in different dialects such as Zaza and Kirmançi; ii) commercial channels 
could not broadcast in Kurdish since monitoring them would be impossible; iii) publication of 
newspapers, and magazines in Kurdish would be fine as there would not be great interest in 
them; iv) the issue of the language of these broadcasts should not only be considered for 
Kurdish but also for other ‘mother tongue languages’ such as Arabic, Bosnian and Georgian 
and they should begin simultaneously with broadcasts in Kurdish (E. Çölaşan, Hürriyet, 30 May 
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2002). This last point was particularly important because it aimed at shifting the focus from 
the Kurdish issue and its relation to broadcasting to a more general level.  
 
In the later stages, the army continued to get involved in the process through its role in the 
Security Council meetings. By delaying the key decisions to be taken in these meetings, the 
government also demonstrated that it did not want to handle this issue without the approval 
of the army.  
 
c) The ‘Foot-dragging’ of the MHP 
 
As of May 2002, there was no concrete steps taken on the issues of EU democratic 
conditionality, although it had been six months since Parliament adopted the constitutional 
amendments. Speeding the process was important because the government had approximately 
two months to prepare the necessary legislations before Parliament finished its working term 
in July. In the meantime, something very important happened to boost the positive mood. 
The EU declared that it would include the ‘PKK’ and ‘DHKP-C’ in its list of outlaw terrorist 
organisations. With this announcement, as stated in Radikal, two new opportunities came into 
sight for Turkey. Firstly, “The European Union took an important step to undermine the 
notion that it wants ‘to divide’ Turkey” and secondly, the “easiness” that this step would bring 
“would make Turkey take more concrete steps on the issues of the death penalty, broadcasting 
and education in mother language and the withdrawal of the state of emergency. The calendar 
of full membership negotiations that Turkey pursues will come into view once these steps are 
taken on time” (D. Zeyrek, Radikal, 4 May 2002).  
 
In response, Prime Minister Ecevit charged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish 
Secretary General for European Union Affairs with preparing an ‘informational report’ and an 
‘action plan’ on the timing and the substance of what had to be done to allow Turkey clinch a 
‘date’ from the EU to begin the accession talks at the European Council Summit in 
Copenhagen, scheduled for December 2002. Indirectly, this action plan was, in fact, the draft 
of the second reform package, which could not be discussed until then due to disagreements 
between the coalition partners. The decision was to organise a ‘Leaders Summit’ that would 
take place in the second week of May. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish 
Secretary General for the European Union Affairs prepared the plan in just four days at the 
end of a non-stop working routine. The details on the content of the report and the action 
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plan were clear. As stated in the publicised report: i) all the efforts presented until now would 
be wasted if the “resistance on a couple of issues on democratic criteria remains”; ii) Turkey 
should begin the accession talks before the enlargement because getting a date from the EU 
could be much more difficult afterwards; iii) abolishing the death penalty is essential and 
urgent, whereas there is more flexibility for issuing legislation for broadcasting and education 
in languages other than Turkish (Radikal, 8 May 2002).  
 
However, this much needed boost of morale faded very quickly. Due to the Prime Minister’s 
ill-health, the Leaders Summit was delayed and could only took place at Başkent Hospital. The 
outcome of the ‘summit’ was a disappointment. The DSP and ANAP were ready to abolish 
the death penalty and prepare the legislation to amend the Broadcasting Law to pave the way 
for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, but the MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli still 
remained opposed. Bahçeli even criticised the announcement of the plan to public without the 
approval of all the party leaders (Milliyet, 27 December 2002). 
 
President Sezer intervened in the dispute and invited the leaders of the coalition government 
as well as the opposition parties to discuss EU related issues. In doing so, the President took 
the initiative to act as a moderator to overcome the crisis and motivate Parliament to continue 
working on what was needed to be done in the name of Europe. However, the MHP leader 
Devlet Bahçeli, who was the main actor in the dispute, was also very prompt in giving his 
response. Bahçeli stated that his party was not against the EU, but their attitude on the issue 
of education and broadcasting in mother language would remain the same. Bahçeli, with his 
statement, did not only challenge the President but also his coalition partner, Mesut Yılmaz, 
who earlier stated that issues on education and broadcasting could be tackled in Parliament 
(Radikal, 24 May 2002). Whilst Bahçeli was making these statements, Mesut Yılmaz was 
holding a press conference in Brussels after the European Convention meeting and 
emphasising the importance of political criteria stating that every candidate should fulfil the 
criteria and this was not an issue of “bargaining”. But he also added that Turkey had some 
“sensitive” concerns and he thought that “eventually, with common sense, we will overcome 
all the difficulties” (Radikal, 24 May 2002).  
 
Back in Turkey, the President’s effort to make all the political leaders reach a consensus on the 
issues of the EU by inviting them to a meeting, to the “EU Summit” as the press preferred to 
call it, was in trouble. As MHP was resistant to compromise, the government was already 
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divided and the opposition leaders were ready to shift the agenda from the EU to domestic 
politics. The government deficit that emerged because of the dispute in the coalition on the 
issues of the EU and the prime minister’s ill health as an add-on factor created a great 
opportunity for the opposition parties to play on their own domestic policy concerns. Their 
common message was straightforward: the required majority to pass the EU laws could be 
achieved according to the parliamentary arithmetic, but the existing coalition was no longer 
capable of governing the country and proceeding with the EU agenda. It was first the AKP 
that called for early general election (Radikal, 25 May 2002).  
 
In the midst of the political disagreements, it was not only President Sezer who tried to form a 
path for consensus among political parties. One of the most influential pressure groups in 
Turkey, The Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSIAD) placed a full-
page advertisement in leading newspapers by the end of May. The headline of the declaration 
was: “Turkey: What kind of a future?” and TÜSIAD had a very angry message to deliver to 
policy-makers: 
 
Every Turk wants to realise their ideals as soon as possible […] Turkey has the 
political and economic power to achieve the EU membership […] Turkey’s 
membership of the EU is state policy. EU membership will increase Turkey’s 
international economic power and its democratic respectability […] EU 
membership should not be used as a means of struggle in Turkey’s domestic 
politics. What is in question is a country’s hopes and ideals. The EU membership is 
the guarantee the future of our youth (BELGEnet, 29 May 2002).  
 
 
TÜSIAD’s push towards the EU was very important since TÜSİAD talked on behalf of the 
biggest corporations in Turkey. TÜSIAD is, in fact, the heart of Turkish economy. TÜSİAD 
did not only lobby on EU-related issues, but it also produced concrete policy proposals. Just 
after the publication of its statement, TÜSIAD announced its policy proposals on the issues 
of death penalty, education and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. The report, 
which was titled “Democratisation Perspectives in Turkey and EU Copenhagen Criteria: 
Opinions and Priorities”, was prepared by Prof. Dr Süheyl Batum, the dean of Faculty of Law, 
Bahçeşehir University.147 In his report, Batum’s principal suggestion was that Turkish policy-
makers were right in defining who would be defined as a minority within the national territory 
just like other European countries defined, but it had to recognise ‘cultural rights’ as a 
                                                 
147 Batum, S. (2002), “Democratisation Perspectives in Turkey and the EU Copenhagen Criteria: Opinions and 
Priorities”, May 2002, TÜSIAD-T/2002-05/325. Istanbul: TÜSIAD. Available at: 
http://www.tusiad.org/turkish/rapor/dem/dem.pdf [Retrieved 17. 12. 2004]. 
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candidate country as it committed to do so both in the 2000 ‘Accession Partnership’ 
document and the National Programme issued in 2001. Therefore, as he argued, policymakers 
should approach the issues of broadcasting not on the basis of ‘minority rights’ but on the 
basis of “cultural rights as in the context of individual freedoms”.148 Although tracing the 
influence of this report on the debate is not easy, it would be fair to argue that there was a 
clear shift from the use of the phrase ‘minority languages’ to other phrases such as ‘mother 
tongue languages’ or ‘traditionally used languages’ in the following months. The confusion on 
how to pitch the debate was for a very long time apparent in the press coverage. Although the 
debate was mainly reported as ‘broadcasts in Kurdish’ as this was central to the debate, 
eventually different ways of phrasing the issue started to appear in the press. However, this 
confusion in terminology in the routine coverage of the press does not suggest any negativity 
of the press towards these reforms. In contrast, majority of the headlines used at this time 
were either just informative or slightly sarcastic about these constantly remerging conflicts.149  
 
The clarity that emerged after the MGK meeting took place by the end of May 2002 eased the 
weeks of tension that dominated the debates. The picture on how EU conditionality would be 
handled started to unfold after the MGK meeting. On the issue of abolishing the death 
penalty, the decision made was to adopt the ‘Hess Model’,150 which would replace the death 
penalty with ‘life imprisonment’ and amnesty or conditional release from life imprisonment 
would be prohibited with an amendment to the constitution. And on the issues of 
broadcasting and education, the prevailing view was that the ‘State’ – meaning the public 
broadcaster TRT – should take the initiative.  
 
The approaching ‘Leaders Summit’ was now the main item on the agenda. However, there 
were still problems. Prime Minister Ecevit’s health remained poor and the position of MHP as 
a coalition party remained unclear. Especially on the issue of abolishing the death penalty, all 
of the party leaders, the ones in coalition as well as the ones in opposition, wanted to include 
the MHP in the final decision since no body wanted the MHP to take this an election pitch. In 
this respect, it was very interesting to see how the election agenda was coming into view along 
with the EU agenda.  
                                                 
148 ibid., 13-14. 
149 Even skimming through the bibliography of this research listing the newspaper articles used would confirm 
this case.  
150 The Hess Model is named after Rudolf Hess, who was Adolf Hitler’s deputy in Nazi Germany. He was 
sentenced to life imprisonment at the end of his prosecution at Nurernberg Trials, which were held from 1945 to 
1949. 
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President Sezer’s approach to this summit was interesting because he also invited some top-
level officers so that they can contribute to the debate. Their knowledge on the technicalities 
of EU conditionality was definitely deeper than the leader of the political parties in Parliament 
and unlike the party leaders they were not biased towards election politics. For instance, 
Volkan Vural, the Secretary General for the EU, was invited by President to brief on what has 
been done so far for the EU and what else should be done, including the possible options that 
all the party leaders could agree on. According to the press, Vural was planning to give the 
message that unless the political criteria are fulfilled there is no way to begin the accession 
talks and the ‘medium term’ was no longer 2004, but is the end of 2002 (Radikal, 6 June 2002). 
Then again, Akın Alptuna, the Deputy Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry responsible of 
the EU, was also invited to brief on the EU’s political calendar that Turkey needs to be aware 
of throughout pre-accession period. In short, President Sezer filled in all the gaps that might 
emerge due to lack of knowledge by including the ‘expert’ view to this crucial meeting. 
 
The Leaders Summit took place at the beginning of June as scheduled, but in the absence of 
Prime Minister Ecevit and Tansu Çiller, the leader of the main opposition party DYP.151 At 
the end of the summit, it was announced that the common goal for all the party leaders 
attending the summit was ‘EU membership’. However, it soon became clear that the MHP 
leader Devlet Bahçeli was still an opponent to EU reforms and was planning to withdraw 
from the government, if his partners choose to collaborate with the opposition parties to pass 
EU reforms. Devlet Bahçeli once again suggested that the EU was imposing its own agenda 
on Turkey by presenting it as a pre-condition to start accession talks. Bahçeli declared that he 
would consider remaining in the coalition government only if the issue of abolishing the death 
penalty is excluded from the second reform package and brought to Parliament as a separate 
agenda (Radikal, 7 June 2002). Just a couple of days after the summit, the vice chairman of the 
MHP announced that his party agreed to let the way to its coalition partners to seek the 
support of the opposition parties to pass the law abolishing the death penalty, but it would not 
tolerate the same strategy being applied to legislation on granting education and minority 
rights in languages other than Turkish (Radikal, 11 June 2002).  
 
In short, there was only one option left for the DSP and ANAP to progress with EU reforms: 
to begin talks with the opposition leaders.  
                                                 
151 Çiller, before the summit, announced that she would not attend the summit in the absence of the Prime 
Minister as it would mean accepting that the country did not have a prime minister (Radikal, 4 June 2002). She 
was actually using Prime Minister’s ill-health to make early elections issue as the centre of the agenda 
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d) The Battle over Early Elections 
 
Seeking the support of the opposition parties’ to abolish the death penalty was actually a blind 
alley. Supporting this might turn out to be far too costly for the opposition parties in the 
general election. Abolishing death penalty might be perceived by the public as an EU-led 
favour to the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who was in jail since 1999. No mainstream party 
leader could take this risk at that time. For instance, within the AKP, some MPs were uneasy 
about the ‘unconditional support’ that their party leader, Tayyip Erdoğan, declared earlier. 
Against the criticisms from his MPs, Erdoğan shifted his stance and declared that they would 
support the law under two conditions: the proposal should be drafted by the Ministry of 
Justice and the constitution should be amended at the same time to include the statement that 
life imprisonment would not be subject to amnesty (Radikal, 12 June 2002). In a similar vein, 
the DYP leader Tansu Çiller was also insistent that the law abolishing the death penalty should 
come to the parliamentary agenda as a government proposal, which was what the MHP 
opposed from the beginning.152 The EU process once again reached impasse because of the 
conflicting views on abolishing the death penalty. Where the arithmetic of Parliament was 
considered, there was no other option left to move forward.  
 
While the calculations on the arithmetic of votes in Parliament were going on, all of a sudden 
the SP proposed a law on broadcasts in ‘mother tongue languages’ on the 12 June. The 
proposed law was amending the related article (Article 4) of the Broadcasting Law. Clearly, the 
SP’s move was merely ‘symbolic’ as it was trying to present itself as a ‘sensible’ party that was 
taking a step forward whereas the others were busy with their bargaining and disputes. The 
SP’s proposal was later dropped from the parliamentary agenda.  
 
However, in a politically astute move, it was the leader of the ANAP, Mesut Yılmaz, who 
suggested in his party group meeting that the priorities in EU reforms could be swapped and 
the issue of abolishing the death penalty could be discussed later. The latest plan was to tackle 
the issues of granting ‘cultural rights’ first. This was, in fact, very important because for the 
very first time the dispute over abolishing the death penalty might not overshadow other 
issues. Additionally, the notion of ‘cultural rights’ was, for the very first time, becoming an 
                                                 
152 The arithmetic of Parliament got very complicated at this point. At least 330 votes were needed to pass a 
proposal to change the constitution, whilst 367 votes were needed to approve the changes without a need to go 
for a referendum. At the time being, the distribution of the seats in Parliament was as follows: DSP: 128, MHP: 
126, DYP: 85, ANAP: 79, AKP: 53, SP: 48, TDP: 3, BBP: 1, Independent: 14, Empty: 13.  
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important aspect of the EU debate. Surprisingly, now it was the DYP leader Tansu Çiller, who 
offered support to Mesut Yılmaz first. Çiller made a complete u-turn and announced that her 
party had no further conditions and would support the reforms. However, it should also be 
noted, neither Mesut Yılmaz nor Tansu Çiller was free from the ‘indirect’ influence of the EU 
in reaching this point. Throughout the dispute, the EU was actually passing on its views on 
the debate through various European Ambassadors in Ankara (Radikal, 22 June 2002). The 
EU was very critical about the ways in which the political parties used EU related reforms to 
pursue their own domestic agendas.  
 
Shifting the agenda from the issue of abolishing the death penalty to the reforms on cultural 
rights was exactly what the MHP did not want to happen. The MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli 
who earlier suggested that his party would not approve if his coalition partners seek the 
opposition’s support to pass EU reforms on broadcasting and education in languages other 
than Turkish. The MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli was very prompt in responding to the shift in 
the agenda by naming Tansu Çiller’s u-turn as a ‘political manoeuvre’ and condemning his 
coalition partners for changing their views “every three months” (Radikal, 24 June 2002).  
 
On the other hand, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was not convinced by the ANAP leader’s 
Mesut Yılmaz to separate the abolition of the death penalty from the package and seek 
support of the opposition leaders to pass the necessary laws on the other issues. This meant 
the shattering of the coalition. Moreover, the working group that was set up by the DSP and 
ANAP to discuss EU reforms, mainly how to tackle the issue of abolishing the death penalty, 
was not able to begin its meetings as the DYP and AKP did not send any members.153 In the 
final Leaders Summit, the ANAP leader once more asked the MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli for 
his support on EU reform package. However, Bahçeli once again stated that if his coalition 
partners looked for support from the opposition leaders on tackling the issues of cultural 
rights, then as a coalition partner he would consider this to be a problem. In response, Ecevit 
assured the MHP leader that they would only ask for the support of the coalition parties on 
the issue of abolishing the death penalty, but not on any other matter. The final decision was 
to put aside the controversial issues for some time and focus on the other reforms that Turkey 
committed to fulfil in the National Programme (Radikal, 3 August 2202).  
                                                 
153 The AKP and the DYP was expecting an official invitation to participate in this commission. Additionally, all 
the opposition leaders wanted the commission to consider the reform package as a whole and not separate the 
issues of cultural rights and the debate on abolishing death penalty. The MHP was against the idea of setting up a 
working group/commission from the beginning, see: Radikal, 2 July 2002.  
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After months of meetings and lobbying, the conflict remained unresolved and the decision to 
keep the coalition running actually meant nothing. The EU bid had turned out to be a vicious 
circle after months of discussion. Prime Minister Ecevit was insistent on not destroying the 
government, but all the possible options to progress with EU reforms were exhausted as of 
July 2002. The legislative year ended at the beginning of July and Parliament closed for the 
summer recess. It was Günter Verheugen, the Enlargement Commissioner, who expressed the 
disappointment of the EU when he stated that the Commission would not accept any political 
bargaining to begin membership negotiations. This statement showed that the EU was certain 
that Turkey would try to bargain over the timing of the reforms by delaying the process in the 
following months. However, İsmet Berkan wrote in his column in Radikal that although he 
was not optimistic about the future of the debate, a strong government would always have a 
strong basis to initiate a ground for bargaining despite what the Commisisoner Verheugen 
stated (İ. Berkan, Radikal, 24 June 2002). The unfolding of events proved him to be correct. 
 
After this point, it was clear that the tripartite coalition government was no longer effective. 
Apart from the ongoing disputes, the Prime Minister’s political leadership capacity was already 
in question due to his poor health. The MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli already started lobbying 
for the elections to take place on the 3rd of November. The need for a new government 
model had become undeniable. The ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz and the deputy Prime 
Minister Hüsamettin Özkan, who was also known to be the Prime Minister’s best ally and 
once his likely successor, began to discuss the possible options and they agreed that the best 
way to proceed was to set up an interim government that would function from September 
onwards, which would exclude MHP and take in the DYP instead. Additionally, Prime 
Minister Ecevit would resign from office and someone else would replace him. The new 
government would announce the timing of the next election, which should also be agreed by 
the opposition parties and not take place before mid-2003. The new government then would 
speed up the process to fulfil EU reforms until election time (Radikal, 5 June 2002). The 
response from the DYP to the whole plan was positive.  
 
Prime Minister Ecevit reacted against the new wave of lobbying. He was very bitter as 
Hüsamettin Özkan, his ally and once his likely successor, abandoned him. Ecevit refused to 
step down and kept delivering ‘the government is up and running’ messages in front of the 
press. Özkan resigned both from his government post and the DSP by the beginning of July 
2002. A flow of resignations followed shortly after. Among these, the resignations of Foreign 
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Minister İsmail Cem and the Minister of Economy Kemal Derviş were serious blows to the 
government. When the number of resignations from the DSP reached fifty-nine MPs by mid-
July, the coalition government lost the confidence vote in Parliament. Former Foreign 
Minister İsmail Cem launched a new centre-left and pro-reform political party named as ‘New 
Party’ (Yeni Parti – YTP) together with sixty-three deputies.154 Finally, in an emergency 
parliamentary session that was held on the final day of July, Parliament set the date for the 
next national election: 3 November 2002, eighteen months earlier than scheduled.155 
 
e) The Impasse Ends: The Reform Package is Ready 
 
From the beginning of the mutiny in the DSP to the launch of the election date a process of 
political bargaining took place in Turkey. Of all the political parties in Parliament, it was 
ANAP and its leader Mesut Yılmaz, who was most keen on tackling the EU agenda before the 
elections. Yılmaz assigned his bureaucrats to draft the EU laws. At the beginning, the idea was 
to involve other political parties in the process by setting up a joint committee to draft the EU 
package. If only the ANAP drafted the EU reforms, the other parties might again block the 
EU agenda in order not to allow the ANAP use the EU cause for its own benefit to appeal to 
the electorate. Therefore, seeking for consensus on EU reforms could make all the parties 
more committed to the process and not make the EU debate a matter of election politics. 
However, the party leaders had their own tactics and they wanted to secure the elections date 
first before moving forward in the EU agenda (Radikal, 17 July 2002; Radikal, 19 July 2002).  
 
Even the MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the name behind the crisis, announced that his party 
was eager to support the proposal to call the Parliament for an emergency session to discuss 
the EU laws, if the elections would be scheduled for the 3rd of November. Bahçeli’s last 
minute declaration of support for the EU reforms, which he opposed for almost a year, was 
an evident strategy to achieve success in the upcoming election. In his own terms, ‘the others’ 
were engineering an “excessive expectation” regarding the EU and they were presenting as if 
the “EU door would open” once Turkey accepts conditions on abolishing the death penalty, 
                                                 
154 When it was first launched, the New Party increased the expectations of its possible future success as it 
consisted of maybe the most respected politicians in Turkey, especially Ismail Cem. However things turned 
upside down in a very short time. The new part was expecting the Minister of Economy, Kemal Derviş, to join 
to the party, but Derviş first withdrew his resignation upon the request of President Sezer and then he could not 
decide which party to join, speculation heightened. Derviş, after a series of meetings, joined to the CHP by the 
end of August. The ongoing speculations and conflicting statements of the New Party MPs damaged the ‘New 
Party’ in an irreversible way. For day by day developments, see: BELGEnet, 18 July 2002.  
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granting education and broadcasting rights in other languages. Bahçeli, as he believed, 
challenged the ‘sincerity’ of other party leaders by pressuring them to pass the EU laws and 
shop for their votes for the elections at the same time. In doing so, the MHP leader was not 
only ‘correcting’ his ‘spoilsport’ image, but also aimed at presenting his party as the only one 
‘understanding the sensitivities of the country’ (Radikal, 15 July 2002; 16 July 2002; 20 July 
2002).156 
 
The ANAP tried to push for the EU laws to be discussed in the same session as the proposal 
for setting the elections date. However, its plan did not work. The EU package could not be 
discussed on the same day with the proposal on setting the date for the elections since the 
Presidency of Parliament decided to treat two issues as separate agendas to be discussed in 
different sessions. Parliament set the election date first before starting discussions on the third 
reform package.  
 
As far as the EU’s own agenda was concerned, scheduling the elections for the beginning of 
November was, in fact, very bad timing. The next EU summit that would take place in 
Copenhagen was already scheduled for December 2002 and the next Progress Report on 
Turkey would be announced by mid-October. This meant that Turkey could only get a 
positive report, if the political criteria were realised by then. Having a positive report was very 
important for Turkey as any possibility of clinching a date from the EU to begin accession 
talks at the Copenhagen Summit was very much dependent on the content of the report. EU 
leaders were going to meet in Brussels on 29 October to have a preliminary session for setting 
the agenda on enlargement that would lead to final decisions at the Copenhagen Summit in 
December. Thus, Turkey had no more than two months to finalise the majority of the EU 
reforms. 
 
This was a very big matter for Turkey and Turkish policy-makers. It was either the beginning 
or the end of the ‘real’ EU journey. It could be a new beginning, if all the necessary EU laws 
could be passed by Parliament in a very short period of time, which would be miraculous. It 
could be the end of the EU debate, if the political parties used the EU debate negatively to 
gain more votes from the elections and resist moving further in terms of EU reforms.  
                                                                                                                                                    
155 TBMM Journal of Minutes (31 July 2002) Term: 21, Legislative year: 4, Session: 123 (emergency), Vol. 101, 
Ankara: TBMM. 
156 For a very interesting interpretation of the Devlet Bahçeli’s political motivations within the coalition, see: A. 
Özgürel, Radikal, 26.07.2002.  
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5.3.4 The Enactment of the Reform Package 
a) Parliamentary Discussions on the Amendments 
 
The prospect of early elections gave a great momentum to the process. The fourteen-point 
reform package together with the proposal to hold elections on the 3 November was referred 
to the Presidency of Parliament by the end of July 2002.157 The fourteen-point proposal called 
the ‘third reform package’ came in front of Parliament at the beginning of August. As it was 
stated in the general justification of the proposal, the aim of the package was to harmonise 
Turkish civil law with recent amendments to the Constitution and also to make the necessary 
changes to various laws as expressed in the National Programme.158 
 
Within the package there were two proposed changes to the existing broadcasting law. The 
related article on amending the Article 4 of the broadcasting law granted broadcasting rights in 
languages other than Turkish and was proposed as the eighth point in the whole package. The 
justification of this was stated as being “to expand the sphere of cultural life in the context of 
individual rights and freedoms and in accordance with Turkey’s goals in the document of 
accession partnership and National Programme within the process of Turkey’s membership to 
the European Union”.159 The second amendment was related to Article 26 prohibiting 
retransmission of broadcasts. The amendment lifted the ban on retransmission and assigned 
the RTÜK the duty to prepare the regulatory framework.160 
 
In the assessment of the proposal for the fourteen-point package, the ‘Justice Committee’ was 
the main committee; the secondary committees were the ‘Constitutional Committee’, ‘Internal 
Affairs Committee’, ‘National Education, Culture, Youth and Sport Committee’, and the 
‘Health, Family, Labour and Social Affairs Committee’. The Justice Committee agreed on the 
proposal with minor changes. On the article amending the broadcasting law, the Committee 
made an add-on to the proposal and simplified the paragraph (f) of the Article 4 of the law 
listing broadcasting standards.161 The MHP representatives attached a statement of reservation 
regarding the proposed amendments in every committee report. 
                                                 
157 TBMM Journal of Minutes (01 August 2002) Term: 21, Legislative year: 4, Session: 124 (emergency), Vol. 101, 
Ankara: TBMM. 
158 Law Proposal on Amending Various Laws and Holding the General Elections on 2 November 2002, Sunday, 
25 July 2002, 21/4, File No. 2/1020, Ankara.  
159 ibid., 8.  
160 This was explained in Chapter 4, pp. 112-15. 
161 TBMM Justice Committee Report, File No. 2/1020, Decision No. 34, 31 July 2002, Ankara.  
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Among the secondary committees’ reports, the one prepared by the National Education, 
Culture, Youth and Sport Committee was the most interesting. The committee did not make 
any comment on the proposed amendment to the Broadcasting Law allowing broadcasts in 
languages other than Turkish by stating that it ‘is not in the competence of the committee’s 
expertise’. On the other hand, the Committee’s comments on granting ‘education’ rights in 
languages other than Turkish in the same package reveal its political stance very clearly. 
Quoting from the report:162 
 
Language unity […] is the most important element that makes a society one nation 
[…] In our country there are nearly 50 dialects and local accents. Perceiving them 
as a separate language can cause great dangers, harm the language unity, endanger 
the unitary structure […] It is true that we support the European Union as the 
Turkish nation. However, it is not possible to compromise our national 
sensitivities or our identity. Our accession to the European Union should be 
realised by keeping these concerns, the elements that will give harm to our unity 
and integrity must be avoided. 
 
As might have been expected, the discussions on the fourteen-point proposal, the third 
reform package, were very intense, starting from the very first session. The next elections date 
was now set and the third reform package was, in fact, part of the deal. What the MPs stated 
in these discussions either on behalf of their parties or as personal views were crucial as this 
might be the last time that the EU bid was discussed in Parliament as it was currently 
composed. Therefore, these discussions were about ideas of Europe in terms of its influence 
on national matters and ideas of Turkey in a yet unclear journey towards accession to the EU. 
Now the MPs from MHP were eager to deliver a comment on almost every article and the 
underlying statement of these comments were the same: ‘there is a very dangerous agenda 
behind all the demands of the EU and now it is time to prove for all the MPs how much they 
love the country, how much patriot they are’. MPs from other parties were outraged at almost 
every comment delivered by an MHP MP. The opposition parties knew that unless they give 
full support, there was no other way to move forward. During the discussions, they took this 
as the opportunity to criticise the tripartite coalition government for not including the 
opposition in the debate in the drafting of the National Programme, which launched the 
debate on EU reforms. They condemned the MHP leader for causing this much trouble by 
opposing EU reforms that were listed in the National Programme that he approved as a 
                                                 
162 TBMM National Education, Culture, Youth and Sport Committee Report, File No. 2/1020, Decision No. 20, 
30 July 2002, Ankara. 
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coalition partner.163 Even the ANAP leader and the deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz 
indirectly criticised his coalition partner MHP. Quoting from Yılmaz’s speech: 
 
Is it really possible to believe that the European Union membership will constitute 
danger for Turkey whilst it brings good for other countries? If the issue is 
considered within the scale of reason, fairness and conscience, everybody will 
acknowledge that it is not the case. We need to see the European Union 
membership neither as a magic wand, nor as a cursed baton, but as a boosting 
engine that will help us to realise the leaps forward that we need in all fields.164 
 
It is noteworthy that although the themes unfolded were similar to the ones emerged during 
the discussions on the constitutional amendments, there were some significant changes in the 
ways in which MPs used the EU cause this time. The general knowledge about the EU was 
much more in-depth and the MPs were more articulate in their comments. This clarity might 
have also had something to do with the ‘confidence’ that the MPs had gained over time as the 
EU was the main agenda of policy-making for quite some time. However, it would be hard to 
say that this confidence was directly related to having more knowledge about the EU. It might 
instead be related more to the upcoming general election. These were the final days of 
Parliament as currently composed and the political performance of the MPs would have 
important consequences.  
 
As the decision was to pass the package at once, it was already past midnight when the MPs 
started discussing Article 8 amending the Broadcasting Law. It was an ANAP MP who first 
commented on the amendment on behalf of her party. Nesrin Nas, in her statement, 
emphasised that the fuss about granting broadcasting rights came from “ungrounded fears, 
meaningless worries” and the changes were required, if Turkey would become “strong and 
effective” within the “competitive” environment of the “global world”.165 This emphasis on 
‘globalisation’ and the influence of new communication technologies on making the language 
prohibitions redundant was very significant in most of the comments. The MPs from different 
parties were now supporting the same argument: as long as these broadcasts are monitored, 
they would not be ‘harmful’ to the unity and the sovereignty of the country. For the very first 
time, the statements of these MPs were full of expressing phrases like ‘cultural diversity’, 
                                                 
163 Discussions on the third reform package were much more intense than the discussions of the constitutional 
amendments. Even the delivery of the general comments on the overall package took a full day and resulted in 
the production of fifty-four pages of minutes of the day. See, TBMM Journal of Minutes (1 September 2002) 
Term: 21, Legislative year: 4, Session: 124 (emergency), Vol. 101, Ankara: TBMM.  
164 ibid., 11. 
165 TBMM Journal of Minutes (2 September 2002) Term: 21, Legislative year: 4, Session: 125 (emergency), Vol. 
102, Ankara: TBMM, p. 97. 
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‘cultural richness’, ‘the necessities of contemporary broadcasting’, and ‘a need for a different 
perspective for broadcasting’. It was an YTP MP, from Hakkari, which also has a high 
Kurdish population, who expressed his views as “a person from the region”, as he put it. 
Evliya Parlak suggested that the people of the region already had access to satellite broadcasts 
of MED-TV, transmitting PKK propaganda and if “we” do not want to go through “that 
period of terror”, “than we shall not be afraid of lifting the bans”.166 To quote from his 
speech:  
 
My mother tongue is Kurdish; I also like its music and listen to it as well. In the 
past, when it was prohibited, I used to beg people and request from whomever I 
found that had it [Kurdish music] as there was almost none. However, when it 
became unrestricted, tax stamped, nobody had that earlier excitement, that 
enthusiasm any longer […] Now, liberating these broadcasts within a legal 
framework will provide this unity; there is nothing to be afraid of”.167  
 
 
The article amending the Broadcasting Law (Article 4) was adopted with 267 votes against 
114. As might be expected, the MHP did not support the amendment.168After a marathon 
session, the discussions on the fourteen-point proposal, the third reform package, came to an 
end at 06:30 in the morning, following the general voting of the whole package. The proposal 
became law after the approval of President Sezer in just a couple of days. The rest was about 
tackling the scope and the timing of the implementation of the law.169  
 
b) Intensification of Lobbying and EU Response: The Emphasis on 
Implementation  
 
After two years of political debate, the legal ground for allowing to “broadcast in different 
languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives” was ready. It 
was a very long process and the focus had shifted from EU conditionality on ‘minority’ rights 
to issues of broadcasting in ‘traditionally used languages and dialects’. Although the core of 
the debate remained the same during the whole process, this shift in phrasing was actually very 
significant as it confirmed the continuing resistance to frame the issue in the context of 
minority rights. The implementation of the third package was now subject to the adoption of 
related regulations. However, the MHP opposed approving the implementation and since it 
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was the cabinet that held the power to approve international agreements and directives, it was 
apparent that the implementation process could only begin after the elections. The reaction of 
the MHP did not end with a crisis this time as both coalition leaders and the opposition 
parties wanted to see the feedback from the EU before the implementation of the reforms. 
The important dates were the announcement of the progress report on the 16 October and 
the EU Summit on 29 of the same month (Radikal, 6 August 2002). 
 
As might be expected, the initial aim was not to wait in silence. Shortly after the passing of the 
third reform package in Parliament, the discussions on how to pursue a lobbying campaign 
began. The aim was to convince the EU to give a date to Turkey in the upcoming EU Summit 
to start the accession talks in return for overcoming the domestic strife and achieving a 
progress with EU reforms agenda. However, related political circles were not quick enough to 
take action on lobbying. The launch of the official campaign was scheduled to take place by 
the beginning of September. The messages to be delivered in these lobbying activities were 
clear: i) Turkey proved its political will to join the EU by passing EU harmonisation laws 
package even at the time where political uncertainty was at its peak; ii) Now it was the EU’s 
turn to take a constructive step by either confirming the beginning of accession talks or by 
announcing a date clarifying when the accession talks could begin. However, these messages 
were rather brave as political circles in Turkey knew very well that what really mattered for the 
EU was the implementation of the law. To implement the final harmonisation package, five 
directives needed to be drafted and there were some other necessary changes in the existing 
regulations. Although, it was forecast that the implementation of the law in the package would 
take a year, it was clear that things needed to be tackled much earlier.  
 
Meanwhile, the MHP applied to Constitutional Court for the annulment of various articles of 
EU harmonisation package including the ones abolishing the death penalty and allowing 
broadcasts in mother tongue languages. The Constitutional Court decided to discuss the 
MHP’s application a day before the announcement of the 2002 Progress Report on Turkey. 
When the date arrived the result was very straightforward: the Constitutional Court rejected 
MHP’s application by a unanimous vote. In doing so, the Constitutional Court symbolically 
demonstrated that it supported EU reforms.170  
 
                                                 
170 For related coverage of the press, see: Radikal, 14 August 2002 and 5 October 2002; M. Yetkin, Radikal, 9 
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In its Progress Report on Turkey, although the EU Commission acknowledged the 
“noticeable progress towards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria” it remained silent 
about whether or when to begin the accession talks with Turkey (European Commission, 
2002: 46). The Commission criticised the lack of implementation and emphasised that there 
was still much to be achieved in regard to changing the ‘mental set’. As a response, the 
Foreign Ministry issued an official statement expressing gratitude to the EU for recognising 
Turkey’s progress, but in the same statement the Ministry criticised the report stating that the 
Commission’s recommendations were very limited in scope and Turkey would like to see 
some concrete steps being taken by the EU in the upcoming summits in Brussels and 
Copenhagen in regard to the future of EU-Turkey relations.171  
 
After the release of the progress report, there was less than a month until the elections. In 
other words, nothing much could be done in the name of the EU in this very short time 
anyway. Nevertheless, from the release of the 2002 Progress Report up until the elections, it 
was ‘self-reflection’ time for policy-makers, especially for the government and for all the EU 
related circles. All believed that the gaps in the report were the result of certain 
‘misunderstandings’ and all of the responsible institutions should take the necessary steps. 
Surprisingly, this time, it was the Secretariat General of the MGK, who declared full support 
to future EU related reforms in the progress report follow-up meetings organised by the 
Secretariat General for EU Affairs. This simply meant that compared with the drafting period, 
military related circles were now much more relaxed about the implementation of the reform 
package (Radikal, 16 October 2001). 
 
Now the plan was to prepare a report for the EU Commission to ‘correct’ the 
‘misunderstandings’. In the report, the steps that were taken for the implementation of the 
reform package that were not acknowledged by the Commission due to shortage of time 
would be explained. More importantly, policy-makers decided to assure the EU that they 
would not delay the implementation of the broadcasts in mother tongue languages to 2003 as 
stated in the Progress Report. RTÜK was already working on the possible alternatives for 
drafting “The Directive on Radio and Television Broadcasts in Different Languages and 
Dialects Traditionally Used by Turkish Citizens in their Daily Lives”, which was then the 
working title. RTÜK suggested that these broadcasts could be realised by; i) either the TRT; ii) 
or by national broadcasters; iii) or by local broadcasters. The first option was most favoured 
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by the army; the second one was not commercially viable as national broadcasters did not 
want to get involved in activities that would cost them and gain less in return. The final 
option, allowing local broadcasters carry out these broadcasts, was actually the best option that 
might help the whole reformation reach its potential. The general view was that the EU would 
be satisfied even if only the TRT carried out these broadcasts. However, when asked its view 
on the issue, the TRT stated that within the scope of the TRT Law172 it would not be possible 
to broadcast in any other language. On the other hand, the Turkish Secretary General for the 
EU Affairs suggested that RTÜK might consider the ‘French model’ and stated that all 
broadcasters whether commercial, national or regional should be given the opportunity, if they 
applied (Radikal, 15 October 2002). There was not much time left for any further discussion 
on implementation as the country was ready to host the general election.  
 
5.3.5 The Aftermath of the Elections, the Role of the AKP Government  
 
The general election held on 3 November 2002 concluded with the AKP’s victory. The 
Foreign Ministry and the Secretary General for the EU Affairs briefed AKP politicians on 
what had been done so far and what more needed to be done regarding EU related reforms. 
From the beginning AKP was very keen on pursuing the EU agenda. The most controversial 
reforms were already adopted and what was left was much easier to realise. The AKP 
government had to promote the reforms in non-political circles by establishing cooperation 
with the civil society organisations; amend the laws that are in conflict with EU reforms; ratify 
all the international agreements that were signed earlier; establish a parliamentary committee 
for the coordination of EU reforms; implement the democratic reforms, and not allow any 
incidence of torture. Erdoğan presented all these points as a list of ‘what to do first’ to 
European ambassadors in Ankara. The aim was to package all these items as a law and bring 
them to Parliament before the Copenhagen Summit in December. By doing so, as the plan 
goes, clinching a date for launching the accession talks would become possible (İ. Berkan, 
Radikal, 14 November 2002). Regarding EU conditionality on broadcasts in languages other 
than Turkish, the decision was to go for the ‘only-TRT’ option. According to the first 
directive prepared by the RTÜK, these broadcasts could not exceed forty-five minutes per 
day, four hours per week for radio broadcasts and thirty minutes per day, two hours per week 
for television broadcasts; television broadcasts would include subtitles and radio broadcasts 
would be followed by a translated programme; the content could include news, music and 
                                                 
172 Law No. 2954, The Radio and Television Law of Turkey, Official Gazette No. 18221, 14 November 1983, 
  
198 
198 
culture but not language learning. The directive neither stipulated which languages or dialects 
would be used nor whether these broadcasts would be nation wide or regional.  
 
The conclusion of the European Council Copenhagen Summit was a disappointment for 
Ankara. The Council declared the conclusion of accession talks with ten of the other 
candidates.173 However, according to the Franco-German proposal that was agreed before the 
Summit, Turkey would not be given a date before December 2004. The AKP leader Tayyip 
Erdogan criticised the EU for having double standards and the EU in return insisted on the 
necessity to see greater implementation of the reforms. However, the Summit was over and all 
the parties had to move on. The following months would bring great changes in the 
international agenda. For Turkey, Cyprus became the main issue. The international agenda was 
dominated by the ‘possible’ US military operation in Iraq, which very quickly shifted the 
debate in Turkey as well.  
 
Although the legal basis for EU related reforms was in place, there were problems with the 
implementation process. Although the first directive made the TRT responsible for these 
broadcasts, the debate on whether the TRT or the commercial broadcasters should carry out 
these broadcasts continued. Conflicting statements were being heard at every level of politics 
and the officialdom. Additionally, the battle was now mainly between the RTÜK and TRT. 
Although the TRT officials kept saying that ‘everything is ready’, a major crisis unfolded by 
mid-2003 and the broadcasts could not begin. It took almost two years for the TRT to air 
these broadcasts due to great hesitation and resistance. It was 7 June 2004 when the TRT 
finally aired its first radio and television broadcasts allowed by the legislation. This period, 
from mid-2002 up to June 2004 is further analysed in the following chapter on public service 
broadcasting in Turkey.  
 
However, in the meantime, the AKP government enacted three more reform packages to 
harmonise the domestic laws with the EU framework. In the sixth reform package, Article 4 
of the Broadcasting Law amended once again to pave the way for the commercial 
broadcasters to broadcast in other languages.174 All of these developments were strictly 
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173 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia. 
174 The sixth EU package (Law No. 4903) was first enacted in the parliament on 19 June 2002. However, it was 
vetoed by the President and the second tour discussions could only begin by mid July. As the President did not 
have a second veto right, it became law once it was published in the Official Gazette. Therefore the correct 
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monitored by the EU. The 2003 Progress Report on Turkey published in November 2003, 
despite its overall positive content, was still critical of the lack of progress in the field of 
broadcasting.  
 
The new RTÜK directive regulating broadcasts in languages other than Turkish came into 
force on 25 January 2004.175 According to the new directive, now the ‘national’ commercial 
broadcasters would be able to carry out these broadcasts, once their application was approved 
by RTÜK. Their applications required the submission of the programme proposals, daily, 
monthly and yearly schedules approved by the executive board of the organisation, related 
documentation showing that the editor-in-chief and the news staff – including the presenters 
– were eligible as stated in the RTÜK Law and other related regulations. The directive even 
stipulated on how the studio and the presenter should appear: no symbol, sign or voice except 
the ones representing the ‘Turkish Republic’ could be used. It was the General Secretary of 
the MGK, the General Staff, and the National Intelligence Service that asked for the inclusion 
of this requirement. In doing so, they aimed at preventing the possible usage of visuals for 
propaganda. 
 
The new directive was not about making these broadcasts possible, it was about the opposite. 
This was even acknowledged by the Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül who stated that he found 
the directive “very limited” (Radikal, 12 December 2003). However, Fatih Karaca, the head of 
RTÜK, insisted that the directive was not limiting as what ‘they’ meant by ‘national’ 
broadcasters in the directive included cable and satellite broadcasters as well (Radikal, 19 
Novemebr 2003). Although the directive was sent for approval to the Prime Ministry on the 
due date (18 November 2003), it was not published. The directive was sent back to the RTÜK 
and two changes were made: the title of the directive was changed176 and the statement 
“broadcasting organisations are obliged not to use any symbol, sign and voice in the studio 
design and the audio effects, except the ones that have been symbols of the Turkish Republic” 
was replaced with “are obliged not to include symbols that consist of a criminal element”. The 
rest of the scope of the directive remained the same. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
reference for the sixth package is: Law No. 4928, Law on Amending Various Laws, Official Gazette No. 25173, 19 
July 2003, Ankara. 
175 Directive on Radio and Television Broadcasts to be Made in Different Languages and Dialects Traditionally 
Used by Turkish Citizens in their Daily Lives, Official Gazette No. 25357, 25 January 2004, Ankara. 
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No commercial broadcaster applied to RTÜK. It was clear from the very beginning that none 
of the national commercial broadcasters would show any interest in broadcasting in any other 
language than Turkish. In the eyes of the commercial broadcasters, as stated earlier, it was not 
economically feasible. Broadcasters were very positive about the directive, but they were 
expressing similar concerns. In fact, although the main issue was presented in the scope of 
media economics, it was clear that the national broadcasters did not want to stick their fingers 
into the ‘bee hive’. Some of these broadcasters earlier received warning from RTÜK for 
broadcasting songs in Kurdish. The broadcasters did not have any faith in RTÜK.  
 
Despite the lack of interest on the side of the national broadcasters, local broadcasters were 
very keen on such broadcasts from the very beginning. As of mid-September 2004, four local 
broadcasters applied the RTÜK to broadcast in Kurdish.177 The regulator did not reject these 
applications straightaway, but told them to carry out the procedures as stated in the directive 
and to hand in the related documentation. Diyarbakır Bar Council took a legal step for the 
annulment of the directive on the basis of unconstitutionality since the directive did not allow 
local and regional broadcasters to carry out these broadcasts. Following the publication of the 
second directive, it filed a court case with the Council of State once again.178 Together with the 
Bar Council, the local radio and television broadcaster Gün also applied to the Council of 
State. However, the Council of State rejected both applications (Radikal, 23 October 2004). 
And RTÜK kept sanctioning some local radio stations. 
 
By the end of 2004, there was a great division between the politicians and the bureaucracy on 
the issues of broadcasting in other languages. The government was satisfied as the TRT was 
already broadcasting on radio and television in five other languages and dialects. The AKP 
government, it believed, ‘justified’ itself in the eyes of the EU. Therefore, politicians distanced 
themselves from the debate about expanding these broadcasts to regional or local 
broadcasters and leaving this issue to be handled by RTÜK. This attitude became very 
apparent after the publication of the 2004 Progress Report on 6 October 2004 and the 
Recommendation Document, which was a threshold for the government. Accordingly, the 
                                                                                                                                                    
176 When it was first published its title was “The Directive on the Language of Broadcasts”, the new title was 
“The Directive on Radio and Television Broadcasts to be made in Different Languages and Dialects Traditionally 
Used by Turkish Citizens in their Daily Lives”. 
177 These broadcasters were Gün TV, Söz TV, Aktüel Radyo ve Televizyon (ART) from Diyarbakır and Çağrı TV 
from Batman.  
178 The Diyarbakır Bar Council first applied to bring the case in front of the Council of State on the 28 January 
2003. The second application took place on the 28 January 2004. The details can be found on the Councils 
website: http://www.diyarbakirbarosu.org.tr  
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European Commission announced that Turkey had ‘fulfilled’ the political criteria and could 
begin the accession talks and was recommended to begin to the negotiations.179 The real 
confirmation came from the European leaders who agreed at the Brussels European Council 
Summit in December to begin accession talks on 3 October 2005. 
 
RTÜK did not give any response to the applicants. By August 2005 there were nine local and 
one regional broadcaster that applied to RTÜK. RTÜK kept asking the applicants to submit 
their ‘missing’ documents. However, in the meantime another very important issue was 
developing in Turkey. Prime Minister Erdoğan started articulating a ‘Kurdish issue’ in terms of 
democratisation. Intellectuals from all over the country issued a statement calling for the PKK 
to cease-fire. This was followed by a debate on ‘sub identity vs dominant identity’. The debate 
heated up very quickly and became very controversial. However, following his tour to 
Diyarbakır, Prime Minister Erdoğan asked the ‘authorities in charge’, implying RTÜK, to carry 
out the necessary preparations to expand broadcasts in languages other than Turkish to 
include local broadcasters.  
 
However, as the composition of the RTÜK Board changed by mid-July 2005, everything was 
on hold. By the end of 2005, which is also the end of the time span that this analysis covers, 
there was no progress on the issue.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
The policy process behind the change of the language policy for broadcasting in Turkey tells 
us a lot about both the EU’s approach to minority rights as a part of democratic conditionality 
and also the limits of change in Turkey in regard to EU conditionality.  
 
What we already know from the literature on Europeanisation in the CEEs that “the issue of 
minority rights is a test for the very notion of conditionality” (Sasse, 2005: 4). As Grabbe 
(2004: 319) notes, where political conditions of membership are concerned, including the 
criterion of ‘respect for and protection of minorities’, the level of uncertainty is higher when 
compared to other areas since there is no “Community competence” in these areas (also see 
Toppidi, 2003). In a similar vein, Sasse (2005: 5) argues that if Europeanisation is regarded as 
the development and institutionalisation of norms and practices in the EU before transferring 
                                                 
179 European Commission (2004), Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’;s Progress 
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them to the domestic policy contexts of the candidate states, then the conditionality of 
minority rights is problematic since there are no commonly defined norms and practices in 
this issue in the EU. The main contradiction here is that the EU relies on policy-instruments 
that are not part of the Acquis. Additionally, there is a crucial gap even in the ways in which 
Copenhagen criteria are enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. Again as Sasse (2005) 
reveals: 
 
[I]t [the Treaty of Amsterdam] incorporated all of the values set out by the EU in the 
first Copenhagen criterion in Article 6 (1) […] but expressly excluded ‘respect for 
and protection of minorities’. That Article 6 (1) draws on the Copenhagen criteria 
is specifically alluded to in Article 49, which specifies that the principles laid out in 
Article 6 (1) are preconditions for any state applying for EU membership. This 
inconsistency was addressed in a footnote in the Commission’s Regular Reports of 
2002 (Sasse, 2005: 4).180  
 
Once the internal contradictions and deficiencies in the EU on the policy tools that are used 
to justify the democratic/political conditionality on minority rights are uncovered, then it 
becomes easier to understand the shortcomings of the monitoring of compliance in the 
candidate states. Uncertainty that is built into the process of norm setting is also apparent in 
the process of monitoring compliance. The European Commission can officially monitor 
compliance of minority rights only through its progress reports. Although the overall tone of 
the progress reports have been influential in the candidate states for steering the political 
agenda according to the EU demands, compliance was limited to adaptation of new legislation 
and effective implementation of new reforms continues to be a crucial problem. This is also 
the case for Turkey. 
 
The ambiguities and uncertainties mentioned above are also apparent in the European 
Commission’s approach to minority rights in Turkey. It is very interesting to see that only the 
1998 Progress Report stated that Kurds are not recognised a ‘minority’ in Turkey. In all the 
other reports the Commission used the phrase ‘Kurdish citizens of Turkish origin’. The 
contradiction here is that although the European Commission addresses the Kurdish question 
in-detail under the sections on ‘minority rights and protection of minorities’ in every report, 
the Commission itself does no longer call Kurds as a minority in Turkey. However, as of 2000, 
the Commission became more specific in regard to its expectations from Turkey on the issues 
                                                                                                                                                    
Towards Acession, COM (2004) 0656, 6 September 2004, Brussels. 
180 In the 2002 Progress Report on Turkey, this was stated in the second footnote. 
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of minority rights. From then on, the emphasis was more on ‘cultural rights’ for “all Turks 
irrespective of their ethnic origin”.181 
 
But, of course, the deficiencies in the EU’s approach to minority rights in candidate countries, 
in this case in Turkey, cannot be used to undermine the importance of the ‘Kurdish question’ 
in Turkey. As the analysis in this chapter has revealed, EU political conditionality on minority 
rights was also a great test in terms of seeing the limits of Europeanisation in Turkey. 
Although conditionality was influential in the policy change, a ‘transformation’ that marks a 
‘paradigmatic change’ was not possible. In this case, Europeanisation was accommodated in 
the domestic policy framework, but the fundamental logic of political behaviour remained the 
same. To put it differently, the idea of broadcasting in languages other than Turkish was by no 
means seen as a reflection of a pluralistic view of society. On the contrary, concerns over 
‘national unity’ have always been prevalent.  
 
The policy-process behind the change of the language policy for broadcasting in Turkey 
confirms that historical legacies are very influential in the translation of EU pressures to 
domestic responses. In the case of the CEEs, Hughes et al. (2004: 30) persuasively argue that 
these states should not be seen as a “tabula rasa” when assessing their transition processes 
since “the legacy of the old regime will continue to loom large over the transition process”. 
This is also valid for Turkey. It might even be argued that the situation in Turkey is more 
complex since what EU accession meant for the CEEs was dismantling their communist 
regimes; however, Turkey is liberal democracy, no matter how it functions. Yet, in both 
contexts the resistance to change occurred in similar groups. In Turkey, outside the realm of 
formal politics, it was the nationalist-right and left wings as well as the high ranking cadres of 
the army that disputed the change in the language policy for broadcasting. For these groups, 
EU conditionality on cultural rights targeted transforming one of the basic characters of the 
Turkish state: ethnic homogeneity. They disputed granting broadcasting rights to ethnic 
communities, especially to the Kurdish population, on the grounds that granting these rights 
without any restrictions would result in the politicisation of separatist movements. As it has 
been explained in this chapter, throughout the whole process, debates on ‘national interest’ 
and ‘national security’ dominated the agenda. On the other hand, the ways in which the short-
lived DSP-MHP-ANAP tripartite coalition handled EU pressures on political conditionality 
offers a very interesting case since both conservative and reformist policy agendas were 
                                                 
181 2000 Progress Report, pp. 18, 19, 21, 72. 
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reflected during the governance of this coalition. These three parties represented a different 
electoral base and were supported by different sets of political as well as non-political 
institutions. In general terms, the army’s view on cultural rights was fed into government 
through the DSP, whereas the ANAP’s approach was in line with the views of the business 
corporations and pro-reform circles, and finally the MHP’s approach reflected the nationalist-
conservative line of argument. However, it would be misleading to think that the discursive 
borders between these parties were clear-cut at all times. As the analysis has revealed, their 
interests overlapped and they were all involved in very complex bargaining processes. 
 
The struggle between the AKP government and the old establishment was different. On the 
issues of cultural rights, the AKP’s approach to policy was based more on problem-solving 
rather than confrontation. However, the AKP government could not eliminate the army’s 
influence on how EU conditionality on cultural rights would be handled. The contours of the 
policy were mostly sketched before the AKP came into office and the army was directly 
involved in this earlier decision-making process. Additionally, the AKP as a very fresh and 
also inexperienced government would not antagonise the army. In this respect, in the later 
stages, the clash between different actor constellations on the issues of cultural rights did not 
occur at the policy-making level, but it unfolded at the implementation level.  
 
This chapter has also confirmed once again the weaknesses of the RTÜK as the regulatory 
authority for broadcasting due to its highly politicised institutional structure. The RTÜK could 
not distance itself from day-to-day politics and act as a ‘policy entrepreneur’. On the contrary, 
it even took a political side that was in favour of the status-quo. The then head of the RTÜK 
Nuri Kayış publicly contested the legitimacy of EU conditionality by disputing the reforms on 
cultural rights. His successor Fatih Karaca’s approach was much more balanced, but the 
RTÜK’s involvement in the debate during the policy-making phase was limited to transferring 
technical knowledge to policy-makers. However, as has been discussed in this chapter, the 
dynamics were different during the implementation phase of the policy. The dispute between 
the TRT and RTÜK on the implementation, which is further analysed in the next chapter, left 
RTÜK in a very awkward position as the regulator. After this dispute, the RTÜK was caught 
up between the AKP government pragmatic approach to policy and the ‘national security’ 
constraints imposed by the army. The process behind the drafting of the second directive as 
explained above in the chapter revealed this tension.  
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What has not been fully covered in this chapter is the Turkish public broadcaster TRT’s 
involvement in the process. The TRT’s foot-dragging to carry out these broadcasts and its 
dispute with the RTÜK on the issue tells us a lot about the nature of public service 
broadcasting in Turkey. However, the TRT’s response to EU conditionality on cultural rights 
can only be fully understood if it is analysed in relation to the TRT’s institutional context. 
Clearly, this institutional context cannot be seen in isolation from the ways in which the TRT 
is organised, managed and financed. All of these issues are thoroughly assessed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 6: 
PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING IN TURKEY: 
RETHINKING EUROPEAN QUESTIONS, FACING DOMESTIC CHALLENGES 
 
 
 
Only strong public television organizations can be 
expected to serve the public interest ‘from inside’: giving 
priority to the vulnerable values at stake in how 
broadcasting performs; and treating them, not as just 
imposed requirements for obligatory or token 
conformity, nor just as instrumentally as means to 
audience maximization, but as ends in themselves 
(Blumler and Hoffmann-Riem, 1992: 2002).  
 
 
 
6.1 The Context 
 
This final chapter looks into certain policy issues on the organisation, management, financing 
and the culture of public service broadcasting (PSB) in Turkey.182 However, in contrast to the 
preceding chapters, here the dynamics of the Turkish PSB system are assessed in relation to 
the debates on the PSB in Europe, rather than pursuing direct links between Turkey and the 
EU. The reason for this is very simple: apart from the influence of change in language policy 
of broadcasting in Turkey in respect to conditionality of its membership, there is not any 
evident link between Europeanisation and policies generated to regulate public broadcasting 
following the Helsinki Summit in 1999. However, the challenges that the Turkish Radio 
Television Corporation (TRT) has been facing since the early 1990s correspond to what 
European public broadcasters have been going through since the 1980s. Despite the 
supremacy of domestic policy concerns in regulating PSB in different European states, there is 
an evident increase in the EU’s influence on broadcasting polices of its member states through 
a combination of direct and indirect policy instruments. As it is further highlighted, the 
regulation of PSB in member states is also not exempt from this process of Europeanisation. 
Therefore, if Turkey does not cut off from the candidacy process in the following years, it will 
be subjected to the processes of ‘policy transfer’ and ‘policy learning’ as a consequence of its 
interaction with different institutions of the EU as well as other member states. In this respect,  
 
                                                 
182 The financial figures used in this chapter are gathered from numerous parliamentary reports, auditing 
documents, parliamentary enquiries and material published by the TRT. 
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all the current debates on PSB at the EU level will soon be directly relevant to the policy 
debates that will emerge in Turkey.  
 
The Turkish case is in fact very different when compared to the earlier conditions of the 
accession states of Central and East European (CEEs) as well as to other candidate countries. 
As it has been widely expressed by scholars involved in European enlargement, establishing an 
independent and well-functioning public service broadcaster in the CEEs was integral to the 
EU’s integration strategy framework in the 1990s. We know from the burgeoning literature on 
the transformation of media systems in the CEEs that establishing European-modelled PSB 
organisations was actually a very troubled process, which failed in many ways. As Jakubowitz 
(2002: 55) argues, in the context of the CEEs, what failed was the “imitation and indeed 
transplantation of foreign patterns and arrangements”, which were “part of the top-down 
social engineering element of transformation”. Harcourt (2003: 316) neatly portrays, how not 
only the EU but also the US experts and actors were involved in the processes of 
‘transplantation’ of regulatory framework for media markets of the CEEs, which turned out to 
be a “battle of the models”. As she puts it, what was promoted in the European model was 
the importance of ‘plurality’, ‘diversity’, ‘editorial independence’ etc., which were thought to be 
achieved best with the establishment of a public service broadcaster, whilst the American 
model gave greater emphasis to the functioning of the commercial market for the achievement 
of the same ‘ideals’ (Harcourt, 2003). Nevertheless, this was an important battle since it was 
the first time that a ‘European’ template for broadcasting, which embraced the core notions of 
PSB, was presented to the candidate states in the framework of enlargement. The debates 
centring on the problems of implementation of this template inevitably reflect the tensions 
surrounding the condition of PSB in Europe since the late 1980s.  
 
Where Turkey is concerned, it is very important to distinguish the institutional setting of its 
broadcasting from those of the CEEs before accession. Neither PSB nor commercial media 
are novel concepts in Turkey. As portrayed in the earlier chapters, what is seen in Turkey from 
an outset is a vivid media market, functioning in its own right and facing some major 
challenges. These challenges did not surface in the context of Turkey’s quest for EU 
membership. The transition of West European television markets from the late 1980s 
onwards, which was comprehensively analysed by Dyson and Humphreys (1988 and 1990); 
Negrine and Papathanassopoulos (1990); Siune and Truetzschler (1992); Blumler (1992), and 
Humphreys (1996) also resonated in Turkey in the course of early 1990s. Therefore, from the 
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EU’s perspective, PSB in Turkey has not been a policy area that needs to be first introduced 
and then Europeanised as in the case of the accession states. On the other hand, the cultural 
and institutional context of PSB in Turkey has most of the drawbacks of the current PSB 
systems in the CEEs that emerged after Europeanisation, the most important being its lack of 
“social embeddedness and the right democratic context in which to operate” (Jakubowitz, 
2002: 55). Public broadcasting in the CEEs is no longer run purely by the state, but they are 
still not accountable to the society as much as was desired by the EU. This in-betweeness for 
the institutionalisation of the broadcasting culture has also been correct for the TRT. 
Therefore, it is not strange to see that the progress reports from 1998 to 2005 contained no 
significant emphasis on the functioning of PSB, except the faults in the areas of implementing 
the policy change in the language of broadcasts. It can be well argued that the EU simply took 
PSB in Turkey at face-value. However, the recent Progress Report, published on 8 November 
2006, hints at a change for the very first time in the EU’s perspective towards the condition of 
PSB in Turkey. Similar to all preceding ones, the 2006 report also confirms the lack of 
satisfactory alignment in media and audio-visual policy in Turkey, but this time the European 
Commission expresses its concern related to PSB as well as the regulation of broadcasting in 
general in Turkey: “[T]he issue of the independence, including adequate funding, of the Public 
Service Broadcaster TRT, and the Radio and Television Higher Council (RTÜK) remains a 
matter of concern.” (European Commission, 2006: 43). Although this concern is not taken 
any further in the final report, it is important to see that the EU has started recognising the 
real problems underlying the functioning of PSB in Turkey.  
  
Within this framework, the dynamics of PSB in Turkey are going to be the focus of this 
chapter. However, before going into the analysis of particular policy problems, I’ll first shortly 
discuss certain aspects of what Tracey (1998: 259) calls the “narrative history of public 
broadcasting”. Under the same section, I am going to link this discussion to the ways in which 
various issues on PSB are pooled into the supranational agenda of the EU to highlight the 
Europeanised elements of the overall debate. By doing so, I aim at developing a reference 
framework so that I can discuss the peculiarities of the Turkish case and highlight the 
underlying aspects of various policy issues in the context of the differences as well as the 
similarities they hold, which is the section that follows the discussion on the EU’s 
involvement in the regulation of PSB in Europe. In this section specific attention is given to 
the implications of ‘autonomy’ of the public broadcaster in the Turkish context, in political as 
well as financial terms. Both the approaches of the policy-makers to regulatory issues 
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concerning public broadcasting and the ways in which the TRT operates in this regulatory 
framework are directly related to how the notion of autonomy is perceived in Turkey. 
Therefore, the discussion offered in this chapter is significant in following the analysis of the 
issues that emerged from 1999 to 2005. These issues are concerned with the restructuring of 
the TRT; the never ending Director General (DG) crises in the Corporation; the state 
subsidiaries, and the TRT’s involvement in the process of implementing EU conditionality on 
cultural rights in Turkey. The chapter concludes with a final discussion of the conditions of 
PSB in Turkey in the context of pre-accession to the EU.  
 
6.2 Defining Public Service Broadcasting and the Involvement of the EU 
6.2.1 Echoes from the Past  
 
For almost three decades there has been an ongoing debate on how to define public service 
broadcasting and how to make this definition serve for the survival of public service 
broadcasters striving to adjust to forces of commercialisation, competition, growth of new 
technologies and audience fragmentation. In this respect, there has always been an inherent 
tension between the descriptions of what actually existed and the debates on how things 
should actually be. Collins (1998: 53), for instance, looking back at the debates in the 1990s on 
PSB, argues that there has been a distinction between ‘inductive’ and ‘deductive’ approaches 
and “inductivists have been concerned with the actual historical practice of public service 
broadcasters, whereas deductivists have focused on a theoretical ideal of public service 
broadcasting”. Although this is a valid distinction, to look into these debates from a different 
perspective by following Tracey’s (1998: 277) analogy of a ‘Russian Matryoshka doll’, which he 
uses to suggest that “any narrative of the contemporary condition of public broadcasting 
becomes an unfolding of plots within plots” is far more captivating.  
 
Tracey’s simple analogy very effectively leads us to question whether distinguishing what 
Collins (1998: 54) calls an “analytical distinction” between the public service broadcasters and 
public service broadcasting is possible or not. As Humphreys (1996: 111) warns us, different 
political contexts of history, culture and politics provide an important reference for the 
explanation of differences in practice. For that reason, any inquiry that links a particular 
institutional setting of broadcasting to a broader polity that it operates within certainly requires 
debating various cultural and political meanings attributed to broadcasting as well as 
normative reflections on good governance, citizenship, democracy, cultural life, etc. 
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Additionally, emphasising this linkage between the so-called “worlds of things” and “the 
worlds of ideas” is particularly important for policy oriented research. As Kejanlıoğlu (2004: 
189) points out, any research that intends to analyse policy, inevitably includes an element of 
‘policy advocacy’ since it is based on values just like any other research.  
 
In this respect, what is striking in the earlier debates on PSB is more about what can be 
identified as ‘the conditions of reasoning’. There are some important points that emerge from 
these debates carried out in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, which are relevant to the recent 
debates in various ways. The first point is related to how the approach towards the conditions 
of PSB shifted in critical research when compared to the earlier academic debates and how 
‘neo-liberal rhetoric’ started adopting a similar language from the late 1980s onwards. In his 
very controversial article published in the course of changes in the organisation and regulation 
of the media markets, Burgelman (1986: 173) argues that researchers who came to support 
PSB from the threats of liberalisation and deregulation were in fact very critical about the 
same institution in terms of its relation to the state before these threats emerged. A similar 
remark was also made by Barnett and Docherty (1991: 23) who suggest that although there 
has been a greater belief in the public-service ethos, earlier debates were different in terms of 
their “connotations of nineteenth-century paternalism, more reminiscent of government 
bureaucracy than individual altruism”. Interestingly, criticisms put forward against public 
service broadcasters until the 1980s, were later vocalised by market-liberalisers. However, in 
the early 1990s, critical research on PSB diverted from an inquiry into the nature of the 
relationship between the state(s) and the broadcaster(s), to a more normative level that focuses 
on the relationship between the broadcaster and the society/audience that it addresses. This 
shift in focus should also be considered in the context of the increasing prevalence of  
Habermasian thinking in social research in the early 1990s, especially the notion of ‘public 
sphere’, which influenced much of the work on PSB (Dahlgren, 2004: 15). On the other hand, 
in recent years, this Habermasian framework has also been under increasing criticism and so has 
research on PSB that has drawn on it,183 but the notion of ‘public sphere’ is still very much 
used in policy rhetoric both in domestic and EU levels. Therefore, it is important to 
understand the shifts in focus in the debates on PSB from the 1980s onwards within its own 
historicity before situating the policy rhetoric on the PSB in today’s context.  
                                                 
183 For instance, as known by scholars involved in this debate, this Habermasian framework was very much in the 
centre of the seminal works of Garnham (1986, 1994), who was very influential in the establishment of this new 
research agenda. For a very interesting critique of his earlier research and his response to it, see: Jacka (2003), and 
Garnham (2003).  
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The second point emerging from the earlier debates is the increasing importance of policy 
oriented research in analysing West European media markets in the last two decades. The 
broadcasting regulatory regime in majority of West European states was relatively stable for 
almost four decades and was very much based on the notions of the ‘welfare state’ model of 
liberal democracy. However, in the course of the 1980s, this model was in flux and much 
sought after “new communications policy paradigm” required a more complex understanding 
of politics, economy and culture (for this periodisation, see van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 
1998). It was mostly political scientists who filled this gap by looking into the dynamics of 
change in public regulation and the role of the states in regulating media markets in Europe. 
Within this canon, the research focus has now shifted to the dynamics of supranational and 
intergovernmental policy-making on the national policy agendas. It is very interesting to 
observe how policy oriented research moved from a quite descriptive research design to a very 
sophisticated one over two decades. Recent research on broadcasting policy in Europe today 
deals with very important political questions on how various institutions of the EU operate to 
foster a policy agenda for an EU level broadcasting regulation for more political as well as 
economic integration. As it is highlighted in the following section, this body of work is very 
important for understanding the current debates on the conditions and the future of PSB in 
Europe.  
 
And the final point on the relevance of the past debates to the recent ones is about the 
‘timing’ and the ‘overarching theme’ of the debates. In retrospect, one can see that the ever 
continuing quest for a definition of PSB in different political circles is in fact all about 
justifying/defying its privileged funding and academic research inevitably starts from this 
pro/anti stance. As witnesses of the changes in the course of 1990s, Barnett and Docherty 
(1991: 24) note that what triggered the debate on the conditions of PSB was the increase in 
the number of public inquiries initiated by West European governments as well in countries 
such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand on the future of their PSB systems, especially on 
the alternative methods of funding. Therefore, for instance, in Britain, it was not a coincidence 
that the academic debate sparked off following the conclusions of the Peacock Committee on 
the future funding of the BBC and the publication of the study of the Broadcasting Research 
Unit (BRU) in 1986. BRU defined the principles of PSB as: geographic universality; 
universality of appeal; catering for minorities; recognition of national identity and community; 
distance from the state and the market; universality of payment; competition in good 
programming rather than in ratings, and liberating programme makers. This British-focused 
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concept was later challenged and re-contextualised by scholars such as Blumler (1992) and 
Brants and Siune (1992) to provide an encompassing model for the West European model. 
Their interpretations were then challenged by scholars such as Syversten (1999) and Ward 
(2002) for not being able to provide adequate frameworks for accounting for the national 
variations of practice and regulation.  
 
In this respect, it is hardly surprising that the current debate on how to define PSB in a 
digitalised communications environment is actually a response to the emerging policies on 
how to regulate digital switchover. Again in the case of Britain for instance, it is very 
important to see how the government’s policy target to complete digital switchover by 2012 
dominated the debates on the recent licence fee settlement between the BBC and the 
government. Clearly, how to fund public broadcasters once the digital switchover is completed 
is one of today’s core debates of policy in many other European countries as well. In these 
debates one can see that same definitions and concepts are vocalised again, but what is 
different today is that the dichotomy of citizen vs consumer, which dominated the debates in 
the 1990s, is no longer the major argumentative line that divides the commercial lobby from 
public service advocates. For instance, as Karpinnen (2005: 2) puts it, ‘pluralism’ and 
‘diversity’ which have been the core concepts of media policy are now more forcefully used by 
both sides and very interestingly “it seems that the discourse of consumer choice has become 
prevalent enough to force the defenders of public service to increasingly adapt it too” (ibid., 
7). On the other hand, what is striking is that the EU’s involvement in the regulation of media 
markets in Europe intensifies this relocation (or dislocation) of definitional and normative 
concepts on what constitutes ‘public service’ in broadcasting. To put simply, none of these 
debates are solely domestic debates any longer and the EU’s influence on domestic policy 
agendas for the regulation of the PSB is increasingly becoming more relevant.  
 
6.2.2 The EU’s Involvement in the Debates on PSB in Europe 
 
a) The Battle Between Actors 
 
The EU’s involvement in the regulation of the media markets in Europe has been one of the 
most contentious debates of recent years. At first sight, there seems to be a contradiction 
between different studies that see the EU primarily having an economic, ‘deregulatory’ agenda 
for the media markets and others attributing a socio-cultural and political, ‘re-regulatory’ role 
beyond its economic imperatives. It is true that as long as we see the EU as a monolithic bloc, 
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we can easily find empirical evidence for these arguments. However, once we see the EU as an 
‘arena’ for/of policy, different realities start to emerge. As various commentators suggest 
(Hitchens, 1997; Collins, 1998; Levy, 1997), what makes media policy a very complex issue in 
the EU is the existence of competing policy goals (between fostering Single Market initiatives 
and promoting pluralism and diversity); competing policy instruments (between liberalisng and 
protective measures), and finally competing powers of struggle (between the institutions of the 
EU as well as between the states and the EU). Therefore, the Community rhetoric about PSB 
cannot be regarded in isolation from these debates. 
 
The debates on PSB in the EU have been carried out primarily on two axes. The first of these 
axes is directly related to European governance and the role of the media in fostering a more 
democratic polity in Europe. The EU has been the centre of criticism due to its lack of 
accountable and democratically elected institutions of governance as well as due to the gap 
between its governing institutions and the citizens, which is referred to as the “democratic 
deficit” (Ward, 2002: 1). Thus, as Collins (1994: 23) puts it, “[t]he achievement of the 
Community’s political goals are widely perceived to depend on changes in European culture and 
consciousness, and here the European audio-visual industries assume a central role” (emphasis 
added). The EU gained this required cultural competence once the Maastricht Treaty came 
into force in 1993. In this respect, it is not a coincidence that EU policy-makers in the early 
1990s adopted much of the rhetoric used in academic as well journalistic circles about the 
formation of the ‘public sphere’ and the particular role that PSB was assumed to have in this 
process (Harrison and Woods, 2001: 480).  
 
On the other hand, the second axis of the PSB debate in the EU centres on the increasing 
involvement of various institutions of the EU in setting a European-level regulatory 
framework for media markets of Europe, including the public sector of broadcasting. In the 
late 1980s there were in fact two parallel processes evident in the EU. On one hand, there was 
a policy agenda promoted specifically by the European Parliament to establish a pan-
European channel that would emphasise ‘unity’ and support European content production to 
protect the European audio-visual industry from the increasing threats of commercialisation 
and Americanisation of content (for this debate see, Collins, 1994; Humphreys, 1996; 
Wheeler, 2004). As Levy (1999: 41) suggests, this “dirigiste agenda” was also supported by the 
Audio-visual Directorate, the film industry, independent producers and majority of the public 
service broadcasters. On the other hand, there was an increasing push towards market 
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liberalisation in accordance with the targeted completion of the Single Market by 1992. The 
European audio-visual industry was seen as losing its strength vis-à-vis the American 
competition and harmonisation of national media regulations to allow free movement of 
television services was seen as crucial to boost the industry (Humphreys, 1996). The ‘policy 
entrepreneur’ behind this liberal agenda was the European Commission and its economic 
imperatives were supported by the Internal Market Directorate, the Telecommunications and 
Information Society Directorate, the commercial broadcasters and advertisers. In this respect, 
the TWF Directive was designed to create this much sought after single audio-visual market in 
Europe. However, as commentators suggest, the period between the publication of the Green 
Paper TWF in 1984 to the adoption of the TWF Directive in 1989 was in fact very significant 
in terms of the ways in which all the above mentioned EU institutions as well as the member 
states, the media groups and the advertising industry tried to exert influence on policy 
(Harcourt, 2005; Levy, 2002). As a matter of fact, what surfaced in the drafting of the TWF 
Directive was the multi-layered dynamics between the supra-national and intergovernmental 
aspects of the EU. During the process, neither the supporters of liberal/deregulatory nor 
interventionist/dirigiste approaches managed to exert full influence, but they all bargained as 
well as negotiated on various issues. Similar struggles over policy were also evident in the 
subsequent policy initiatives on regulating media ownership, competition and convergence 
(see, Humphreys, 1996; Harcourt 1998, Harcourt, 2004). 
 
Following the adoption of the TWF Directive, the supporters of PSB criticised the EU for 
undermining the public service ethos by prioritising economic goals before cultural ones. 
Venturelli (1998: 226), for instance, argues that “[t]he decline of public-service broadcasting 
[…] is linked directly to the liberalization environment created by the television directive”. 
However, recent analyses of policy-making in the EU, which particularly focus on European 
level broadcasting policy initiatives since the 1980s, offer us a different picture on the nature 
of the problem. As Humphreys (2006: 306) points out, broadcasting is a very challenging 
sector to subject to EU level positive regulation (market-correcting and re-regulatory) since it 
is still seen in the competence of the national governments due to its politically sensitive 
character, which makes it harder to reach an intergovernmental agreement in the EU level. 
Therefore, as Harcourt (2005: 2) portrays, the EU uses a combination of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ laws 
to foster its policy agenda for more EU level policy convergence. In a similar vein, 
Humphreys (2006: 310) also draws attention to how EU institutions utilise “coercive” and 
“voluntary” transfer of policy to push its EU level regulatory agenda. Accordingly, coercive 
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policy transfer stem from the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the 
Competition DG as well as the EU Directives, whilst voluntary transfer occurs as the result of 
interaction between ‘policy networks’ and ‘epistemic communities’ as well as benchmarking 
and target-setting in policy debates. However, the problem with the EU institutions, according 
to Harcourt (2005: 2), is their reliance “on a policy framework dependent upon technocratic 
solutions to policy problems based upon economic arguments”. In the case of the TWF 
Directive, for instance, since the policy was developed as a Single Market initiative, it had to 
be justified on economic grounds, which made the negotiations in the name of public interest 
much harder to press (Harcourt, 2005: 65). On the other hand, the earlier rulings of the EJC 
that confirmed broadcasting as a ‘tradable service’ had a great impact on how the European 
Commission framed this economic rhetoric and justified its position to regulate the European 
media market. Therefore, much earlier than the European Commission’s push towards more 
market integration for broadcasting, it was in fact the ECJ that influenced the direction of the 
European audio-visual policy framework (Harcourt, 2005: 23; Ward, 2002: 57). The EJC did 
not only justify the EU’s involvement in broadcasting regulation of its member states, but it 
also altered the ‘cultural paradigm’ underpinning the main policy approach to broadcasting in 
the member states by rejecting the view that public broadcasters should be treated differently. 
However, as Harcourt (2005: 38) concludes, on the issue of the funding of PSB, the Court was 
much more cautious in not exposing a definitive approach. As a consequence, the European 
Commission, more specifically its Competition Directorate, became more influential in 
steering the agenda.  
 
b) Issues on Funding the Public Broadcasting Sector in the EU  
 
Considering that the EU did not have any policy competence in mandating cultural matters of 
the member states before the enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, it is explicable 
why various EU institutions based their earlier rulings or policy frameworks on economic but 
not cultural grounds. However, it was this economic rhetoric that made the organisation of 
PSB more difficult to sustain in relation to what competition indicates in the context of the 
Single Market. In the mid-1990s, the key question was whether the funding arrangements for 
public service broadcasters could have been justified within the EU. The powerful media 
groups started objecting to the privileged status of public broadcasters, especially of those 
which receive ‘mixed’ funding, by filing complaints to the European Commission (for these 
complaints, see Ward, 2002: 97-102 and Smith, 2001). As commentators suggest, the long-
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term goal of the commercial media in pursuing these complaints was to push the policy-
makers to define PSB in such a restricted way that only a few broadcasters are financed by 
public revenues to fulfil strictly imposed mandates so that commercial revenues could be 
shared by commercial media only and PSB could be marginalised (Smith, 2001; Barnett, 2006; 
and for a commentary that supports this line of argument, see Collins, 1998b).  
 
However, the European Commission had difficulties in responding to these complaints and 
the cases became pending. The Competition DG’s earlier efforts to open these cases to debate 
by circulating a report drafting the possible guidelines on funding broadcasting did not reach a 
conclusion in 1995 (Levy, 1999: 96). In the late 1990s, some new cases emerged and some of 
these complaints came back. Member states finally managed to agree on an initial approach to 
clarify the scope of funding of the PS broadcasters according to the principles laid out in the 
‘Amsterdam Protocol’ annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Accordingly, it was 
confirmed that “[f]unding is granted to broadcasting organisations for the fulfilment of the 
public service remit as conferred, defined and organised by each Member State, and insofar as 
such funding does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Community”. 
However, the Protocol produced more confusion on the side of the public broadcasters as 
well as the Competition DG. In the case of the broadcasters, although the competence of the 
member states was seen as primary in determining the scope and the funding of PSB, the EU 
still asserted its competence by urging public broadcasters to distinguish their activities from 
their commercial counterparts and be transparent in spending the public money (Coppens and 
Saeys, 2006: 266). On the other hand, for the Competition DG, there was still the problem of 
how to apply the EU level competition regulations to resolve the ongoing complaints on the 
funding of various public broadcasters, especially those having mixed revenues.  
 
The Competition DG attempted one last time in 1998 to pursue an EU level approach to the 
issue by circulating a policy discussion paper outlining possible options for funding PSB in 
Europe. The first model, which was preferred by the DG itself, was based on the BBC model 
imposing a clear distinction between the public and commercial broadcasting sectors. The 
second model was a dual funding model allowing public broadcasters to benefit from state 
subsidies as well as to collect commercial revenues, but required the imposition of certain 
content obligations. And finally, the third model was based on the establishment of a kind of 
‘public fund’, whereby funding would be allocated to both public and commercial 
broadcasters on the basis of their offers (see Ward 2002: 103-5). The most contentious parts 
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in the discussion paper were related to the Competition DG’s suggestions on the obligations 
of public broadcasters and the limits of their commercial activities for those having dual 
funding. Accordingly, the DG proposed imposing stricter obligations on these public 
broadcasters, including more thorough content requirements, and urged them to set up a 
transparent accounting system to distinguish their commercial activities from their public 
service output (see Ward, 2003).  
 
The Competition Directorate’s policy paper met with hostility from the member states, who 
wanted to preserve their policy competence in the financing of their public broadcasters. 
Additionally, the European Commission distanced itself from the proposals, which 
consequently resulted in the withdrawal of the discussion paper. Under the pressure of the 
member states, rather than developing a coherent EU level policy framework, the 
Commission decided to continue examining the complaints on a case-by-case basis in the 
framework of Article 90(2) of the Treaty.184 Therefore, as Smith (2001: 8) puts it, “[i]t thus 
seems probable that future attempts to escape from the impasse will involve less contentious 
forms of regulatory supervision, focusing on the need for analytical accounting and financial 
transparency rather than further elaboration of the public service remit”. This was also evident 
in the Commission’s decision in 2001 on the application of state aid rules to broadcasting. 
Although the Commission confirmed the social significance of the PSB in member states, it 
still asserted its influence over the member states by defining the conditions that should be 
fulfilled. According to this new framework, member states are now expected to ‘officially’ 
define the tasks they enforce on their PSBs; assess whether these task are realised and be 
proportionate on how public funding is allocated to the PSBs so that the market players are 
not disadvantaged (Coppens and Saeys, 2006: 267). The policy-process behind the new BBC 
Charter in the UK offers a very interesting case to see how these concerns are translated in the 
national level of policy-making. However, much less obvious is the significance of all the 
issues covered in the context of a non-member country, Turkey.  
 
Clearly, Turkey was not directly involved with these debates as was the case of the member 
states. Yet, as stated earlier, Turkey went through similar processes simultaneously with its 
West European counterparts. Additionally, Turkey indirectly took part in these debates both 
                                                 
184 Article 90 (2) stipulates “Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or 
having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this treaty, in 
particular to the rules on competition, insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, 
in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such 
an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community.” 
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as a member of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and also through the international 
networking activities of its broadcasting regulator RTÜK. As is illustrated below, there have 
been many commonalities between the Turkish and European experiences. Therefore, once 
these commonalities are revealed, the reverberations of the policy debates in the EU on the 
current conditions of the PSB in Turkey become more apparent.  
 
6.3 Framing the Turkish Experience: Public Service Broadcasting in Turkey 
 
Very similar to the processes experienced in many West European countries, the breakdown 
of the monopoly of the Turkish public broadcaster TRT in 1990 was one of the many 
outcomes of the processes of the reorganisation of the economy, the rise of the market-driven 
politics, the introduction of new technologies and the transformation of the social and cultural 
spheres from the mid-1980s onwards. However, what was experienced differently in Turkey 
was the TRT’s incompetence to respond to these changes until the late 1990s and the lack of 
debate on the conditions of PSB in Turkey, let alone any apparent social concern about the 
demise of ‘vulnerable values’ in broadcasting. In the midst of increasing audience 
fragmentation and decreasing advertising revenues, the TRT continued to expand its 
broadcasting operations since the general state policy framework obliged the state broadcaster 
to introduce new services on education, culture and international broadcasts (Kejanlıoğlu, 
2004: 380). The problem was that no strategic planning was tied in with this expansion. As of 
1992, there were six TV channels and four radio stations under the TRT’s broadcasting 
network, which had to compete with six commercial TV and dozens of radio stations, and 
many others were ready to proliferate (Şahin and Aksoy, 1993). However, as Çelenk (2005: 
128) observes, from the introduction of first private TV channel in 1990 to the end of 1992, 
there was no indication of change in the TRT’s programming output as a response to 
competition. According to Çelenk, this might either be due to the TRT’s lack of vision in 
foreseeing how quickly new entrants might flourish in this newly emerging broadcasting 
market, or might be related to the TRT’s self-identification in the midst of these changes that 
assumed no need for any change in its position since the TRT’s revenues did not rely on 
advertising (ibid., 129). Yet, the sharp decline in advertising revenues became a very serious 
problem in a very short time, in the course of 1994. The reason why the financial crisis 
influenced the TRT so severely was due to its lack of financial autonomy, which gradually 
obliged the organisation to compete with its rivals for more commercial revenues 
(Kejanlıoğlu, 2004: 381). And of course, lacking financial autonomy meant also lacking 
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political autonomy, which coupled together made the TRT’s accountability to the public more 
problematic. These problems did not emerge due to the introduction of commercial TV, as 
noted earlier, they existed for decades. The transformation of the broadcasting market in the 
1990s just made these problems more visible and acute. Therefore, the welcoming of 
commercial TV in Turkey with great enthusiasm was no surprise. There was in fact no room 
for the TRT to manoeuvre in the midst of these changes as it did not have any political and 
financial autonomy to do so. As Kejanlıoğlu (2004: 372) points out, during the period from 
1991 to 1994, which was significant in the transformation of broadcasting market in Turkey, 
the majority of the debates about the condition of the TRT continued to be about the 
tensions in the management level of the organisation and the discontentment of various 
political circles with the TRT’s programme output. In short, the TRT’s future was no matter 
of concern in political circles and kept attracting the same criticisms and attacks.  
 
The first four years following the introduction of commercial broadcasting in 1990 were 
chaotic. Until July 1993, the TRT awkwardly retained the state monopoly in broadcasting 
granted to it by the constitution despite the mushrooming of commercial stations one after 
another. After years of political dispute, the TRT’s legal situation finally became clear 
following the amendment to the related article of the constitution. The amendment was 
significant in terms of legalising commercial broadcasting, but it was also significant in 
granting back the TRT an ‘autonomous’ status, which was abrogated in 1971, following the 
second military intervention. However, the constitutional autonomy was an important but not 
a sufficient step. This autonomy had to be translated into operational provisions in the TRT 
Law, which was the main legal framework that governed the operations of the TRT. 
Unfortunately, it never happened.  
 
The Broadcasting Law, which came into force almost a year after the constitutional 
amendment, strangely enough incorporated provisions on the TRT, although it was originally 
designed to regulate the commercial broadcasting sector. Firstly, the TRT was obliged to 
comply with the broadcasting standards outlined in the law. Secondly, together with the 
commercial broadcasters, the TRT was also obliged to allocate 5 per cent of its annual gross 
advertising revenues to finance the Supreme Council (RTÜK). Finally, and most importantly, 
the Broadcasting Law granted exclusive rights to RTÜK in relation to the appointment of the 
Director General and Board of Directors as well as the conditions for their dismissal. 
Accordingly, if the TRT violated the broadcasting standards stated in the Law, RTÜK would 
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first warn the TRT and if its broadcasts need to be suspended, the term of duty of Director 
General and Board of Directors would automatically end (see Aziz, 1993: 65-6). Although the 
1993 constitutional amendment granted autonomy to the TRT, the subsequent regulatory 
framework adopted a year later made it impossible to exercise.  
 
During the second half of the 1990s, what the competition meant for the TRT was not only 
related to the sharp decline in advertising revenues and loss of the audience; the TRT started 
losing its skilled personnel as well. Commercial broadcasters headhunted the majority of 
qualified TRT staff with enormous salary offers. As might be expected, this personnel 
‘draining’ of the TRT had influenced the TRT’s programme output very negatively (Çaplı, 
1997; Çaplı and Tuncel, 2005: 1562). Under this picture, restructuring was inevitable for the 
TRT. In 1998, the TRT management commissioned McKinsey & Company to develop a new 
organisational structure. After four months of research and investigation within the TRT, 
McKinsey & Company prepared a report on the initial steps to be taken for restructuring the 
organisation. McKinsey & Company concluded that the TRT should: i) replace its bureaucratic 
governance structure with and institutional one that is less hierarchic; ii) down-size its 
personnel and the scope of its operations; ii) improve the identity of its channels; iii) adopt an 
adequate cost and performance analysis system; iv) increase productivity and efficiency by 
adopting an “internal market model”, and v) plan ahead for the digital switch-over.185 It was 
Yücel Yener, the then Director General of the TRT, who initiated the restructuring 
programme and pushed it forward. However, Yener could get enough support from neither 
the political circles nor from the TRT’s personnel. In a very short time the restructuring 
programme turned out to be a project applied with a top-to-bottom approach despite 
increasing internal resistance. Additionally, the financial cost of the project became the target 
of the political circles. Since no change was made in the TRT Law in relation to the 
requirements of the restructuring programme, no progress could be made. Following Yücel 
Yener’s resignation in 2003, the TRT was dragged into very severe management crisis. For the 
AKP government, which was in office for less than a year, the management of the TRT 
became a serious problem and by the end of 2005 it was still so.  
 
Regulations on the TRT in the Broadcasting Law were later amended in 2002 due to different 
reasons as it is further analysed in this chapter. However, no significant improvement in the 
status of the TRT was made. On the contrary, policy-makers kept demanding too much from 
                                                 
185 McKinsey & Company, Başarılı Bir Gelecek İçin Değişim Programı Tasarısı, Ankara: TRT. 
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the TRT without improving its conditions. These demands increased and the problems got 
bigger in the context of Turkey’s EU bid. Naturally, no discussion on public broadcasting in a 
particular national context can be developed unless the implications of ‘autonomy’ for the 
PSB in that context are uncovered. No matter what the day-to-day imperatives of politics are, 
autonomy continues to lie in the heart of the debates on PSB. In this respect, the current crisis 
of public broadcasting in Turkey is rooted in the TRT’s lack of autonomy, in all aspects. 
 
6.3.1 Going Back to Basics: The Importance of Autonomy 
a) Political Implications  
 
There is no doubt that ‘autonomy’ is a very contentious concept. It is very abstract and it can 
only be achieved (assuming that it is something to achieve) if certain other conditions exist. In 
this respect, what Prosser (1992: 175) argues for the concept of PSB is also valid for the 
concept of autonomy that it “must be assembled from a number of diverse sources rather 
than being rooted in any authoritative legal concept”. Clearly, these sources are embedded 
both in the political culture as well as public life of any particular national context. In the 
Turkish case, paradoxically, the 1961 Constitution, which was drafted after the military 
intervention a year earlier, proclaimed an “autonomous public juridical person” status for the 
Turkish broadcasting service.186 This legal autonomy was then translated into operational 
enforcements in the establishment of the TRT, which was realised in the regulatory 
framework of the first TRT Law enacted in May 1964.187  
 
The establishment of the TRT as autonomous public body was in fact a top-to-down 
approach to policy that can only be understood within the specific historical context of the 
events that led up to military intervention in 1960 and the subsequent political environment 
(see Şahin, 1981; Aziz, 1999; Kejanlıoğlu, 2001). As commentators argue, the adoption of 
broadcasting autonomy was a reaction to the ruling Democratic Party’s partisan usage of radio 
in 1950s in Turkey (Aziz, 1999; Şahin, 1981). To put differently, autonomy was never seen a 
sine qua non of broadcasting, but it was rather seen as a solution to avoid further political 
controversy. Looking back at Turkey’s political history before the Democratic Party regime, 
which was the single party rule under the Republican Peoples Party (CHP), reveals that 
autonomy of broadcasts was not an issue of debate; it did not even take place in any 
                                                 
186 Article 121 of the 1961 Constitution.  
187 Law No.359, Law on Turkish Radio Television Corporation, Official Gazette No. 11596, 02 January 1964. 
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legislation. Putting aside the period when radio broadcasts were carried by a private company 
between 1927 and 1936, broadcasts were always run and monitored by the institutions of the 
state (Aziz, 1991 : 89). Therefore, autonomy had no institutional basis in Turkey and as Şahin 
(1981) notes there was no consensus on its meaning either. Even within the TRT there were 
different views on how autonomy should be interpreted. Şahin (1981) suggests that some 
circles in the TRT at that time believed in the “strict” implementation of autonomy as laid 
down in the constitution, whereas the producers arm of the Corporation favoured a more 
“dialectical view” that attributed a historical responsibility to the TRT in the “transformation 
of the socioeconomic base in the direction of true social balance”. Clearly, this view of 
autonomy of the public broadcaster is very parallel to the social role attributed to PSB in post-
war Europe, especially in the case of the British example, the BBC.  
 
However, the autonomy of the TRT soon became a political problem, especially after the 
introduction of television broadcasts in 1968. As Mutlu (1999: 20) suggests, governments were 
not able to “digest” autonomy and the “price of autonomy” turned out to be very harsh for 
the TRT. The more the TRT fought for autonomy, the more the Justice Party in office 
asserted indirect pressure on the TRT by refusing to increase the licence fees, blocking state 
funding and delaying staff appointments (Şahin, 1981; Mutlu, 1999). And finally, with another 
constitutional amendment, the TRT lost its autonomy after the 1971 military intervention. 
Ironically, it was no longer autonomous, but was still obliged to be ‘impartial’. Additionally, 
the amendment to the constitution in 1972 also specified the broadcasting standards that the 
TRT had to comply with: 
 
the requisites of the integrity of the state with its territory and people, to the national, 
democratic, secular and social Republic based on human rights, to the national security 
and public morale in the selection of news and programs, in their elaboration and 
presentation and in the performance of their functions to assist culture and education, 
as well as in the principles of ensuring authenticity of news and in the selection of the 
organs, their powers, and their duties and their responsibilities shall be regulated by 
law.  
 
Clearly, the scope of this amendment was far beyond the purpose of constitutional law-
making. It simply stipulated a regulation which could have been drawn by law (Kejanlıoğlu, 
2004: 184). It was also significant in establishing the legacy of one of the major problems of 
Turkish broadcasting policy: the ambiguity of broadcasting standards, which could not be 
corrected even years after the introduction of commercial television. 
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The amended TRT Law that came into force in March 1972 increased the powers of the 
Director General whilst decreasing the competence of its Executive Board. The irreversible 
damage was about the changes in the appointment of the Director General. The law 
politicised the post by giving the Cabinet in office the power to appoint the DG. Under the 
heightening political pressures, no DG could manage to keep the post for a full term. The 
instability of Turkish politics damaged the TRT management as well. The DG of the TRT was 
replaced with someone else every time governments changed. From 1964 to 1990, the DG of 
the TRT changed eleven times; it was only the first DG that could hold the post for seven 
years. And from the 1970s onwards, the ‘DG crises’ became synonymous with the TRT. As it 
is further analysed in this chapter, since the resignation of Yücel Yener from his DG post in 
March 2003, the TRT has been undergoing one of its most severe DG crises in its history that 
could still not be resolved.  
 
b) Financial Implications 
 
When the TRT was established in 1964, the adoption of the ‘licence fee model’ was seen as 
integral for providing financial autonomy to the TRT alongside political autonomy granted 
under the constitutional framework. However, within Turkey’s unique political culture and 
public life, the licence fee model could not be sustained. Firstly, radio broadcasts were 
commercially funded since 1951 when advertising was allowed. The European – or more 
precisely British – understanding of ‘broadcasting as a decommodified sphere’ (Keane 1993) 
in the aftermath of the Second World War did not thrive in the Turkish context. In this 
respect, the TRT’s accountability to its public was always very different from its European 
counterparts. The Turkish public remained reluctant to pay the fee and an efficient fee 
collection system could not be set. The Ministry of Transformation, which was responsible for 
allocating the licence fee revenues to the TRT collected by the Turkish PTT, kept using its 
power as a political pressure.  
 
One of the major changes in the funding of the TRT took place in 1972 when advertising on 
television was allowed. As Kejanlıoğlu (2004: 186) precisely puts it, although 
commercialisation did not seem to make sense for an organisation under state monopoly, it 
had drastic impact in the financial collapse of the TRT especially after the breakdown of the 
state monopoly in 1990. However, most important changes in the financing of the TRT took 
place in the mid-1980s. In 1984, the licence fee was replaced with the tax revenues collected 
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from the sales of the radio and television receivers. Additionally, another source of revenue 
was designed for the TRT: taxation on electricity consumption. As of today, the TRT’s main 
sources of income are: i) tax levied on all electricity bills; ii) allocations from the general 
budget; iii) sales tax levied on the purchases of radio and television sets, and iv) advertising. 
TRT’s revenues are regulated by law188 and its budget has to be approved by the State 
Planning Office and the Ministry of Finance before it comes in front of the Executive Board 
for final approval. As it is further analysed, from 1999 onwards, the taxation on electricity 
consumption became an issue of a huge political battle between the electricity providers, the 
TRT and the two successive governments.  
 
The major impact of competition on the TRT was the sharp decline in its advertising revenues 
over the years. In 1997, the advertising revenues of the TRT amounted to less than US$3.5 
billion, which was 2 per cent of all its revenues. The advertising revenues started to increase 
during Yener’s term, but the TRT never managed to have a strong position in the 
broadcasting market. Over the years the TRT actually earned very little amount of its income. 
Additionally, the severe managerial crisis in the TRT following Yücel Yener’s resignation in 
March 2003 and its mismanagement by his successor Şenol Demiröz gradually put the TRT in 
an extremely frail position. As the table below reveals, the revenues obtained from taxes levied 
on electricity bills and radio and television sets gradually became the main sources of income 
that funded all the operations of the Corporation. In 2002, the sum of these two revenue 
sources amounted to 67.8 per cent (US$29.3 million) of its all revenues; in 2003 this ratio was 
again 67 per cent (US$216,428,880) and in 2004 it was 73.3 per cent.  
 
Table 4. Net Income of the TRT – Breakdown by revenue source (2000-2005) 
Share of total revenues  Source of 
revenue  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tax on 
electricity  
45.5 52.6 62.5 53.7 46 46 
Sales tax  13.6 5.2 5.4 14 21 33 
Advertising  6.3 4.9 8.9 10.4 12 8 
Other  34.6 37.3 23.2 21.8 21 13 
Total net 
income 
(USD) 
356,694,081 276,099,026 332,303,151 379,674,616 369,676,123 403,648,311 
      Source: TRT 
 
                                                 
188 Law No. 3093, Law on the Revenues of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, Official Gazette No. 
18606, 15 December 1984. 
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On the other hand, where the TRT’s operations are concerned, it was in fact the personnel 
costs that the huge bulk of the Corporation’s income was spent on. In 2000 the personnel 
costs of the TRT amounted to US$115,554,870 and following a steady increase over the years 
it amounted to US$179,489,089 as of 2004.  
 
Table 5. Expenditure of the TRT – Breakdown by type of costs (2000-2005) 
Share of total expenses (per cent)  Type of 
expense 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Personnel 47.1 39.4 37.3 44.1 40 49 
Programming  24.6 29.6 45.4 41.6 36 36 
Running 
Costs 
22.6 22.7 5.6 5.9 6 5 
Other 5.6 8.3 11.6 8.4 16 10 
Total 
expenses 
(USD ) 
237,116,223 198,134,115 265,834,237 336,042,551 445,648,096 389,367,610 
     Source: TRT 
 
The main reason behind this huge burden of personnel costs is the wrong personnel 
recruitment strategy that has always been a major problem in the TRT. As Çaplı and Tuncel 
(2005: 1565) precisely put it:  
 
Staff recruitment has been a contentious issue throughout the history of TRT. 
Working for TRT has always meant security, a good salary and highly satisfactory 
retirement benefits. As a result of various demands and pressures, thousands of 
people were recruited by TRT with no expertise in broadcasting, but with fortunate 
connections. This led to overmanning and underqualified personnel. 
 
From 1990 to 1997, the total number of the TRT personnel swung between 5,857 and 6,442, 
the lowest being in 1997 and the highest in 1998. It reached to its peak in 2000 with 8,171 
personnel following the reallocation of the personnel that run the broadcasting transmitters 
under the management of the then PTT since 1989. With the handover of these transmitters 
back to the TRT in 1998, 1,841 technical personnel joined the TRT. Another factor that 
resulted in an increase in personnel costs was the restructuring programme under the Yener 
administration that gained momentum by the end of 1999. The then DG Yücel Yener 
favoured a more competitive strategy to strengthen the TRT by directing considerable 
financial sources to produce popular programming. In 2001, personnel costs of the TRT 
amounted to US$81,864,868, which was US$28,205,542 more than the previous year, and in 
2002 it amounted to US$98,928,537. During his term in office, Yücel Yener was highly 
criticised for inflating the TRT cadres.  
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6.3.2 From Hope to Despair, 1999-2005: Issues on the Regulation and Management of 
the TRT 
 
The acceleration of Turkey’s relations with the EU in 1999 coincides with the restructuring of 
the TRT, which was a very radical project initiated by the then DG Yücel Yener, who was 
appointed to the post in July 1997. From March 1999 onwards, the Yener administration was 
heavily involved in the restructuring programme to improve the TRT’s condition in the 
broadcasting market. As is further analysed, the programme eventually failed due to lack of 
political as well as institutional support, but it was very much in the centre of political 
attention until the elections in November 2002. Yener’s successor Şenol Demiröz, who was 
appointed to the post in 2004, did not show any commitment to the programme either.  
 
In the post-Helsinki period, there were two major issues that both administrations had to deal 
with. The first one was not related to Turkey’s EU bid, but it was relevant in the context of 
the debates on the financing of PSB in Europe. In July 1999, the management of the radio and 
television transmitters were taken from the Turkish PTT and transferred back to the TRT. 
During the time, the cost of this handover was predicted to amount US$468 million. The 
annual cost of running the transmitters was calculated to reach something between US$110-
150 million. Additionally, as of 1998, the TRT had 6,442 personnel and the handover meant 
an extra 1,841 personnel added to the payroll. In short, the question of how to finance this 
operation was an important political concern in the second half of the 1999. The then DSP-
MHP-ANAP coalition government wanted to increase the TRT’s revenues obtained from the 
taxation levied on the electricity consumption by increasing its share to 7.0 per cent from 3.5 
per cent, but this was rejected by the Constitutional Committee before it came to Parliament. 
The government decided to finance the operation differently, but the controversy on 
subsidising the TRT remained. The most destructive blow to the TRT came from the AKP 
government in February 2003. The 3.5 per cent revenue share on the electricity bills was 
reduced to 2.0 per cent. The shrinking of its budget influenced the TRT so badly that in mid-
2005 the Demiröz administration reached a stage where selling some of the TRT’s assets was 
seriously considered as an option to relax the Corporation’s finances.  
 
During the period from 1999 to 2005, the second major issue that the TRT was involved in 
was directly an outcome of Turkey’s relations with the EU. As analysed in the previous 
chapter, during the process of changing the language policy of broadcasts to allow broadcasts 
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in languages other than Turkish, the TRT was in the centre of the debates. Previously, I 
looked into this process mainly from the perspective of policy-making, but in this chapter, I 
specifically focus on the role of the TRT in the process. This is particularly important since 
the Yener administration’s attitude towards the issue tells a lot about how the TRT perceives 
its own role as a public service broadcaster. This case reveals that the TRT simply dragged its 
feet in carrying out one of the initial roles that is traditionally attributed to public broadcasters 
in Europe: catering for a variety of social and cultural groups. It is true that policy-makers 
wanted the TRT to carry out these broadcasts since this was considered the least risky way of 
handling EU conditionality, but on the other side of the fence, the TRT was also not able to 
approach the issue in a different way. The politics of broadcasting was in the centre of the 
debate and there was almost no consideration of the social and cultural aspects of 
broadcasting. TRT’s reluctance to make any positive contribution to the debate on changing 
the language policy of broadcasts in Turkey takes us back to the question of autonomy.  
 
  a) The ‘Yener’ Administration and the Restructuring Programme  
 
Yücel Yener, who was first appointed as the DG to the TRT in 1997 was one of the most 
ambitious DG figures in the TRT’s history. He was the first DG who was appointed to the 
post from the inner circle of the organisation. Yener was the architect of the ‘restructuring 
programme’ that took shape after the TRT’s consultation of McKinsey & Company in mid-1998. 
Although his term in office was due to end in July 2001, he was reappointed by a political 
manoeuvre in August 2001 supported by the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition that came into 
office in May 1999. However, Yener gained more enemies than supporters during his term. 
He was accused of treating the TRT as his ‘farm’, which even became the title of a book in 
which his administration was heavily criticised. Yener eventually resigned in March 2003. 
 
The restructuring programme started following the establishment of a coordination office in 
March 1999. TRT consulted McKinsey & Company a second time for designing the phases of 
the programme in July 1999. After four months of research, McKinsey & Company concluded 
its recommendations. The programme had three arms. The first one aimed at altering the 
management structure in the TRT, which was extremely hierarchical and heavy-handed. 
McKinsey & Company recommended the TRT to convert all of its units to business units except 
the management of its channels. The second arm was about the operations of the TRT. 
McKinsey & Company proposed the TRT to downsize its personnel, abolish its regional 
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organisations and privatise its auxiliary services. And the final arm of the programme was 
about improving the TRT’s public image. Accordingly, the TRT had to change its visual 
identity as well as its channels’ content portfolio.  
 
Clearly, the most important barrier for the TRT was the TRT Law itself. Unless the TRT’s 
constitutional autonomy was translated into enforcements guaranteeing TRT’s managerial 
autonomy with an amendment to its binding legislation, there was no way that the TRT could 
carry on with the restructuring programme.189 It was certain that the Yener administration 
took a great risk in launching this programme before the necessary changes in the regulatory 
framework were made. However, although there was not any public debate on amending the 
TRT Law at that time, there were some important political hints that soon the TRT Law 
might be brought to the political agenda. For instance, the eighth Development Plan outlining 
Turkey’s targets for the years 2000-2005 had also provisions on the TRT under the section 
outlining Turkey’s policy targets in the areas of information and communication technologies 
between the years 2000-2005. In this eighth Development Plan, which was adopted by the 
Cabinet in June 2000, it was confirmed that “the regulatory changes that are required in 
relation to the restructuring of and providing a healthy financial structure to the TRT will be 
realised.”190 Therefore, it can be well argued that despite the lack of debate, the condition of 
the TRT was somehow politically recognised. Yet no change was made in the TRT Law in the 
following years. 
 
Since the TRT Law limited the options that could be realised in the restructuring programme, 
the Yener administration focused heavily on one arm of the project: strengthening TRT’s 
public image. New projects were commissioned to international marketing and PR companies. 
Strateji Mori carried out two research projects for the TRT; the first project was a marketing 
research on media consumption patterns of the public and the second one was about 
developing a new institutional identity for the TRT according to the results of this marketing 
research. From May 1999 to October 2000, the TRT paid more than US$250 thousand to 
Strateji Mori. Additionally, the new visual identities and related marketing and PR packages for 
the TRT’s new institutional identity were designed by Pittard Sullivan. In return, the TRT 
agreed to pay US$2.8 million. TRT’s new visuals, including its new logo, and new channel 
                                                 
189 Article 16 of the TRT Law No. 2954 describes the organizational structure of the Corporation that the TRT is 
obliged to operate in. This article had to be amended in Parliament to allow the TRT administration to make the 
necessary structural changes designed as a part of the restructuring programme.  
190 Prime Ministry State Planning Organization, 8th Development Plan (2000-2005), 27 June 2000, Ankara, p.159. 
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identities were first introduced in January 2001. However, if audience share figures would be 
the main indicators of the TRT’s new image, the picture in 2002-2003 did not reveal much of 
an improvement. In 1999, the average audience share of the TRT1 was 10.9 per cent and 3.1 
for TRT2. In 2002, TRT1 had 7.1 per cent share whereas TRT2 had 1.2 per cent. And in 
2003, TRT1 had 7.0 per cent audience share and TRT2 had 1.8 per cent.  
 
As of May 2001, TRT spent US$6.2 million for the restructuring programme and the final 
budget was predicted to amount to US$30 million. The restructuring programme became the 
target of the opposition parties that were very critical about the Yener administration from the 
very beginning. Especially the Islamic party FP, which contained the AKP’s initial cadres, kept 
pressuring the government on the TRT by bringing up official enquiries to be replied either by 
the then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit or the related ministers during the routine 
parliamentary discussions. Most of these questions were on issues such as the financial details 
of the restructuring programme; the reasons why Turkish marketing and PR companies were 
not commissioned to create the new logo; the numbers of the TRT personnel under the Yener 
administration. The official responses to these enquiries usually drafted on similar lines and 
did not contain any additional information different than what the TRT publicized.  
 
The criticisms of the opposition parties against Yücel Yener heightened when the tripartite 
coalition government changed the regulatory framework during the Broadcasting Law 
amendment talks in May 2001 for the benefit of the TRT. With the annulment of Article 35 
RTÜK’s authority to monitor the TRT broadcasts and sanction the TRT administration in 
cases of violation was ceased. Additionally, the TRT was exempted from the obligation to pay 
RTÜK the 5 per cent share of its annual gross advertising revenues with an amendment to the 
Article 12 of the Broadcasting Law.191 Just a couple of days prior to when the amendment 
talks were due to end, the government proposed a further amendment to one of the 
temporary articles of the package. Instead of the existing RTÜK Board, the new board that 
was to be established once the amendment package came into effect would be responsible for 
nominating candidates for the TRT’s DG post. By doing so, the term of duty of Yücel Yener, 
which was due to end in July 2001, was automatically extended. During the talks, the FP MPs 
from the opposition were enraged about the amendments and accused the government of 
politicising the TRT to their own advantage, but they could not prevent the adoption of the 
                                                 
191 For full discussions in the Parliament on the amendment to the Articles 12 and 35, see: TBMM Journal of 
Minutes (30 May 2001) Term: 21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 110, Vol. 65. Ankara: TBMM, pp. 6-15; and TBMM 
Journal of Minutes (31 May 2001) Term: 21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 111, Vol. 65. Ankara: TBMM, pp. 28-38.  
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amendment package.192 As highlighted in the previous chapter, since new RTÜK Board could 
not be composed due to the President’s veto, Yücel Yener continued to hold the post.  
 
The opposition parties were not able to assert any influence on the amendments, but they 
persisted in directing official enquiries on various issues related to the TRT to be answered by 
the government. After the closure of the FP, it was the SP and AKP MPs who drafted these 
enquiries. They kept enquiring about similar issues again and again: why certain newspapers 
were excluded from certain morning shows, whether this or that personnel were recruited 
according to the legal procedures, what were the criteria for the selection of the dramas, etc. 
One SP MP even placed more than ten enquires on the TRT in a single day in July 2002.  
 
However, the dynamics of the relations between the TRT and the government changed once 
Yener started to procrastinate regarding the government’s EU related democratic reforms. 
The Yener administration was in disagreement with the government on how the issue on 
minority language broadcasts should be handled. TRT had gone through an investigation by 
the High Auditing Board of the Prime Ministry in September 2002, just two months before 
the elections. Although the auditing revealed wrongdoings of the Yener administration, no 
legal case was brought. As might be expected, Yücel Yener’s position as a DG was no longer 
tenable after the AKP headed the elections in November 2002. Yener eventually resigned in 
March 2003. After his resignation, TRT had gone through another investigation. In June 2004, 
upon the President’s assignment, State Auditing Office of the Presidency investigated every 
detail took place between 2000 and 2002. The Cabinet also approved the Yener 
administration’s wrongdoings and recommended further investigation. However, the State 
Council revoked the Prime Minister’s endorsement to further investigate the DG, his vice-
chair and the members of Board of Governors in February 2005. By doing so, all the Yener 
administration related issues were set aside.  
 
b) The AKP and  the Director General Crisis  
 
Yener’s resignation in March 2003 was the beginning of a long-term chaos in the TRT. 
Following the routine procedure, the RTÜK Board appointed three candidates for the TRT’s 
DG post, one to be appointed by the Cabinet. As might be expected, the name supported by 
the AKP was the strongest candidate for the post. In this case it was Şenol Demiröz, the 
                                                 
192 For full discussions, see: TBMM Journal of Minutes (5 June 2001) Term: 21, Legislative year: 3, Session: 112, 
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former head of Cultural and Social Affairs Office of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. 
However, the appointment of Demiröz to the DG post was not a straightforward process as it 
took nine months due to RTÜK’s mistakes during the nomination process. 
 
According to the legislation, the DG candidates for the TRT must not have any affiliation 
with any political party. It is the responsibility of the RTÜK’s to make sure that its nominees 
comply with the rule. However, the then attorney general of the Supreme Court detected that 
one of the candidates – Mehmet Nuri Şahin – decieved RTÜK with false paperwork and was 
incorrectly nominated for the post along with other candidates, including Şenol Demiröz 
(Hürriyet, 1 May 2003). This revelation put RTÜK in a very troubled position since it had no 
idea on how to proceed; the nomination process should either be conducted from scratch or a 
new candidate could be nominated by keeping the existing two other nominees that comply 
with the rules. Considering how politically sensitive the issue was, RTÜK decided to consult 
legal experts as well as the Prime Ministry. However, the Minister in charge – Beşir Atalay – 
rejected RTÜK’s request for consultation on the grounds that it should have the responsibility 
to decide on the procedure that should be followed (Hürriyet, 6 May 2003).  
 
The situation got more complicated when the legal experts from Ankara University, 
Department of Law presented their views on the issue. The legal experts concluded that the 
current RTÜK Board could not nominate candidates for the TRT’s DG post as the amended 
article of the Broadcasting Law regulating the composition of the board was annulled by the 
Constitutional Court following the President’s veto in June 2001 (Hürriyet, 15 May 2003). They 
decided that Şahin’s candidacy was aborted due to his unlawful act; the candidacy of the other 
nominees should no longer be effective; the other nominees could not take this issue to court; 
three new candidates should be nominated from the existing list of applicants. In the 
meantime, Şahin appealed to court for the suspension of the execution on the termination of 
his candidacy. RTÜK decided to wait until the related court concludes the case (Hürriyet, 21 
May 2003). The Administrative Court in charge concluded the case in favour of Şahin and 
suspended the execution. Following this, RTÜK decided to nominate the same three 
candidates for the post. The Court’s intervention made the process much easier for RTÜK, 
but once again the civil judiciary asserted influence on broadcasting regulation by means of its 
ruling.  
                                                                                                                                                    
Vol. 65. Ankara: TBMM, pp. 115-24. 
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As might be expected, Şenol Demiröz was appointed by the Cabinet from the three nominees 
presented by RTÜK. The AKP was successful in placing a pro-AKP DG to the one of the 
most politicised management posts in Turkey, but the controversy was far from being over. 
Considering the President’s well-known attitude towards ‘partisan appointments’, it was clear 
that this appointment would also not be approved by him. That was what exactly happened; 
President Necdet Sezer started another crisis by not approving Şener’s appointment on the 
grounds that existing RTÜK Board had no authority to nominate candidates for the DG since 
with the last amendment in the Broadcasting Law it was suggested that ‘new’ RTÜK members 
would be responsible for the nomination (Hürriyet, 11 June 2003). This was a serious blow to 
government as the rule of veto for the appointments was different and the President had the 
authority to veto Demiröz’s appointment indefinitely. Therefore, it would not make any sense 
for the government to present the appointment to the President once again knowing that it 
would not be approved. The only way to overcome the deadlock was to amend the related 
article of the Broadcasting Law once again to allow the current RTÜK Board nominate the 
candidates (Hürriyet, 10 July 2003). This amendment passed in Parliament by the end of July 
when the crisis was in its fifth month.193 During the discussions in Parliament, now it was the 
CHP MPs in opposition who accused the AKP of politicising the TRT to their own 
advantage; the same way the AKP MPs had opposed legislation extending Yücel Yener’s term 
of duty two years earlier.194  
 
Following the amendment to the legislation, everything started from scratch and RTÜK 
announced the DG post once again. Although it was clear that Demiröz would again be 
nominated, there were 114 applications in a month (Hürriyet, 28 August 2003). As might be 
expected Demiröz was one of the three names nominated by RTÜK, but once again the civil 
judiciary intervened upon the appeal by one of the candidates – Aydoğan Kılınç – who was 
not short listed. Kılınç in his appeal claimed that RTÜK did not apply the rules stated in its 
own directive during the nomination process. The Court once again ruled in favour of the 
applicant and suspended the execution (Hürriyet, 8 October 2003). Although President Sezer 
was well-known for his prompt responses in approving (or disapproving) the legislation he 
would receive, on this occasion he only reached a decision after a month and a half. Following 
the announcement of the Court’s ruling, the President once again rejected the appointment of 
                                                 
193 Law No. 4951, Law on the Amendment to the first Temporary Article of the Law No. 4756 Enacted on 15 
February 2002, Official Gazette No. 25183, 29 July 2003, Ankara. 
194 For full discussions, see: TBMM Journal of Minutes (22 July 2003) Term: 22, Legislative year: 1, Session: 109, 
Vol. 65. Ankara: TBMM, pp. 63-72. 
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Demiröz on the grounds that the process has been damaged due to RTÜK’s errors (Hürriyet, 
16 October 2003). RTÜK’s appeal against the Court’s decision was also rejected and the Court 
annulled the nomination process in December 2003. The crisis was in its ninth month. In 
order to end the deadlock, RTÜK decided not to appeal against the Court’s decision and short 
listed Kılınç together with two other names, one being Şenol Demiröz once again. Clearly, 
RTÜK persisted in nominating what the AKP government wanted despite the controversy 
around the nomination process and the President’s constant vetoes.  
 
The crisis reached a conclusion only after seven months of long controversy. President Sezer 
finally approved the appointment of Şenol Demiröz; who started his new post as the DG of 
the TRT on 12 January 2004. However, the term of duty of Demiröz happened to be much 
shorter than anticipated. Demiröz could not resolve the problems that the Corporation 
inherited from the former administration. Furthermore, he conflicted with his staff and in the 
later stages also with the government. Dealing with the managerial problems of the TRT 
turned out to be one of the worst experiences of the AKP government.  
 
c) TRT under the AKP Rule: The Decline and Fall of the TRT  
 
After a seven month long period of governance by a deputy after Yücel Yener’s resignation, 
the TRT finally had a DG in January 2004. However, having a DG did not improve the 
condition of the Corporation. During his first year, Şenol Demiröz encountered two major 
challenges. The first of these challenges was the heightening of allegations of misconduct in 
the corporation, which forced Demiröz to apply to the Prime Ministerial High Auditing Board 
for an investigation. And the second challenge was in fact a serious blow to the TRT. In 
February 2004, the AKP government decreased the TRT’s share that was collected from the 
electricity consumption bills to 2.0 per cent from 3.5 per cent. The fiscal balances of the TRT 
crashed following the AKP’s cut on the TRT’s main source of revenue.  
  
The allegations of misconduct extended back to the Yener administration. As it was claimed, 
there was a kind of beneficiary link effective in the TRT, mainly in the drama department 
(Vatanım, 12 February 2005). Accordingly, the independent production companies, which 
were commissioned to produce dramas were actually either set up by close relatives of the 
head of the drama department or certain companies known to be in the close circle of some 
high level executives of the Corporation were favoured more than the others. Additionally, 
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although the TRT personnel cannot work for any project outside the corporation unless being 
authorized, it was claimed that the TRT staff were recruited in the technical teams of these 
drama productions. The allegations proved to be correct following the unexpected visit of the 
TRT officials to the production set of the rumoured TV drama as assigned by Şenol Demiröz. 
Demiröz launched an investigation on the staff involved in this misconduct (Sabah, 14 
February 2005). 
 
However, Demiröz was also accused of favouring his close circles in commissioning the 
independent productions. Additionally, the shuffles he made in the key posts in the 
Corporation made the political circles, especially the CHP opposition very uncomfortable. 
The CHP MPs even revealed the conflicting responses that Demiröz provided for the official 
enquires made by a CHP MP on the issue whether the rumours to change the channel 
identities launched by the former administration were correct or not. Demiröz denied the 
plans for change in one response and confirmed it in the other (Radikal, 16 February 2005). 
The way CHP MPs questioned the TRT administration and revelations of the accusations to 
the public made the AKP government very uncomfortable. As a result, the government 
decided to assign one of its officers as a General Secretary to the TRT. This was the first 
disclosure of conflict between the government and Şenol Demiröz. In return, Demiröz 
decided to call for a more through official auditing to be conducted by the State Auditing 
Committee under the Prime Ministry. The major reaction to Demiröz’s call came from the 
recently recomposed Executive Board of the TRT. The Board members, who were appointed 
by the government, perceived Demiröz’s call for auditing as a challenge and they did not 
approve his budget (Radikal, 16 February 2005). 
 
The launch of an official auditing in the TRT changed all the dynamics between the 
government and the Corporation. As early as March 2005, there were already rumours that the 
AKP government would pressure Demiröz to resign (Radikal, 4 March 2005). Demiröz was 
invited to give a brief on the management and finances of the TRT to a parliamentary sub-
committee dealing with the state economic enterprises in April 2005. The picture Demiröz 
presented to the committee proved that the TRT was in its worst condition in its history. 
According to this picture, even the payment of staff salaries after May was in danger. TRT was 
face to face with such a severe financial crisis as a consequence of the cut down in electricity 
revenues that its expenses were constantly more than its revenues. Demiröz stated that unless 
the TRT was granted a financial and managerial autonomy with an amendment to its law, 
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there was no way the Corporation could survive against today’s market forces (Hürriyet, 13 
May 2005). The statements of Demiröz were also striking in terms of how the daily routine in 
the TRT was seen by the top-level executive of the Corporation. At some point during the 
committee meeting Demiröz stated that: 
 
Broadcasting is not a job that can be done by civil servants. When the working day is over, 
3700 staff members leave the central broadcasting house, hop on the bus and go home, just 
like a factory worker. The real broadcasting time begins after the official working hours 
(Netgazete, 11 May 2005).  
 
As might be expected, the details of this meeting were extensively covered by the press due to 
the controversies around the TRT and its DG. In the following months, Demiröz’s 
relationship between the government and even with the TRT personnel became more 
strained. The publication of Demiröz’s assertions on the typology of the TRT presenters at an 
informal interview with a journalist heightened the antagonism in the Corporation towards the 
DG (see Sabah, 28 June 2005). For the first time in the TRT’s history, the TV presenters 
issued a public statement condemning the DG of the Corporation for insulting his own 
personnel with unacceptable claims on their appearances (Milliyet, 2 July 2005). After this 
point, for the AKP government that was already in search of an option to let Demiröz go, 
there was no way to repair the damage. Demiröz applied for early retirement in August 2005, 
before completing his second year in office. Just a couple of weeks before his decision to quit 
his post, there were already speculations in the newspapers on the possible names for the next 
DG to come (see, Sabah, 13 July 2005). 
 
The ‘Demiröz experience’ of the TRT was later severely criticised by the politicians and the 
press. Some journalists condemned Demiröz for not having any vision on what PSB should 
be about (see H. Şahin, Radikal, 3 August 2005), whereas opposition MPs and the union 
representatives accused the government for proposing such a controversial name for the 
TRT’s DG post (see Sabah, 1 August 2005). 
 
One of the major disputes between the AKP government and the CHP opposition was over 
the Islamisation of the TRT’s programme output. The allegations started when Şenol Demiröz 
was in office, but it became a huge controversy following his resignation. Just a couple of 
months before the retirement of Demiröz, it was first Emin Çölaşan who wrote in his column 
in Hürriyet that Islamisation is in increase in the TRT broadcasts (E. Çölaşan, Hürriyet, 3 June 
2005). After Demiröz retired, it was again another Hürriyet columnist who revealed that a 
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particular Islamic sect in Turkey asserted influence on the TRT’s religious programming (Y. 
Bayer, Hürriyet, 1 October 2005). The controversy reached its peak when an extract of a debate 
that took place in one of the TRT’s programmes was published by another daily having its 
headlines as “Tribute to Sharia [Islamic Law] on the TRT” (Vatanım, 29 October 2005). Just in 
a few days the issue was brought up in Parliament by a CHP MP as an official enquiry 
addressed to Prime Minister Erdogan to reveal their discomfort. Soon after, questions on the 
silence of the regulator RTÜK and the Courts in charge arouse. However, as explained earlier, 
according to the Broadcasting Law amended in 2002, the relation between the TRT and 
RTÜK was now limited to the nomination of the DG and the members of the Executive 
Board. The RTÜK could not intervene in the matters of the TRT. Therefore, its statements 
on the issue were just the expressions of wishful thinking that the new DG to be appointed 
might end the chaos (M. Mutlu, Vatanım, 2 November 2005). However, the appointment of 
the new DG became another saga of a well-known TRT crisis. Apart from an internal 
investigation, no other action was taken regarding the accusations of Islamization of the TRT.  
 
By the end of 2005, Islamisation of the TRT was only one of aspect of the crisis of the TRT. 
The controversy coincided with the uncovering of a series of bribery allegations targeting the 
adviser to the former DG Şenol Demiröz. According to these allegations, the former head of 
the television department favoured certain production companies during the programme 
commissioning process in return of huge sums of financial benefit. The Chief Public 
Prosecutor’s Office in Ankara filed a court case but to date it has not been concluded yet.  
 
No new DG could be appointed to the TRT since the retirement of Demiröz. Since August 
2005, the TRT is run by a deputy and this is the second DG crisis between the AKP; the TRT 
and the President. However, the dynamics of this ongoing crisis are not covered in this 
chapter since it falls beyond the time scope of this study. 
 
6.3.2 Issues on the Financing of the TRT: Debates on State Subsidies 
a) The Handover of the Broadcast Transmitters  
 
Up to 1989, the TRT was responsible for the establishment and the management of the 
broadcast transmitters in Turkey. However, the then ANAP government adopted a new law 
(Law No 3517) in January 1989 instructing the handover of the broadcast transmitters to the 
PTT on the basis of merging the infrastructure and the management of broadcast and 
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communications networks. As Kejanlıoğlu (2001: 94 and 2004: 327) persuasively argues, this 
was actually an outcome of the then government’s continuing effort to increase the PTT role 
in the communications field at a time when ‘convergence’ of broadcasting and 
telecommunications was already included in the policy vocabulary. The idea was to prepare 
the ground for the introduction of commercial television in Turkey by empowering the PTT 
to expand the infrastructure. However, this debate turned out to be one of the most 
complicated policy-processes of broadcasting policy-making in Turkey. Shortly after the 
adoption of the law, the then opposition Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat 
Halkçı Parti – SHP) brought the law before the Constitutional Court on the basis of 
incongruity of the law with certain articles of the constitution, but most importantly with 
Article 133. As explained earlier, Article 133 of the 1982 Constitution stipulated the state 
monopoly in radio and television broadcasting. On this case, the Constitutional Court 
confirmed the incongruity of the law with this article and annulled majority of the provisions 
in the law.195 However, in order to avoid a legislative gap, the Court granted a six months 
period to legislators to draft a new law. Accordingly, the new law was supposed to be adopted 
by January 1991 at the latest, but it did not happen. The PTT, TRT and the ministries in 
charge could not reach an agreement on the details (see Kejanlıoğlu, 2004: 301-4). The 
impasse continued until July 1999. In the meantime, the drive behind the initial policy lost its 
significance since commercial broadcasting started via satellite, and the PTT directed its 
investments in cable and commercial broadcasting remained to be a non-regulated field until 
April 1994. In June 1994, the telecommunication services were separated from the PTT and 
the Turkish Telecom continued to operate the transmitters. It was mostly the personnel in 
charge of running these transmitters that were influenced from this handover and the 
following regulatory impasse. As a consequence of the handover, 1,841 members of personnel 
lost their privileges when they were on the TRT’s payroll (see Cankaya, 2003: 221).  
 
Almost a decade later, the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government decided to end the 
impasse by drafting a law to return the transmitters and their personnel back to the TRT. In 
the proposed draft, the law was justified on the basis of the need to fill the gap in the 
legislation. However, there was actually another reason behind the timing of this law that was 
not officially stated in the justification of the law. The then government wanted to conclude 
the privatisation of the Turkish Telecom that has been on the agenda for more than a decade. 
Handing the transmitters back to the TRT would increase the value of the Turkish Telecom 
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since all the costs of running them would be abandoned with the handover. This was 
particularly emphasised during the discussions of the Constitutional Committee, before it 
came in front of the Parliament.196 
 
However, one of the key concerns was the financing of this handover. A new source of 
revenue had to be provided to the TRT so that the Corporation could be able to overcome 
the financial burden of this operation, particularly the personnel costs. The government 
proposed financing the TRT through a combination of sources: i) the TRT’s share of revenues 
from the electricity consumption would be increased to 7.0 per cent; ii) the Corporation would 
no longer be responsible of contributing to the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund; and iii) 
the Turkish Telecom would apply a 5.0 per cent increase to service charges to fund the TRT 
with this additional revenue. In the draft law, the government also granted the cabinet the 
right to increase all the amounts stated in this article twice as much. 
 
The Planning and Budget Committee, which was the main committee responsible of finalising 
the draft before it was taken into the parliamentary agenda, blocked the government’s plans to 
finance the handover through the sources stated above. Firstly, it limited the increase of the 
TRT’s revenue share of the electricity bills to 7.0 per cent the most by keeping the existing 3.5 
per cent limit as the threshold. Therefore, even if the cabinet would decide to increase the 
TRT’s share twice as much, it could not be more than 7.0 per cent. Secondly, the Committee 
withdrew the provision on the telecommunications revenue share. As it was expressed in the 
Committee’s report, some members considered the state subsidiaries that TRT received as 
contradictory with the dynamics of the liberal market economy. For them, the TRT had a 
‘bulky’ organisational structure; it should be restructured urgently and should be granted with 
financial and managerial autonomy so that it could compete with its commercial rivals rather 
than relying on the state subsidiaries.197 
 
Similar remarks were made during the discussions in Parliament. It was mainly the DYP and 
FP MPs from opposition who were very critical about the financing of the TRT. The DYP 
MPs argued that this handover should be financed through the general budget rather than 
relying on the electricity revenue share. In a similar vein, the FP MPs also emphasised that the 
government should never increase the per cent of this share since the steady increase in 
electricity consumption would gradually result with an increase in the TRT’s revenues in any 
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way. Although it was not a very novel idea, the SP MPs also suggested that a consortium in 
which the TRT as well as commercial broadcasters take place could run these transmitters 
rather than just the TRT. This idea would later be fed into the package amending the 
Broadcasting Law in June 2001. Apart from these points, the noteworthy remarks were the 
comparisons that both the government representatives as well at the opposition MPs made 
between the BBC and the TRT. For the coalition government MPs the TRT was ahead of the 
BBC in regard to total broadcast time and the scope of its operations and for the MPs from 
opposition the TRT was far behind the BBC in regard to its revenues and should have been 
downsized to two TV channels.198 
 
The parliamentary discussions were concluded with the adoption of the Law regulating the 
details of the handover of the broadcast transmitters from the Turkish Telecom to the TRT.199 
However, the ways in which this handover will be financed without putting the: TRT under a 
huge financial burden remained unclear. The government tried to push the agenda once again 
in the following months by issuing a new draft law. The aim of the government was to finance 
the TRT through what was called a ‘telecommunications share’. When the broadcast 
transmitters were handed over to the then PTT in 1989 by law, the taxation on the PTT 
services was reduced to 0.1 per cent from 6.0 in order to finance the PTTs cost at that time. 
As of 1999, the DSP-MHP-ANAP government wanted the Turkish Telecom to finance the 
TRT’s cost of transmitters by transferring this 5.0 per cent revenue share back to the TRT 
since it was now the TRT that would run the transmitters. However, the government’s plan 
was blocked once again by the Planning and Budget Committee. The Committee agreed on 
only a one-off payment over the 2.5 per cent of the Turkish Telecom’s year 2000 gross 
revenues.200 Although the DYP in opposition supported the law, for the FP even this revised 
version was controversial. During the discussions in Parliament, the FP MPs argued that 
financing the TRT through subsidies could no longer be justified since the TRT continued to 
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be an ‘unsuccessful’ and ‘insufficient’ broadcaster.201 Yet, regardless of the FP’s dispute, the 
law was adopted by Parliament.202 The one-off payment was made to the TRT. 
 
Additional to the issue of financing the management costs of the TRT’s broadcast 
transmitters, there is another very important policy issue that should be shortly discussed here. 
As noted earlier, one of the main consequences of lacking strategic policies to regulate the 
emerging dual broadcasting system in the early 1990s in Turkey was the mushrooming of 
broadcasting transmitters all over the country, particularly in the big cities. The private 
broadcasters, one after another, erected their own transmitter towers and built partnerships 
neither with each other nor with the TRT. Among the amendments to the Broadcasting Law 
that came in front of Parliament first in May 2001 and adopted the second time after the 
President’s veto in May 2002, there was a very important additional article aimed at regulating 
this chaos for the very first time. According to the amended Broadcasting Law, the private 
broadcasters were instructed to shut down their individual towers and start broadcasting from 
the transmitters run by a company either set up by the TRT or by a consortium in which all 
the private broadcasters as well as the TRT participated. As might be expected, neither the 
TRT nor the private broadcasters welcomed this new regulation. For the TRT, this meant 
extra financial costs and dealing with big media conglomerates might also be costly in political 
terms. On the other hand, for private broadcasters, TRT’s lack of autonomy was a very 
serious consideration. They had the belief that in case of conflict the TRT might react 
according to the political pressures and cease the broadcasts of private broadcasters without 
any notice. Due to these concerns no progress on the issue could be made. However, the issue 
recurred in 2006 in the context of Turkey’s switchover plans to digital by 2014.  
 
b) The Electricity Market vs the TRT: The Controversy over the Subsidiaries 
 
Political reactions against financing the TRT through state subsidiaries, especially through a 
3.5 share of revenue that the Corporation receives from the electricity bills, gradually turned 
into an organized lobbying by the corporate actors of the electricity market in the course of 
2002. It was mainly the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye 
Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB) that was actively involved in this lobbying. In February 2002, 
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TOBB published a report on the reasons why the energy costs were very high in Turkey and 
the possible ways to reduce these costs (Hürriyet, 2 February 2002). According to the report, in 
the EU member states, the average cost of industrial electricity consumption was 4.3 cent, 
whereas in Turkey this average amounted to 6.5 cent. As might be expected, the report 
concluded that the 3.5 revenue share transferred to the TRT was one of the reasons for the 
high energy costs in Turkey.  
 
Together with the TOBB, the Electricity Market Regulatory Authority (Elektrik Piyasası 
Düzenleme Kurulu, EPDK) also started campaigning against the TRT’s revenue share. The 
EPDK was established in 2001 by law to guarantee a fair competition in the energy market, 
which required all the energy costs derive solely from the dynamics of the market by 
September 2002. In this respect, according to the new market regime, the TRT share in the 
electricity bills was not a real, but rather an ‘artificial’ cost imposed on the electricity market. 
In August 2002, the head of EPDK sent an official letter to the Office of Prime Ministry 
stating that the TRT subsidiary provided from the electricity market should be terminated 
since such an add-on cost in the electricity market could not be accepted in the scope of new 
regulatory regime of the electricity market (Hürriyet, 29 August 2002). The TOBB publicly 
announced its full support to the EPDK (Hürriyet, 30 August 2002). 
 
As might be expected, the then DG Yücel Yener outraged about the pressures on the 
government to cut off the TRT’s main source of revenue. From 1999 to 2001 the TRT’s 
revenues from the electricity share amounted to US$452,438,417 which hardly covered the 
personnel costs of the same period. In this respect any loss in the TRT’s revenues would be a 
disaster for the corporation. As a response to the amounting pressures of the EPDK, the 
Yener Administartion also started lobbying in political circles. Yener was succeesful in 
blocking the EPDK, but the battle between the two organisations continued.  
 
In the aftermath of the November 2002 elections, the Yener administartion was not able to 
get support from the AKP government as much as it did from the former DSP-MHP-ANAP 
coalition government. Just two weeks after the AKP’s elections victory, the party leader 
Necmettin Erdoğan announced the AKP’s ‘urgent action plan’. According to this plan, the 
AKP would withdraw the TRT’s electricity revenue share within the first three months in 
office (BELGEnet, 16 November 2002). In January 2003, the AKP government did not 
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withdraw the TRT’s share completely, but reduced it to 2.0 per cent from 3.5.203 This 
reduction meant an approxiametly US$147,410,277 annual loss in the TRT’s revenues. In 
response, the then DG Yücel Yener announced that this cut would inevitably result with 
reducing the TRT’s investments as well as programming expenses (Hürriyet, 20 February 
2003). A month after the AKP’s decision, Yener resigned from his post. He did not deliver 
any statement relating his decision to resign to the AKP’s attitude towards the TRT, but where 
the Yener administration’s ambitious and costly plan to restructure the TRT was concerned, 
reducing the TRT’s revenues could well meant a rejection of the Yener administration. After 
that point, Yener’s position as a DG was no more tenable.  
 
The fiscal dynamics of the TR completely went off balance following the cut in the TRT’s 
main source of revenue. The overspending of Yener’s successor, Demiröz, made the picture 
worse. In his first year in office, Demiröz spent almost US$12 million just for the acquisition 
of 970 movies, of which 712 were of foreign origin. As of May 2004, the crisis reached a point 
where Demiröz declared at a parliamentary committee briefing that even the distribution of 
June personnel salaries was in danger. When Demiröz asked for early retirement in August 
2005, the TRT was at its lowest ebb in its history, both in organisational and financial terms. 
Considering how much the AKP government persisted to appoint Demiröz to the DG post 
of the TRT, this was also a failure of the AKP as well. 
 
6.3.4 EU Conditionality and the TRT: Broadcasts in Languages other than Turkish 
 
All the issues on the management and the financing of the TRT explored above took place at 
a time when the main agenda in Turkish politics was Turkey’s EU bid. As thoroughly assessed 
in the previous chapter, the adoption of the constitutional amendments in October 2001 was 
the beginning of a three years long political confrontation on the details of how to fulfil EU 
conditionality. Together with abolishing the death penalty, lifting all the restrictions on the 
expression of linguistic and cultural identities were the key conditions articulated by the EU 
for the launch of accession talks with Turkey. Therefore, from October 2001 onwards, the 
TRT was part of the policy process regarding the change of the language policy of broadcasts 
in Turkey.  
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As discussed earlier, one of the first disputes on the issue within the DSP-ANAP-MHP 
coalition government in the aftermath of the constitutional amendments was on whether both 
commercial broadcasters and the TRT or only the TRT should carry out these broadcasts. 
Although the DSP and ANAP were positive about either of the options, the MHP was against 
the TRT’s involvement in these broadcasts. For the MHP, the TRT should emphasise unity 
rather than diversity and should continue to broadcast in Turkish. The MHP’s view on the 
issue changed only after the army’s position became clear. The army pressured the 
government to make only the TRT responsible of broadcasts in languages other than Turkish 
so that the army’s concerns on issues of ‘national security’ could be reassured. On the other 
hand, when the AKP came into power, there were still doubts even within the government 
itself on who should carry out these broadcasts. Different ministers of the same AKP 
government kept delivering conflicting statements in the course of mid-2003.  
 
In this respect, the TRT was actually pulled into this process without any debate on its status 
as a public broadcaster. On the contrary, the ways in which the political establishment 
considered the TRT’s role in this process perfectly revealed how much the TRT was seen as a 
‘state broadcaster’ that was obliged to follow the view of the establishment. However, the way 
the TRT responded to the debate on EU conditionality on cultural rights was more 
problematic. The reason why political circles wanted the TRT to carry out these broadcasts 
was not because they believed that catering for minority rights should be the TRT’s 
responsibility as a public broadcaster, but because the TRT’s involvement in the process was 
considered as the ‘safest’ way to deal with EU conditionality. Yet the reason why the Yener 
administration that was in office at the time dragged its foot was more complicated. 
 
a) The Dispute Between the TRT and RTÜK 
 
As thoroughly analysed in the previous chapter, until the end of 2002, there was still confusion 
on whether private broadcasters, the TRT or both should/could carry out broadcasts in 
languages other than Turkish, specifically Kurdish. At the very beginning, the DSP-MHP-
ANAP coalition government agreed that private broadcasters can broadcast in Kurdish as the 
coalition partner MHP strictly opposed the TRT’s involvement in this process. However, the 
TRT option became more viable after a couple of MGK meetings in which the top-ranking 
generals of the army ‘emphasised’ their concerns on issues of ‘national security’. As of 
September 2002, the ministers of the then government started delivering statements about the 
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Yener administration’s eagerness to involve the TRT in the process (M. Yetkin, Radikal, 5 
September 2002). The first directive prepared by the RTÜK was announced in December 
2002 and according to this directive TRT would be the only broadcaster carrying out these 
broadcasts.204 The directive stipulated that these broadcasts in other languages than Turkish 
would be limited to plus five minutes a day and four hours a week for radio and thirty minutes 
a day and two hours a week for television. The then head of the RTÜK Board, Fatih Karaca, 
introduced the directive by stating that they actually had a year to prepare the directive but 
they prepared it early so that “the relations with the EU could be improved” (Radikal, 21 
November 2002).  
 
A very severe crisis emerged in June 2003 when it became clear that the TRT appealed to the 
Council of State for the annulment of the directive adopted by the RTÜK in December 2002. 
The story came out four months after the TRT’s appeal in February 2003 and the RTÜK 
claimed that it had no idea about this case. It was argued that the Yener administration 
mislead the RTÜK as well as all the political circles by acting as if the TRT was ready and 
eager to carry out these broadcasts. However, in the court application statement, the then DG 
Yücel Yener asserted that the directive was unconstitutional since this assignment was 
imposed on the ‘autonomous’ TRT through the directive drafted by the RTÜK rather than 
through amending the TRT Law adopted by Parliament. It was asserted that RTÜK had legal 
right neither to impose any obligation on the TRT nor to monitor its activities in anyway since 
the TRT’s competence could only derive from its own binding Law (Radikal, 16 June 2003). 
The situation was very complicated since Yener was no longer in office as the DG of the TRT 
and therefore the RTÜK had no person to address to. However, the former DG Yener 
unofficially responded to the RTÜK’s outraged comments and accused the regulator for not 
telling the truth. Yener stated that both RTÜK and the government were informed about this 
case, but his claims were denied by both the head of the RTÜK and the State Minister in 
charge of media (Radikal, 16 June 2003).  
 
In July 2003, The Council of State ruled in favour of the TRT and annulled the directive 
drafted by the RTÜK. Therefore, the RTÜK had to prepare a new legislation. The conflict 
between the TRT and the RTÜK confused the AKP government that was in office for less 
than a year. According to the sixth reform package adopted the same month, the Broadcasting 
Law amended once again to allow both the public broadcaster and the private broadcasters 
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broadcast in languages other than Turkish as this was the only way to speed up the process in 
order to progress in the EU agenda.205 The new directive was ready by November 2003 and 
this time the directive stipulated that both the public broadcaster as well as the private 
broadcasters would be able to broadcast in languages other than Turkish in the framework of 
the new legislation. However, this time it was the government that was not pleased with the 
directive as it was very ‘limiting’ (Radikal, 12 December 2003). The second directive was finally 
adopted by the end of January 2004 after a minor revision.206 
 
The dispute between the TRT and the RTÜK was a serious blow to the AKP government. If 
the TRT had taken the responsibility, the controversy over EU conditionality would be 
resolved. There was still no application made to the RTÜK after two months following the 
publication of the new directive. Eventually, the prevailing view in political circles as well as in 
the Security Council (MGK) was to persist on the TRT option (Radikal, 28 March 2004). In 
the meantime, the head of the Caucasians Society applied to the TRT once again to demand 
broadcasts in their language. The then Şenol Demiröz welcomed the application, but stated 
that unless the TRT Law was amended, no broadcasts in any other language could be made 
(Radikal, 1 April 2004). 
 
As of May 2005, Fatih Karaca, the then head of the RTÜK Board, pressured the Demiröz 
administration to start broadcasting according to the final directive and insisted that no 
amendment to the TRT Law was required to broadcast in languages other than Turkish 
(NTV, 24 May 2004). By the end of May, the TRT Executive Board finally approved the 
decision to start these broadcasts. The then DG Şenol Demiröz confirmed the decision and 
stated that the TRT’s “full commitment to the nation state is not an obstacle of the pluralist 
democracy” (Showtvnet, 27 May 2004). After this, the only unclear issue left was which 
languages will be chosen apart from Kurdish. In a week, Demiröz announced that broadcasts 
were to begin in a few days and they would be in Bosnian, Arabic, Caucasian and the two 
dialects of Kurdish: Zaza and Kirmançi (Ntvmsnbc, 4 June 2006).  
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b) The End of the Process: Reactions to the First Broadcasts 
 
As might be expected, the announcement of the TRT’s decision hit the headlines the next day. 
The columnists of the major dailies commented on the developments until the end of the first 
week of these broadcasts. These editorials were full of mixed feelings on the issue, but the 
criticism of the TRT for dragging its foot to start these broadcasts for the last two years and 
danger Turkey’s EU membership prospect was apparent. For instance, Oktay Ekşi, the leading 
columnist of Hürriyet called the TRT as the “national corporation of obstruction” and 
ridiculed the TRT for its earlier emphasis on autonomy to oppose carrying out these 
broadcasts (O. Ekşi, Hürriyet, 28 May 2004). In a similar vein, Murat Yetkin from Radikal 
commented that “one of the major EU reforms could have not been realised if the head of 
the RTÜK did not put his finger into the bee hive” and concluded that the timing of these 
broadcasts would be crucial for gaining an advantage in the EU process (M. Yetkin, Radikal, 6 
June 2004). However, there were still some other columnists who argued that the TRT should 
not be made responsible of doing these broadcasts as a ‘state broadcaster’ (C. Ülsever, 
Hürriyet, 7 June 2004). 
 
After years of dispute, the first broadcasts were finally aired on 7 June 2004 in Bosnian and 
followed by Arabic. Very surprisingly, the Bosnian minority in Turkey reacted against the 
broadcasts. Various representatives of Bosnian NGOs in Turkey delivered statements about 
how much they were disappointed to be regarded as a ‘minority’ in Turkey (Milliyet, 8 June 
2004). For the broadcasts in Arabic, the viewers were pleased in general but they criticised the 
broadcast for not reflecting the daily Arabic they use (Zaman, 9 June 2004). The other 
disappointed community was the Laz people of the Black Sea region, but for a different 
reason. In contrast to the Bosnian community, the Lazs were disappointed for being excluded 
from these broadcasts (Radikal, 8 June 2004). 
 
However, considering that this whole process was actually done for allowing broadcasts in 
Kurdish, the reactions to the last two broadcasts were the most important. Not coincidentally, 
on the same day of first broadcasts in Kurdish the three former MPs of Kurdish origin were 
also released from jail. In doing so, the government sought after giving a different message to 
the EU beyond the scope of broadcasts in languages other than Turkish. On the day of the 
broadcast, other television channels broadcast clips from the south eastern Turkey showing 
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people dancing on the streets, watching the broadcasts in groups in public places. In general, 
the Kurdish community regarded this as an important step, but they also emphasised that 
more could be done (Radikal, 10 June 2004).  
 
The reactions in the political circles also varied, but in general there was not too much support 
despite the repeated importance of these broadcasts in regard to the EU agenda. The MHP 
leader Devlet Bahçeli who was the partner to the former coalition government repeated his 
well-known political line that the TRT’s involvement in this process was a mistake. The 
ANAP that was no longer led by Mesut Yılmaz, who was a great advocate of these broadcasts, 
was now very critical about these broadcasts. Its new leader Nesrin Nas stated that she 
regarded these broadcasts as a lip-service to the EU. The DYP leader Mehmet Ağar stated 
that they would welcome these broadcast as long as the ‘unitarian’ core of the state was 
preserved. And finally, the leader of the CHP in opposition in Parliament, Deniz Baykal, 
announced that his party did not approve the state’s involvement in these broadcast and they 
regarded these broadcasts as the ‘show’ of the AKP. The Minister of Interior of the AKP 
government, Abdullah Gül, responded these comments with these words: “They are 
jealous”.207  
 
The start of broadcast in languages other than Turkish was a great leap forwards in EU-
Turkey relations. The process that began in May 2001 with the adoption of the constitutional 
amendments concluded more than three years later with the start of the TRT broadcasts in 
five other languages/dialects in June 2004. Together with other EU harmonisation packages 
adopted by Parliament in between these dates, Turkey was now at the stage of demanding the 
‘carrot’ of the EU. In the 2004 Progress Report on Turkey announced in October 2004 the 
significance of the progress was reported, but the Commission also noted that “[t]he measures 
adopted in the area of cultural rights represent only a starting point as considerable restrictions 
remain” (European Commission, 2004: 175). Despite the emphasis on limitations of the 
legislation in different areas in Turkey, including cultural rights, the European Council in 
December 2004 decided to launch accession talks with Turkey on 3 October 2005. Turkey 
was finally successful in clinching a date from the EU and its EU prospect was very clear for 
the very first time after five decades. 
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The TRT broadcasts in other languages and dialects were significant in stepping a huge stone 
in the name of the EU, but they soon became the centre of criticism as they were very limited 
both in terms of content and duration. According to the RTÜK’s directive, the duration of the 
broadcasts was limited to forty-five minutes daily and a total of four hours a week for 
television and an hour a day and five hours a week for radio. In its TV broadcasts the TRT 
used the same programme content with different voice-overs and only changed the music 
clips. Even the same news stories were covered in all the broadcasts without any emphasis on 
the region or the community it addressed. The TRT kept giving the image that the only reason 
it carried out these broadcast was just because it was asked to do so. As of 2006, there was no 
improvement in the TRT’s broadcasts. Additionally, the battle was now between the 
regional/local broadcasters in south eastern Turkey and the RTÜK on expanding these 
broadcasts to local communities. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has started looking into the dynamics of PSB in Turkey by first offering a 
discussion on the conditions of public broadcasting in Europe. Accordingly, the key question 
of what constitutes ‘public service’ in the context of broadcasting continues to be one of the 
most controversial debates in Europe. For almost three decades, this question dominates the 
regulatory agenda of broadcasting. As it has been suggested, the ever-ending quest for a 
definition of PSB intensifies under circumstances where the financial arrangements of public 
broadcasting are under scrutiny. In this respect, the ways in which various institutions of the 
EU involved in this debate have been very significant.  
 
As this chapter has revealed, this contextual background on PSB in Europe is directly relevant 
where Turkey’s experiences of transition to a dual system of public and private broadcasting in 
Turkey in the course of 1990s are concerned. In this respect, the processes took place in West 
Europe in the 1980s also reverberated in Turkey, but the transition took place some years 
later. Any discussion on the current conditions of PSB in Turkey in the context of Turkey’s 
EU membership prospect should acknowledge this connection as this is one of the most 
significant difference that Turkey holds when compared to the experiences of the EU with 
former candidates during the pre-accession process.  
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The features of the TRT, in fact, resemble the case of France to a great extent. The 
experiences of the French Radio and Television (RTF) after 1959, despite being granted an 
institutional and financial autonomy corresponds to those of the TRT throughout its history. 
As Şahin (1981) puts is, in the case of the TRT, although the legal basis of its political 
autonomy is very well-built, the problems of the TRT in exercising this autonomy can only be 
understood in relation to the “socio-political environment and traditions” it is situated in. 
Some of the key characteristics of these are highlighted in this chapter. 
 
As this chapter has revealed, PSB in Turkey is in a severe crisis. The crisis of the TRT has 
three dimensions, two of which are directly related to its lack of autonomy. Firstly, the 
Corporation hugely suffers from lacking effective administration and leadership. Since it is a 
highly politicised post due to the stringent political pressures of the ruling governments, the 
Director Generals appointed to the post cannot keep it long. Within the time span covered in 
this study, the case of the TRT under Yener administration was an exception. Yücel Yener 
was the only DG appointed the second time, but he also chose to resign just a few months 
following the change in the government after the November 2002 elections. His successor 
Şenol Demiröz, who was appointed by the AKP Cabinet despite being vetoed by the 
President four times, also did not complete his second year in office due to circumstances 
highlighted in this chapter. Following his retirement, no new DG could still be appointed due 
to the objections of the President to the nomination processes. President Necdet Sezer, who is 
known to be opponent of the names supported by the AKP to the key administrative posts in 
Turkey, kept blocking the process.  
 
The second dimension of the crisis of the TRT is related to its lack of financial autonomy. 
Following the introduction of a dual system for broadcasting in Turkey in the early 1990s, the 
TRT increasingly became dependant on its revenues from the tax levied on electricity bills and 
the sales of radio and television sets in Turkey. The reduction of the TRT’s share of electricity 
revenues to 2.0 per cent from 3.5 per cent in February 2003 by the AKP government gave 
great damage to the fiscal dynamics of the Corporation. Where the debates on the state 
subsidiaries to public broadcasters in Europe are considered, what makes the Turkish case 
very interesting is the difference of the market actors involved in the debates. In Europe it was 
originally the commercial media that disputed the financial privileges that public broadcasters 
had for being subsidised by the state; however, in Turkey, it was the electricity suppliers that 
pressured the government for the abrogation of the tax levied on them. So far, none of the 
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media groups in Turkey has lobbied against the dual funding that the TRT receives. 
Considering the TRT’s share in the advertising market revenues, it can be argued that media 
groups do not even consider the TRT as a serious contender in the broadcasting market. 
 
The third and the final dimension of the TRT’s crisis is maybe the most problematic one. 
Under its current conditions, the TRT is far from performing any organisational and social 
functions associated with public broadcasting in Europe. If we asses the TRT’s performance 
according to the criteria offered by Blumler (1992) to characterise PSB in Europe, the picture 
we get is very dim. In this respect, as analysed in this chapter, the way the TRT responded to 
EU conditionality on cultural rights during the implementation phase is a clear rejection of 
fulfilling one a major role of any public broadcaster: commitment to a multicultural 
understanding of society by catering for minorities. Ironically, the Yener administration 
justified its disinclination to broadcast in any language other than Turkish on the basis of the 
TRT’s ‘autonomy’ laid in the constitution. If this is the way that autonomy is interpreted at the 
top level of the TRT, then the question is whether anything is left of the understanding of 
broadcasting as a societal good in the Turkish context? The TRT as it is now is far from being 
accountable to its public. However, the process behind the implementation of EU 
conditionality has also revealed that the TRT was successful in challenging the ‘authority’ 
despite stringent political pressures, only for wrong reasons.  
 
In April 2007, the AKP government announced an ‘EU road map’ covering all the policy 
objectives of the AKP to be realised until 2013. According to this map, the TRT will be 
restructured in the next two years. Clearly, the implementation of this road map depends on 
whether the AKP will still be in the government or not. However, there seems to be no other 
way to make a public broadcaster out of the TRT unless an EU tie attached to the project.  
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   Chapter 7: 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
When Turkey was granted candidacy status at the European Council Helsinki Summit in 1999, 
it was very difficult to envisage the scale and the scope of the EU impact that would soon 
follow. Where Turkey’s almost half a century long association with Europe is concerned, the 
conclusion of the Helsinki Summit signified a new direction in Turkey-EU relations rather 
than a neutral beginning. Following the confirmation of its candidacy, Turkey initiated a 
massive reform process, which even shattered the then tripartite coalition in 2002. The AKP 
government that came to power after the November 2002 election carried on with the EU 
reform process and in two years it was successful in clinching a date from the EU to open 
accession negotiations. This study looked into the EU impact on domestic politics in Turkey 
by particularly focusing on issues of broadcasting policy that emerged during the period from 
1999 to 2005.  
 
As stated at the beginning, this study had two interrelated objectives. Firstly, it aimed to 
analyse the complexity of Turkey-EU relations by situating itself within research on 
Europeanisation, which offers different ways to understand how Europe matters in national 
contexts. Second, it aimed at exploring what ‘change’ as an outcome of the EU impact actually 
means in Turkey. In December 2004, when the European Council announced its decision to 
open accession talks with Turkey in a year’s time, it expressed its appreciation of the “decisive 
progress made by Turkey in its far-reaching reform process” and concluded that Turkey 
“sufficiently” met the demands of the Copenhagen criteria (EU Council, 2004). However, 
when we consider the EU impact on broadcasting policy in Turkey in the context of the 
policy issues analysed in this study, we can hardly identify “decisive progress” in the area of 
broadcasting. The issue at stake here is what do we conclude from the contradiction between 
what the EU said has been achieved and what had actually been achieved. Therefore, there are 
two sets of overarching questions that need to be linked to the final conclusions of the 
analysis presented in this study. Firstly, what does the EU influence on broadcasting policy-
making in Turkey tell us about the dynamics of Europeanisation in Turkey? In other words, 
what can we say about how Europe matters to Turkey in the light of the broadcasting policy 
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issues analysed here? And secondly, what does the EU impact on the issues broadcasting tell 
us about the future development of policy in Turkey?  
 
The Impact of Democratic Conditionality  
 
The key factor that underpinned Turkey-EU relations on the issues of broadcasting was 
‘conditionality’. However, as this study revealed, Turkey’s responses to EU conditionality was 
not unified across different issues of broadcasting policy. Its response to ‘democratic 
conditionality’ was directly influenced by prevailing ideas about ‘the credibility of the EU’ as 
well as calculations of the ‘costs of compliance’. By allowing broadcasts in languages other 
than Turkish, Turkey ‘accommodated’ the EU conditionality in its domestic political context, 
but a ‘paradigmatic change’ was not possible. The analysis of the policy process behind the 
change in the language of broadcast media revealed that the legacies of the past prejudiced the 
ways in which policy actors calculated the costs of fulfilling democratic conditionality on 
minority rights. This affected the policy outcome as well as the implementation of 
broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. Following Schimmelfening and Sedelmier 
(2004), we see that the EU democratic conditionality upset the ‘domestic equilibrium’ in which 
only non-Muslims were officially recognised as minorities in Turkey and ‘ethnic homogeneity’ 
was regarded as a core element of ‘Turkishness’. The dynamics between various actor 
constellations presented in this study demonstrated that anything more than what Radaelli 
(2003: 37) identified as “absorption”, which “indicates change as adaptation”, was actually not 
possible on the issues of minority rights in regard to broadcasting.  
 
According to the mechanisms of change discussed in this study, from a rationalist 
instititionalist perspective, change is seen as the outcome of the actions of the political actors 
who use EU driven process of change as a new opportunity structure to justify/pursue their 
own interests. These actors, who are assumed to follow a ‘logic of consequentialism’ (March 
and Olsen, 1998), will be successful in altering the way things are only if they can overcome 
the ‘veto points’ that oppose change and if they have the support of ‘formal institutions’ 
(Börzel and Risse, 2000). From 1999 to 2002, within the tripartite coalition government, it was 
mainly ANAP and to a lesser degree the DSP which were ready to bear the costs of EU 
democratic conditionality, but the veto points in the country were much more influential in 
steering the policy agenda. As the analysis of the case revealed, the two strongest veto points 
throughout were: the nationalist MHP and the army. Considering that the first was in the 
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coalition government at that time and the latter was regarded as one of the most trusted 
institutions in the country, it becomes very clear why the position occupied by the veto points 
within the political system should be seen as crucial in assessing their impact on the process 
and its outcome. This is exactly where issues of power and change are linked to one another. 
The literature on Europeanisation suggests that in domestic political contexts where power is 
diffused among different political actors, domestic consensus on how to handle the EU 
impact is very difficult to achieve (Börzel and Risse, 2004). As the case revealed, among 
different actors involved in the debate it was clearly the army that asserted its power more 
forcefully than others. The analysis of the case uncovered why, how and at which stages the 
army got involved in the process. For anyone who is familiar with politics in Turkey, the 
army’s interference in the process would not be surprising; however, the analysis of the 
process on allowing broadcasting in languages other than Turkish provided an additional 
perspective on the debate by revealing how other policy actors fine-tuned their perspectives 
on the issue by avoiding any conflict with the demands of the army. In relation to this, 
RTÜK’s approach to the issue and its involvement in the process explained a lot about its 
own policy competence and its lack of independence.  
 
At this point, it is also important to reflect on the second condition for change as suggested by 
rationalist intuitionalist perspective: the support of formal institutions. EU conditionality on 
broadcasting in languages other than Turkish could have been handled differently, if two core 
institutions related to broadcasting in Turkey contributed to the process positively: RTÜK as 
the regulator and the TRT as the public broadcaster. Neither of the two actively supported a 
change in the language policy of broadcast media. Their interactions with political actors 
throughout the process and their contributions to the debate were shaped according to their 
own calculations of the cost of compliance with EU conditionality. They both acted with the 
motive to minimise this cost for themselves. As the analysis of the case demonstrated, 
although the regulator RTÜK could have decided on the regulations concerning the 
implementation of policy by itself, it left all the issues to be concluded by political actors and 
by no means acted as a ‘policy entrepreneur’. The public broadcaster TRT even used its 
‘autonomy’ as the justification of its refusal to get involved. The analysis exhibited what 
motivated their behaviour and also how they calculated the costs of complying with the EU 
conditionality in their own institutional settings. Their behaviour confirmed some of the key 
postulations of sociological institutionalism. According to which actors follow a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1998) by incorporating what is proper and acceptable in 
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their interactions with others. Therefore, as Börzel and Risse (2000) suggest, these actors will 
respond positively to change, if they are persuaded by ‘change agents’ or ‘norm entrepreneurs’ 
and if they know that the costs of change will be shared by other actors involved in the 
process. However, throughout the process there was neither any efficient political leadership 
that would pursue RTÜK and the TRT to respond to change differently, nor a cost-sharing 
political culture. On the contrary, the conflict between different political actors was so severe 
that both the regulator and the public broadcaster chose to react on a defensive basis rather 
than becoming norm agents.  
 
The process behind different policy issues analysed in this study demonstrated how political 
actors in Turkey were in continuous conflict with each other throughout on how to handle 
EU driven political agenda. The ‘democratic accountability’ crisis in Turkey once again 
unfolded in the context of relations with the EU and the interactions of the domestic political 
actors were guided by mistrust rather than cooperation. This in turn directly affected the 
attitudes towards the EU in general and democratic conditionality in particular. Additionally, 
Grabbe’s (2004) emphasis on the negative impact of uncertainty built into the EU process also 
resonated in Turkey. This uncertainty and the inconsistencies of the EU in its approach to 
Turkey inevitably increased the tension between different political actors and societal groups. 
The EU’s approach to the Kurdish issue in Turkey validated the remark made by Ozalins 
(2003) on how promoting linguistic rights might not necessarily be the right way of conflict 
prevention in a targeted domestic context. Due to the conditionality factor attached to the 
opening of accession talks, Turkey had to change its policy on linguistic rights in the context 
of broadcasting, but since the core of the issue was very complex, conditionality did not prove 
to be as effective as intended. On the contrary, the EU’s credibility declined sharply and 
nationalist reactions against the EU heightened. This outcome was in line with 
Schimmelfening and Sedelmier’s (2004) observation on the ineffectiveness of a ‘rationalist 
model of conditionality’ where bargaining between the EU and the targeted country is 
assumed to motivate the candidate to comply with the EU standards. In this respect, although 
a social learning based model of conditionality suggested by the authors has the potential to be 
more effective in Turkey in the long term, factors required for a successful norm adaptation 
do not exist in Turkey. To put it differently, EU rules are not seen as legitimate in Turkey; 
there is a lack of identification with the EU community in general and finally the conflict 
between the domestic and the European norms is very complex. What was missing in the 
discussions on minority rights and broadcasting in Turkey in the context of EU conditionality 
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was a perspective on two core issues: ‘diversity’ and ‘pluralism’. All in all, minority language 
media are about communities and what kind of a cultural space they should occupy in a 
particular broadcasting ecology. Therefore, the quality of policy in this area very much 
depends on what extent issues on diversity and pluralism can be articulated during the policy 
process. However, where Turkey is concerned, these issues have never gained any significance 
in discussions on broadcasting anyway. Turkey might have handled EU conditionality on 
minority language media differently, if a new paradigm of cultural politics with a different 
terminology could be introduced. Neither the broadcasters (including the public broadcaster 
TRT) nor the regulator for broadcasting had the capacity to have such an influence on the 
process.  
 
Turkey’s response to EU democratic conditionality on minority rights in the context of 
broadcasting also unveiled a great power struggle between governments and the political elite 
in Turkey on how to conduct the EU driven policy agenda. The complexity of the interaction 
between different actor constellations in Turkey intensified particularly after the 2002 general 
election. The evidence in the former candidate countries of Central and East Europe suggests 
that, the EU dealt either with pro-reform governments (as in Hungary and Czech Republic) 
supported by pro-EU elites or with Eurosceptic governments (as in Romania and Slovakia) 
that are eventually replaced with pro-reform ones. However, since the 2002 general election, 
political volatility in Turkey unfolded at different levels. The AKP has proved itself to be a 
pro-EU government, but it was not successful in having the elite support due to its Islamist 
roots. Therefore, the democratisation debate in Turkey today overlaps with a battle over the 
centre of politics. In this respect, EU process is no longer about whether Turkey will carry on 
with its democratisation agenda or not, but it is mainly about what kind of a government will 
occupy the centre to carry on with the EU agenda. It is evident that both the nationalist right 
and left wings and the army want to evacuate the AKP from the centre, but the upcoming July 
2007 election will clarify the picture and it will be the public concluding on the future of the 
centre. At this stage, it is not possible to predict whether there will be a change in the ways in 
which issues related to cultural as well as minority rights and broadcasting in the context of 
EU related reforms are articulated.  
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The Impact of Acquis Conditionality  
 
As this study demonstrated, acquis conditionality had a different impact on broadcasting in 
Turkey when compared to democratic conditionality. The most significant difference was that 
the EU associated granting broadcasting rights in languages other than Turkish with the 
Copenhagen criteria and presented it as a prerequisite of starting accession talks. On the other 
hand, where the scope of acquis conditionality on broadcasting in Turkey is concerned, the 
significance of direct EU impact has been limited since the ‘misfits’ in broadcasting regulation 
in Turkey have not been linked to accession talks yet. Although this might sound like a 
technical detail, it is significant in assessing the dynamics of broadcasting policy-making within 
the time span covered in this study. What we have on the table for now is a range of ‘major’ 
discrepancies identified by the European Commission, which are mainly in the areas of: i) 
definitions; ii) jurisdiction; iii) freedom of reception; iv) alignment with the Television Without 
Frontiers Directive; v) independence of the regulatory authority; vi) limits on foreign capital, 
and finally vii) the independence of the public broadcaster. It seems that the scope of the EU 
influence on the regulation of broadcasting in Turkey will eventually increase.  
 
This is very important because it draws our attention to one of the major caveats about 
looking into the EU impact on a particular domestic context: “how to distinguish between 
Europeanization and endogenous processes, as well as with other exogenous pressures” 
(Grabbe, 2003: 311). The policy process behind the amendments to the Broadcasting Law first 
adopted in May 2001 and readopted a year later due to the President’s veto was significant 
since it revealed what happened in Turkey when endogenous and EU driven processes 
coincided. The amendments package was the outcome of the pressures of media proprietors 
in Turkey, particularly of the biggest tycoon Aydın Doğan, who have long been lobbying in 
political circles for the liberalisation of ownership regulations. This package was rebuffed by 
the then opposition parties in 1998 and it was the ANAP within the tripartite coalition 
government that brought it back to the parliamentary agenda in May 2001. In this respect, the 
beginning of the process was not linked to the EU agenda, but the amendments to the articles 
related to broadcasting standards; the composition and jurisdiction of the regulator; freedom 
of reception, and broadcast advertising inevitably linked the process to the EU agenda since 
these were the problematic areas identified by the European Commission.  
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The analysis of the process demonstrated that the outcome of the collision of endogenous 
processes with the EU imperatives results in regulatory chaos in Turkey. Firstly, some 
provisions of the Broadcasting Law (e.g., the composition of the governing board of the 
regulator) became less European than they were after they were amended. This change in 
negative direction, which is referred to as “retrenchment” by Radaelli (2004: 38) was an 
interesting outcome of the process. Secondly, the analysis also showed that the capacity of 
actors to make use of the EU to promote specific regulatory change depends on their 
expertise on that particular policy area. Paradoxically, although the hidden agenda behind the 
package was deregulatory and served the interests of the powerful media proprietors, the 
proposed change in the regulation of media ownership was actually the most suitable for 
anchoring an EU tie. The issue at stake here is not whether anchoring an EU tie is a sufficient 
condition for domestic change in a targeted policy area; it is clear that it is not. The real issue 
is about which policy issues are suitable for reframing in relation to the EU. Despite its 
problems, the proposal to replace traditional share-based approach in ownership regulation 
with an audience-share model was actually relevant for an EU driven reframing of the 
ownership debate in Turkey because this model has long been an issue of debate in the EU. 
However, since the amendment to Article 29 that introduced this model was later annulled by 
the Constitutional Court, we will never know what the broader implications of this model 
might have been on broadcasting in Turkey. The paradox is that although the existing 
limitations on ownership and the financial operations of the media proprietors are preserved, 
these limitations are still not applied; media proprietors continue to veil their real shares under 
nominal ownership and the media tycoon Aydin Dogan bids in state tenders. Moreover, 
Turkey now has foreign investors who penetrated the broadcasting market through nominal 
ownership. 
 
In relation to this final remark, among the policy processes analysed in this study, the case in 
which the EU tie proved to be ineffective in changing a particular area of broadcasting policy 
was the AKP government’s attempt to open the broadcasting market to foreign ownership. 
When compared to the policy process behind the amendments to the Broadcasting Law 
during the former tripartite coalition, the AKP government was clearly more successful in 
attaching the EU tie to its policy agenda. The time and the scope of the proposed policy 
change were both relevant to the EU debate. However, the AKP was not successful in 
removing the restrictions on foreign ownership in the broadcasting market in Turkey; its 
deregulatory and liberal agenda was rejected by the President and the CHP, the opposition 
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party. This outcome of the process is exactly where we need to link the conclusions of the 
analysis presented in this study to the broader questions on the impact of exogenous factors in 
Turkey that overlap with the EU driven process.  
 
The key exogenous factor that needs further consideration is clearly the driving force of 
globalisation. However, where Turkey is concerned, identifying the exact causal mechanism 
between the external forces of globalisation and the domestic policy responses in broadcasting 
is very difficult. Turkey’s interaction with the EU makes the picture more complex, because as 
this study revealed, ideas about Europeanisation and globalisation overlap in the presentation 
of broadcasting policy issues in Turkey. This is the point where we need to understand how 
the link between the increasing globalisation pressures and international regulatory 
competition operates in the Turkish context. This is particularly important because what we 
conclude from the AKP government’s policy initiative to open the broadcasting market to 
foreign investment under the EU conditionality cover is directly related to the conflict views 
in Turkey on how to handle globalisation driven pressures of deregulatory competition in 
Turkey. It is evident that Turkey’s EU accession prospect increased the exposure of 
broadcasting sector to global media players such as Rupert Murdoch and CanWest, but the 
accession process itself was effectively irrelevant because deregulatory pressures would have 
operated in the same way had there never been an EU accession factor. In this respect, 
although the AKP government advocated an opportunist policy response to the these 
pressures by attempting to open the Turkish broadcasting market to foreign ownership, 
attaching an EU tie to its policy agenda did not provide it a sufficient bargaining power to 
convince its opponents who wanted to keep broadcasting sheltered from international 
competition. However, where Turkey’s EU accession prospect is considered, this is a very 
problematic outcome because it suggests that Turkey has not been able to develop a robust 
understanding of the European Single Market. If accession talks continue, Turkey will have to 
open its markets, including the broadcasting market, to European players. Therefore, it is very 
important to reflect on whether Turkey sees the EU as an agent of globalisation that it wants 
to resist or a kind of a safeguard that will be essential in developing its individual response to 
globalisation jointly with other European states. Such a self-reflexive debate has not occurred 
in Turkey. The main reason for this lack of debate is simply because pooling sovereignty is 
predominantly seen as surrendering it by policy-makers. These contradictions result in a catch-
22 situation in Turkey which was very evident in the context of the process analysed in this 
study. 
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To conclude, the EU did not have any transformative impact on broadcasting policy-making 
in Turkey. The dominant approach to broadcasting policy is still characterised by a very 
politicised and conflictual policy-making style which reduces policy-making to a bargaining 
process. However, where the complexity of the accession politics is concerned, EU pre-
accession process necessitates the establishment of a problem-solving approach to politics 
where actors agree to share the costs of Europeanisation. The fragmented multiactor policy 
system in Turkey makes it very difficult to establish a consensual decision-making where 
existing policy issues can be reframed in the context of the interaction with the EU. 
Nevertheless, this is a very dynamic interaction and this research is limited to what it revealed 
about the early stages of pre-accession politics between Turkey and the EU on the issues of 
broadcasting policy-making. Although it was a deliberate choice to grasp this interaction in its 
complexity without reducing it to a testing of hypothesis, future research should look further 
into the dynamics of causality within this interaction by employing a more through approach 
of ‘process tracking’. Additionally, the conclusions of this research need to be reassessed in 
comparison with other research projects that deal with similar questions by looking at 
different areas of public policy. This is very important to reach a more reliable analytical 
account of the dynamics of Europeanisation in Turkey. 
 
However, the bottom line is that research in this area is immensely important as long as there 
is a process to look at in Turkey. The outcome of the July 2007 elections will be crucial in the 
shaping of the future debate. The political turmoil that the country is in at the moment makes 
is very difficult to conclude whether Turkey will pursue its EU membership aspiration or 
depart from the accession process. There is one thing for sure; the longer Turkey stays in this 
inward-looking and self-absorbed political mood, the further it will get from realising its EU 
membership aspiration. This does not mean that EU membership is a deus ex machina that will 
resolve all the issues in Turkey, but my personal view is that the pre-accession process is 
definitely worthy of living no matter how it concludes.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Broadcasts 
Law No. 3984 of 20 April 1994 as Amended by the Law No. 4756 on 21 May 
2002∗ 
 
KEY ARTICLES  
 
 
  
Broadcasting Standards 
Article 4.  
  
Radio, television and data broadcasts shall be conducted within a spirit of public service, in 
compliance with the supremacy of the law, the general principles of the Constitution, fundamental 
rights and freedom, national security and general moral values. The broadcasts shall be in Turkish 
language. However, it may also be broadcast for the purpose of teaching foreign languages, which may 
have contribution to the formation of universal culture and scientific works or transmitting music or 
news in those languages. 
  
Furthermore, there may be broadcasts in the different languages and dialects used traditionally 
by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. Such broadcasts shall not contradict the fundamental principles 
of the Turkish Republic enshrined in the Constitution and the indivisible integrity of the state with its 
territory and nation. The principles and procedures for these broadcasts and the supervision of these 
broadcasts shall be determined through a regulation to be issued by the Supreme Board. 
  
The broadcasting standards in radio, television and data broadcasts are as follows: 
  
a) Broadcasts shall not violate the existence and independence of the Turkish Republic, the 
territorial and national integrity of the State, the reforms and principles of Atatürk. 
 
b) Broadcasts shall not instigate the community to violence, terror, ethnical discrimination or shall 
not incite hate and hostility by making discrimination in the community in terms of the diversities 
of the social class, race, language, religion, sect and territory or shall not give rise to feelings of 
hatred in the community. 
 
c) Broadcasting shall not be exercised in a manner that serves to the unfair interests of 
broadcasting enterprises, shareholders and their relatives by blood or by marriage, up to and 
including those of third degree or of any other real or legal persons. 
 
d) Broadcasts shall not, in any manner, humiliate or insult people for their language, race, color, 
sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion, sect, and any such considerations. 
 
e) Broadcasts shall not violate the national and moral values of the community and Turkish family 
structure. 
 
f) The privacy of private life shall be respected. 
 
g) Broadcasts shall serve for the improvement of the general objectives and basic principles of the 
Turkish national education system and the national culture. 
 
h) Broadcasts shall use the Turkish language in its spoken form without destroying its 
characteristics and rules; shall ensure its development in the form of a modern cultural, educational 
and scientific language as a basic element of national unity and integrity. 
                                                 
∗
 Official translation, provided by the Radio Television Supreme Council. 
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i) Broadcasts shall not offend the personality of individuals beyond the limits of criticism, shall 
respect the right of reply and rectification; the news, which the investigation of their accuracy is 
possible within the framework of code of conduct of media, shall not be broadcast without proper 
investigation or without being sure of their truthfulness; the given information, provided that it be 
kept confident, shall not be broadcast unless there is a serious necessity for public interest. 
 
j) Broadcasts shall not serve to an unfair aim and interest and shall not lead to unfair competition, 
broadcasts qualified as proclamation and advertising shall be announced clearly without leading to 
any suspicion; a product promotion created by one agency with its own efforts shall not be 
broadcast by an other agency as if it belongs to itself; source of the news which are provided by 
agencies or another media source shall be indicated with particular importance, 
 
k) Broadcasts shall not present or declare no one as guilty unless there is a court decision; any 
programme item that leads people to commit a crime or raise the feeling of fear shall not be 
broadcast. 
 
l) Broadcasters shall respect the principles of impartiality, conformity and reliability in news 
programmes; broadcasts shall not prevent free formation of opinions; the secrecy of the source of 
information shall be preserved unless there is an intention for misleading the public. 
 
m) The advertisements which are deceptive, misleading or that would lead to unfair competition 
shall not be broadcast. 
 
n) The equality of opportunity shall be established among the political parties and democratic 
groups; the broadcasts shall not be biased or partial; the broadcasts shall not be violate the 
principles on the election bans which are determined at election times. 
 
o) Broadcasts shall not violate the rights of the right holders stipulated by law. 
 
p) Broadcasts shall not resort to contests or similar methods via information communication 
telephone lines, and no prizes shall be awarded to listeners or viewers or no mediation is provided 
for awarding prize; lotteries shall not be made, questionnaire and opinion polls via telephone shall 
be realised before the notary from the preparatory stage to announcement of the results. 
 
r) Broadcasts on subjects which includes information related or unrelated to the main programme, 
shall not be made via split-screen; continuous broadcasting by using frames or scrolling band 
technique shall not be done; scenes which are not related to the subject shall not be broadcast in 
news, scenes which show similarity with the content of the news should be identified as archive. 
 
s) All the items of the program services shall respect to human dignity and fundamental human 
rights. 
 
t) Broadcasts shall not be obscene. 
 
u) Broadcasts shall not encourage violence and discrimination against women, weak and minors. 
 
v) The broadcasts shall not encourage the use of violence or incite feelings of racial hatred, 
 
y) Broadcasts shall not reflect the fearful and intimidate features of crime organizations. 
 
z) Programmes, which could impair the physical, mental, and moral development of young people 
and children shall not be broadcast within the time intervals that they may be viewing. 
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Establishment 
Article 5.  The Radio and Television Supreme Council is established as an autonomous and impartial 
public legal person in order to regulate radio and television broadcasting services. 
  
Election of Supreme Council and Term of Office 
Article 6.   
Supreme Council is composed of nine members of which; 
  
a)    Five members to be elected by Turkish Grand National Assembly upon nomination of 
political party groups determined according to the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
Presidency Council formulation quota, (the enforcement of this sub-paragraph was 
suspended by the Constitutional Court on 12 June, 2002.) 
  
b)    Two members to be elected by Council of Ministers among 4 nominees of Higher 
Education General Board from non-members of the Board in electric-electronics, 
communication, culture/arts and print/audiovisual media fields, 
  
c)    One member to be elected by Council of Ministers from 2 candidates jointly to be 
nominated by two journalists association having the most numerous members with yellow 
press card and Press Council, 
  
d)   One member to be elected by Council of Ministers from 2 candidates to be nominated by 
National Security Council General Secretariat among civil servants, among persons who 
have at least four years of higher education, ten years of professional working experience 
in public and private organisations, sufficient professional knowledge and experience and 
qualification for being a state officer and are over the age of 30. 
  
  
Functions and Powers 
Article 8.  The functions and powers of the Supreme Council are: 
 
a) (This sub-paragraph was abrogated by the Law No.4756 on May 21, 2002.) 
  
b) In keeping with Article 16, to issue, commensurate with standards of impartiality and 
fairness, broadcasting permits and licenses to applicants who have complied with the prerequisites; to 
allocate  channels and frequency bands, with due respect to the use on a time sharing basis and in 
keeping with regional balances of at least 50 percent of the channels and frequency bands included in 
the national, regional and local frequency plans, excluding those channels and frequency bands used by 
the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation,  
 
c) Under the provisions of Radiocommunication Law No. 2813 of 5.4.1983, to issue 
establishing and operating permits to radio and television enterprises for transmitting facilities to cover 
broadcast service areas allocated to radio and television enterprises according to national frequency 
plans for national, regional and local broadcasts and to supervise the compliance of the facilities with 
the provisions of the Radiocommunication Law and with the prerequisites for such facilities,  
 
d) Under the provisions of this law, to issue licenses for the construction and operation of 
telecommunication facilities so that, in addition to the radio and television transmitters provided for in 
the national frequency plans and to the existing telecommunications network between stationary and 
mobile transmitting units, radio and television enterprises can establish radiolink stations for the 
purpose of linking up with satellites in order to relay  their national and local broadcasts, on condition 
that these are used solely for the objectives set forth, and to verify that these facilities are operated in 
keeping with the provisions of Radiocommunication Law No. 2813 of 5.4.1983, 
  
e) To encourage enterprises to extend their broadcasts to various regions of the country, while 
observing regional balances in the allocation of time sharing channels, 
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f) To specify and publicize, while bearing in mind the principles of the European Convention 
on Transfrontier Television , the prerequisites and standards to be fulfilled by public and private radio 
and television enterprises that intend to transmit from within the country in order to apply for 
broadcasting permits and licenses, 
  
g) To establish via relevant regulations the preconditions for allocating channels and frequency 
bands, the deadlines for recipients of allocations to start regular broadcasts, and the broadcasting 
permit and licence fees to be paid by operators of radio and television stations, 
 h) to verify the compliance of broadcasts with the provisions of Article 4 above and with 
international treaties to which Turkey is a Party by setting up monitoring systems for radio and 
television broadcasts, 
  
i) To decide on the relevant sanctions in cases of violation of the provisions of this Law or of 
the conditions for frequency allocation, 
  
j) To permit building of radio and television transmitters by local means in parts of national 
territory that cannot be reached by available transmissions. 
  
k) To ensure that broadcasts from or to national territory to be transmitted via satellite 
conform to national and international rules and standards, and to cooperate.to this end with competent 
authorities in other states , 
   
l) To formulate the rules to be applied to encoded broadcasts and to cable radio and television 
installations and broadcasts within the framework of this Law, taking care not to leave any surplus 
capacity in the cable radio and television facilities of the PTT Administration, 
  
m) To conduct or commission public opinion surveys in order to follow regularly the reaction, 
approval or sensibilities  of the public and to provide appropriate guidance  in relation to radio and 
television broadcasts, on condition that the functions and powers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
are preserved, 
  
n) On condition that the functions of the Directorate General of Radiocommunication and 
the functions and powers of the  Ministry of Foreign Affairs are preserved, to represent the State at 
organizations that have legal personality under international law, and are concerned with radio and 
television broadcasts, as well as fulfilling the representation function at international organizations 
concerned with radio and television broadcasts but without legal personality under international law; to 
sign duly the instruments formulated under this paragraph, 
  
o) To evaluate trends in public opinion by periodically consulting with institutions and 
agencies on radio and television broadcasts, 
  
p) To draft the regulations and other rules regarding its own work and activities in keeping 
with this law and the European Convention on Transfrontier Television. 
  
 
Financial Resources and the Budget 
Article 12.  
  
Financial Revenues of Supreme Council are as follows : 
  
a)    Television and radio frequency annual allocation fees from private radio and television 
enterprises. 
b)   Five percent share of annual gross advertising receipts of private radio and television 
enterprises. 
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c)   When needed, appropriations included under the section on transfers in the budget of 
Turkish Grand National Assembly Presidency. 
d)   Administrative fines imposed on the radio and television enterprises in accordance with 
the Article 33. 
  
Broadcasting permit and licence fees paid by the private radio and television enterprises shall 
be transferred to Treasury as revenue. 
  
Annually, the Supreme Council, when necessary, shall submit to the Presidency of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly the appropriation it requires from the National Assembly budget by 
scheduling its proceedings. 
  
Supreme Council’s budget and list of staff are reviewed with the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly’s Presidency’s budget in the Turkish Grand National Assembly Plan and Budget 
Commission and shall be debated and approved at the Plenary Session of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly. 
  
The remaining amount of the annual budget of the Radio and Television Supreme Council 
shall be transferred to an account opened at a public bank on behalf of Ministry of Culture with the 
aim of preserving and enlivening cultural and natural wealth at home and Turkish cultural entities 
abroad. The procedure and principles regarding expenditure on this account shall be determined by 
regulations. 
  
Radio and Television Supreme Council is not subject to the provisions of State Tender Law no 
2886. The procedure regarding the Supreme Council’s purchasing-selling, renting, transporting and 
other transactions shall be determined by a regulation. 
  
The Supreme Council shall request the Ministry of Finance to supervise the advertising 
revenue of radio and televisions together with the account of intermediary agencies. 
  
Relations with the Government 
Article 14. Relations of the government with the Supreme Council are conducted by the Prime 
Minister. 
  
The Power to Allocate Channels and Frequency Bands 
Article 16. On condition that other provisions of the Radiocommunication Law No. 2813 are 
observed, the power to allocate channels and frequency bands and to issue broadcasting permits and 
licences to public and all private radio and television enterprises, as well as the power to revoke such 
allocations and permits, lies exclusively with the Supreme Council. 
  
Allocation of Channels and Frequency Bands 
Article 17.  One-fourth of the channels and frequency bands in the national frequency plans are 
allotted to the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, the number of channels allotted not being 
less than three, and of frequency bands not less than four.  One of the channels is reserved for 
transmitting the activities of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Speaker of the Grand 
National Assembly shall decide which activities shall be transmitted to what extent. 
 Of the remaining national, regional and local channels and frequency bands, one-half shall be 
allocated on a full time basis, while the other half are allocated on a time sharing basis and, if necessary, 
by rotation. 
 The term of the allocation may not exceed five years. 
  
Obligations of Private Radio and Television Enterprises  
Article 18.  The enterprises to which the Supreme Council grants broadcasting permits are obliged to 
extend their coverage to at least 70 percent of the territory of Turkey and to broadcast at least eighty 
hours a week  by the end of the second year from the date of the permit at the latest. 
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Advertising 
Article 19.  All advertisements shall be fair and honest.  They shall not be misleading and shall not 
prejudice the interests of consumers; advertisements addressed to or using children shall avoid 
anything likely to harm their interests and shall have regard to their special susceptibilities. 
 The advertiser shall not interfere in any way with the content of programmes. 
 The amount of advertising shall not exceed 15 percent of the daily transmission time.  
However, this percentage may be increased to 20 percent to include forms of advertisements such as 
direct offers to the public for the sale, purchase or rental of products or for the provision of services, 
provided the amount of spot advertising does not exceed 15 percent.  The amount of spot advertising 
within a given one-hour period shall not exceed 20 percent. 
 Forms of advertisements such as direct offers to the public for the sale, purchase or rental of 
products or for the provision of services shall not exceed one hour per day. 
  
  
Form and Presentation of Advertisements 
Article 20.  Advertisements shall be clearly and easily distinguishable as such and recognisably separate 
from the other items of the programme service by optical and acoustic means; subliminal 
advertisements shall not be allowed. 
 Advertisements shall not feature, visually or orally, persons regularly presenting news and 
current affairs programs. 
  
Insertion of Programmes 
Article 21. Advertisements shall be inserted between programmes. Advertisements may also be 
inserted during programmes in such a way that the integrity and value of the programme and the rights 
of the rights holders are not prejudiced.   
 In programmes consisting of autonomous parts or in sports programmes or similarly 
structured events and performances comprising intervals, advertisements shall only be inserted 
between the parts or in the intervals. A period of at least twenty minutes should elapse between each 
successive advertising break. 
 The transmission of feature films and films made for television (excluding serials, 
entertainment programmes and documentaries), provided their duration is more than forty-five 
minutes, may be interrupted once at the end of each period of forty-five minutes. If a film lasts longer 
than forty-five minutes, it may be interrupted once for each additional period of twenty minutes after 
the first complete period of forty-five minutes. 
 Advertisements shall not be inserted in any broadcast of a religious service. News bulletins, 
current affairs programmes and children's programmes, when they are less than thirty minutes of 
duration, shall not be interrupted by advertisements. 
 Surreptitious advertising shall not be allowed in any broadcast. 
  
Advertising of Particular Products 
Article 22. Advertisements for alcoholic or tobacco products shall not be allowed. Advertisements for 
medicines and medical treatment which are only available on prescription shall not be allowed. 
Advertisements for other medicines and medical treatment shall be composed of elements that are 
honest, truthful and subject to verification, and shall comply with the requirements of protecting the 
individual from harm. 
  
Programme Sponsorship 
Article 23.  When a programme or series of programmes is sponsored in whole or in part, it shall 
clearly be identified as such by appropriate credits at the beginning and/or end of the programme. 
 The sponsors may not exert any influence on the content and scheduling of sponsored 
programmes in such a way as to affect the responsibility and editorial influence of the broadcaster. 
 Sponsored programmes shall not encourage references to products or services of the sponsor 
or a third party, or their purchase, sale or rental. 
 Programmes may not be sponsored by natural or legal persons who are concerned with the 
manufacture or sale of products or the provision of services, the advertising of which is prohibited by 
virtue of Article 22. 
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 Sponsorship of news and current affairs programmes shall not be allowed. 
  
 Responsibility of the Telecommunication Authority 
Article 24. (As amended by the Law No. 4756 on May 21, 2002.) 
  
In accordance with the Radio Communication  Law No.2813, authorization of making studies 
for the frequency plans for national, regional and local radio and television channels and frequency 
bands of  radio and television broadcasts in Turkey are under the responsibility of the 
Telecommunication Authority. 
  
Telecommunication Authority shall submit the national, regional and local plans which it shall 
prepare in co-operation with the Radio and Television Supreme Council, Turkish Radio and Television 
Corporation, General Directorate of Turkish Telecommunication Corporation and other relevant 
authorities and enterprises for the approval of Communication High Council in accordance with the 
Radio Communication Law No.2813. 
  
 Communication High Council may approve the plans as prepared or may ask for the necessary 
amendments. National, regional and local frequencies and channels shall be allocated with free of 
charge to the radios and televisions of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, Meteorology 
Radio broadcasting under the structure of General Directorate of Meteorological Affairs, Police Radio 
broadcasting under the structure of General Directorate of Security and local frequencies and channels 
shall be allocated with free of charge to the Communications Faculties which have radio and television 
departments.  The Supreme Council shall tender the remaining television channels and radio 
frequencies for the usage of private enterprises under a certain plan. The Communication High 
Council shall determine to what extent and according to which schedule radio and television 
frequencies are tendered and shall notify the Supreme Council for the tender within this framework. 
  
 Turkish Grand National Assembly activities are transmitted on TRT3, one of the television 
channels allocated to Turkish Radio and Television Corporation via TGNA TV, and open education 
broadcasts are transmitted on an other channel as well. The Presidency of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly shall decide to what extent the activities of the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall be 
broadcast in co-operation with the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation and authorities 
responsible for preparing the education programs shall decide for the open education broadcasts in co-
operation with the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation. Other matters related with the 
broadcasts shall be determined with a protocol between the Presidency of Turkish Grand National 
Assembly and Turkish Radio and Television Corporation. Any fee shall not be charged for open 
education and TGNA TV broadcasts. 
  
Telecommunication Authority shall apply the TV channel and radio frequency allocations for 
the enterprises notified by the Supreme Council which are granted broadcast permit and licence other 
than the cable medium and are allocated TV channel and radio frequency in accordance with the 
provisions of this Law and shall register them before the national and international authorities. 
  
 In a case where detrimental interferences occur on the national and international aviation and 
navigation systems caused by the radio and television systems, Telecommunication Authority shall 
temporarily switch off and seal the transmitters that cause the interference in order not to endanger the 
security of property and life, and the provision of article 391 of the Turkish Penal Code shall be 
implemented for the responsible persons. Activities done shall also be notified to Supreme Council. 
  
 Communication High Council shall undertake the follow-up of the duties delegated to the 
Supreme Council in addition to the coordination of the activities among the Supreme Council, Turkish 
Telecommunication Corporation and Turkish Radio and Television Corporation in accordance with 
the provision of Radiocommunication Law No.2813. 
  
Suspension of Broadcasts 
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Article 25.  With the exception of court orders, broadcasts shall not be subject to a priori control or 
suspension.  However, in cases of acute necessity for reasons of national security or of a strong 
possibility that public order may be disturbed, the Prime Minister or a minister designated by him may 
suspend a broadcast. 
 Radio and television enterprises are obliged to broadcast public announcements issued by the 
President of the Republic or the Government for reasons of national security, public order, public 
health or public morals. 
 Appeals against executive and administrative decisions taken under the above paragraphs may 
be made directly to the Council of State.  The Council of State shall give priority to handling and 
deciding these cases. It decides on appeals for a stay of execution within 48 hours. 
  
Retransmission  
Article 26. (As amended by the Law No. 4756 on May 21, 2002 and by the Law No.4771 on 9 
August, 2002.) 
  
The re-transmission of the broadcasts shall be allowed provided that it does not contradict 
with this Law. The principles and procedures relating to re-transmission shall be by a regulation to be 
issued by the Supreme Board. 
 The Supreme Council shall be informed about the retransmitted broadcasts. 
For the transmitted and retransmitted broadcasts, provision of Article 25 and 33 are reserved.   
  
 Establishment and Ownership 
Article 29.  
  
Conditions about share ratios and structure of the corporations which are granted or shall be 
granted radio and television broadcast permit are as follows.    
  
a) Political parties, associations, labour and employer unions, professional associations, co-
operatives, foundations, local governments and companies established or partially owned by local 
governments, commercial companies, unions, and organisations and enterprises dealing with 
investment, import, export, marketing and financial affairs shall not be granted radio and television 
broadcast permit; these enterprises could not be the partner of the enterprises which have granted 
radio and television broadcast permit.  
b) According to this Law, radio and television broadcast permit shall be only granted to the 
corporations, which are established for the purpose of radio and television broadcasting, 
communication, education, culture and art in accordance with the provisions of the Turkish Trade 
Law. A single corporation may establish only one radio and television enterprise.  
c) Shares of the private radio and television enterprises should be registered shares. These 
corporations may not enter into usufruct contracts on behalf of any individual. 
d) According to the annual average viewing measurements carried out in compliance with the 
regulation prepared by the Supreme Council, if a television or a radio enterprise’s average annual 
viewing or listening ratio exceeds 20 percent, then capital share of a real or legal person or a capital 
group in an enterprise shall not exceed 50 percent. Shares of blood relatives and relatives by marriage 
up to the third degree are also accounted in calculation of the shares of a real person. (the 
enforcement of this sub-paragraph was suspended by the Constitutional Court on 12 June, 
2002.) 
 
e) If annual average viewing and listening ratio of a radio or a television, where a real or a legal 
person or a capital group has a share of more than 50 percent, exceeds 20 percent, then they have to 
decrease their share in the capital below the 50 percent by selling or offering for sale to public within 
ninety days after the notification of the Supreme Council. If excess of the annual rating ratio occurs as 
a result of total number of shares in more than one radio and television, they shall sell appropriate 
number of companies in order to decrease that ratio down under 50 percent. In a case of violation of 
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this provision, broadcast permit of the enterprise shall be annulled. (the enforcement of this sub-
paragraph was suspended by the Constitutional Court on 12 June, 2002.) 
 
 f) National viewing ratios shall be determined by the Supreme Council for each calendar year 
and announced in January of the following relevant year.  
 g) Approval of the Supreme Council is required before applying for permission to the 
Securities Exchange Board under the provisions of Law No. 2499 in offering the shares of the private 
radio and television enterprises. 
h) The share of foreign capital in one private radio or television enterprise may not exceed 25 
percent of the capital paid up. 
  
ı) A real or legal person of foreign nationality holding shares in a certain radio or television 
enterprise may not become a shareholder in another private radio or television enterprise. 
  i) Citizen or alien shareholders may not, under any circumstances, hold preferred shares.  
j) The turnover shares of an incorporation to which broadcast permit has been granted, are 
informed in one month as of the date of turnover to the Supreme Council together with the 
information about name and surname of the shareholders, shareholding structure and share rates 
formed as a result of the turnover of the company. Before starting the procedures such as a turnover 
of companies to another company, purchase of a company by turnover or merging with a company, it 
is compulsory to make an application with necessary information and documents to the Supreme 
Council for permission. If any controversy to the provisions of this Law occurs in the formulation of 
the corporation structure as a result of these procedure, the controversy must be eliminated in a time 
period given by the Supreme Council. Otherwise, the broadcast permission shall be annulled.  
 k) Minimum administrative, financial, technical conditions and principles of broadcasting 
coverage, broadcasting hours and periods that has to be acquired by the corporations which are 
granted or shall be granted radio and television broadcast permit shall be determined every year by the 
Supreme Council. Corporations must arrange their structure to comply with the determined conditions 
within the given period. On the contrary, broadcasting permit shall be annulled.  
 l) Radio and television enterprises could not put contrary provisions to their main contracts 
after they are granted broadcast permit, and could not include actions that are not settled with the 
radio and television broadcasting within their operational area. 
  
 m) It is not allowed to allocate channel, frequency and cable capacity for the radio and 
television enterprises, which are broadcasting, to Turkey from abroad. The equivalents of commercials 
and advertisement given to these enterprises abroad by the enterprises taxable in Turkey may not be 
deducted from their tax assessments. However, the possibilities such as the sound synchronization in 
Turkish language of the foreign origin broadcasts transmitted from abroad and through satellite 
platform and cable system, the broadcasting in multi-language in a simultaneous manner and the 
broadcasting of commercials in Turkish language shall be allowed.  For the broadcasts in which the 
commercials in Turkish language are transmitted, the relevant directive of the Supreme Council is 
applied.  
  
Content of the program service and the use of new broadcasting techniques 
Article 31. (As amended by the Law No. 4756 on May 21, 2002.) 
  
Radio and television enterprises shall be obliged in their programming to give place in certain 
ratio and hours to the education, culture, Turkish folk and Turkish classical music programs. The rules 
relevant with the type and ratio of these programs shall be determined by the Supreme Council. 
Thematic channels shall be exempted from this obligation.  These channels shall not change their type 
of broadcasting without the consent of the Supreme Council. The rules and procedures relevant with 
thematic channels shall be determined by the Supreme Council.  
  
 The rules and procedures of the broadcasts and services transmitted in any communication 
environment and with any kind of technology shall be ascertained by the Supreme Council in the 
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framework of the strategy determined by the Communication High Board and shall be submitted by 
the Supreme Council to the Communication High Board for approval. The Supreme Council shall 
supervise the compliance of the broadcasts and services to the Law.   
  
Warning, Fine, Suspension and Revocation  
Article 33.  
  
The Supreme Council shall issue warnings to those private radio and television enterprises 
which fail to fulfill their obligations, violate the conditions of  the broadcasting permit, or transmit 
programmes that violate the broadcasting rules and other standards stipulated in this Law, or shall 
require them to apologize clearly during the same broadcasting spot. In case of not complying with this 
request or repetition of the violation, the transmission of the programme, which contains violation, 
shall be suspended between one to twelve times. Within this time period, the producer of the 
programme and its speaker, if there is any, shall not produce any other programme under any other 
names. Instead of the suspended programmes, the programmes on education, culture, traffic, women 
and children’s right, physical and moral development of adolescents, struggle against drugs and 
harmful habits, good use of Turkish language and environment training shall be broadcast during the 
same broadcasting period and without any advertisement.  
  
In case of the repetition of the violation following administrative fines; 
  
a) For national broadcasting enterprises, provided that it shall not be less than 125 billion TL, 
up to 250 billion TL in accordance with the gravity of the violation, 
  
b) For local, regional and cable broadcasting enterprises; 
  
1. To those which broadcast for the provinces and districts that have a population 
over 1.000.000, from the point of view of its broadcasting coverage, provided that it 
shall not be less than 60 billion TL, up to 100 billion TL in accordance with the 
gravity of the violation, 
  
2. To those which broadcast for the provinces and districts that have the population 
between 500.000 and 1.000.000, from the point of view of its broadcasting coverage, 
provided that it shall not be less than 30 billion TL, up to 60 billion TL in accordance 
with the gravity of the violation, 
  
3. To those which broadcast for the provinces and districts that have the population 
between 250.000 and 500.000, from the point of view of its broadcasting coverage, 
provided that it shall not be less than 20 billion TL, up to 40 billion TL in accordance 
with the gravity of the violation, 
  
4. To those which broadcasts for the provinces and districts that have the population 
less than 250.000, from the point of view of its broadcasting coverage, provided that it 
shall not be less than 5 milliard TL, up to 10 milliard TL in accordance with the 
gravity of the violation, 
  
c) For radio broadcasts, up to half of the amount stipulated above, shall be imposed. 
  
The fines in this Law shall be increased in accordance with the re-evaluation ratio announced 
by the Ministry of Finance every year. 
  
In case of the repetition of the violation during one year period beginning from the violation 
date, the administrative fines shall be increased 50 percent. In the event of the third repetition of the 
violation during one year period beginning from the violation date, the broadcasting permit may be 
suspended up to the period of one year in accordance with the gravity of the violation. 
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In case of violation of the broadcastings standards defined in the items (a), (b) and (c) of the 
second paragraph of Article 4, the broadcasting enterprise shall not be warned and its broadcasts shall 
be suspended for one month. In case of the repetition of the violation, the broadcast shall be 
suspended for an indefinite time period and the broadcasting license permit shall be revoked. 
  
The broadcasting licence of any enterprise, which forsakes any one of the conditions required 
for a broadcasting permit or which has fulfilled the conditions through fraudulent means shall be 
revoked.  
  
In case of violations except for the cases, which require warning, the defence of the concerned 
party shall be asked. 
  
The procedure of imposing penalties and way of public announcement with its explanatory 
report shall be determined by regulations. 
  
  
Responsibility of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation 
Article 35. This article was abrogated by the Law No.4756 on May 21, 2002.) 
  
 The Radio and Television High Council 
Article 36.  The provisions of Law No. 2954 on Turkish Radio and Television relating to the Radio 
and Television High Council cease to apply  upon the assumption of office by the Supreme Council; 
the function of the High Council is thus terminated.  The powers of the High Council with relation to 
the appointment of the Director General and Board of Directors of the Turkish Radio and Television 
Corporation are hereby transferred to the Supreme Council; the remaining powers of the High Council 
are transferred to the TRT Board of Directors. 
  
Competent Courts 
Article 39. The courts in Ankara are competent to hear any administrative lawsuits against the 
Supreme Council. 
  
The following articles has been added by the Law No. 4756 to the Law No 3984  
ADDITIONAL ARTICLE 1.- Private radio and television enterprises granted broadcast permit 
under this Law shall transmit their broadcasts, through television and radio frequencies allocated to 
them, from transmitter stations belong to the Turkish Radio Television Corporation or from 
transmitter stations operated under  the service and responsibility of the company which is jointly 
established for this purpose by the Turkish Radio Television Corporation with private broadcasting 
enterprises. Turkish Radio Television Corporation shall take into consideration also the needs of the 
private broadcasting enterprises during establishing, operating, renovating of transmitter stations and 
modification of these stations.  
  
 The Supreme Council shall supervise whether or not the operation of the stations, which are 
allowed to be established complies with the requirements foreseen in this Law or permission 
certificate. 
  
 The rules and procedure of making use of the transmitter stations of Turkish Radio Television 
Corporation by private radio and television enterprises and annual hiring fees shall be put into force by 
being determined by Turkish Radio Television Corporation with the approval of Supreme Council.  
  
ADDITIONAL ARTICLE 2.-  Apart from the exceptions specified in this Law, persons or owners 
and managers of enterprises which transmit radio and television broadcasts without the permission of 
the Supreme Council or despite the suspension or revocation of such a permit by the Supreme Council 
shall be punished by imprisonment of 6 months to 2 years and a fine of  one billion to ten billion 
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Turkish liras even if their activity constitutes another offence. Persons whose broadcasts were 
suspended or broadcasting permits were revoked by determining their broadcasts incite destructive and 
divisive actions against to the existence and independence of the Turkish Republic, the territorial and 
national integrity of the State, owners and managers of these enterprises and the persons who are in 
charge of these kind of broadcasts shall be punished under article 314 of the Turkish Penal Code. All 
transmission equipment shall also be confiscated under article 36 of the Turkish Penal Code. 
  
 Owners or managers of enterprises which fail to keep taped recordings of broadcasts and 
which fail to submit audio-visual tapes if and when asked by the Supreme Council or the Prosecutor 
shall be punished by heavy imprisonment of six months to one year and a heavy fine of one billion to 
ten billion Turkish liras. An additional penalty of suspending broadcast for one to three months shall 
also be imposed. In case of the tape sent is not the one requested in terms of content of view or in 
case of damaging, removing or erasing the tape, heavy imprisonment of two to ten years and a heavy 
fine of two billion to ten billion shall also be imposed additionally.  
  
 The fines mentioned in this article shall be increased in accordance with the re-evaluation ratio 
announced by the Ministry of Finance every year. 
  
 ADDITIONAL ARTICLE 3.-  Radio and television broadcasts, in compliance with the 
broadcasting rules and standards stipulated in this law; 
  
a)    National, regional and local broadcasts shall be monitored and evaluated by the Supreme 
Council. 
b)    The monitoring and recording of regional and local broadcasts of areas where the 
Supreme Council determines may be transferred to units assigned by The Ministry of 
Interior. In this case, the Supreme Council shall provide necessary technical equipment 
and training of relevant personnel and shall undertake the cost. Tapes of the broadcasts, 
which are suspected to violate the broadcasting standards and other principles stipulated 
in this Law, shall be sent to Supreme Council for evaluation. The co-operation between 
Ministry of Interior and the Supreme Council shall be organised with a protocol.    
  
In case the Telecommunication Authority has the ability to monitor the broadcasts under the 
framework of the National Monitoring Activities, this broadcasts shall be monitored by the 
Telecommunication Authority and shall be sent to the Supreme Council for evaluation within the 
framework of a protocol signed between the Supreme Council and Telecommunication Authority.
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APPENDIX 2 
Political Parties Contesting the 2002 General Election 
 
 
Name of the Political Party Abbreviation Year of 
Establishment 
Ideological Position Attitudes Towards the EU 
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 
(Republican People’s Party) 
CHP 1923 State Nationalist  
Turkey’s oldest political party. 
Presents itself as social-democratic 
Presents itself as pro-EU, but it 
has similar reservations with the 
army on issus as of national 
soverignity  
Demokratik Sol Parti 
(Democratic Left Party) 
DSP 1985 Social Democracy 
Was the leading party in the tripartite 
coalition from 1999-2002 
    Pro-EU 
Anavatan Partisi 
(Motherland Party) 
ANAP 1983 Neo-liberalism 
Was a partner of the tripartite 
coalition government from 1999-2002 
    Pro-EU 
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 
(Nationalist Movement Party) 
MHP 1969 Turkish Nationalist 
Was a partner of the tripartite 
coalition government from 1999-2002 
   Eurosceptic 
Very critical about the issues such 
as minority rights and foreign 
capital.  
Doğru Yol Partisi 
(True Path Party) 
DYP 1983 Conservative Secularism Pro-EU 
 
Saadet Partisi  
(Felicity Party) 
SP 2001 Islamist, conservative 
Established by the members of the 
Virtue Party (FP) following its closure 
in June 2001.   
Consisted of both pro-EU and 
Eurosceptic MPs.  
 
Its more liberal and pro-EU 
members later joined the AKP. 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi AKP 2001 Conservative Neo-liberalism Pro-EU 
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(Justice and Development Party) Comes from the ‘Reformist’ wing of 
the old Islamist Welfare Party that 
was banned from politics in 1998. 
 Constantly denies any association 
with its members’ earlier Islamist 
agendas 
 
Yeni Türkiye Partisi 
(New Turkey Party) 
YTP 2001 Social Democracy 
Established as a result of a leadership 
crisis in the DSP in the midst of the 
1999-2002 government term. 
It joined the CHP in 2004. 
Pro-EU 
Genç Parti 
(Young Party) 
GP 2002 Turkish Nationalism 
Its party leader was one of the biggest 
media tycoons before the group’s (the 
Uzan Group) assets were confiscated 
by the TMSF.  
Anti-EU 
Demokratik Halk Partisi 
(Democratic People’s Party) 
DEHAP 1997 Kurdish Nationalism 
Banned by the Constitutional Court 
Later established as the Democratic 
Society Party (DTP) 
Pro-EU 
Yurt Partisi  
(Homeland Party) 
YP 2002 Turkish Nationalism, conservative Eurosceptic 
Millet Partisi  
(Nation Party) 
NP 1992 Turkish Nationalism  
Büyük Birlik Partisi  
(Great Union Party) 
BBP 1993 Islamist-Turkish Nationalism, far-
right 
Anti-EU 
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Liberal Demokrat Parti  
(Liberal Democrat Party) 
LDP 1994 Liberalism 
Supports the neo-liberal legacy of 
Turgut Özal, the former leader of 
ANAP 
Lobbied for a united centre-right, but 
was not successful 
Pro-EU 
Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi 
(Independent Turkey Party) 
BTP 2001 Islamist-Turkish Nationalism Anti-EU 
Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi  
(Freedom and Solidarity Party) 
ÖDP 1996 Libertarian Socialist 
It constitutes a variety of left-wing 
groupings 
Pro-EU, but groupings in the 
party have different views on the 
management of the EU agenda 
Türkiye Komünist Partisi  
(Communist Party of Turkey) 
TKP 2001 Marxist-Leninist Communism 
It was first established as the Socialist 
Turkey Party in 1992 
Anti-EU 
Türkiye Đşçi Partisi  
(Workers Party of Turkey) 
ĐP 1961 National Socialist Anti-EU 
 
 
 
